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Foreword I
How to Encourage the Development of Natural Gas
as a Major Energy Source in China
Widespread development of natural gas is a textbook approach adopted by
developed countries and in emerging economies during optimisation and
updating of energy systems. It is also widely recognised as being a key
transitional route in the move towards future sustainable energy source
systems. From the perspective of China, whether or not to follow this general
pattern and the challenges, opportunities and policies required to achieve the
development of natural gas are issues of major concern to policy makers,
academics and the business world in general. In order to respond to these
questions, following from the previous instalment of the China Mid- to
Long-term Energy Development Strategic Joint Study, the State Council
Development Research Center and Shell organised a number of international
and local institutions to join forces in conducting further strategic research
into the development of natural gas in China. This has received extensive
support from both the Chinese and British governments, and on December 2,
2013, Premier Li Keqiang and Prime Minister David Cameron witnessed the
signing of bilateral cooperation documents in respect of this. After a year and
a half of research, the results of this research have been collated, and form the
basis for the following primary viewpoints and judgements.
Global Natural Gas Development Trends Against the Backdrop of the
Shale Natural Gas Revolution
1. There are plentiful global natural gas resources, and these will go on
to take a more significant role in future energy systems. There are
sufficient global natural gas resources to allow for an additional 200 years
of extraction, conventional natural gas and unconventional natural gas,
each accounting for about a half. There are 50 years of viable confirmed
reserves, while the rate at which further reserves are confirmed is greater
than the consumption. In the last 10 years, there has been 2.7% growth in
natural gas consumption, making it the fastest growing fossil energy type.
In 2014, natural gas accounted for 23.8% of global energy consumption,
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and it is predicted that by 2035 natural gas will have become the largest
global energy source.
2. Natural gas trade and pricing approaches will undergo major
changes, and there will be an increase in terms of the interconnect-
edness of the global natural gas market. The increase in importance of
LNG in addition to the rapid increase in the number of LNG exporting
and importing nations will increase the fluidity of the global natural gas
market. Natural gas pricing mechanisms will automatically adjust. Cur-
rently, the price of 43% of global wholesale natural gas is established by
market competition and is not pegged against oil prices. As both trade and
pricing models change, there will be an increase in the interconnectedness
of the three main regional markets of the Americas, Europe and Asia,
with the difference in prices shrinking, and developing towards
integration.
3. In the short term, there will be a large drop in natural gas prices, but
in the long term the price of imported natural gas in China will not be
excessively low. There has recently been a relaxation in terms of natural
gas supplies, with a large drop in natural gas prices, as the price of
Japanese LNG has dropped from $20/MMBtu in 2014 to the current price
of around $7. But in the long term, the price of natural gas when it arrives
at Chinese coastal regions from Australia, the United States and Canada,
the main newly developed sources of LNG, will not remain below the
$10/MMBtu level for long due to development, liquefaction and transport
costs being fairly high.
4. China’s share of the global natural gas market is gradually rising,
making it necessary to become more actively involved in the inter-
national natural gas market. In 2014, the share of global natural gas
consumption accounted for by China was less than 5%, but by 2030 this
will have grown to between 9% and 12%. There are abundant global
natural gas resources in China, and China also has fairly large natural gas
resources. Increases in natural gas consumption in China will not result in
a pronounced increase in the global market price. Apart from this, China
should not always be on the receiving end of fluctuations in the inter-
national natural gas price, and it should be possible for the nation to take a
more active role in the international natural gas market via trade and
investment.
Changes in the Mode of Supply of China’s Natural Gas in the Future
and Main Sources of Conflict
1. China’s economic development is entering a stage of a “new normal”,
with energy demand entering a stage of medium rate increases. The
rate at which China’s economy has been developing has already transi-
tioned from a high rate of growth towards a medium-high rate of growth.
There will be major changes in economic structures, with the tertiary
industry proportion growing while the secondary industry proportion
drops. A peak in steel, cement and other heavy/chemical industries will
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occur in the period surrounding the 13th Five-Year Plan. Energy demand
will revert from a high growth rate to a medium growth rate, while it is
predicted that by 2020 total energy consumption may reach 5 billion
tonnes of standard coal. Between 2016 and 2020, average annual growth
will be approximately 3%, while by 2030 it is possible that energy
consumption may have reached 5.7 billion tonnes of standard coal.
2. If appropriate policies are put in place, China’s natural gas demand
will still continue to grow relatively quickly. Development of the ser-
vice industry, expanding urbanisation and atmospheric pollution control
will drive continuous growth in natural gas consumption. Quantitative
analysis indicates that, under the current policy climate, natural gas
consumption will have reached 300 billion cubic metres by 2020,
reaching 450 billion cubic metres by 2030, respectively accounting for
8.0% and 11.0% of energy consumption. With enhanced environmental
measures and imposition of a carbon tax, natural gas consumption would
reach 350 billion cubic metres by 2020 and 580 billion cubic metres by
2030, respectively accounting for 10.8% and 15.4% of energy con-
sumption. This is a significant increase when compared to the 5.8%
proportion in 2014. Residential gas, natural gas heating, transport gas,
industrial gas and power generation gas will be fields in which a relatively
rapid rate of growth of natural gas use occurs.
3. There is significant potential in terms of natural gas supplies within
China, natural gas import capacity will increase by a large amount.
China actually has fairly plentiful natural gas resources. Based on Min-
istry of Land and Resources data, there are 40 trillion cubic metres of
accessible natural gas reserves (dynamic appraisal of national oil and gas
reserves in 2013), while there are 25 trillion cubic metres of shale natural
gas and 10 trillion cubic metres of coalbed methane. Annual detection of
new reserves is increasing rapidly, reaching 1.1 trillion cubic metres in
2014. However, extraction is both difficult and costly, requiring both
technical and institutional innovation, before potential resources can be
converted to actual output. Under the current institutional arrangements,
the natural gas output for 2020 and 2030 will be 230 billion cubic metres
and 380 billion cubic metres respectively, while shale natural gas will
account for 40 billion cubic metres and 80 billion cubic metres respec-
tively. If institutional systems were reformed, the 2020 and 2030 natural
gas output quantities would be 270 billion cubic metres and 470 billion
cubic metres respectively, shale natural gas accounting for 60 billion
cubic metres and 150 billion cubic metres respectively. In terms of
imports from abroad, pipeline gas import capacity will reach between 135
and 165 billion cubic metres by the end of 2020, with LNG imports
reaching approximately 65 billion cubic metres. If one then adds to that
the coal gasification output capacity currently planned for construction, in
2020, there will be a supply capability of between 415 billion and 495
billion cubic metres. By 2030, between 665 billion and 800 billion cubic
metres of supply capacity will exist.
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4. Pronounced changes will occur in supply and demand relationships,
requiring correct handling of the challenges faced in the development
of natural gas. From the above supply and demand analysis, supply and
demand of natural gas will begin to exhibit a wider balance over the next
5 to 10 years. Supply quantities will no longer be a major factor
restricting the development of natural gas. Low efficiency, high prices,
difficulties in transport and inflexible institutional arrangements will
gradually become more significant, while the main sources of conflict in
the development of the natural gas industry will undergo a transformation.
If appropriate adjustments are not immediately made to policy, the
momentum necessary to achieve a rapid rate of natural gas growth will be
lost and this will have an enduring effect on the development of the
natural gas industry.
Strategy for the Development of Natural Gas Over the Next 15 Years
1. Great efforts should be made towards developing natural gas, in
order to develop natural gas into becoming a major energy source.
Natural gas is clean, highly efficient and convenient. Regardless of
whether it is the issues of controlling atmospheric pollution or increasing
the efficiency of energy systems that concern us, or the need to provide
peak regulation that will be necessary with the future development of
renewable energy on a huge scale, each of these requires large-scale
development of natural gas. Natural gas presents effective investment
opportunities, due to its potential for massive growth allied with the fact
that there is no excess output capacity. If access to markets were relaxed,
there is the potential for annual investment of as much as CNY 400
billion, which would result in a 0.6% increase in GDP. It is safe to say
that expansion of effort in the development of natural gas, in order to
develop it into a major energy source, conforms to the general patterns
encountered in the evolution and updating of global energy systems and
the urgent needs for economic and social development encountered in
China.
2. Natural gas should be developed in a safe, highly efficient and sus-
tainable manner. By safe, we are really referring to two layers of safety
involving natural gas resource assurances and manufacturing and opera-
tions, as these are prerequisites for the development of the natural gas
industry. Increasing local supplies in addition to expanding the sources of
imported gas and increasing modes of import are both essential to this
process. At the same time, national natural gas network connections need
to be improved, which should be accompanied by construction of
multi-level natural gas storage in order to ensure stable operation. High
efficiency relates to increasing efficiency in natural gas exploration,
transport and usage, as this will form the foundation of the development
of natural gas in China. Sustainability relates to the balancing of eco-
logical and environmental needs that the development of natural gas
allows, this being a major aim of developing natural gas. At the same time
as extraction, delivery and usage occur, special attention needs to be paid
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to environmental protection and the sustainability of resource supplies.
Sustainability concepts must be applied to the design and planning of the
overall energy systems. In particular, this can be achieved by ensuring
that the external costs of environmental pollution are fully reflected, in
order to allow for the full adoption of natural gas.
3. Clarification of the strategic aims and pathways to be adopted in the
development of natural gas. The aim is that by 2020, the share of
primary energy consumption accounted for by natural gas should reach
10%, with consumption increasing to 350 billion cubic metres. By 2030,
the share of primary energy consumption accounted for by natural gas
should reach 15%, with consumption reaching 580 billion cubic metres.
The main pathways are: guiding and nurturing the natural gas con-
sumption market, accelerating the diversification of upstream natural gas
supplies, creating a safe, fair and transparent natural gas pipeline transport
and storage network, relying on technical innovation to improve the
technical standards of the industry, actively promoting natural gas pricing
reforms, and creating a modern natural gas market system and govern-
ment regulatory system.
Guiding and Nurturing the Natural Gas-consuming Market, Expanding
the Scope of Natural Gas Usage
1. Key to expanding the use of natural gas is improving its economic
competitiveness. Central heating, natural gas power generation and
industrial fuels have a low natural gas price tolerance and, under the
current pricing system, natural gas is not competitive. To increase natural
gas competitiveness would, first, require the internalisation of external
costs, the effects on the environment and health of energy use would
therefore need to be reflected, which would allow greater advantage to be
taken of natural gas environmental strengths. Second, natural gas usage
efficiency needs to be improved, an improvement in efficiency helping to
restrict the increasing costs of energy usage.
2. Increase environmental monitoring and improve energy usage effi-
ciency, with the replacement of dispersed coal usage. The replacement
of dispersed coal usage is one of the most important areas in which
natural gas should be developed. First, environmental monitoring would
be increased, with online coal boiler pollution and emissions reduction
detection systems, capable of real-time monitoring of waste gas emis-
sions. Second, more effort would be put into energy-saving upgrades,
improving energy usage efficiency, with the government providing a
certain amount of fiscal support. Third, in China’s eastern and central
regions, where there are major issues in terms of controlling atmospheric
pollution, no additional new coal-fired boilers should be permitted, with
gas use becoming obligatory. It is predicted that by 2030, the replacement
of dispersed coal usage would require 280 billion cubic metres of natural
gas.
Foreword I ix
3. Enhance planning and technical standards, accelerating the devel-
opment of gas use in transport. In transport, natural gas is capable of
replacing oil. It reduces emissions and has major significance in terms of
energy safety and environmental protection, apart from which it is both
economical and viable. The construction of gas filling stations and
infrastructure should be accelerated. Industry standards that encompass
the complete production chain should be created so as to adopt suitable
safety and regulatory standards. Full advantage should be taken of the
power of government purchasing to lead this development, increasing the
usage of natural gas-powered buses. It is predicted that by 2030, gas used
in transport will reach 75 billion cubic metres.
4. Improve pricing mechanisms, encouraging appropriate development
of gas power generation. Where base load generation is concerned,
natural gas does not present any advantages compared to coal. But natural
gas is well suited to peak regulation and integrated thermoelectric cool-
ing, both of which are essential aspects of power systems. First, there is a
need to establish peak and trough electricity and gas prices, which will
allow better usage of the peak regulation effect, thereby allowing low
price gas to be used to generate high-price electricity. Second, the loca-
lised manufacture of key technology needs to be achieved, which will
reduce equipment and maintenance costs. Third, the introduction of
environmental taxes is needed, accompanied by carbon trading, which
then allows advantage to be taken of the benefits natural gas power
generation presents in terms of being clean and environmentally friendly.
It is predicted that by 2030, peak regulation and base load generation will
account for between 60 and 70 billion cubic metres of natural gas, while
gas consumption for cogeneration and distributed type energy source
generation will be approximately 100 billion cubic metres.
5. Peak regulation, residential and chemical industry gas pricing,
reduction of cross-subsidising between different users. Residential use
gas and chemical industry gas have been priced below the cost of supply
for a long period of time, the subsidies for this having been borne by other
users. Residential use gas prices should be adjusted up to above the gas
supply cost, with most residential users being perfectly capable of with-
standing price increases, while special case social groups could be pro-
vided with subsidies. From the point of view of chemical industry users,
establishing market mechanisms such as peak and trough gas pricing and
interruptible gas pricing would still provide them with price discounts.
However, maintaining prices at less than the cost of supply in the long
term is not sustainable and there is a need to establish a timeframe for
bringing chemical industry gas prices into line.
Introduction of New Market Entities, Large-scale Increases in Natural
Gas Supplies
1. Introduction of new development modes to the fields of conventional
oil and gas. China has ample sources of gas, but key to supply is the issue
of institutional regulation. New development modes need to be introduced
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to the fields of conventional oil and gas. One of these is the relaxation of
market access, which would involve allowing state-owned energy com-
panies that already own shale natural gas rights, or overseas energy
companies already active in the oil and gas industry access to conven-
tional oil and gas mineral rights. The second would be adjustment of the
minimum prospecting investment: the minimum prospecting investment
should be increased by a factor of between three and five, which would
change the current phenomena of areas being occupied without any
prospecting taking place. The third would be the creation of confirmed
natural gas reserve trading mechanisms and a trading platform, which
would then allow the development of latent reserves by allowing the
circulation of mineral rights.
2. More extensive and bolder regulatory reform, establishing regional
trials in the fields of unconventional oil and gas. Not only does
unconventional gas require new technology, it has an even greater need
for institutional reform. It would be possible to establish a regional trial in
the Sichuan basin and surrounding areas, which would explore the fol-
lowing areas. First, regarding mineral rights management, resources other
than those currently under production by one of the three main oil
companies, or those which have been confirmed and where extraction
work is currently taking place, should be uniformly put out to tender.
Second, regarding market access, it should be provided not only to other
state-owned enterprises, but also to privately owned enterprises and
overseas businesses. With respect to foreign investors, independently
owned foreign enterprises that satisfy technical and environmental stan-
dards and that have passed state safety assessments should be allowed
access. Apart from this, new breakthroughs could be made in terms of
distribution of benefits accruing from such resources, reform of mixed
ownership structures and environmental monitoring.
3. Diversification of imported gas sources and importing modes. In
general terms, China’s natural gas imports are secure. Of greater impor-
tance is diversification in terms of sources of imports, entities involved,
contract durations and pricing mechanisms in order to spread risks out
more evenly. First, this would require increased LNG import from
Indonesia, Australia, North America and East Africa, which would allow
further diversification of the sources of imported gas. Second would be
the introduction of long-term, mid-term and short-term spot trading
contract portfolios, with pricing based on a combination of oil and typical
natural gas centre pricing indices. Third would be the introduction of new
purchasing entities, encouraging large-scale end users to buy natural gas
from the international market.
4. Development of natural gas trade and overseas investment from a
commercial perspective. Encourage overseas investment in natural gas,
including regional investment and investment in individual nations which
are major sources of gas imports. Investment should satisfy the strategic
direction of China’s policies, in addition to ensuring that such activity is
commercially profitable to the greatest extent, basing project cooperation
on economic considerations. Of course, expectations should be realistic
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where it comes to high-price contracts that have been signed in the past
and an approach should be sought to ensure that the historical costs
therein are shared by both commercial enterprises and the nation.
Enhanced Planning and Construction of Pipeline Networks and Gas
Storage Facilities, in Order to Ensure Interconnected Networks and Fair
Access
1. Accelerate the construction of basic infrastructure, to overcome
storage and transport bottlenecks. Efforts need to be made to ensure
that by 2020 the pipeline network extends to 150,000 km, with a gas
delivery capacity of 400 billion cubic metres. This should be extended to
250,000 km by 2030, and gas delivery capacity should exceed 690 billion
cubic metres, establishing the “western gas piped east, northern gas going
south, maritime gas reaching the land, supplies being based on whichever
is nearest” approach to supply. The working capacity of gas storage
facilities should reach between 35 and 40 billion cubic metres by 2020,
reaching 65 billion cubic metres by 2030. Large-scale gas storage banks
and LNG tanks capable of providing seasonal peak regulation, small-scale
LNG daily urban peak regulation tanks, CNG spherical tanks and asso-
ciated storage installations need to be constructed.
2. Planning and realisation of interconnected networks needs to be
enhanced. The interconnectedness of basic infrastructure is key to
ensuring the safety and stability of natural gas operations. The national
pipeline backbone requires interconnected junction stations and branch
lines, provincial pipeline network backbones connecting to distribution
hubs, thus allowing flexible distribution, with subterranean gas storage
and LNG receiving stations connecting to the state-owned long-distance
pipeline backbone, in conjunction with the creation of regional networks
based on adjacent provinces and cities. During the planning stage this will
require effective cooperation, which will allow connection between dif-
ferent networks; government departments will need to adopt a unified
approach to the construction of infrastructure, in addition to providing
back-up during both implementation and subsequent follow-up.
3. Introduction of societal capital, encouraging the diversification of
investment entities. Under the premise of a unified plan, involvement by
all types of capital in natural gas infrastructure investment should be
encouraged. The three main oil companies should open up construction
of the national pipeline backbone to outside investment, allowing the
entry of societal capital. The planned Western No. 4 line, the Western
No. 5 line, the new Guangdong–Zhejiang line and other such major
national natural gas backbone pipelines should be constructed as joint
ventures using societal capital. Removal of the monopoly of provincial
gas companies for the construction of provincial infrastructure, com-
pletely opening provincial branch pipeline construction rights to outside
investment, will allow companies that are appropriately qualified to take
part in construction and operation in a compliant manner.
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4. By clarifying and establishing functional roles and regulatory oper-
ations, it is possible to achieve the separation of pipeline service and
sales businesses and to allow third-party access. Promote the division
of pipeline services and sales businesses in terms of business operations,
finances and legal status. Regulate the scope of business operations,
costing rules, operational modes and openness of information. Introduce
third-party access to services as soon as possible. Ensure effective mon-
itoring of access contracts, service prices and service quality, in order to
ensure that operators provide non-discriminatory services.
5. Clarify responsibility for gas storage and improve pricing mecha-
nisms in order to ensure gas supply security. Implement a tiered gas
storage management regime. The state can be responsible for strategic
natural gas storage facilities, upstream natural gas companies can bear the
responsibility and duties of providing seasonal peak regulation and
emergency storage, and individual provincial gas companies can bear the
responsibilities and duties of providing daily and hourly peak regulation.
Implement peak and trough pricing for various types of users, in order to
encourage sensible consumption, finally acting to compensate for troughs
and peaks. Establish a real-time, sensitive advance warning emergency
response system.
Accelerate Development of Pricing Mechanism and Government Regu-
latory System Institutional Reforms, Creating a Modern Natural Gas
Market System
1. Optimise current pricing approaches, in order to resolve conflicting
pricing. First, the netback method needs to be implemented as soon as
possible. The reference oil price level and pricing conversion indices need
to be adjusted, as these should reflect changes in the cost price of alter-
native energy sources and should not be based on the previous price of
high cost gas imported by the three large oil companies. At the same time,
the pricing adjustment frequency needs to be changed, with the aim that
seasonal pricing adjustments should be introduced. Second, the transport
costs and prices applied to long-distance pipelines, branch pipelines,
provincial pipelines, municipal pipelines and distribution pipework
should be established in a scientific and appropriate manner. Greater
regulation should be applied to this, in order to ensure appropriate returns
on pipeline investment. Third, a revision of metering standards and val-
uation methods is necessary, with conversion from flow quantity-based or
mass-based pricing to calorific-based pricing. It will also be necessary to
accelerate elimination of inappropriate charging activities by local
government.
2. Encourage market-set natural gas prices, accelerating the creation of
natural gas trading centres. In locations where natural gas sources are
relatively diversified and there are fairly abundant supplies, such as
Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, remove regulation of the
provincial and municipal gate prices, the prices then being set directly by
upstream and downstream users. Encouraging the creation of regional
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trading centres would then accelerate the creation of Shanghai, Beijing,
Guangdong, Hubei and Xinjiang natural gas trading centres. Efforts
should be made to establish Shanghai as the international trade and
pricing centre. The creation of natural gas trading centres must commence
with the introduction of spot trading, at which point futures trading can
then be developed.
3. Improve overall energy regulation and establish a single, indepen-
dent, specialist regulatory system. Increase efforts to establish an overall
energy regulator, which will be responsible for establishing energy
strategy, planning and policy; it would also be responsible for adjust-
ments in the balance of total energy sources, thus ensuring energy
security, while regulating energy structures, being responsible for both
energy conservation and energy efficiency. This would also be respon-
sible for greater data collection and analysis, energy-related scientific and
technological innovation and international energy cooperation. Create a
unified energy regulator, which in addition to having environmental and
territorial resource regulatory functions would gradually implement reg-
ulation of the economic and social aspects of the complete energy pro-
duction chain, creating an independent, unified, specialist energy
regulatory body and a comprehensive regulatory system.
4. Deepen natural gas-related legislation, establishing a complete legal
system. Establish a comprehensive legal framework, centred on an “Oil
and Natural Gas Law”, which sets out natural gas-specific legislation.
One of the main objectives is to perfect resource ownership rights and
exploration and extraction contracts. Another is to apply production
safety and environmental subsidies, transnational investment, import and
export trade and other such legislation to the regulation of infrastructure
construction and operation, storage, sale and usage, safety and advance
warning and emergency response. The relationship between the Oil and
Natural Gas Pipeline Protection Law and other laws must be coordinated
according to legal interpretation.
The above topics have been formulated based on many different sug-
gestions after extensive discussion. It would be right to say that these topics
consist of an open, collaborative and inclusive study, with the members
of the various teams coming from many different institutions, with Chinese
representatives coming from the government, research institutes and state
energy companies as well as private enterprises. The achievements of this
project are based on the assimilated knowledge of all of these parties and
involve an ongoing knowledge-sharing process. In addition, when it came to
establishing the details pertinent to each area and the conclusions drawn, this
was achieved through constant discussions between a number of consultants
for each topic as well as being based on the suggestions of specialists in each
field, and involved field trips to Shanghai, Zhejiang, Sichuan and Chongqing
to properly assess each aspect of the production chain. During the course of
researching this project, the research teams submitted many different internal
reports, on topics including: negotiation of the China–Russia natural gas east
pipeline project; natural gas pricing reform; oil and gas storage; and shale
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natural gas development. They have also attracted comments from the State
Council on a number of occasions in relation to support for instigation of the
related reforms and policies. After the research into the topics in question was
complete, the main conclusions and a summary report were submitted to the
leaders of the State Council and attracted further comments and a positive
response. Of course, as open research, inaccuracies and oversights are dif-
ficult to avoid, and experts and friends are invited to kindly provide their
feedback and corrections where deemed appropriate.
Li Wei




Joining Hands in Dealing with the Challenges Presented
by Energy and the Climate
On behalf of Royal Dutch Shell, it has been an honour to work with the
Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council on China’s energy
evolution. In our previous joint research, we looked broadly at the country’s
energy system. In this project, we have focused on China’s gas development.
The aim was to provide insights to help shape China’s 13th Five-Year
Plan, and this meant facing a very tight timescale. The DRC and Shell teams
have risen to the challenge. The standard of work is high, especially seeing
the pace at which the teams had to work, and the results are very rich and
insightful.
The teams have worked together exceptionally well, with each side
contributing their own specific expertise. DRC brought a deep understanding
of China’s energy system and the development challenges to be addressed,
and this was complemented by Shell’s international experience and knowl-
edge of global gas markets, regulatory mechanisms and the drivers of gas
demand.
Why is gas important? One of the world’s toughest challenges is meeting
greater long-term demand for energy. According to the IEA, global demand
is expected to be 37% higher in 2040. Population growth, economic devel-
opment and the need to provide access to modern energy to more people are
critical factors in bolstering demand. China is no exception to these trends.
China will need all sources of energy to meet demand, including natural
gas. But this is only one part of the picture. Another is the role the energy
sector can play in building a sustainable future if it reduces the impact of
energy production and use on the environment. When burned for power, gas
produces around half the CO2 and one-tenth of the air pollutants that coal
does. Using more gas will therefore help address China’s environmental
challenges.
Natural gas is also flexible. A gas-fired plant takes less time to start and
stop than a coal-fired plant. This makes gas an ideal partner to intermittent
energy sources like wind and solar, which are increasingly crucial to the
future of the China’s energy system.
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The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) showed a clear will to diversify
China’s energy sources with a view to ensuring a cleaner, more sustainable
energy system. The promotion of natural gas was one of its key elements.
The 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) is expected to keep natural gas as a
priority in China’s energy planning.
This report offers insights on how best to increase the share of gas in the
energy mix while balancing the objectives of energy security, energy
affordability and the environment. The DRC and Shell worked hard together
to map out the different factors which drive the increasing share of gas in the
global energy system; and how to apply the insights to the local context to
determine the potential for gas in China. Globally, a key factor has been the
changing level and mix of economic activity in various countries, such as a
switch from industry to services. The move to natural gas from other energy
sources, in particular oil, was another key factor.
Another important element of this study was grappling with complex
economic and technical factors to develop credible outlooks for natural gas
production in China. The teams have considered many sources of gas,
including conventional gas, unconventional shale gas, coal bed methane and
synthetic natural gas production from coal.
This study was also aimed at building confidence that at expected levels of
gas imports, including both pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG), there is
sufficient diversity of supply that energy security will not be an issue for
China. Finally, the study looked at the international experiences of market
liberalisation and diversifying gas infrastructure and applied them to the
China context. This was done in a way which will benefit China but still
respects its important political principles and values.
The work has resulted in robust and pragmatic policy recommendations. It
includes supply-side measures to accelerate domestic gas production and
demand measures to promote gas usage in China. It also considers the
reforms needed in the midstream.
The DRC’s collaboration with Shell demonstrates how governments and
companies can collaborate effectively over energy and climate challenges,
and I believe other countries will be keen to learn from this.
The DRC and Shell have established and demonstrated the ability to work
together. I now look forward to further collaboration on topics where we can
combine Shell’s international energy market experience with DRC’s deep
understanding and thought leadership on China’s development.
Ben van Beurden
CEO, Royal Dutch Shell
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1General Summary
Natural gas is an efficient, easy to use fuel. There
are abundant resources, and advances in tech-
nology have brought increased supply and lower
costs. The golden age of natural gas has arrived,
and in the future it will play an even greater role
in the global energy system. In China, the
development of the natural gas industry must be
promoted as part of the optimisation of energy
resources to control atmospheric pollution while
meeting the energy needs for economic growth.
Efficient, safe and sustainable development of the
natural gas industry requires the rationalisation of
the structure of the industry, greater demand,
increased supply, improved safety, higher effi-
ciency and the creation of a modern natural gas
industrial system and government management
system. This will lead to natural gas becoming
one of the main energy sources in China.
1.1 Global Trends in the Natural
Gas Industry
1.1.1 Abundant Resources,
and a Greater Role
for Natural Gas
in the Future
According to International Energy Agency
(IEA) statistics, global current natural gas
resources stand at 751 trillion m3, and at the
present levels of production, these can be
exploited for more than 200 years. These
resources include 420 trillion m3 of conventional
gas reserves and 331 trillion m3 of unconven-
tional gas reserves, with the latter including
206 trillion m3 of shale natural gas, 76 tril-
lion m3 of tight natural gas and 47 trillion m3 of
coalbed methane. The proven reserves (resources
which can be extracted under current economic
and technological conditions) are estimated at
185.7 trillion m3 and can be exploited for more
than 50 years. Moreover, the new resources
discovered every year exceed consumption, and
natural gas resource to production ratio of 55.1 is
showing a steady upward trend. It is, therefore,
safe to conclude that in the future gas reserves
will remain abundant.
The importance of natural gas in the global
energy structure is growing all the time. The
global consumption of natural has grown by
approximately 2.7% between 2005 and 2014, the
fastest of any fossil fuel (BP 2014). Assuming
continued strong consumption growth in the
future, natural gas consumption may increase at
* This chapter was compiled by Jinzhao Wang and
Changwen Zhao, with important guidance and final
vetting provided by Wei Li, Shijin Liu, Junkuo Zhang,
Laiming Zhang, Guoqiang Long and Bin Yu from the
Development Research Center of the State Council. The
study group consultants and core experts provided
important suggestions for revision. International team
members and Chinese team members also offered
important contributions to the drafting of the report.
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approximately 2% per annum until 2030, and by
2035 it will become the largest primary energy
source (IEA, Current Policies Outlook). The total
supply and demand for natural gas is expected to
have grown from 3.1 trillion m3 in 2010 to
approximately 5 trillion in 2030 (Fig. 1.1).
Recently, due to factors such as sluggish
economic recovery, the low price of coal and
large subsidies received by the renewable energy
sources industry, the growth in the demand for
natural gas in developed countries such as the
EU, the USA and Japan has been limited.
Demand in non-OECD nations is much higher,
and is expected to continue to be so: in the period
up to 2030, non-OECD countries are expected to
account for 80% of the increase in global natural
gas consumption.
1.1.2 Changes to the Global Trade
and Pricing, and a More
Interconnected Market
Advances in liquefied natural gas (LNG) tech-
nology have greatly changed the global natural
gas trade, and the proportion of LNG in global
trade is gradually growing. In 2013, the volume
of the international gas trade stood at 1 tril-
lion m3, of which 320 billion (32%) was LNG
(IGU 2014). This share has grown and diversi-
fied dramatically over the last few decades. In
1990 there were eight LNG-exporting countries
and nine LNG-importing countries. The numbers
have now grown to approximately 30 and 20
respectively, and future estimates are that this
will continue to grow, creating a much more
liquid global market. There have also been
extensive changes in which nations export LNG.
Australia’s production capacity has been growing
rapidly, and recent investments into seven LNG
projects there will bring its total annual capacity
to 85 billion m3 (95 billion m3 if projects under
construction in neighbouring Papua New Guinea
are included). The success of the shale natural
gas industry in the USA has turned the country
into another potential exporter. The capacity of
LNG projects now under construction worldwide
is now estimated at 130 billion m3, and if these
projects become operational as planned, total
global annual production capacity of LNG is
expected to rise from 390 billion m3 in 2012 to
approximately 520 billion by 2017. Exports from
Australia, the United States and Canada are
expected to affect the global LNG trade structure
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2 1 General Summary
the most, and with this change come both ben-
efits and risks to China’s LNG imports.1
The pricing of natural gas has also been
changing. Formerly dominated by linkage to oil
price and by long-term supply agreements, now
there is a diversity of methods in modern markets
for setting the price for natural gas, and there is
also regional variation in prices.2 The 2014
report by International Gas Union (IGU) showed
that just 19% of natural gas was linked to oil
price (Fig. 1.2).
Changes in the natural gas trade and pricing
methods have increased the interconnectivity of
natural gas markets. Previously, gas markets
were regional—Europe, Asia and North America
were the three main regional markets, and the
was a large price differential between them,
caused by the regional differences in resources,
transportation methods and pricing methods.
North American prices were the lowest, followed
by Europe and then Asia. In extreme cases, Asian
prices were double those in Europe and quadru-
ple those in North America. With the changes in
trade and pricing mechanisms, the interaction
between the markets will strengthen, reducing
the price gap, and putting the global market on
the road to greater integration.
1.1.3 Falling Oil Prices and Their
Effect on Natural Gas
Markets—but no Great
in the Price of Imported
Gas in China in the
Medium to Long Term
International oil prices, which in June 2014 stood
at over 100 $/bbl (Brent), have more than halved,
and in October 2015 were below 50 $/bbl.
Where gas price is linked to oil price, this has
meant a substantial fall in gas price. In Japan,
LNG prices fell from 20 $/MMBtu in 2014 to the
current level of 7 $/MMBtu. Gas-importing
countries whose supply agreements are based
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Fig. 1.2 Evolution of global natural gas pricing mechanism. Note The width of the line increases with time; if a line
moves towards the corner of the triangle, this indicates a tendency towards that pricing method
1For Australia, the United States and Canada, LNG
development has an influence on Chinese imports. Further
discussion is provided in Sect. 8.3.
2Contracts linked to oil prices can also be competitive, but
it is fixed-price gas contracts that are generally more
competitive, and are able to more rapidly respond to
changes in the market.
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have also seen a fall in the cost of imports. As for
the gas supplier countries, the largest impact was
on current projects under construction, as many
of those had been launched with the expectation
of high oil prices, and the profitability of such
projects will have reduced, with some perhaps
becoming no longer profitable. Falling oil prices
have also greatly affected planned natural gas
projects in the long term. The total capacity of
projects where final investment decision has been
made is 30 billion m3, and for those at the
Front-End Engineering Design phase is 370 bil-
lion, while the capacity of projects at even earlier
phases has reached 500 billion (IGU 2014).
Falling oil prices have affected the investment
process for several of these projects. The final
investment decision has been postponed, for
example, for the Browse gas project in Australia
and for Canada’s Pacific Northwest Project. The
global fall in oil prices is caused adjustments in
natural gas markets. The falling oil prices have
resulted in natural gas supply being lower than
predicted, and this will, to a certain extent, pro-
vide a limit to how low international natural gas
prices can sustainably fall.
Causes of the Current Fall in Oil Prices
and Future Trends
The shale oil and gas revolution in the
United States has changed the global oil
and gas supply structure and changed the
international balance of power as regards
price control.
The breakthrough in the shale oil
industry stem originated in advances in
the US hydraulic fracturing technology,
and in 2011 the supply of natural gas
overtook demand, leading to a fall in
prices. The effects of the shale revolution
the made themselves felt in oil, and there
was a large increase in US oil output in
2011, with supply rising from 5.5 million
barrels per day to 9.3 million in 2014, an
increase of 3.8 million barrels per day in
just three years. This increase allowed the
United States to overtake the output of
both Iran and Iraq, the number two and
number three OPEC producers, the
equivalent of the United States having
become, in the space of three years, a
major OPEC nation.
More importantly, the shale oil and gas
revolution has changed the international
balance of power in price control. Previ-
ously, oil supply capacity and demand
were such that Saudi Arabia was able to
regulate market balance using its spare
capacity of 2–3 million barrels per day—
they were effectively able to set oil prices.
Currently US shale oil output is 4.2 million
barrels per day and production is able to
respond rapidly to higher market prices.
The result is a flattening of the global oil
supply curve and a reduction in the ability
for Saudi Arabia to use its capacity to
manage international oil prices.
The slowdown in Chinese demand has
also greatly affected the global demand for
oil. Demand in China grew by an average
of 6.5% per year between 2004 and 2013,
an annual increase of 500 million barrels
per day, accounting for 45% of the annual
global increase of 1.1 million barrels per
day. In some years the increase in demand
for oil in China exceeded 1 million barrels
per day, and the oil bull market of the past
10 years is to a certain extent attributable
to this rapid growth of Chinese demand.
However, recently there has been a slow-
down in the growth of China’s oil demand,
with growth falling to 3.7% or 0.39 million
barrels per day. In 2014, growth fell fur-
ther, to 2.3% or 0.22 million barrels per
day, slipping below the past 10-year aver-
age. The slowdown in the growth of the
Chinese economy might have become the
norm, and the situation of demand
exceeding supply caused by high-speed
Chinese economic growth might never
return.
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The medium- to long-term view is that the oil
prices may recover to 70–80 $/bbl, with the
average cost of US shale oil at 60–70 $/bbl. As
global demand gradually grows, it will absorb
the spare capacity we see now, and international
oil prices will again exceed the cost of supply of
shale and other unconventional oil.
Therefore, in the short and medium term,
natural gas supply will exceed demand.
Asian natural gas spot prices may slide to below
7–8 $/MMBtu. This can be an opportunity for
China to expand natural gas usage, provided
there is timely liberalisation of imports. In the
medium to long term, if there is to be increased
use of natural gas this will require improvements
in the efficiency of usage and a rationalised
pricing system. Also, the costs of natural gas
exploitation, liquefaction and transportation in
Australia, the United States and East Africa are
high, and, once delivered to Chinese ports, the
price is expected to exceed 10 $/MMBtu.
1.1.4 China’s Share of the Global
Natural Gas Market Is
Slowly Growing—China




In 2014, China’s consumption of natural gas
stood at 183 billion cubic metres—less than 5%
of the world’s total—but it is expected to rise
quickly in the future. According to several dif-
ferent development strategies, by 2030 China’s
consumption of natural gas will rise to 450–
570 billion m3 (9–12% of total global con-
sumption) and account for 15–25% of the global
increase in natural gas demand.
The increase in China’s natural gas con-
sumption is not expected to lead to a marked
increase in global prices. First, China has abun-
dant resources of natural gas, and domestic
production can cover part of the increase in
consumption. Second, global natural gas resour-
ces are plentiful. If China sends out a clear
demand signal to global markets, this can stim-
ulate upstream investment to expand future sup-
ply capacity, without having a significant impact
on global gas price. Third, ending the national
reliance on coal will cause Chinese coal prices to
fall, and, as China accounts for over 50% of
global coal consumption, this could have a
material impact on international coal prices.
Developing countries, more sensitive to eco-
nomic costs, may increase their coal consump-
tion and reduce their consumption of natural gas,
thus triggering a global crowding-out effect and,
to a certain extent, hedging against the rise in
price caused by the increase in Chinese demand.
Quantitative model analysis shows that active
measures to increase the consumption of national
gas would only lead to an approximately 4%
increase in international gas prices.
China must stop being a natural gas consumer
nation, passively accepting natural gas market
prices, and should, using trade and investment,
play an active role in the international natural gas
market. Chinese enterprises could play this role
via equity investment, joint development and
provision of technical services. By implementing
the ‘One Belt, One Road’ development strategy,
China will have an opportunity to establish an
in-depth partnership with major natural
gas-producing countries such as Russia, Turk-
menistan, Qatar and Iran. This is undoubtedly a
great opportunity for China to connect to the
global natural gas industry. Moreover, China can
actively move forward the core natural gas con-
struction projects, raising its status both in the
domestic market and in the East Asian market.
By 2030, the demand for natural gas from
developing countries, such as India, is expected
to enter a phase of explosive growth and China
would be able to be proactive, yet operate from a
position of security, in the face of global market
competition.
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1.2 China’s Natural Gas Supply
and Demand and Its Primary
Challenges
1.2.1 The Chinese Economy’s New
Normal
The characteristics of China’s new economic
normality are as follows. First, the speed of
economic growth has shifted from fast to med-
ium. According to forecasts, GDP growth during
the 13th Five-Year Plan period is expected to be
in the region of 6.66%, followed by 5.56%
between 2021 and 2025, and 4.64% in 2026–
2030. It is hoped that in 2020 GDP per capita
will reach $10,000 (using 2013 fixed prices and
basing the calculation on an annual appreciation
rate of yuan renminbi of 0.5%), rising to 20,000
in 2030. The second characteristic is the struc-
tural change in the Chinese economy. Currently
the Chinese economy is in the late stage of
industrialisation, which is expected to be com-
pleted by 2020. The industrial structure is
expected to change—the proportion of the ser-
vice industry in the economy is expected to rise
to 53.1% in 2020 and 61.2% in 2030, while the
contribution of secondary industry will shrink to
39.8% and 33.4%, respectively. In the industrial
sector, the contribution of heavy chemical
industry will decrease, with the demand for steel,
cement and other heavy chemical industry
peaking around the period of the 13th Five-Year
Plan. As far as energy is concerned, China’s
demand will go back to medium growth from fast
growth. Model predictions tell us that in 2020 the
total energy consumption will reach 5 billion
tons, a 3.4% average annual increase between
2010 and 2020, and in 2030 the energy con-
sumption will increase further to 5.7 billion tons.
1.2.2 Growth Natural Gas Demand
in China
Even though there has been a slowdown in
economic growth and energy demand, the
demand for natural gas will continue to increase
for a period of time in the future. The first reason
is the low contribution of natural gas to total
energy consumption. In 2014 Chinese con-
sumption of natural gas stood at 183 billion m3,
which, according to the latest statistics, accoun-
ted for 5.8% of total energy consumption that
year. Globally, that proportion stands at 23.8%,
with more than half of countries at 20–40%.
During the 30-year period between 1982 and
2012, the United States, Japan, Germany and the
United Kingdom saw the part played by natural
gas in their energy consumption grow from 23, 9,
12 and 27%, respectively, to 40, 33, 29 and 45%.
The same statistics for the emerging economies
of Turkey, Malaysia and Egypt show an increase
from 1, 2 and 9% to 41, 48 and 63% respectively,
a huge increase for both the developed and the
emerging economies.
The second reason is that the expansion of the
services industry, growing urbanisation and the
control of atmospheric pollution all spur on the
continuing growth of natural gas consumption.
The data for the developed countries shows that
for each 1% increase in the service industry there
is a corresponding 0.84% increase in the contri-
bution of natural gas to the total energy con-
sumption. One cause for such a close link
between the growth of the service industry and
the increase in natural gas consumption is that
the demand for high-quality energy sources rises
with economic development, and especially with
the growth of the services industry. The second
cause, and an important one, is the people’s
demand for clean air, a consequence of growing
urbanisation, accompanies the growth of the
services industry. The experience of developed
countries shows a close relationship between
natural gas consumption and fine particulate
atmospheric pollution—as the role of natural gas
in energy consumption rises, it is followed by a
large drop in the airborne concentration of fine
particles.
We have carried out a quantitative scenario
analysis on the future demand for natural gas.
The results of the analysis are as follows. Under
the “business as usual” scenario, in 2015 the
demand for natural gas approaches 200 bil-
lion m3. In 2020 it will break the 300 billion m3
barrier, and in 2030 it will exceed
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450 billion m3. The fastest growth is expected to
occur in residential usage: gas, heating, transport
and electricity generation. Despite the predicted
fast growth in natural gas consumption under the
“business as usual” scenario, the targets for nat-
ural gas industry development stipulated in the
12th Five-Year Plan and the Medium- to
Long-Term Energy Resources Development
Strategy will not be met. This clearly illustrates
that, in order to meet these targets, more effective
policies must be adopted to further boost the
growth of the demand for natural gas.
Using model testing we have concluded that
the most effective economic measures are the
strengthening of environmental regulation and
the setting of carbon prices by introducing car-
bon trading and carbon tax. Under the conditions
of stronger environmental regulation and carbon
pricing, the Chinese demand for natural gas may
indeed reach the 12th Five-Year Plan targets of
consumption of 350 billion m3 by 2020 and
580 billion by 2030. These policies will lead to
the proportions of natural gas in national energy
consumption of 10.8 and 15.4% respectively, a
large increase on the 2014 figure of 5.8%
(Fig. 1.3).
Under the policy scenario, the areas where the
increase in natural gas consumption is expected
to be the fastest are those sensitive to changes in
the coal prices and in the environmental costs.
These include gas heating, gas electricity gener-
ation and transport. Compared with the “business
as usual” scenario, in 2030 the consumption of
natural gas for electricity generation will rise to
45 billion m3. Gas heating is another area with
great demand potential, which is also very sen-
sitive to cost changes, and under the policy sce-
nario, the consumption of natural gas for heating
is expected to rise to 30 billion m3. For the other
areas, such as the residential use of gas, the
changes in demand are relatively small
(Table 1.1).




The statistics tell us that China is rich in coal,
lacks oil and is poor in natural gas—but in fact
China has rather abundant natural gas resources.







































































Fig. 1.3 Natural gas demand volume and its role in energy consumption under the different scenarios
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According to Ministry of Land and Resources oil
and gas data for 2013, China’s conventional gas
resources stand at 68 trillion m3, of which
40 trillion m3 are recoverable. China also pos-
sesses extensive unconventional gas resources,
comparable in size with its conventional resour-
ces—25 trillion m3 of recoverable shale natural
gas and 11 trillion m3 of recoverable coalbed
methane. As for newly discovered proven
resources, in 1986–1990 less than 40 billion m3
of natural gas deposits were confirmed, in 1991–
1995 this figure rose to almost 100–150 bil-
lion m3 in 1996–2000, to 300 billion m3 in
2001–2005, to 320 billion m3 in 2006–2010, and
in the three-year period between 2011 and 2013
the proven geological reserves exceeded
600 billion m3, reaching the 1.1 trillion m3 mark
in 2014. The volume of the recoverable newly
confirmed reserves exceeds 500 billion m3, and,
based on the data from the previous years, we
can expect proven resources to continue to grow
in the future. China’s production of conventional
natural gas billion cubic metres in 2014 was
128 billion m3 with, in addition, 2.6 billion m3
of coal seam gas and 1.3 billion m3 of shale
natural gas.
China might possess abundant natural gas
resources, but even so, natural gas extraction in
China is very difficult and the costs high. One
third of all the recoverable natural gas in China is
tight natural gas, deemed to be an unconven-
tional resource outside China, and its extraction
is more difficult and expensive than that of the
common natural gas. Many of the conventional
gas deposits in China lie very deep, are rich in
sulphur and have high extraction costs. China has
very rich shale natural gas resources, but, apart
from few locations such as Fuelling in Chongq-
ing, most of the deposits of shale natural gas are
situated at great depth with difficult surface
conditions, and the exploration and exploitation
costs are thus higher than in the United States.
Innovation, both in technology and in organisa-
tion, is needed to exploit the full potential of
these resources.
Analysis has shown that, with things organ-
ised as they currently are, by 2020 conventional
gas output may reach 180 billion m3, shale nat-
ural gas 40 billion m3 and coal seam gas
10 billion m3, bringing total natural gas output to
230 billion m3. In 2030, conventional natural gas
output will rise to 260 billion m3. The total
output of shale natural gas is expected to rise to
80 billion m3, as the output from Southern
Sichuan and East Sichuan’s Longmaxi shale
formations is expected to increase, and output
breakthroughs are expected at other shale natural
gas fields. Rough estimates predict that the out-
put of coal seam gas will reach 40 billion m3,
with coal seam gas contributing 20 billion m3,
Table 1.1 Natural gas consumption under the different scenarios
Business as usual scenario Policy scenario
2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Extractive industry 151 169 138 115 150 188 161 141
Petroleum processing and coking
industry
143 216 286 356 144 228 304 384
Non-metal mineral industry 132 179 179 180 137 236 251 265
Metallurgical industry 79 101 97 98 82 138 140 148
Natural gas power generation 249 499 766 1120 257 673 1057 1574
Natural gas heating 57 252 415 589 59 349 601 887
Transport 269 435 623 787 268 446 652 842
Chemical industry 316 402 420 456 314 396 415 454
Other industries 168 177 205 233 176 246 287 326
Residential 405 576 683 742 397 548 662 734
Total 1968 3005 3811 4678 1985 3447 4531 5756
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and coal bed tight natural gas and shale natural
gas another 20 billion m3. The total gas output in
China will thus reach 380 billion m3. If an
organisational reform is carried out, more players
are attracted to open up and exploit the resource,
and further technological breakthroughs are
achieved, then in 2020 the output of shale natural
gas could reach 60 billion m3, coal seam gas
15 billion m3, and coal bed tight gas and shale
natural gas 15 billion m3, bringing the total to
270 billion m3. By 2030, conventional gas out-
put could rise to 280 billion m3. An output of
150 billion m3 of shale natural gas can be
achieved by 2030 if the new system used in
Southern and East Sichuan production proves to
be effective, and is used successfully at other
shale formations. Rough estimates predict the
coal seam gas output to reach 40 billion m3, thus
pushing the total natural gas output to 470 bil-
lion m3. Moreover, the coal gas industry can also
grow, and may reach production capacity of
30 billion m3 by 2020 and 50 billion by 2030.
The methane hydrate industry is expected to
remain at the research and development and
experimental and demonstration stages in 2030,
as large-scale commercialisation of this energy
source remains very difficult.
Turning to consider imports from overseas,
China’s import capacity is undergoing rapid
growth. Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline
Lines A, B and C are already operational, with
total capacity of 55 billion m3/year. The capacity
of Line D of the same pipeline is 30 bil-
lion m3/year and this is estimated to become
operational in 2016. The Myanmar–China Pipe-
line became operational in 2013 and has a
capacity of 12 billion m3/year. The contracts
have been signed for the construction of China–
Russia East Route pipeline, which is estimated to
start operations around 2018, and have capacity
of up to 38 billion m3/year. The Memorandum
of Understanding was signed in November 2014
for the western China–Russia pipeline route,
planned to start operations before the year 2020,
and its capacity is expected to reach 30–60 bil-
lion m3/year. In total, by 2020 China’s import
capacity via pipelines will reach approximately
100 billion m3/year, rising to 135–165 billion
m3 by 2030.
As far as LNG imports are concerned, according
to the already signed contracts, including sales and
purchase contracts, letters of intent and memoran-
dums of understanding, the import volumewill rise
from the current 25 billion m3 to approximately
57 billion in 2020. The Australian contribution to
LNG imports will increase greatly, from the current
5 billion m3 to approximately 25 billion in 2015.
Other major contributors to this import growth are
Canada (8 billion m3), Russia (4 billion m3),
Papua New Guinea (3 billion m3) and other third
parties (9 billion m3). Regarding LNG terminal
construction, the capacity of China’s LNG termi-
nals may reach 85–225 billion m3/year, greatly
surpassing the expected future volume of LNG
imports. Based on these facts, and considering the
long-term LNG and pipeline contracts that China
has already signed, in the coming fewyears China’s
capacity for natural gas imports is expected to grow
quickly, from 53 billion m3 in 2013 to over
160 billion m3 in 2020 and is expected to reach
210–240 billion m3 in 2030.
If both domestic supply and imports are added
up, the estimation is that the total supply capacity
will reach 425–495 billion m3 by 2020, rising to
640–800 billion m3 in 2030. It is important to
make it clear that these capacities can only be
reached if breakthroughs are made in the devel-
opment of the domestic natural gas, and espe-
cially non-conventional gas, resources, and if the
international contracts are fulfilled. The annual
capacity and import capacity depend on growing
demand, opening up of domestic resources,
progress made in the construction of international
projects, and changes in the domestic and the
international supply prices.
1.2.4 Key Problems Facing
the Development
of the Natural Gas
Industry
The past 10 years saw a rapid growth of natural
gas demand, with demand exceeding supply, but
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in the coming five to ten years the situation is
expected to be different. As domestic output
grows and import capacity increases, the supply
and demand for natural gas will have reached a
broad general equilibrium. According to model
analysis, even under the scenario of strengthened
environmental regulation and levying of carbon
tax, the demand for natural gas will reach
approximately 350 billion m3 in 2020 and
580 billion in 2030, but the supply capacity will
exceed 400 and 600 billion m3 in the same years.
Supply is no longer the key factor in inhibiting
the growth of natural gas industry, as the prob-
lems facing the industry have changed greatly.
The increase in natural gas consumption that we
saw over the past few years has slowed down
greatly, and the current problems that have
gradually emerged are low efficiency, high pri-
ces, problematic transportation and organisa-
tional inflexibility. The key problems at all the
links in the industrial chain—resource extraction,
transportation, sale and usage—must be system-
atically identified understood and addressed.
First, the environmental benefits and the
economic value of natural gas must be realised in
order to boost its consumption. Natural gas is an
ideal substitute for other fuels—it is a clean,
environmentally friendly, efficient and easily
regulated energy source. However, the problem
when comparing it with coal is its persistently
higher price. Burning of natural gas does not
produce SO2 and soot, but this environmental
benefit is not factored into the cost equation.
When used in electricity generation, natural gas
has a great advantage—its capacity for regulation
and response—but its potential to be used for
peak shaving has not yet been exploited either.
The thermal efficiency of natural gas when used
for CCHP generation is twice that of coal, but we
are having difficulties realising this potential to
save energy and reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Failure to externalise the economic and
environmental benefits of using natural gas will
make the maintenance of the previously fast
consumption growth problematic. Now that total
Chinese resource consumption has entered a
medium growth period of 3–4% per annum, an
increase in the natural gas consumption cannot
come solely from the demand for new energy
sources, but must also, to a great extent, come
from coal and oil substitution. Currently, the
surplus production of coal in China is extremely
severe, with prices at their historical minimum,
and, if we cannot exploit the environmental and
economic benefits of natural gas, it will have
difficulties competing with coal and the slow-
down of its consumption growth will continue.
Second, we can, using a rational price,
achieve a sufficiently stable supply. According to
our modelling, compared to current levels, by the
years 2020 and 2030 China’s consumption of
natural gas will double and treble respectively.
Failure of domestic production to keep up will
lead to gas imports quickly rising to over 50%,
and supply security issues will then impede the
sustainable development of China’s natural gas
industry. In addition to the protection of natural
resources, price levels and market stability are
also critical. Currently, the upstream exploration
and exploitation of national resources are not
competitive with imports. This results in irra-
tional resource allocation and rapidly rising
upstream natural gas costs. The price in the
contracts signed recently is relatively high. There
is an objective reason for this—currently demand
is higher than supply on the international natural
gas market—but another reason is the misplaced
belief by the three largest players in the oil
industry that their market superiority allows them
to pass the high price downstream. Allowing the
upstream costs of natural gas to grow further may
result in exceeding the potential for end user
switching and thus running the risk of making
natural gas unsellable at this high price.
Third, we must achieve safe, fair and trans-
parent interoperability of natural gas transmis-
sion and distribution. In recent years China’s
natural gas pipeline network has grown greatly
and the construction of the unified pipeline net-
work framework is already at preliminary stage.
The length of the network stands at 80,000 km,
three times the figure for 2004. However, taking
the medium- to long-term view of natural gas
consumption and demand, the transmission and
distribution capacity of the network are far from
sufficient, and we need to mobilise and apply the
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capacity of all forces for its development,
investment and construction. Looking at the
market structure, there is a lack of overall plan-
ning, pipeline transmission and sales services are
bundled together and there is a severe problem of
market monopolisation. There are also a whole
series of problems, from insufficient branch lines
and peak storage facilities to pipeline network
operational safety.
Fourth, we must standardise markets and
pricing. Pricing mechanisms are key if we want
to co-ordinate the benefits which extend down,
up and mid-stream on the industrial chain, and
they will have direct relationship with healthy
sustainable economic development in China.
There is currently a great deal of government
intervention in price setting in China, and with
the pricing management arrangements as they
stand, the government is over-regulating in some
areas, while other areas are left completely dis-
regarded. Currently, in pricing, the net present
value method is being gradually replaced by the
“cost plus” method, but the situation still exists
when only the upstream urban gate price can be
set, without a way to solve the problem of dis-
connecting oil and gas prices. The midstream
pipeline transmission services are bundled with
terminal sale services, there is a lack of stan-
dardised fees for pipeline transmission and, due
to lack of supervision, provincial and
metropolitan networks artificially inflate their
prices. The downstream sales market is monop-
olised by local gas companies, and also there is a
cross-subsidy issue between industrial clients and
private residential users. The inverted situation
has arisen, where the price for industrial clients is
higher than that for private individuals, which
absurdly contradicts the international principle of
large customers enjoying lower prices. This is
also detrimental to coal substitution and envi-
ronmental protection.
Fifth, a modern natural gas industrial system
and government regulatory mechanism must be
formed. A reconstruction of Chinese natural gas
industry setup and market management system
must be carried out in order to support and
benefit the growth of Chinese natural gas market.
Looking at the market situation, it is clear that the
market is currently dominated by single large
players—state-owned enterprises. No matter
where you look, at the ownership of resources or
the pipeline construction and operation, the
market share of the three large oil companies
exceeds 90%, with the share of PetroChina alone
at over 70%. There is currently virtually no
market competition in the industry and there is
no sign of rising efficiency. It will, therefore, be
extremely difficult to sustain the predicted future
output of 580 billion m3. In the past, the gov-
ernment relied primarily on administrative com-
mand when it came to managing the natural gas
industry, which is not suited to a diversified,
competitive and flexible industrial system. We
must gradually explore the transition from the
“full control” to the “standardised regulation”
method, set clear regulation content and
methodology, and assess its cost and feasibility.
1.3 China’s Natural Gas Industry
Development Strategy
for the Next 15 Years
1.3.1 National Strategy and Policy
Are Crucial for Natural
Gas Industry
Development in China
We have developed two scenarios for the future
development of China’s natural gas industry.
According to the “business as usual” scenario,
influenced by expensive natural gas, cheap coal
and oil and weak environmental policies, the
growth of the demand for natural gas will slow
down, and natural gas will remain a niche energy
source. In the event of there being no break-
throughs in non-conventional gas sectors such as
shale and coal seam gas, growth in supply will
also slow. With natural gas being currently
widely available on the international market,
imports into China will rise rapidly, but volatility
in international markets will start raising prob-
lems of supply security. Without extensive
restructuring of natural gas production and
management systems, the industry will lack
dynamism, have low operational efficiency and,
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as the price for both imported and domestically
produced gas remains relatively high, growth in
the natural gas market will be restricted, and the
entire development of the natural gas industry in
China will enter a bottleneck.
The other scenario is a “transformation” or
“revolution” scenario. On the demand side, the
relevant policies must be formulated and imple-
mented, levying environmental and carbon taxes
to reflect external environmental costs. Concur-
rently, stronger competition will drive the cost
markedly down, leading to rapid expansion of
the market, with natural gas gradually becoming
the main energy source. For supply, as new
players are attracted to the market, the output of
shale and coal seam gas will rise greatly, with
most of the supply becoming domestic, and the
domestic market, via the influence of the inter-
national market, will undergo optimisation and
adjustment. The new players on the market will
bring with them a greater degree of competition,
markedly driving down supply costs, and push-
ing development into an optimal cycle. A multi-
faceted, highly competitive market will then
emerge, together with a modern, rationally
structured industrial system. The industrial sys-
tem will be adapted and transformed—the role of
the government, which previously gave priority
to planning and direct instructions, will give way
to regulation fundamentally by the market itself.
A modern regulatory system will emerge—the
role of the government will be reduced to
ensuring environmental protection, production
safety and fair competition in the market.
It must be emphasised, however, that the two
scenarios described above do not represent the
only possible outcomes. The natural gas industry
is still at the initial stages of its development, and
its future development is, therefore, very flexible.
China is endowed with comparatively abundant
gas resources, has a great development potential,
and innovation—and especially structural reform
—will allow China ample operational space to
expand its gas consumption and use global nat-
ural gas resources. Therefore, if natural gas is to
become a principal energy source, the crux of the
matter is the strategy and policy choices that
China makes.
Different development strategies do not only
have a deep effect on the future development of
China’s natural gas industry and energy resource
structure. Robustly developing the natural gas
sector would also be an important method to
increase effective investment and promote eco-
nomic growth.
Robust Development of the Natural
Gas Industry Stimulates Economic
Growth and Plays a Role in Protecting
the Environment
There is great opportunity for natural gas
industry growth in China. Currently,
annual consumption of natural gas in
China does not exceed 200 billion m3,
possibly rising to 350 billion m3 in 2020
and rising further to 580 billion m3 by
2030. The end market alone is expected to
double. Taking into account the potential
for growth in the upstream, midstream and
downstream segments of the natural gas
industry, the investment demand is very
considerable. It is estimated that in the
period between 2015 and 2060, cumulative
total investment to the value of almost
CNY 6 trillion will be created. Equivalent
to CNY 400 billion a year, this can drive
up the annual GDP growth by 0.6%.
Regarding the upstream production of
gas, China’s production potential may
reach 470 billion m3 in 2020, a figure
which includes 280 billion m3 of conven-
tional gas and 190 billion of shale and coal
seam gas. To build these capacities will
require cumulative investment of CNY
1.6 trillion. Just one shale natural gas field
project in Sichuan basin with annual
capacity of over 100 billion m3 requires an
investment of 0.8 to CNY 1 billion.
As regards midstream pipeline invest-
ment, China needs to expand its pipeline
network to over 150,000 km by 2030, and,
based on the investment budget of CNY
10–15 million per km of pipeline, this
could result in a total investment of
approximately CNY 2 trillion. The total
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investment required for the construction of
natural gas peak and reserve facilities and
LNG terminals exceeds CNY 500 billion.
Regarding urban gas pipeline networks,
here the total investment must be raised to
CNY 1.2–1.6 trillion, based on previous
calculations of CNY 3–4 invested for each
additional cubic metre of gas.
With regard to sources of investment,
the Chinese natural gas industry is still at
an early, fast-growth stage, and therefore
investment risks are low and returns are
stable, making it very attractive to many
different types of capital. In recent years,
after the launching of coastal LNG termi-
nals, investment of over 50 billion fol-
lowed within a short period of time, a very
positive market response. Even without
government funds, the deregulation of rel-
evant areas brings a great deal of social
capital.
There are also clear environmental and
social benefits to actively developing the
natural gas industry. Estimates suggest that
by 2030 natural gas will replace the use of
300–400 million tons of coal, and rough
calculations show that this will lead to a
10% reduction in PM2.5 concentration,
which will be of great benefit to the health
and the quality of life of China’s citizens.
1.3.2 Strategic Objectives of High
Efficiency, Safety
and Sustainability
Development of the natural gas industry must be
carried out with a fundamental emphasis on high
efficiency, safety and sustainability. The specific
implications are:
• Achieving efficiency means working to raise
efficiency at all stages of the process—ex-
ploration and production, transport and utili-
sation. Efficiency is the foundation of the
development of natural gas industry in China.
China is endowed with gas resources, but
their quality cannot compare with that in the
Middle East, Central Asia and Russia, and the
conditions are unfavourable when compared
with those in the United States. To make the
extraction of natural gas economically viable,
both extraction and transmission
cost-effectiveness must improve. Moreover,
the end-user price for natural gas in China is
kept high due to cheap alternative energy
sources and the long distances involved in gas
imports. To make gas competitive, therefore,
it must be used with greater efficiency so that
its qualities of being an efficient and clean
fuel can be fully realised.
• Safety, both natural gas resource security and
production safety, is a prerequisite for
development. The importance of energy
security is self-evident as far as leading
nations are concerned; the energy security of
a leading nation starts within its borders, and
is based on robust regulation. It is on this
basis that resource security can be achieved
under the open economic conditions of global
resource allocation. In order to strengthen
resource and energy security, domestic sup-
ply must be boosted, and gas import sources
and import mechanisms diversified. At the
production and operation level, the peak and
trough differences in the demand for natural
gas are very large, and we must strengthen the
national natural gas network and boost
national gas storage reserves in order to
ensure the security of supply of natural gas.
Moreover, the safety of gas usage remains
important, as it is used by a great number of
households nationwide.
• Sustainability is the relationship between the
effective management of the development of
natural gas industry and the environment and
ecology, and is a goal of natural gas industry
development. First, in order to improve the
environment rather than damage it, the natural
gas industry must emphasise environmental
protection at production, transmission and
usage stages, and also pay attention to the
sustainability of resource supply. Second, the
concept of sustainable development must be
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used throughout the natural resources indus-
try. In order to protect the environment, the
external cost of pollution must be fully
reflected, and enlarging the usage of natural
gas will raise the efficiency of natural
resource industry, lowering the environmental
pollution caused by the utilisation of natural
resources.
1.3.3 Clearly Defined Channels
and Targets
of the Natural Gas
Industry
China’s target for the next 15 years is to vigor-
ously develop the natural gas industry. Efforts
must be made for natural gas to reach 10% of all
primary energy source consumption by 2020,
increasing consumption to 350 billion m3, and
more than 15% and 580 billion m3 respectively
by 2030. The main channels to achieve this are
outlined below.
First, end consumer markets must be devel-
oped. In order to turn natural gas into a principal
energy source, multiple measures must be
applied simultaneously to enlarge natural gas
consumption:
• Environmental regulation must be strength-
ened, and there must be an emphasis on using
natural gas a substitute for coal, including in
rural/urban residential heating and fuel usage
in light industries such as textiles and paper
mills. This will be critical in reducing smog
and improving the environment.
• Natural gas transport must be developed. The
emphasis here will fall onto road passenger
transport and waterway freight transport. The
promotion of gas as a replacement for oil
must be achieved by strengthening infras-
tructure and perfecting the relevant techno-
logical standards.
• In electricity generation and heavy industry,
relying on competitive markets for energy
resources, green finance and taxation reform
must ensure that the environmental and
economic benefits of using natural gas (such
as energy saving and peak storage capacity)
are valued and realised. We must raise the
economic benefits generated by, and thus the
competitive power of, natural gas in peak
electricity reserves, trigeneration and the
natural gas chemical industry.
Second, the upstream natural gas supply must
be diversified. Using a two-pronged approach
involving increasing domestic production and
using foreign trade, relying on the dynamic com-
plementarity and boosting the competition
between the two can raise the efficiency of
resource allocation, and achieve market liberali-
sation and diversification of the natural gas supply.
Domestic production of natural gas resourcesmust
be strengthened, and the following three-step
strategy regarding conventional gas, tight natural
gas and shale coal seam bed gas promoted:
• In the near term, growth must be centred on
the technological reserves for the production
of conventional gas and tight natural gas,
shale and coal seam gas.
• The medium-term aim is to simultaneously
advance conventional gas, tight and shale
natural gas industry. China must also actively
participate in foreign markets, and, using
commercial principles, promote natural gas
trade and investment, and strengthen control
and bargaining power capacity for imports
coming into China.
• Sustainable development of trade with Rus-
sia, the Middle East, South East Asia
(Myanmar) and the maritime trade must be
promoted, partnership with the Shanghai
Co-operation Organization, ASEAN and
Canada must be enlarged further, and import
methods and pricing mechanisms must be
gradually diversified. China must combine its
“One Belt, One Road” strategy with the
active implementation of the “Go Out” pol-
icy, and play an active role in the interna-
tional markets by means of long-term
agreements, equity investment, joint devel-
opment, pipeline network construction and
ocean shipping.
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Third, a gas pipeline and storage network
must be constructed consistent with the princi-
ples of safety, fairness and transparency.
• The system must have unified planning, be
interconnected and integrate the national gas
producers, imports and consumption. The
top-level design of the pipeline network must
be carried out using a scientific approach,
ensuring the interconnectivity of different
gas-producing areas and markets in various
locations.
• There must be a focus on diversifying
investment in the construction of the pipeline
network, encouraging the entry of
non-state-owned enterprises and capital. The
security risk issues can be avoided by
demarcating pipeline hierarchy and differen-
tiating the investment accordingly.
Long-distance pipeline must be constructed in
combination with national-level planning;
construction of provincial-level trunk lines
must be performed under the guidance of
local government, using both state-owned
enterprises and social capital. The city- and
regional-level pipeline construction market
must be gradually liberalised.
• Access to the pipeline network must be fair.
National pipeline access standards must be
unified. In order for gas from different loca-
tions to have access to the pipeline network
and reach the end customers, the only
requirement must be that the correct safety
standards are complied with.
• The reserve capacity must be strengthened,
and the obligation to maintain reserve
capacity must be backed up by legislation.
The gas reserve price must be fixed, and all
parties must be mobilised to boost national
peak regulation reserves and the emergency
capacity.
Fourth, innovation must be applied to raise the
technological levels in the industry. Vigorous
efforts must be made to promote technological
innovation at each segment of the industrial
chain, from exploration and production,
transmission and distribution to conversion and
utilisation, allowing the technological revolution
to achieve technological and economic efficiency
at every stage.
• The strategic layout of natural gas production
and conversion key technology will be laun-
ched in advance: exploitation of shale, deep
sea, coal seam bed and methane hydrate
reserves launched, key problems in areas such
as gas engines and combined cycle electricity
generation facilities tackled, both human tal-
ent and financial investment boosted, and
technological innovation in institutional
mechanisms activated.
• Research and development and application of
complete technological sets and solutionsmust
be explored in depth, focusing on the integra-
tion of the equipment systems, reduction of
costs, environmental protection and green
development. Efforts must be made to ensure
that, by 2020, China achieves a clear increase
in the technological level of the equipment, that
great strides forward are achieved in technical
autonomy and domesticising of shale and sea
gas prospecting and exploitation technology,
and that the efficiency of the industry’s func-
tioning, production and operation is raised. By
2030, the industry’s technological level and
production and operation efficiency will
achieve leading international standards, and
domestic technological innovation capacity be
raised greatly.
Fifth, natural gas price reform must be vig-
orously promoted. As gas markets and infras-
tructure in different locations mature,
liberalisation of gas price setting must be pushed
on in waves, gradually reducing the direct
intervention by the government, actively per-
fecting the pricing mechanism and market envi-
ronment, and finally realising a complete
liberalisation of natural gas prices. Full advan-
tage must be taken of the multiple import chan-
nels and mature infrastructure in South-Eastern
coastal locations such as Shanghai, Guangdong
and Zhejiang.
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• Take the initiative in upstream market diver-
sification, abolishing price setting at gas ter-
minals, and promoting independent pricing at
upstream markets.
• Building on this, the separation of the mid-
stream pipeline transmission and downstream
sales must be pushed on, third-party access to
pipeline network transmission allowed, direct
access provided to large customers and lib-
eralisation of the end market gradually pro-
moted. In central and western China, where
infrastructure is not yet mature, an upper cap
must be placed on gate price and transmission
and distribution, and the end-market pricing
mechanism must be further improved, with
price adjustment frequency increased. Prices
for transmission and distribution and storage
must be formulated rationally, and measures
implemented to improve the situation as
regards the seasonal price gap, the peak and
trough price gap and the end price. By 2020,
the situation will be ripe for gradually push-
ing for cross-regional price merger using
methods such as third-party access to the
pipeline network, and finally achieving lib-
eralisation of the prices of natural gas.
Sixth, a natural gas industry system and a
government regulatory system must be built. In
order to have a healthy, sustainable modern
natural gas industry, we need to allow the market
to play a decisive role in resource allocation, and
at the same time take advantage of the role of the
government. When designing the system, we
must:
• completely understand the crucial junctions in
the reform of the natural resources system;
• promote the liberalisation of the natural gas
industry;
• design the organisation and modes of opera-
tion in upstream, midstream and downstream
segments of the production chain;
• diversify resources and subjects;
• create standardised, legitimate competition
and co-operation; and
• apply the utmost effort to building an effi-
cient, open, orderly market.
Regarding government regulation, it is nec-
essary to carry out, as soon as possible, top-level
design and division of responsibility in natural
gas market regulation; regulation must place an
emphasis on environmental protection, fair
access to the pipeline network and low-stream
separation of pipeline network transmission and
sales. Also, unified pipeline transmission price
control measures must be formulated. The aim is
to achieve, by 2020, multifaceted competition in
Chinese natural gas market, breakthroughs in
exploration and production and imports, price
liberalisation in some regions, an efficient gov-
ernment regulation system, and industry growth
that shows greater vitality and efficiency. By
2030, the aim is to have a system of robust, fair
markets with multiple players, where the market
itself plays the decisive role in price setting.
Also, by the same year, a unified, independent,
professional regulatory system should be in
place. The dynamic, efficient new industry will
enjoy much greater influence internationally, and
its output will be internationally competitive.
1.4 Raising Efficiency
and Supporting Improved
Policies to Expand Natural Gas
Use
In order for natural gas to become a main energy
source, natural gas use must be expanded, and
raising its competitiveness is the key. Natural gas
price sensitivity for residential use, industrial
services, vehicular transport and hydrogen pro-
duction is low, while that of central heating,
electricity generation, usage for industrial fuel,
production of synthetic ammonia and methanol is
higher, and under current pricing conditions
natural gas lacks competitiveness. One way of
raising this competitiveness is to internalise the
external costs, reflecting the impact that resource
utilisation has on the environment and people’s
health, and this will enable us to express the
advantage of natural gas as a clean resource.
Another way is to raise the efficiency of natural
gas utilisation, and this higher efficiency will
prevent the end cost of using the expensive
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natural gas from increasing markedly. Specific





Natural Gas for Coal
Substituting natural gas for the coal used in
decentralised energy generation is one of the
priorities in the development of the natural gas
industry, and there is a great potential for
development in this area. Decentralised use of
coal is inefficient and highly polluting, leading to
high pollution control costs. Currently approxi-
mately half of the coal in China is used for
centralised electricity generation, and the other
half is used in a decentralised manner. Half of the
latter is accounted for by areas such as metal-
lurgy and cement firing, and the rest is made up
of public heating, textiles, ceramics, glass and
paper production. In all these areas there is
potential to substitute gas for coal. Looking at the
experience of developed countries, the propor-
tion of coal used for electricity generation stands
at 78% in OECD countries, and the same figure
exceeds 90% in the United States. There is also
very little use of coal for decentralised electricity
generation.
There are three main channels for coal to gas
substitution:
• Catering for heating users in small and
medium-sized northern cities and some
industry clients located in the industrial zone,
coal-fired boilers can be replaced with
coal-fired CHP plants. This is an
economy-based, environmentally friendly
substitution route.
• The same approach (replacement of coal
burning with CHP plants in public heating) is
difficult to implement for large and very large
northern cities due to limited environmental






















































































































































































































Fig. 1.4 Natural gas price adaptability of different user categories (in CNY/m3). Note The user adaptability described
above is based on the international crude prices at $80 per barrel, and TCE at CNY 600 per tonne
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available for power plants and problems with
coal transportation. Moreover, it is very dif-
ficult, using coal-powered CHP plants, to
satisfy the requirements of industrial clients
who require extremely high temperatures and
those users whose locations are widely dis-
persed. Their energy requirements can only
be satisfied by using natural gas and
expanding natural-gas fired CHP.
• For the urban fringe and in the countryside,
where coal is used in decentralised manner
for heating and cooking purposes, apart from
substituting LPG and LNG for coal, there is
also an option of using biogas produced from
the organic waste generated in the villages.
The expectation is that, using the above
methods, by 2030 the use of gas will rise in
the areas where it is most used—to 160 bil-
lion m3 among the industrial users, and to
approximately 120 billion in urban heating,
and residential and commercial use.
Regarding policy, one option is to strengthen
environmental regulations, increasing the cost of
coal when used in decentralised energy genera-
tion. For example, an onlinemonitoring system for
reduction of atmospheric pollution produced by
coal-burning boilers could be set up, as well as
emissions monitoring systems. Second,
energy-saving reform could be strengthened in
order to improve energy resource usage efficiency,
for example boosting the construction of
energy-saving buildings, and optimising industrial
processes and their methods of using energy. For
high-quality, expensive energy resources, the
economic burden must not be passed down to the
end user, and the government can providefinancial
support for the replacement of the energy facilities
and to aid with energy-saving reform. Third, to
address the addition of new coal-burning boilers in
areas such as northern and central China where
atmospheric pollution management comes under
the greatest pressure, enforcing compulsory usage
of natural gas can be considered, to avoid adding







Expanding the use of natural gas in transport
would be a highly significant move and have
important implications for safeguarding national
energy security. Natural gas is a clean and effi-
cient fuel, but using it as a substitute fuel has
several specific economic and technological
implications. Pollution and carbon dioxide
emissions from gas-powered vehicles are on
average lower than those from traditional internal
combustion vehicles. From the economic point
of view, over the past few years, the large dif-
ference in price between gas and oil, as well as
sales tax exemption, has made gas-powered
vehicles economically viable and propelled fast
growth in their use, especially as CNG urban taxi
fleets and public buses.
There is enormous potential for the growth and
development of gas-fuelled transport. In China the
total gas volume used by vehicles reached
approximately 12 billion m3 in 2013, of which
CNG vehicles contributed 10 billion m3 and LNG
vehicles 2 billion. The CNGmarket for vehicles is
gradually entering a period of fast growth. It is
expected that by 2020 annual consumption will
reach 20 billion m3, then 23 billion in 2025, and
that this will be followed by a slowdown. The
market for LNG vehicles is expected to maintain
fast growth in the future; the forecast is that in 2020
the LNG market will exceed 20 billion m3, with
expectations of exceeding 40 billion by 2030. The
use of LNG as ship fuel is another important
potential market, but, due to the more rigorous
environmental policies, growth here is expected to
be slow initially, and changes in environmental
policy will dictate the outcome of the later stages
of development. According to optimistic calcula-
tions, the market for LNG as ship fuel may exceed
2 billion m3 in 2020 and 10 billion in 2030.
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However, there are barriers obstructing the
development of the natural gas transport fuel
industry. Unlike the fixed-source users in power
generation, and residential and industrial users,
transport users are mobile, and need an external
network. While the change from coal to gas in
electric power generation can be called a “point”
substitution, the change from petrol or diesel to
gas in transport is more of a “network” or “sys-
tem” substitution. Large-scale development of
the industry does not just depend on the technical
and economic qualities of one segment of the
industrial chain or a certain industry, but rather
on the network effect of the entire system. Only if
a sufficient number of service facilities, such as
refuelling stations and repair shops, join the
network can the customers’ mobile,
network-based demand be satisfied. The network
can then reach a tipping point, and the old
“chicken and egg” problem can be solved. This
process of establishing a network will require a
great deal of time if left to the market’s “invisible
hand”. Markets can also malfunction from time
to time, so the government can be extremely
helpful here. These are the recommendations for
promoting gas for petrol substitution:
• The construction of filling station infrastruc-
ture must be accelerated. The first step is to
formulate a filling station network construc-
tion plan for China’s important freight trans-
port road routes, water transport routes and
key areas. In order to benefit vehicle users,
conflicts, fragmentation, duplicate construc-
tion and harmful competition must be avoi-
ded. Second, suitable tax reduction and
exemption policies must be formulated to
make investment in gas fuelling facilities at
filling stations attractive, thus accelerating the
availability of gas at filling stations until a
tipping point is reached. Having reached the
tipping point, a gradual withdrawal of the
incentives may be considered. Moreover, any
obsolete regulations must be identified and
amended, for example any regulations based
on the premise of using gasoline fuels must
be revised, the approval process for filling
stations must be simplified, and the ban on
LNG transport on the railways must be lifted.
• Industrial standards must be formulated as
quickly as possible for the entire industrial
chain, for example regarding fuel quality,
measuring fuel calorific value, construction of
filling stations and gas vehicles’ component
parts. Accelerating the standardisation of the
entire industrial chain will allow economies
of scale to be achieved.
• The government must take the lead, with the
industry associations playing the role of
co-ordinators. Full advantage must be taken
of the government’s leading role in procure-
ment; funds for gas-fuelled vehicles must be
allocated a clear proportion in the financial
support and subsidies issued by the municipal
administration, public transport and govern-
ment departments for vehicle procurement. In
addition, the co-ordinating role of the indus-
try associations must be given free rein.
Co-ordination is particularly necessary in
building the natural gas transport industry
network, and, since transportation has already
been fully liberalised, the government must
not interfere directly in the markets, and so
the role of associations as co-ordinating
intermediaries is vital.
1.4.3 Improve the Pricing
Mechanism, Making
the Development
of Natural Gas Electrical
Power Generation
Justifiable
Using natural gas to generate electricity has
many benefits compared with coal. It is cleaner,
provides flexibility to respond to demand peaks
and requires a much smaller land area. It is
highly suitable for peak-time electricity genera-
tion and CCHP usage, and these qualities make
natural gas indispensable in electricity
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generation. Looking at the international experi-
ence, in 2010 the global contribution of natural
gas to electric power generation stood at 30% of
all fossil fuels, and in 2030 it is estimated to rise
to 37%. In developed countries, electricity gen-
eration is a major portion of natural gas usage,
accounting for 30–40% of total natural gas use.
China has abundant coal resources and
coal-based electricity generation can be easily
made clean and efficient. Coal is an excellent,
competitive fuel when used for baseline elec-
tricity generation. For this reason, in China, the
use of natural gas to generate electricity should
centre on peak-time electricity generation and
CHP generation as well as decentralised
power-generating, heating and cooling. In the
decentralised electricity generation sector, we
must take into account the economies of scale in
asset utilisation and assign priority in the order:
region, building, household. The liberalisation of
the electricity market, especially in electricity
sales, provides an important opportunity to pro-
mote the development of the decentralised
energy sources. It is estimated that by 2030 the
volume of gas used in peak and baseline elec-
tricity generation will reach 60–70 billion m3,
whereas CHP generation and decentralised
resource electricity generation will use approxi-
mately 100 billion m3. The key measures to be
implemented in order to boost the competitive
power of electricity generation from natural gas
are as follows:
• Peak and trough electricity and gas prices
must be set. As regards electricity generation,
gas is a flexible energy source for this pur-
pose, and has high peak regulation and
reserve values. Its value for peak generation is
even more significant against the background
of the increased use of renewable and inter-
mittent energy sources. Looking at the natural
gas part of the system, there is seasonal
variation in the use of electricity and gas. For
example, during winter a lot of gas is used for
heating, but electricity is used relatively little,
while in summer a great deal of electricity is
used for refrigeration, but there is little heat-
ing being used. The use of natural gas in
electricity generation, therefore, can reduce
the difference between the peaks and the
troughs in natural gas demand. Using cheap
gas to produce expensive electricity is a
competitive advantage of electricity genera-
tion using natural gas. Currently the grid
tariffs are higher for electricity generated
using gas than for electricity generated using
coal, which to a certain extent reflects its peak
regulation and reserve usage value. The next
step may be to introduce time-of-use pricing
to further express the benefits of using natural
gas for peak shaving. Time-of-use pricing for
natural gas should be formulated in such a
way as to fully express the competitive power
of gas-generated electricity.
• The external environmental cost must be
reflected. The external cost of electricity
generation can be separated into two cate-
gories. The first is the costs of normal pollu-
tion such as dust and sulphur and nitrogen
oxides. Increasing investment can lead the
emissions produced by coal-based electricity
generation to approach the levels produced by
gas-based electricity generation, as the new
coal electricity generating units now basically
have the same pollutant concentration limits
as gas units (using 6% oxygen content as
reference, the concentration of dust, sulphur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions does
not exceed 10, 35 and 50 mg per m3 respec-
tively). Boosting investment in environmen-
tally friendly facilities and equipment and
factoring this into the budget increases the
cost of electricity produced by large generator
units by 0.01–0.02 CNY/kWh, and this figure
is slightly higher for older, smaller generators
which use inferior-quality coal. Overall, the
measures to control general pollution do
contribute to the gap in the cost of electricity
production between gas and coal, but this
effect is not large. The other aspect, a key
one, is the cost of coal emissions. Using coal
for generating electricity produces
0.8 kg/kWh of emissions, while using gas
produces only 0.37 kg/kWh. As the price of
coal increases, the corresponding costs of
pollution from generating electricity using
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coal are also showing an upward tendency.
According to an example from the Shenzhen
Emissions Exchange, on June 18, 2013 the
online opening price for one ton of coal stood
at CNY 30 per tonne, and the cost of
coal-produced electricity at 0.013 CNY/kWh.
When the coal price peaked at
143.99 CNY/tonne on October 18, 2013, the
cost of coal-produced electricity rose to
0.06 CNY/kWh.
• The core equipment and facilities must be
produced domestically. Currently, core tech-
nology such as turbines and computerised
turbine equipment is a monopoly of foreign
companies, which creates high long-term
costs and keeps transportation and long-term
preventive maintenance fees high. Solving
this problem will lower the fixed costs of
gas-generated electricity. Lowering invest-
ment per unit by 15% can lower the electricity
cost by approximately 0.014 CNY/kWh. At
the same time, changing to the domestic
production of key equipment can lower total
lifecycle costs. If the total repair fees are
lowered by 50%, then the corresponding
reduction in electricity costs will be reduced
by approximately 0.01 CNY/kWh. Changing
to the domestic production of key equipment
can lower the electricity cost to the approxi-
mately 0.024 CNY/kWh.






There are large subsidies in place to provide
low-cost natural gas to residential and chemical
industry customers in the long term. For exam-
ple, in 2013, the average price of gas for end
urban residential users nationwide was
2.15 CNY/m3, which was 1.5 CNY/m3 lower
than the national average marginal residential
supply cost. The volume of gas used by
residential users is approximately 18 billion m3,
which means that the subsidy from the gas sup-
pliers to urban residents reached approximately
CNY 27 billion. For fertiliser producers, the gas
price is now 1.80 CNY/m3 on average, which is
1.10 CNY/m3 lower than the national average
marginal commercial supply cost. The volume of
gas used by the fertiliser industry is approxi-
mately 20 billion m3, implying that the subsidy
by the gas suppliers for this industry’s users is
approximately CNY 22 billion. It appears on the
surface that these large subsidies are provided by
the gas suppliers, but, in actual fact, it is other
users that bear the cost. The resulting higher
price for these users is detrimental to the
expansion of natural gas use in their sectors.
The price for the residential users must be
gradually raised until it exceeds the cost for the
gas suppliers. The first reason is that the volume
of gas consumed by residential users (including
for heating purposes) is expected to grow greatly,
from 28.8 billion m3 in 2012 to 54.8 billion in
2020 and 73.4 billion in 2030. Such increases
will make the continuation of subsidies highly
problematic. The second reason is that the price
adaptability of residential users is high, and they
can be regarded as top-quality downstream cus-
tomers. Looking at the competition, and com-
paring with oil, LPG or electricity, as long as gas
prices remain below 4 CNY/m3, gas remains
competitive. Regarding the adaptability of the
consumer, the average amount of gas used by
one person each year is approximately 60 cu-
bic m, and a hypothetical price increase of
1 CNY/m3 results in additional CNY 60 per
year spent on gas. In 2013 the disposable income
of the low-income stratum (the bottom 20%) of
the rural/urban population stood at CNY 11,434,
which means that the increased spending on gas
amounts to a mere 0.5% of that figure. Moreover,
the price of heating must also be adjusted,
otherwise it will be difficult to continue with the
use of natural gas for this purpose. Naturally, the
use of gas for cooking and heating is absolutely
essential in people’s lives, and for this reason a
subsidy can be given to the part of the population
living in poverty when the prices are adjusted.
Choosing the right opportunity and the right
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method to raise the prices for the residential users
is crucial, as is the importance of communication
with the public. Leaving the decision-making
regarding the extent of the price adjustment range
to the lower levels of authority, such as local
government, can also be considered.
For chemical industry users, certain discounts
may be given using market measures, such as
setting peak and trough prices and interruptible
prices, but the situation so far, with prices below
cost, can no longer continue. The chemical
industry must no longer rely on cheap gas, but
has to optimise its industrial process and
strengthen its production management to be able
to fully take advantage of time of day prices and
discounts for interruptible prices. In addition, it
must continue with industrial upgrading and
develop high value-added industries. Regarding
policy, a clear timeline must be set for the price
merger between residential users, the chemical
industry and other users, to provide local gov-
ernment with ample room for adjustment.
1.5 Measures to Ensure a Safe
and Efficient Gas Supply
At the same time as expanding the use of natural
gas, we must also raise gas supply capacity, as
well as ensuring the safety and efficiency of the
gas supply. The key to ensuring a safe and effi-
cient gas supply is attracting new players to the
exploration and exploitation of gas resources,
thus greatly boosting the national supply capac-
ity. In addition, import sources and methods must
be diversified further, to ensure the security of
natural gas imports. The advance of pipeline
network construction must be moderated, and the
interconnectivity of the pipeline network boos-
ted. Construction of gas reserve facilities and
reform of the relevant institutional mechanisms
must both be consolidated to ensure the smooth
operation of natural gas industry. We must also
raise the technological level of the equipment
and facilities and of the innovation capacity of
the industry, strengthening the very foundation
of its long-term development.
1.5.1 Attracting New Players
to Resource Exploitation
to Expand Natural Gas
Production
China is richly endowed with gas resources and
has the fundamental technology it needs to
exploit them. Priority is given to conventional
gas, tight natural gas, shale and coal seam gas,
and to the appropriate development of coal gas
industry. The key problems lie with the organi-
sation of the industry. As mentioned above,
under the current system, the output volume of
natural gas in China will reach 230 billion m3,
possibly reaching 380 billion in 2030. If the
system is reformed, the same figures may rise to
270 and 470 billion m3 respectively. This sec-
tions outlines the measures that should be taken
in order to attract new players to resource
exploitation and thus expand national natural gas
production volume.
1. Development model
A new model of development must be
applied. Exploration and production and the
pipeline transmission of natural gas are subject to
the regulations of the State Council, and are
operated by the state-owned oil companies. The
advantage of this system is that it allows inten-
sive development of the natural gas industry, and
makes it convenient to undertake large-scale
exploitation, but it also faces the problem of high
costs. The other development route is to reform
the current monopolised control system and
strengthen the role of market forces, attracting
businesses with different models of ownership to
the exploration and production of natural gas,
and achieving diversified development. The
resulting market competition, “the survival of the
fittest”, will create a new structure of exploration
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and production in the natural gas industry. It is
recommended that the current institutional
mechanisms be adjusted appropriately, and con-
ventional oil and gas operational authority be
moderately liberalised. Before anything else,
though, conventional oil and gas mining rights
must be opened up to the state-owned energy
enterprises which have already obtained shale
natural gas mining rights, as well as to those
energy enterprises which are engaged in overseas
imports. This change will attract these enterprises
to the domestic exploration and production of
conventional resources.
2. Minimum investment level
The minimum exploration investment must be
adjusted. The 1996 Chinese Mining Law and the
follow-up supporting laws and regulations state
that the minimum investment for oil and gas
prospecting rights is 5000 CNY/km2 in the first
year, CNY 7000 in the second and CNY 10,000
in the third. However, it fails to consider other
factors, such as currency inflation. Due to the
costs having risen greatly and the fixed-price
budget, these unchanged minimum prospecting
and surveying investment regulations have led to
a decrease, year after year, in the exploration
workload per unit area. In the past, three explo-
ration wells could be completed with a budget of
CNY 100 million, but currently it is only possi-
ble to complete one. Physical exploration
investment per unit area has is currently barely
between one third and one fifth of its level
15 years ago and there is a severe lack of phys-
ical exploration work done in the regions
favourable to gas production. According to the
investment standards and regulatory require-
ments for shale natural gas block tenders, the
basic exploration investment required for con-
ventional oil and gas blocks is 3–5 times greater
than the current levels, with a minimum invest-
ment of 30–50,000 CNY/km2. Raising minimum
exploration investment, raising the prospecting
efficiency of the blocks, encouraging block
withdrawal and reducing the surface area of the
blocks will transform the current prospecting
stalemate. At the same time, the current advanced
block application system must be reformed, and,
as with shale natural gas block sales, it should be
possible to sell conventional oil and gas blocks
through a competitive process. In addition,
mechanisms for block exit that are widely prac-
tised internationally can be used. Monitoring
teams must also be set up to oversee the imple-
mentation of all the rules and regulations.
3. Trading mechanism for reserves
Trading mechanisms and platforms for proven
natural gas reserves need to be established. In
recent years, the average annual increase in
proven geological natural gas reserves has
exceeded 600 billion m3, and this tendency to
fast growth is expected to continue in the coming
years. However, there is investment and opening
up of the newly proven reserves is not promptly
achieved, with parts of the reserves remaining
unexploited for prolonged periods of time. The
reason for this is the difficulty of making the
exploitation of some of these reserves economi-
cally viable. The recommendation, therefore, is
to establish a trading mechanism for the
hard-to-exploit proven reserves, allowing them to
enter the market, where they can be transferred to
a different party, and can eventually come into
possession of an enterprise capable of conducting
more expeditious exploitation and making it
economically viable. The exploration enterprises
can thus recover their exploration costs and the
producer enterprises, by purchasing these
reserves, gain a production opportunity. To
ensure that these reserves are developed
promptly, the situation where rights transfer is
not followed by development must be avoided.
Recommendations for Setting up a
100 billion m3 Annual Capacity Shale
Natural Gas Integrated Experimental
Area in Sichuan Basin
The development of the shale natural gas
industry touches upon many areas—the
conditions of the natural resources, tech-
nology, equipment, construction, invest-
ment, utilisation and environmental costs,
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for example—and these must all be con-
sidered. We estimate that with appropriate
organisation and policy support, Sichuan
Basin can become a leader and focal point
for shale natural gas development in China,
and the potential production of shale nat-
ural gas in this region could be as high as
100 billion m3 by 2025. The reasons for
this are as follows:
1. Guaranteed resource base: According
to PetroChina evaluation data, the total
reserves of shale natural gas in the
Longmaxi and Qiongzhusi formations
approach 40 trillion m3. These include
Longmaxi marine facies shale natural
gas, where production breakthroughs
have already been made, with a total
area of 75,000 km2, containing reserves
of 25 trillion m3 of shale natural gas,
with recoverable resources of 3.7 tril-
lion m3. Of these 75,000 km2, 35,000
have been found to have conditions that
are especially favourable to shale nat-
ural gas extraction, containing almost
14 trillion m3 of shale natural gas, of
which 2.8 billion m3 is recoverable. In
a scenario where the 20,000 km2 area
of Longmaxi shale coal formation is
used, development is started in 2015,
then the exploration and well distribu-
tion can be completed and 10,000 wells
can be drilled by 2025, with the
potential production of shale natural gas
reaching 100 billion m3 in 2025. Fol-
lowing that, drilling approximately 800
wells annually, production can remain
stable for 20 years.
2. Mining technology and equipment:
Currently China is at already in the
initial stages of mastering shale natural
gas geophysics, well drilling and com-
pletion, and fracturing technology.
China currently possesses 3500 m
capability of horizontal drilling and
stage fracturing. Chinese non-seismic
geophysical prediction and
identification technology, fully mobile
tracked drilling rigs, large fracturing
vehicles and construction environmen-
tal protection technology all comply
with advanced international standards,
and there has also been a breakthrough
in domestic bridge plug production.
Currently the only fields where there is
a gap between Chinese technology and
advanced foreign technology are well
drilling geological guidance, measure-
ment while drilling (MWD), micro- and
nano-structures and component analy-
sis. However, there are already many
foreign shale oil companies in China
taking part in shale natural gas devel-
opment, and these can supply the key
technology required. The fact that
Sinopec’s Chongqing Fooling shale
natural gas field has already entered the
commercial exploitation phase proves
that the development of Chinese shale
oil industry has passed an important
benchmark.
3. Exploitation is productive and eco-
nomic viability guaranteed: By
November 30, 2014 (when the research
group was on-site), Sinopec, in Fool-
ing, Sichuan, completed 69 fracturing
test wells, all of which produced med-
ium and high shale natural gas flow.
The average flow at a single well was
measured at 32,000 m3 per day. On
average, a single well, under conditions
of uninterrupted flow, can produce over
21.6 million m3 of gas, with the aver-
age cost of single well standing at CNY
80 million (including exploration, pro-
duction and transmission costs). Add-
ing taxes and other simple management
fees, the well cost is below 1.5
CNY/m3. Currently the wellhead price
of shale natural gas stands at
2.78 CNY/m3, and adding the
0.5 CNY/m3 national financial subsidy
gives us the actual gas price of
3.18 CNY/m3, and a single well can,
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therefore, dependably generate an
annual income of up to CNY
68.69 million. Other areas in Sichuan,
such as Changning and Weyuan, also
have shale deposits, situated at great
depth, but here shale natural gas fields
are layered with conventional gas
deposits and the economic value lies in
their combined extraction, while shale
natural gas production in Exi, in the
east of Chongqing, is made highly
economically viable due to the presence
of associated light oil. These facts
confirm the assured economic viability
of shale natural gas production in
Sichuan Basin.
4. Existing environmental protection
precedents to draw lessons from and
guaranteed water resources required
for gas extraction: The United States
currently has over 100,000 shale natural
gas wells, and under effective govern-
ment supervision and public scrutiny,
there have so far been no environmental
accidents which might have been
detrimental to society. In Sichuan
Basin, the extractable layers of shale
natural gas are situated at the depths of
over 2000 m, and measures such as
adequate well casing and increased
safeguards (adding an extra casing) can
effectively prevent the water used for
fracturing from permeating to the sur-
face. As far as water use is concerned,
the production of 100 billion m3 of gas
consumes approximately 400 mil-
lion m3 of water, which amounts to
1.6% of the current water consumption
in Sichuan province. Therefore,
Sichuan Province, richly endowed with
water resources, can guarantee suffi-
cient water reserves for the industry.
In order to meet the 100 billion m3
annual mark, CNY 800 billion of invest-
ment is required to build the capacity (to
cover the drilling and completion of
approximately 10,000 wells between 2015
and 2025). Under the current system the
project would rely solely on PetroChina
Southwest Oil and Gasfield Company.
However, this company’s investment track
record is insufficiently dynamic—as evi-
denced by the Laongangmiao gas field
(with over 400 billion m3 of capacity),
discovered by PetroChina Southwest Oil
and Gasfield Company in central Sichuan
(these conventional gas fields also require
large exploration investment). Thus a new
way of thinking is needed to develop the
shale natural gas industry, and we propose
establishing an integrated shale natural gas
exploitation experimental zone in Sichuan
Basin and its periphery. First, preliminary
testing will be conducted under safe con-
ditions and strict environmental manage-
ment, and the consequent exploitation must
then proceed using new, remodelled
methods, mechanisms and regulations. As
well as playing a role in bolstering shale
natural gas exploitation, it will become a
trailblazer for China’s oil and gas reform,
and the experience gained from it can be
replicated and promoted. Important initia-
tives include:
1. Innovative mining rights manage-
ment and market access manage-
ment: A unified tender can be put out
for resources, with the exception of
those areas where the three main
enterprises have started already pro-
duction, are verifying resources or are
carrying out exploration. Market access
must not be restricted to other
state-owned enterprises but must also
be opened to privately run companies
and foreign-owned enterprises. It is not
only the large transnational foreign
enterprises that need to be attracted to
take part, but also small and
medium-sized companies with exten-
sive experience and strong capacity for
innovation. It is these companies that
played a key role in shale oil and gas
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revolution in the United States. If the
environmental targets for technology
are met and national security clearance
is obtained, foreign enterprises can
enter the Chinese market as wholly
foreign-owned enterprises.
2. The full benefits of the mixed own-
ership system must be obtained: This
practice has already been implemented
by PetroChina and Sinopec. In the
Changning block PetroChina has set up
Sichuan Changning Gas Development
Co., Ltd., while Sinopec established
Chongqing Shalegas Exploration and
Development Co., Ltd. in Chongqing,
both of which are under mixed owner-
ship. A mixed system of ownership not
only grants an investment opportunity
to local state capital, private capital and
foreign capital to invest, but is also
conducive for central enterprises’ usage
of social capital in order to bolster
resource exploitation. The presence of
local state capital is beneficial with
regard to demolition and resettlement,
road building and the immediate usage
of natural gas. The participation of
private and foreign capital is beneficial
in reforming corporate governance and
raising extraction efficiency and the
level of services. In order to deepen the
mixed ownership reform in shale natu-
ral gas industry, it is necessary to apply
great effort in the areas of corporate
governance, strategic synergy and the
division of labour. We must maintain
the initiative across the board, and
avoid misappropriation of funds or sit-
uations where the mixed system of
ownership exists only on paper, and the
external investors are denied participa-
tion in management and operations.
3. Effective regulation methods for
shale natural gas industry: Appropri-
ate policy system, management stan-
dards, regulation system and rules for
shale natural gas prospecting and
exploitation, as well a platform to
gather and share information, can be set
up and applied for a period of 3–4 years
in the experimental area. Regarding the
environmental regulations, the envi-
ronmental regulation will be organised
and implemented locally following the
standards and policies set by the central
government. The Environment Ministry
is currently researching and formulating
the environmental impact assessment
guidelines for the shale natural gas
industry, and these can be put to a pilot
test in the experimental area, bringing
out and implementing, for the first time,
the national standards and regulations
regarding land use, vegetation restora-
tion, water resource utilisation, waste
water treatment, waste disposal, gas
emissions, exploratory well drilling and
well completion. Regarding sharing
geological data and information, it is
possible to follow the American exam-
ple and introduce legislation to enforce
the obligatory compilation of geologi-
cal shale natural gas data, building it up
into a geological engineering informa-
tion management platform, with the
government controlling the natural
resources information, which will then
be shared, boosting the efficiency of
shale natural gas exploitation.
4. Fiscal and taxation policy
Fiscal and taxation policy regarding natural
resource extraction must be improved. Conven-
tional gas projects generate high income after
price liberalisation, and the natural resource
taxation rate should be raised. However, for tight
natural gas, shale natural gas and coal seam gas,
in order to encourage development of the
unconventional gas industry, it is necessary to
consider reforming the financial and taxation
system, adjusting the relationship between local
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and central taxation, lowering the natural
resource tax rate and mobilising the role of local
government. Regarding shale natural gas, during
the 2012–2015 period, the central financial
administration provided a subsidy of
0.4 CNY/m3 to shale natural gas-producing
enterprises meeting the relevant conditions. The
13th Five-Year Plan period is a crucial time in
the development of China’s shale natural gas
industry, as it moves from the investment stage to
growth stage. Even in the current situation of
very low international oil prices, with the
expectation that the price of a barrel of oil is to
remain around the 60–80 $/bbl in the next 3–
5 years, and with global investment in shale
natural gas shrinking, it is especially important to
encourage active exploration and production of
shale natural gas. For this reason, the subsidies
for shale natural gas industry must be extended
and continued. Currently the Finance Ministry
and the Natural Resources Ministry have already
decided that the subsidies will be fixed at the
level of 0.3 CNY/m3 for the period of 2016–
2018 and 0.2 CNY/m3 for 2019–2020.
Coalbed gas exploration must also be sup-
ported. First, in coal seam gas exploitation, we
must, with safety and environmental protection
as guiding principles, closely integrate the
development of mines and wells within coal
mining areas. Ground drainage must be per-
formed five years in advance, pumping water
from the well must be advanced moderately, and
old reservoir coal seam gas (methane) must be
actively extracted. Independent enterprises must
be encouraged to purchase coal seam gas
(methane) from different mine and well locations,
large-scale usage must be realised, and subsidies
extended to the enterprises directly or partially
using this gas. Second, commercial exploitation
of non-coal mine coal seam gas should be pro-
moted using targeted policy. Coal seam bed gas
production must be commercialised in partially
exploited coal bed gas areas situated in the
locations outside the regions with coal mining
programmes, as well as in those mines which for
10 or 20 years have not engaged in coal pro-
duction. The current categorised incentive policy
does not allow the extension of these incentives
to the coal mining locations which do not address




of Natural Gas Imports
The general orientation of support and encour-
agement for natural gas imports is as follows.
With regard to natural gas import policy, China
needs to reconcile the conflict between the fol-
lowing three aspects: the need to address the
problem of environmental pollution, a continu-
ous increase of natural gas consumption caused
by economic development and a rise in people’s
incomes, and the need to ensure the security of
natural gas supply. The domestic consumption of
natural gas must be expanded both as a propor-
tion of the total energy resource consumption
(currently at 5.8%) and as regards the penetration
rate in residential use (16%). Preventing air
pollution has already become urgently necessary
and is a strong motivating factor in the expansion
of the use of natural gas. In summary, to solve
the fundamental contradictions facing the issue
of how to expand domestic natural gas con-
sumption, the formulation and issuing of all the
relevant natural gas policies and regulations in
China must be subordinate to the need to effec-
tively resolve these contradictions. The orienta-
tion of China’s import policy in the near future
(from the present day to 2020 and then 2030) is
as follows: imports must be cautiously encour-
aged, but at the same time efforts must be made
to achieve diversification of the import sources
and import partners, as well as of contracts and
pricing methods, in order to guarantee overall
control of natural gas imports.
Analysis of Chinese Natural Gas Sup-
ply Security
The degree of dependence of China on
foreign natural gas is rising fast, reaching
32% in 2013. For this reason, some take
the view that restrictions should be placed
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on the proportion of natural gas imports.
Our analysis shows that China is capable
of maintaining overall control of the
security of natural gas supply, without the
need for restrictions being placed on the
proportion of natural gas imports. The
reasons for this are as follows:
• Natural gas is a substitutable resource
and can be easily substituted using oil,
coal or renewable energy sources,
which makes the problem of its supply
security easily solvable.
• The security of natural gas supply in
China is markedly better than that of
oil. One reason is the diversity of
sources of natural gas imports—from
Central Asia in the North West, Russia
from the North East, Myanmar in the
South West, and on the Eastern sea-
board the LNG arriving via maritime
routes from different countries. The
situation is clearly different from oil,
which relies on the supplies from the
Middle East, and over-relies on the
supplies delivered via the Strait of
Malacca. The second reason is that,
compared with other countries, the
current ratio of natural gas in its energy
structure and the ratio of its imports,
make China’s diversified imports com-
parable with the European Union, and
in the future will be comparable with
Japan and South Korea.
• The national reserves of conventional
gas, shale natural gas and coal seam gas
have very large development potential,
and, provided the institutional mecha-
nisms are rationalised and enough time
is allowed, production output can be
increased greatly.
It could be said that the key and the
incentive to achieve national gas supply
security are firmly in China’s own hands.
For this reason, in the context of China’s
ample global natural gas supply and its
pressing need to control emissions,
increasing gas imports will allow China to
simultaneously increase natural gas usage
and reduce emissions. Naturally, while
encouraging imports, the operation of gas
stocks and reserves as well as the inter-
connectivity of the pipeline network must
be increased, in order to mitigate against
potential short-term market fluctuations
(Fig. 1.5).
First, the sources of imports must be diversi-
fied. According to the current LNG and pipeline
contracts signed by China, in the coming years
natural gas imports are expected to undergo fast
growth, from 53 billion m3 in 2013 to approxi-
mately 192–230 billion m3 in 2020. Generally
speaking, the diversification of China’s natural
gas imports is growing. The main importers into
China are Turkmenistan and Russia, with each
country accounting for roughly 30% of the total,
while Australia’s imports come second, at 12%.
The remaining 30% or so is contributed by eight
different countries—including Myanmar, Qatar,
Uzbekistan and Papua New Guinea—and also by
centralised natural gas buyers. These figures
represent a significant change from the propor-
tion of natural gas imports in 2013: the imports
from the Middle East into China fell the most,
from 17.7% in 2013 to just 3%, Turkmenistan’s
fell from 47 to 30%, but imports from Russia
grew from zero to 32%, with a slight increase in
Australian imports also.
Second, the import methods must be diversi-
fied. Regarding contracts and price setting:
• The contracts must include long-, medium-
and short-term ones, as well as merchandise
on hand contracts, in order to facilitate greater
flexibility and also to better respond to and
control market changes.
• When setting prices, the oil price index as
well as the standard diversified price index
must be included.
• When estimating the competitiveness of the
price, it is necessary to consider factors such
as the risks involved in the project and the
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commercial structure; risks can be mitigated
by using rolling contracts for purchasing
natural gas, which are also suitable for bal-
ancing domestic supply and demand.
The natural gas supply structure must involve
diverse geographic sources. Also we must attract
new participants in the import industry, encour-
aging more large-scale end users to purchase
natural gas on the international LNG market.
Such new customers, both electricity companies
and large-scale urban heating enterprises, will
bring great benefits to the market, and by
reducing the intermediate links this can improve
the efficiency of the natural gas value chain.
Supervision and regulations must be strength-
ened, and access by third parties to the relevant
facilities, such as receiving stations and the
pipeline network, must be effectively promoted
to ensure an efficient, unimpeded flow of natural
gas imports into the country.
Third, natural gas trade and foreign invest-
ment must be bolstered using commercial prin-
ciples. Encouraging foreign investment in natural
gas, especially in the “One Belt, One Road”
region and by the major gas-producing countries,
is particularly beneficial for safeguarding the
security of natural gas supply, as well as being
beneficial to extending the commercial cover to
more segments in the natural gas value chain. It
also helps the chain to withstand the risks of
price fluctuations. When developing foreign
trade and investment in natural gas, in order to
consistently maintain commercial principles, we
must not adhere only to national strategic guid-
ance, but must also make the utmost effort to
obtain commercial benefits, and make economic
viability a foundation of project partner-
ship. Naturally, in order to realistically tackle the
problem of contracts signed at the time of high
prices, a new mechanism of sharing the historical
cost between enterprises and the state can be
explored.




Pipeline network is key infrastructure and its
construction must be advanced moderately, and







































Fig. 1.5 Proportion of natural gas imports and import diversity in selected countries. Note The Herfindahl index is
used to measure and describe varied indicators. The lower the value, the higher the diversification
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its unified planning, interconnectivity and dis-
patch flexibility strengthened. Specific measures
are outlined below.
First, the construction of pipeline network
infrastructure must be accelerated and transmis-
sion capacity increased. China’s 2020 natural gas
market demand will be approximately 350 bil-
lion m3, and 580 billion in 2030. Knowing that
resource supply to demand ratio must be 1:1.1
and the transfer capability to demand ratio 1:1.15
in order to ensure proper distribution and allo-
cation within the market, we can see that the
capacity of the pipeline network must reach
400 billion m3/year in 2020, and 670 billion in
2030. At the end of 2014 the transmission
capacity of China’s pipeline network stood at
240 billion m3, capable of satisfying just 60% of
the 2020 transmission demand and 36% of the
2030 transmission demand. Therefore, the con-
struction of pipeline network infrastructure must
be accelerated in order to meet the demands of
the growing market. Efforts must be made to
extend the total pipeline network length to
15,000 km by 2020, achieving transmission
capability of over 400 billion m3, and 26,000 km
and 690 billion m3 respectively by 2030. The
aim is to achieve a pattern of “western gas to the
East, northern gas goes South, eastern gas arrives
by sea, using the nearest supply”. In other words,
Central Asia imports of gas supply the North
West of China, Myanmar supplies gas to the
South West, the North of China will be supplied
by Russia, and Eastern China by maritime
imports of LNG, forming four great import
pathways. Between 2020 and 2030 Lines A, B,
C, and D of the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline
will achieve transmission capacity of 85 bil-
lion m3, the Myanmar–China Pipeline a mini-
mum capacity of 10 billion, the Russia–China
pipeline 68–69 billion, while LNG imports are
expected to realise a reception capability of
100 million tons.
Second, the construction of pipeline network
must achieve optimal layout and interconnectiv-
ity. The fundamental idea is to create intercon-
nectivity by constructing a backbone trunk of the
long-distance national pipeline, equipped with
hubs and tie-lines. The flexibility of allocation
control will be achieved by provincial-level
backbone pipeline trunks running through dif-
ferent hubs. Underground reservoirs and LNG
reception terminals will be connected to the
national pipeline network and the adjacent
provincial and metropolitan markets will form a
regional network. Specific measures required are:
• Achieve interconnectivity of the main trunk
of the national pipeline network. The inter-
connectivity of the main trunk relies first on
the key hubs at the junctions of the network.
Such hubs have been formed in Zhongwei in
Ningxia, Yongqing in Hebei and also in
Shanghai and Guangdong. Among these,
Ninxia’s Zhongwei is the junction on the
route connecting Western China to the East,
and is connected to the system transporting
Western gas eastwards, linking up the Xin-
jiang coal methane pipeline, the Shaanxi–
Beijing pipeline, the Zhongwei–Jingbian
pipeline and the Zhongwei–Guizhou pipeline.
Zhongwei brings together the gas from Cen-
tral Asia, from Xinjiang’s and Changqing’s
gas fields as well as the Xinjiang coal
methane. Yongqing in Hebei is northern
China’s regional hub; it connects the
Shaanxi–Beijing Pipeline, the Russia–China
Natural Gas Pipeline, the gas storage reser-
voirs in northern China and the Tianjin–Hebei
resources pipeline. It is the northern region’s
centre for the regulation of the natural gas
flow, it optimises natural gas allocation and
mitigates peak demand. Many lines of the
backbone national pipeline traverse Hubei
Province, which is a key hub in South Central
China, a key junction connecting the supplies
of conventional gas and coal methane from
Xinjiang, the imported gas from Central Asia
and Russia, as well as shale natural gas from
Sichuan and Chongqing. Shanghai, an
important natural gas market centre, is not
only an important hub for China’s West to
East Pipeline’s Pipelines 1 and 2, and the
Sichuan to East Pipeline, it also receives gas
from the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and also a
large quantity of LNG imports. Shanghai is a
gas trading hub and is also a national pricing
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benchmark, and the city is destined to become
a national hub in the future. Guangdong
Province is an important natural resources
hub, and in the future will form a staging area
for different types of gas. Its supply structure
is varied, with pipeline gas, sea gas and LNG,
and its supply pipelines include China’s West
to East Pipeline’s Pipelines 2 and 3, the
Xinjiang–Guangdong–Zhejiang pipeline, sea
gas and also LNG terminals. Guangdong is
the most diversified province as far as sources
of gas are concerned, and several different
categories of gas resources are pooled here,
including conventional gas, coal methane, sea
gas and LNG (Fig. 1.6).
• Unified planning, interconnectedness and
flexible deployment of resources of
provincial-level pipelines are a priority—in
order to avoid replication of infrastructure and
loss of efficiency, the infrastructure con-
struction must take place under a unified
planning programme and proceed step by step
according to the degree of market develop-
ment. The provincial natural gas companies
must be in charge of the construction and
operation of the provincial pipelines and peak
regulation facilities. However, provincial gas
companies must not purchase natural resour-
ces. This is done by the downstream cus-
tomers negotiating directly with upstream
suppliers.
• Because of factors such as administrative
divisions and examination and approval red
tape, the structure and development of
regional pipeline networks, apart from the
trans-provincial long-distance pipeline and its
tie-lines, is largely concentrated within the
borders of provinces, creating large natural
gas consumption gaps between neighbouring
provinces or economically similar provinces.
In the future, relying on government guidance
and support, pipeline network tie-lines must
be built to connect the backbone provincial
pipelines, achieving resource complementar-
ity, bolstering regional natural gas industry
development and improving the regional
pipeline network system.
Third, overall planning of infrastructure con-
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Fig. 1.6 National natural gas pipeline concept
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supervision of the schedules of planned projects.
Currently, infrastructure construction in China is
mainly carried out by the three major oil and gas
companies, with no effective links between them.
As the infrastructure keeps improving, the inter-
connectedness of the infrastructure layout will
become crucial in ensuring the security and sta-
bility of the functioning of China’s natural gas
industry. This will become especially significant
in the future following the construction of the
Xinjiang–Guangdong–Zhejiang Pipeline, West
to East Pipeline Lines 4 and 5, and the Russia–
China Pipeline, as well as of coastal terminals
and underground storage reserves. Effective
infrastructure interconnection can only be
achieved if effective co-ordination is included in
the planning stage. For this reason, the govern-
ment departments must become involved in
infrastructure construction, carrying out com-
prehensive co-ordination and strengthening the
supervision, regulation and control of the con-
struction projects. In order for the planning tar-
gets to be implemented, the progress and the
actual status of the projects must also be tracked.
Fourth, we must diversify the investors. China
encourages and supports all categories of capital
to participate in investment into the construction
of infrastructure under the umbrella of unified
planning. The three major oil and gas companies
must open up their investment rights for the
construction of the national backbone pipeline,
and private capital must be attracted to this area.
The monopoly of the provincial gas companies
on infrastructure construction must be broken.
By attracting private capital to participate in the
infrastructure construction, we will bolster
infrastructure construction and raise construction
capacity. Attracting new shareholders, such as
the National Council for Social Security Fund,
urban infrastructure industrial investment funds
and Baosteel, will break the established pattern
of 100% investment by the three major oil and
gas companies, and establish private capital in
the construction of the national backbone
long-distance natural gas pipeline. The planned
West to East Pipeline Lines 4 and 5 and the
Xinjiang–Guangdong–Zhejiang Pipeline must,
using the method applied for West to East
Pipeline Line 3, create a joint capital venture
using private capital. Investor diversification in
long-distance pipeline infrastructure will be
achieved by bringing in investors other than one
of the three major oil and gas companies. To
accelerate provincial infrastructure construction,
those provinces with their own gas companies
must attract private capital with a desire for
investment and the necessary investment eligi-
bility to form investment partnerships. The con-
struction rights for the provincial branches of the
main pipeline network must be completely lib-
eralised and the eligible enterprises will be
allowed to take part in infrastructure construction
and operation, in accordance with national and
local government’s planning.
1.5.4 Accelerate the Construction




Natural gas storage and peak regulation are
extremely important in ensuring the smooth
operation of natural gas supply. Currently, Chi-
na’s effective storage capacity stands at approx-
imately 4 billion m3, merely 2.2% of the
consumption volume, very different to the 15–
20% observed in developed countries. The sys-
tems of organisation are also inadequate. The
specific recommendations are as follows.
• Clear targets must be set for the construction
of gas storage facilities. Natural gas storage
facilities in China must be built in accordance
with the scale of China’s future natural gas
consumption, taking into account the current
peak regulation capacity, the conditions of the
underground storage reservoirs and the
advancements in the construction of LNG
terminals, as well as drawing on the experi-
ence of major foreign gas consumer countries.
The integrated system of the underground
storage facilities and LNG storage facilities
will, by 2020, have a storage capacity
of 30 billion m3 of natural gas and
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5–10 billion m3 of LNG. With a working
storage capacity of 35–40 billion m3, this
provides a storage equal to 10–11% of the
total demand and will transform the current
peak regulation method of reducing customer
demand. At the same time, in order to guar-
antee supply security of key regions, the
national natural gas emergency response
system must be set up as quickly as possible,
specific emergency plans perfected, and an
early warming emergency response system
built. During the period leading up 2030, the
scale and capacity of the storage system for
peak regulation must continue to be gradually
expanded, and the working capacity of stor-
age facilities expanded to 65 billion m3, or
12% of the total demand, converging with the
global average. Around 2030, the strategic
storage capacity must reach approximately
5% of the import volume in order to create an
emergency reserve storage system that is
capable of dealing effectively with demand
and supply fluctuations and able to cover the
full national demand.
• Emergency peak regulation reserves storage
construction must be accelerated and its lay-
out optimised. The first step is to boost the
pace of the construction of large-scale natural
gas storage reservoirs and LNG tanks for
winter peak emergency. In northern,
north-eastern and north-western regions of
China, where the seasonal peak/trough dif-
ference in gas consumption is very large, and
where there is no shortage of locations to
build the storage facilities, priority must be
given to the construction of underground
storage facilities, as well as supplementary
small and medium-scale liquefying facilities
and LNG terminal tanks. For peak regulation
in Central and South Western China, with its
specific geological conditions and the prox-
imity of oil- and gas-producing areas, it is
possible to use depleted oil and gas pools to
construct underground storage reservoirs, and
at the same time use the upstream gas fields,
supplementing this with small and
medium-sized LNG installations. In eastern
and southern China and other regions with
rather inadequate conditions for the con-
struction of underground storage reservoirs,
priority must be given to the construction of
LNG tanks, while underground reservoirs and
small and medium-sized tanks can be used as
a supplementary system for peak regulation.
The second step is to prioritise the construc-
tion of small-scale gas storage facilities in
order to satisfy daily peak regulation needs.
In cities with high natural gas consumption,
in order to solve the important problem of
daily peak time demand, free hand must be
given to gas companies, and the construction
of small-scale LNG tanks and CNG spherical
storage vessels must be accelerated. Further-
more, it is worth considering using the newly
discovered large-scale gas fields as storage
facilities (with strong regulation capacity),
but the relevant technology and incentive
measures must be researched first.
• Formulating the laws and regulations on gas
reserve storage facilities, and thus clearly
defining the obligations of the operating nat-
ural gas companies, is of critical importance.
The national policies and regulations must be
improved as quickly as possible so as to
ensure the optimal external policy environ-
ment for both the structure and the institu-
tional framework. Enterprises must receive
encouragement to become engaged in the
construction of storage facilities and research
must be launched into innovative storage
facility operational models. National rules
and laws on the management of natural gas
storage facilities must draw on international
experience, and clearly state the organisa-
tional and managerial roles and their duties
and obligations, as well as create a graded
management system for storage facilities.
While strategic gas storage reserves remain a
responsibility of the state, the responsibility
and duty for the daily and hourly peak regu-
lation must be shouldered by the provincial
and municipal gas companies, together with
the operation of, and all the investment
required by, the regulation storage facilities.
• Pricing and taxation policy for gas storage
must be improved. The gap between the peak
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and the trough prices is a reflection of the
value of the natural gas at peak hours. We
recommend that China introduces
peak-trough price differences for all types of
customers, which will lead to rational con-
sumption, and the reduction in peak and
trough differences this causes will the raise
the operating efficiency of the system. In the
United States and France, the difference
between peak and trough prices is usually a
factor between 1.2 and 1.5. January–February
and November–December will be designated
as peak gas usage season, when peak pricing
will be implemented, with the price rising
above the gas prices at that time, establishing
a rational mechanism for pricing. The tariffs
can then be calculated on the basis of the
operating costs of storage reservoirs and
storage facilities, and on the basis of the
internal return rate approved by the govern-
ment. The government approves the price
level, but periodic evaluation and adjustment
of storage reservoir prices must be carried
out. The formulation of preferential policies
and measures will further encourage enter-
prises to become involved in the construction
of storage facilities. The recommendation is
for the government to apply preferential
policies to the costs of the construction of
storage facilities. Here the government can
use the law regarding commercial oil reserves
as a reference, where the upstream supplier
can offset 30% of the cost of LNG used in
storage and of the total cost of the investment
into the construction of LNG emergency peak
regulation storage faculties against tax. This
will encourage upstream suppliers to set up an
appropriate amount of LNG storage, enabling
them to counter the problem of temporary
supply disruptions or excessive peak demand.
• Reform of the management system of gas
storage must be accelerated. Taking into
account the Chinese gas industry’s special
characteristics, future gas storage operations
in China may at first adopt an operating
model that is not fully market-based, with
independent storage operating companies set
up within companies managing pipeline
transmission. Gas storage facilities will thus
become independent profit-making bodies,
which will not only help the gas storage
industry to operate in a more professional and
market-oriented way, but will also support
independent market price setting. As China’s
gas storage services industry develops at great
speed, there will be a developing tendency for
storage services to separate from pipeline
transmission services, becoming an indepen-
dently operating link. The diversification of
peak regulation storage facilities construction
must be encouraged. For this purpose, an
independent state-owned enterprise, munici-
pal gas companies and independent storage
operating companies must be formed to create
a diversified system, which will help to
ensure natural gas supply security and fast
growth in gas storage capacity.
• An effective early warning emergency
response system must be set up. The first step
will be to establish a forecasting and early
warning system. Statistical data monitoring
and evaluation and information dissemination
mechanisms must be established as soon as
possible, communication channels must be
fully integrated, and the system responsible
for information and natural resources statis-
tics collection must be continuously upgra-
ded. Next, an emergency response system
covering all the aspects of the natural gas
industrial chain—production, transportation
and sales—must be set up. Different levels of
contingency plans must be decided upon in
accordance with the specific enterprise and
regional characteristics. In order to guarantee
timely, rigorous and authoritative emergency
response, overall co-ordination must be
entrusted to the National Energy Commis-
sion, establishing an assessment system and a
decision-making mechanism capable of han-
dling major events in the natural resource
sphere, as well as providing feedback and
information disclosure.
• Finally, research must be conducted into the
appropriate scale of strategic natural gas
reserves. On a global perspective, the gas
industry has not yet seen an international
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supply crisis like the oil industry has, and
there are no prominent security issues. How-
ever, compared to the oil industry, the gas
industry harbours a great potential risk—it
has a high degree of integration between the
downstream, midstream and upstream.
A problem at any of these points can have an
effect on supply security. The Russia–Ukraine
gas war of 2009 is one such example. For this
reason, China must, as soon as possible, on
the basis of its commercial reserves, start
researching the issue of strategic gas storage
reserves, evaluating the future mid- and
long-term trends in national and international
natural gas security, commencing preliminary
planning, and formulating a strategic reserves
scope and model suitable for China.




By expanding joint research and co-operation
with foreign partners in science and technology,
innovative, advanced technology must be
developed and deployed. The technology of
exploration, extraction and production of shale
natural gas, suitable for the specific nature of
Chinese geology and subterranean structure,
must be clearly understood, and a China-specific,
cost-effective, environmentally friendly and
scalable solution developed:
• Equipment: To begin with, there should be a
switch to more powerful equipment, to reduce
the quantity of equipment and the scale of
well sites and to facilitate operations in
mountainous terrain. Following that, a switch
should be made to module-based,
smaller-sized, portable equipment for those
operations in areas with geologically complex
terrain.
• Cost reduction: In order to achieve
large-scale cost reduction, we must actively
work on research on the crucial and
complementary areas of technologically
optimal design and low-cost fracturing fluids.
• Environmental protection: The safety and
environment-friendliness of the additives
used must be guaranteed. In the next three to
five years, the aim is to achieve, through
innovation and the introduction of advanced
technology, an economically viable system
for shale natural gas that addresses China’s
specific needs.
We must strive to achieve, after 2020, a
mature and complementary shale natural gas
industry capable of developing its own technol-
ogy. We must bolster research into shale natural
gas geology, and explore advanced yet workable
methods for shale natural gas exploration and
commercialisation.
The intensity of technological innovation
must be increased. There must be a focus on
making key technological breakthroughs, and
greater input must be applied to the research in
key common technology in areas such as
unconventional gas extraction, deep sea gas
industry development, and LNG storage and
transportation facilities. Strategic planning must
be carried out, as soon as possible, with regard to
research and development of key technologies in
eight major areas—shale natural gas extraction,
sea gas exploitation, coal seam gas extraction,
methane hydrate extraction, coal gas,
gas-powered vehicles (ships) engine manufac-
turing, combined cycle gas turbine generator
units, and carbon capture and storage. While
focusing on achieving breakthroughs in key
technologies, we must also carry out, in advance,
fundamental research in the relevant fields.
Finally, innovative energy technologies
require an innovative management system. The
national energy authorities must take the lead,
and organise and co-ordinate the work of the
ministries of technology, national resources,
industry and information technology, finance,
environmental protection and of the Standard-
ization Administration. Every organisation’s role
and responsibility in supporting natural gas
technological innovation should be clearly
defined. The supporting policies must be
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formulated according to the special characteris-
tics of generic technologies in order to strengthen
the support system for innovative natural gas
technologies. A national unconventional natural
gas research laboratory must be set up, bringing
together human, material and financial resources
to achieve breakthroughs in the key areas of
technology.
1.6 Constructing a Modern Natural
Gas Market Mechanism
and Management System
Expanding supply and demand, raising efficiency
and safeguarding supply safety all require a
reform of the institutional mechanisms. The ori-
entation of such reforms is identical with the
reform spirit and the orientation of the Third
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China. Namely, while
the decisive role must be given to market and
resource allocation, the government role must
also be applied to the greatest possible extent. In
order to rationalise the comparative prices for
natural gas and alternative energy sources, a
pricing system and a green finance system must
be set up which reflect the degree of scarcity of
natural resources, the supply and demand rela-
tionship, and the external cost of environmental
damage. Diversified competition and greater
openness to foreign involvement must be boosted
at all the stages of the natural gas industrial
chain, but we must also at the same time
strengthen the regulations regarding market
access fairness and general services in order to
establish a diversified, opened, orderly and
modern market system. Specific measures are as
follows.
1.6.1 Liberalisation of the Upstream
Sector and True Import
Liberalisation
In order to have competition in the natural gas
market, it must have a certain number of partic-
ipants. The United States and Europe are
examples of classic competitive markets, with
many players and vigorous competition at every
stage, from exploration and production, and
storage and transportation, to wholesale and
retail and market hubs. Resource acquisition is
the prerequisite of natural gas usage, but in this
industry it is often the upstream producers that
control the operations and the profit allocation
along the entire industrial chain. For this reason,
the liberalisation of access to upstream explo-
ration and development is crucial for the growth
of the natural gas market.
Market Characteristics of Major
Countries
The characteristics of a competitive,
responsive, fluid natural gas market are:
• The number of participants in the mar-
ket must exceed a certain number: a
greater variety of services is made
available to consumers by greater mar-
ket participation and midstream
competition.
• Competitive prices at wholesale and
retail levels.
• Non-discriminating liberalised market
access, including access to infrastruc-
ture facilities such as pipeline network,
storage reservoirs and LNG terminals
(Table 1.2).
Currently the oil and gas concessions in China
are almost entirely concentrated in the hands of
large oil companies. Nationwide, the total area of
registered oil and gas exploration concessions
stands at 4 million km2, and the area granted to
the three main oil companies—Sinopec, Petro-
China and China National Offshore Oil Corpo-
ration—stands at 3.9 million km2 or 97% of the
total. The area of registered mining concession is
approximately 118,000 km2, of which
117,000 km2 (99%) belongs to the three main oil
companies. Exploration and development of
unconventional gas resources, such as shale and
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coal bed gas, has already been opened up to a
variety of different enterprises, but the number of
exploration blocks is limited. Furthermore, the
three main oil companies still enjoy the leading
positions in the development of the unconven-
tional gas resources due to the fact that under
many circumstances the degree of the overlap
between non-conventional gas (mainly shale
natural gas) and conventional gas blocks is very
high. Moreover, in the import segment of the
industrial chain, even though policy allows a
greater number of enterprises to participate in the
natural gas import trade, currently, because of the
limiting factors such as reception terminals, the
number of players in the domestic natural gas
trade market is still very limited, being restricted
to a few enterprises such Huadian Group, Jiufeng
Energy and ENN Energy.
Solving the problems which plague the issue of
mining concessions, such as over-concentration,
“enclosure without prospecting” and “control
without development” is a crucial part of the
comprehensive, deep upstream reform of the
industry. For this reason, starting with the existing
laws, regulations and management methods, the
maximum effort must be exerted to promote
investment diversification, and improve market
access standards. The tender bid system must be
comprehensively applied to natural gas conces-
sions, and we must push forward, in an orderly
and efficient manner, the construction of primary
and secondary prospecting and mining rights
markets, while at the same time putting funda-
mental natural gas resource data to work for the
public benefit.
Regarding imports, we must, on the one hand,
expand the standardisation, public disclosure and
transparency of the approval process for built
facilities, such as receiving terminals, and, on the
other hand, draw on the international experience,
producing detailed policy regarding third-party
access, and effectively strengthening the neces-
sary regulation. We must compel those enter-
prises that meet the necessary conditions to turn
Table 1.2 Natural gas market characteristics of major countries and regions







689 269 38 3 0.5 115





40 30 30 65 50 15
Industry 20 20 10 5 20 45
Pipeline (km) 500k 200k 8k 5k 4k 50k





Access openness Upstream ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Transmission ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Allocation diversified diversified ✓ X X X
Unbundling of transportation
and sales rights
✓ diversified ✓ X X X
Independent (federal)
market power
✓ ✓ ✓ X X X
Liquidity market centres ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X
Note The above data is from 2013, but the data for China’s natural gas consumption for electricity generation and by
industry is given at 2011 levels
Source Vivid Economics, and based on IEA, EIA, Chinese Government and ENTSOG data
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towards the natural gas import industry (pipeline
transmission and LNG) and make independent
choices to engage in natural gas imports.




Natural gas reform is key to resolving the
numerous conflicts in the natural gas sector. Such
reform must not only focus on adjusting natural
gas price levels. The focus must also be on the
reform of the pricing mechanism.
1. The netback method must be improved fur-
ther, as quickly as possible. First, price reg-
ulation frequency must be adjusted, and
efforts must be made to achieve seasonal
regulation as soon as possible. Second, the oil
price levels and depreciation indices used as a
reference for price adjustment must, to the
greatest possible extent, reflect the changes in
the price of alternative energy sources, rather
than be based on the high-price import costs
paid previously by the three large gas and oil
companies.
2. The cost and the prices for gas transmission
using long-distance pipelines, pipeline bran-
ches, provincial and metropolitan pipelines,
and distribution pipelines must be determined
on a scientific and rational basis. In addition,
the regulation in this sector must be
strengthened and the return on pipeline
investment rate adjusted from 12% down to
8–10%. The current situation of inflated
transmission and distribution prices must be
reformed in order to create a more optimal
environment for price reform and for the
development of the natural gas reform
industry.
3. Improvements must be made in the imple-
mentation of seasonal price differences, the
peak and trough price differences, intermittent
supply prices and storage prices. Measure-
ment standards and valuation methods must
be revised (from being based on flow rate or
quality, to a valuation based on calorific
value) and at the same time we must
strengthen, both in technological and admin-
istrative areas, the supervision and checks of
pricing violations. The problem of the lack of
organisation in tax collection by local gov-
ernments must be solved as quickly as pos-
sible. Currently, as part of the natural gas
price adjustment fund, the local government
levies a fee of between 0.3 and 1 CNY/m3 of
natural gas sold, which adds to the burden on
the consumer. This practice must be abol-
ished. The aim is to gradually rationalise the
price of natural gas for residential use.
4. Price liberalisation must be carried out in
areas which comply with the necessary con-
ditions. In areas with multiple sources of
natural gas and abundant supply, such as the
eastern regions of Shanghai, Guangdong,
Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the imports of natural
gas must be liberalised by allowing
third-party access to infrastructure; liberali-
sation must also extend to the gate price of
every province, with prices decided directly
by the up- and downstream users.
5. The construction of regional trading hubs
should be promoted. The construction of the
Shanghai and Guangdong hubs can be pushed
forward in the near future. In the medium and
long term, new regional hubs can be set up in
Beijing, Sichuan, Hubei, Ningxia and Xin-
jiang. Efforts must also be made to make the
Shanghai hub into an Asian, and even inter-
national, natural gas trade hub. Eventually,
the Shanghai hub will develop into a trading
hub system where its international pricing
hub capability can interact with that of a
multi-regional hub, acting as a link and
comprehensively connecting the domestic
and the foreign demand and supply. The
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trading hubs must first engage in spot trading,
then expand its trade volume and scope, and
only then commence developing trading in
futures, increasing the market depth.
The Function, the Conditions and the
Implementation Phases of Trading
Hubs
Spot trading provides greater flexibility
and fluidity to long-term contracts, and its
role in international natural gas trade is
continuing to grow. Trading hubs have two
important roles. The first is to physically
bring together the sellers and the buyers,
and the second is to allow for the compe-
tition to decide the prices. For this reason,
as the signal of market-oriented pricing
raises the economic efficiency of the trad-
ing and investment decisions, correspond-
ingly lowering trading costs, market
participants will benefit. Moreover, the
trading hubs can, by using the pricing
mechanisms, also solve the problem of
supply and demand imbalance, safeguard-
ing the security of gas supply. The poten-
tial shortcomings are that the prices might
experience intense short-term fluctuations,
since they are decided entirely by compe-
tition, and led entirely by
non-governmental market forces. The data
shows that price fluctuations are often
greater when prices are set using the trade
hub method than when set using oil price
as a standard.
The success of trading hubs depends on
three prerequisites. First, there must be
non-discriminatory access to an improved
and open natural gas transmission pipeline
network for the market participants to
operate in. Liberalisation of the pipeline
network is the key to successfully liberal-
ising prices, and failure to meet this con-
dition can cause the natural gas supply,
regardless of whether the gas is domesti-
cally produced or imported, or transported
by pipeline or as LNG, to be unable to link
up with local demand. Second, many of the
independent buyers and sellers actively
take part in arbitrage trade, and none have
strong market allocation capacity. For this
reason, the trading hubs must be guided by
competitive prices, thereby avoiding the
problem of the market forces influencing
and distorting prices and trade volume.
Third, the government must support the
liberalisation of prices on the wholesale
gas market, along with providing stable,
transparent and reliable regulations. The
trading hubs must place priority on arbi-
trage trade, which will raise market oper-
ational efficiency, but the arbitration trade
must rely on accurate and highly trans-
parent reports of natural gas prices.
China has many of the conditions nec-
essary to become Asia’s regional natural
gas trading hub: the scale of its natural gas
production, the growth of its pipeline net-
work and the volume of its LNG imports.
Moreover, other Asian countries cannot
match China on the Asian natural resources
market. However, the Chinese market is
still comparatively centralised, third-party
access to the pipeline network is still sub-
standard, and the prices remain under the
government control. These factors will
hinder the establishment of trading hubs.
A roadmap for the next 5–10 year devel-
opment of China’s natural gas trading hubs
must be formulated. First, pilot projects
must be launched. A mechanism compris-
ing third-party access to pipeline network
and transparent prices can be set up in the
Shanghai region, creating the conditions of
competitive natural gas demand and sup-
ply. Then the area allocated to pilot pro-
jects can be expanded, new categories of
sellers and buyers added, while at the same
time strengthening market supervision.
Gradually, as the effectiveness of the pilot
project grows, it will attract a growing
number of producers and consumers. As
more and more different organisations join
the hub trade, the network effect can be
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achieved, increasing the advantages of the
hub. Both the hub’s scale and its role in
setting prices will continue to grow until
the hub becomes limited by the size of the
land area allocated to it.
With price liberalisation action as a founda-
tion, it is also necessary to use the regulatory role
of taxation policy, and to establish and improve
the policy system of environmental taxation and
carbon trading. Environmental tax and carbon tax
can be used as an incentive mechanism to expand
the natural gas industry, and will also send out a
powerful signal to the investors. The period of
the 13th Five-Year Plan must witness the for-
mulation and appearance of the environmental
tax, the expansion of carbon trading and the
establishment of a robust national market,
expanding across the entire economy, including
primary, secondary and tertiary markets, and
integrated into the global market.




In order to ensure the fairness of market trans-
actions, we must, in accordance with the
demands of the Third Plenum, push forward with
the separation of pipeline network from natural
gas transmission services. The detailed methods
are outlined below.
First, we must push forward with the separa-
tion of pipeline network from natural gas trans-
mission services. Both international experience
and the practices established in China indicate
that unbundling of services, accounting and legal
affairs alone is not sufficient; the key is to achieve
the unbundling of functions and structure. If it is
successful, and is backed up with robust regula-
tion, the splitting of ownership rights is not
required. More specifically, in order to complete
these three tasks, we must first, as fast as possi-
ble, push forward the unbundling of services,
accounting and legal affairs; pipelines already
built can remain in the possession of the three
main oil and gas companies, but their company
branches must be turned into subsidiaries. As for
the newly built pipelines, here the three main
companies can take the lead, but a diversity of
investors must be brought in. The three major
companies must be encouraged to form consor-
tiums with up- and downstream enterprises,
especially those engaged in natural gas services,
for joint investment, construction and operations.
Even more important is to provide the gas
transportation companies with business scope,
cost regulations, operational methods and infor-
mation disclosure methods. The transportation
companies must have independent management
rights, and the information disclosure by the
parent company, the affiliated companies and
other companies must be synchronised.
Unbundling of the Natural Gas Pipe-
line Network and Natural Gas
Transmission
The unbundling of services in itself is not
very effective. In the United Kingdom, in
the early stages of this process, the domi-
nant position of the established brand,
British Gas, hindered competition. In
Japan, where the degree of unbundling of
accounting and functioning was not strong
enough at the early stages, the unbundling
of services did not have much value. The
European experience also shows that the
unbundling of legal affairs on its own does
not have much use either, and must be
supplemented by deeper structural
unbundling using measures such as func-
tional unbundling.
Functional unbundling is a crucial fac-
tor in the entire unbundling process.
Functional unbundling often involves a
series of restrictions and requirements
which affect the operations of midstream
services (regardless of whether or not they
are an independent legal entity). Unbund-
ling includes the following: establishment
of an independent trademark and brand;
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data processing restrictions; unbundling of
auxiliary services such as legal affairs,
accounting and IT; management unbund-
ling; and compliance and reporting plan-
ning (Table 1.3).
If the regulatory mechanism is suffi-
ciently robust, there is no need for owner-
ship rights to be unbundled. Only the UK
and The Netherlands have carried out
ownership rights unbundling. The French
and German policy makers advocate
structural unbundling without the unbund-
ling of ownership rights, and the latest
European Union natural gas directives
have stipulated robust regulatory measures
in order to boost structural unbundling.
According to this new reform plan, the
large-scale electricity and gas enterprises
must choose one of the following three
reform programmes:
• unbundling of ownership rights and
sale of the pipeline transportation net-
work, achieving a complete separation
of pipeline network and transmission;
• unbundling of operational rights while
preserving the pipeline network own-
ership rights, but with the establishment
Table 1.3 Five methods for the unbundling natural gas pipeline network and natural gas transmission
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able to sell the natural gas to







profits and costs, and be
separated from the up- and
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favourable conditions for the
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Midstream business become a
separate legal entity, but
remain vertically integrated
into the company structure,
for example as a
wholly-owned subsidiary
A legal duty for the subsidiary
company to become credited
as a legal person.
Management unbundling can
be more effective if done as an
independent legal entity
A separate legal entity must





separation of the midstream
business operations policy
incentive mechanism from the
incentive mechanism of up-
and downstream enterprises
Separation of the midstream
business operations incentive
mechanism from the relevant
entities, creation of a more
effective market by
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anti-competitive behaviour
Midstream business must be a
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defined actions and duties
Ownership
unbundling
All the midstream businesses
must be separated from the
vertically integrated company,
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independent ownership rights
Comprehensive unbundling of
ownership rights must achieve
the fullest possible separation
of midstream business from





with separate accounts and
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of an independent company (indepen-
dent system operator) to run the pipe-
line network transmission operations;
• management rights unbundling while
retaining the possession and operation
of pipeline transmission, but the man-
agement of the pipeline transmission
must be handed over to an independent
subsidiary endowed with management
and decision-making rights (indepen-
dent transmission operator).
The reform programme also requires all
member states to set up an independent
regulatory mechanism in order to ensure
that the large enterprises carry out effective
“separation of production and supply” and
truly implement the principles of free
competition in the energy market. The
American experience also shows that a
competitive gas market can be sustained
without the compulsory unbundling of
ownership rights, provided that strict reg-
ulations are imposed on the operations of
transmission and supply companies. Under
normal circumstances a robust regulatory
system on its own is sufficient to achieve
effective structural unbundling.
Third-party access services must be provided
as soon as possible. Robust regulation must be
applied to the terms of access, service prices and
service quality, ensuring that the main operators
provide fair, impartial services, and creating the
conditions to cultivate a competitive market. In
order to establish detailed regulations regarding
third-party access, and thus ensure third-party
participation, we need to promote information
disclosure and strengthen the regulatory capacity.
An open and transparent oil and gas management
and operations information platform is required,
covering all the information relevant to industrial
operators, such as current excess production
capacity infrastructure and the conditions and
costs of third-party access.
Moreover, the unbundling of the pipeline
transmission business and sales business and
third-party access reform are complementary
when it comes to liberalising the free choices of
downstream users. The graded (according to the
volume of annual natural gas consumption) lib-
eralisation of large users’ direct choice of gas
suppliers must be pushed forward as soon as
possible. For this purpose, large users include
urban gas companies, electricity generating sta-
tions and CCHP stations with 20,000 kW
capacity, large enterprises (including raw mate-
rials and fuels) and LNG/CNG suppliers. The
storage and city distribution link of the natural
gas industrial chain must also gradually intro-
duce the third-party access mechanism for cus-
tomers at different consumption scales. Starting
with the largest annual non-residential users, an
annual schedule and the list of gas consumption
volume must be made, and the large
non-residential users can be presented with sup-
plier choices based on their own time schedule
and operations. The users may also choose to
avoid the urban gas distribution networks com-
pletely or chose solely the services of the city
distribution networks where the price is fixed by
the government.





When promoting marked-oriented reform of the
natural gas market, we need to strengthen com-
prehensive energy resource management and
professional regulation. The component parts of
this are: building a comprehensive energy man-
agement regulatory system; formulating a natural
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resource strategy, regulations and policies; con-
trolling and regulating the overall balance of
energy resources; ensuring energy resource
security; adjusting the energy resource structure;
adopting energy-saving and efficient manage-
ment practices; strengthening information col-
lection and analysis; supporting technological
innovation and international co-operation in
energy; and ensuring co-ordination with the rel-
evant departments.
We must strengthen the energy resource reg-
ulatory mechanism and maintain order in the
energy market, promote market competition in
the industry, and solve market disputes. The
authority and the position of the regulators must
be independent, and the regulators must make
correct decisions while extending equal treatment
to all players in the markets. The specific steps
are as follows:
• In the near future, we must further improve
the regulatory and co-ordinating mechanism.
The relevant departments must exercise better
communication, co-ordination and
co-operation when formulating regulatory
laws, rules and standards, national energy
development planning and strategies and
energy industry policies. The departments
must also improve their information sharing
and co-ordination during regulatory opera-
tions. On the local level, purely
provincial-level energy regulation depart-
ments must be established which will directly
send out professional regulation teams to any
locations required. Moreover, the central
regulatory authorities must carry out robust
inspection and supervision of the local regu-
latory departments.
• In the medium and long term, we need to set
up a unified energy regulatory mechanism.
This mechanism, apart from monitoring the
environment and national resources, must be
gradually given an economic and social reg-
ulatory function across the entire energy
industry chain. It will explicitly co-ordinate
its work with the relevant departments, with a
detailed breakdown of its duties and respon-
sibilities, and gradually become an indepen-
dent regulatory body. The final outcome must
be an independent, unified and professional
energy regulation mechanism, and a
top-down regulatory organisation system.
According to the convention of Chinese
administrative reform, in 2018 the adminis-
trative system will enter into an adjustment
phase and at that point these plans to build a
unified integrated energy management
mechanism and an energy regulation mecha-
nism can be considered.






of the Division of Labour
The experience of the American shale revolution
demonstrates that a development style that
involves diverse participants and the division of
labour can mobilise progress in many areas,
including venture capital, research and develop-
ment, upstream resource extraction, infrastruc-
ture, market development and terminal
applications. In a free competition environment,
highly specialised, technologically advanced
technical services companies can provide engi-
neering services such as horizontal drilling, well
completion, well cementing and multi-stage
fracturing, as well as technological services,
such as well logging and experimental testing, to
mining rights holders. Some companies can
simply withdraw after having completed their
services at a certain stage of the industrial chain,
and then be replaced by an enterprise from the
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next stage of the chain. High division of labour
has therefore turned the extraction of shale nat-
ural gas, at each stage, into a low-investment,
short-operating-cycle process with fast invest-
ment return. It has also attracted a great deal of
venture capital and private capital into the
extraction of shale natural gas. We must there-
fore exploit the role of market forces to the full
and strongly encourage the development of spe-
cialised technological services companies and
advanced technology companies in the oil and
gas industry. In accordance with the principle of
“demand for production, advances in technology,
excellence in reputation”, we should use methods
such as market forces and quality control to
regulate these service enterprises and their oper-
ations. We must organise specialised construc-
tion teams, and establish the system of rules for
each segment, including exploration, production,
cost, safety and environmental protection, with
the aim of achieving an orderly, standardised
operation of the production process, as well as
ensuring orderly exploration and production.
The policy measures needed to encourage the
development of specialised companies may
include tax breaks in the first instance. Another
method is to split off smaller auxiliary companies
from the large state-owned enterprises as part of
the reform of state-owned enterprises. These
venture exploration, oilfield and engineering
technology auxiliaries can, after becoming inde-
pendent, form specialised companies and inde-
pendently enter the market. There are several
advantages to this. First, the burden on the main
company will be lowered and operational effi-
ciency improved. Second, the development and
growth of the service companies will be
accelerated.
Despite the concerns expressed by some over
the survival of such auxiliary companies after
separation, experience has shown that many such
auxiliary companies have demonstrated excellent
growth as specialised operations. For example,
Bureau of Geophysical Prospecting Inc., China
National Petroleum Corporation, after leaving the
management of CNPCC and forming a spe-
cialised company, grew rapidly and became
strongly competitive internationally. It is now
ranked third globally in overall strength, and is in
a firm first place for ground operations. After
successful example is that of the subsidiaries of
China National Offshore Oil Corporation—China
National Oilfield Services and Offshore Oil
Engineering Company—which have shown
excellent progress.
A third possibility is to form a rational and
scientifically-based oil industrial chain—after the
split off the auxiliaries, the main company will
have a greater choice of specialist companies that
can provide services, and the auxiliaries will also
have more choices over their co-operation with
the main companies. In addition, expansion into
the international market can also follow. Even
more important is that specialised companies can
provide technology services to the new entrants
into the competitive market, which can break the
current technology monopoly.
1.7 Deepen the Laws
and Regulations System
of the Gas Sector, and Establish
a Sound Legal System
Although the formulation of the legal framework
for the gas sector in China is already in its initial
stages, the problems of lack of co-ordination and
systematisation and of inconsistency persist. For
example, China still lacks a specialised, com-
prehensive Oil and Gas Law to cover all the links
on the industrial chain. In the area of exploration
and production there is a legislation base from
the Mineral Resources Law and Solid Ore Min-
ing Law, and there is a common problem with
specification of mining resources, but it fails to
address the issues specific to the special
44 1 General Summary
properties of gas as a gaseous mining resource.
A great deal of the current legislation retains the
particularities of a command economy, with
restrictions on the acquisition and transfer of
mining rights. As a result, such legislation is
unsuitable for the requirements of market reform
and the special characteristics of natural gas. The
regulatory legislation and rules covering gas
transmission, storage and distribution at each
segment of the industrial chain from pipeline
network to end consumption, as well as those
covering environmental protection and other
aspects, remain unsound. The duties and the
obligations of the local government and the rel-
evant enterprises are not clearly defined. The
technology specifications and standards for a
modern natural gas industry require improvement
and standardisation, and the legal framework of
the natural gas sector must be overhauled as soon
as possible.
The key measure necessary is the establish-
ment of a sound Natural Gas Law, using a spe-
cialised gas law to support for the entire legal
framework. The laws and regulations must be
made more practical, adapting them to the special
characteristics of natural gas exploration, pro-
duction, transmission, storage and distribution,
and usage, and improving the drafting of the
specific rules and supporting regulations that are
needed. The natural gas-specific laws and regu-
lations must be formulated as quickly as possible.
When formulating and revising the Oil and Gas
Mining Rights Regulations, the Mid–and
Downstream Natural Gas Management Regula-
tions, the Natural Gas Extraction Environmental
Protection Regulations, the Sea Oil and Gas
Pipeline Management and Protection Regula-
tions, the Natural Gas Storage Regulations and
other such administrative regulations, the focus
must be on the legal system of the resources’
property rights, exploration and development
contracts, infrastructure construction, operational
management, storage, sales and usage, safety and
emergency warning and response system, pro-
duction safety and ecological benefit compensa-
tion, cross-border investment and imports,
exports and trade.
Conflicts between the Oil and Natural Gas
Pipeline Management and Protection Regulations
and other laws must be solved by resorting to the
judiciary. There is an urgent need to clarify many
areas: the co-ordination of pipeline development
planning and other specialised programmes, the
convergence of pipeline construction planning
and urban-rural planning, the legal definition of
the pipeline underground rights of passage, the
restrictions imposed by pipeline safety on land
use, and the conflict between pipeline safety and
the safety requirements of highways and
railways.
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PART I
Analysis of Natural Gas Demand
2Developments in Global Natural GasConsumption
China is a country rich in coal but lacking in oil.
For many years, coal has held the leading posi-
tion in the country’s energy mix, while petroleum
and natural gas consumption has been low.
Recently, with economic growth and increasing
energy consumption, the increasing pressure on
the environment brought about by the extensive
use of coal has led to unprecedented attention
being paid to the development of clean energy by
the state. On the supply side, the development of
shale natural gas, coalbed methane and other
unconventional gas sources has also been
accompanied by greater development of con-
ventional gas sources. Natural gas import vol-
umes are also expected to grow. If China’s
natural gas supply capabilities continue to grow
at the current rapid rates, then in the future sup-
ply will no longer be the primary obstacle to the
development of natural gas. Given these cir-
cumstances, research into applications for natural
gas and its development potential, allowing tar-
geted measures to support the growth of natural
gas consumption, is of major significance in the
promotion of the adoption of natural gas.
2.1 Major Factors Affecting Natural
Gas Consumption Growth
in Other Countries
In recent years, natural gas consumption grown
rapidly in many countries, so that it accounts for
an increasing proportion of energy used. China
can learn crucial lessons by analysing natural gas
consumption growth in these countries.
2.1.1 Proportion of Energy
Consumption of Natural
Gas in Various Countries
The horizontal axis in Fig. 2.1 indicates the
proportion of energy consumption represented by
natural gas (0–100%, divided equally into
10 groups) while the vertical axis indicates the
proportion of natural gas consumption of each
country compared to global natural gas con-
sumption. It is clear that, out of 103 countries (or
regions), there are 29 countries whose natural
gas proportion is between 0–10% of total energy
consumption and these 29 countries account for
8.34% of global natural gas consumption. There
are 14 countries whose natural gas consumption
is between 20–30% of total energy consumption
and these 14 countries account for around 32.7%
of global natural gas consumption. There are
another 19 countries whose natural gas con-
sumption is between 30–40% of total energy
consumption, accounting for around 19.64% of
* This chapter was overseen by Zhaoyuan Xu from the
Development Research Center of the State Council and
Martin Haigh from Shell International, with
contributions from Baosheng Zhang and Shouhai Chen
from the China University of Petroleum, Lianzeng Zhao
from the China Petroleum Planning Research Institute,
Linji Qiao from ENN and Juan Han from Shell China.
Other members of the research group participated in
discussions and revisions.
© The Editor(s) and The Author(s) 2017
Shell International and The Development Research Center (Eds.), China’s Gas Development Strategies,
Advances in Oil and Gas Exploration & Production, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59734-8_2
49
global natural gas consumption. There are few
countries where natural gas usage accounts for a
proportion greater than 40%, and these countries
often possess large quantities of natural gas
reserves. However, with the exception of Iran
and Russia, these countries are not major natural
gas consumers in terms of quantity. The majority
of global natural gas demand comes from coun-
tries where natural gas usage accounts for
between 20–30% and 30–40% of total energy
structure.
In order to analyse the prospective growth of
China’s natural gas consumption, we chose
seven countries to act as “benchmark countries”
for China, and carried out detailed analysis of the
growth in consumption of natural gas in these
seven countries. Each of these seven countries is
a major consumer of natural gas, and the pro-
portion of energy consumption accounted for by
natural gas has increased relatively quickly in
each case. Of these, four countries are developed
countries: the United States, Japan, Germany and
the United Kingdom. There are also three
emerging countries: Malaysia, Turkey and
Egypt. There are other major natural
gas-consuming nations where the proportion of
energy usage accounted for by natural gas is
quite high, but these have large natural gas
reserves, excluding them from the comparison
due to China’s relatively small reserves. In
addition, there are countries where growth in
natural gas consumption has been slow over a
number of decades, which are therefore not
suitable for adoption as “benchmarks” for the
analysis of China’s future natural gas demand
(Fig. 2.2).
Since 1982, the proportion of natural gas
consumption of these benchmark countries
exhibited major increases, especially in the three
emerging countries of Turkey, Malaysia and
Egypt, where natural gas proportions have risen
from very low levels to extremely high levels
over the past 30 years. During this same period,
the proportion of energy sources that natural gas
The majority of gas demand
occurs within 33 countries
that use gas for 20–40% of
their primary energy  
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Fig. 2.1 Proportion of energy consumption of each country accounted for by natural gas and proportion of global
natural gas consumption of each country. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on IEA and EIA data
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Fig. 2.2 Natural gas consumption in seven benchmark countries. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on
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Fig. 2.3 Changes between 1982 and 2012 in the proportion of natural gas consumption of seven benchmark countries.
Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on IEA data
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accounted for in China rose from 2% in 1982 to
4% in 2012 (Fig. 2.3). This indicates that an
increase in the proportion of energy sources
accounted for by natural gas could occur.




To carry out analysis of the natural gas con-
sumption growth in these seven benchmark
countries, we used index breakdown analysis
methods, carrying out quantified analysis of the
most important factors driving natural gas
demand, allowing the degree to which various
factors contributed to the growth in natural gas
demand to be calculated. The main factors
include economic activity, energy density and
fuel conversion.
1. Method of analysis
In different economic sectors, natural gas
demand changes are related to changes in eco-
nomic activity, energy density and proportion of
natural gas usage. Each economic sector’s natu-
ral gas demand can be expressed as a function
that includes a series of drivers (namely, eco-
nomic activity, energy density and proportion of
energy usage represented by natural gas), as










 share of energy
from gas i
In the equation above, the total natural gas
demand G is broken down into the sums of the
natural gas demand of various sectors Gi (i = 1,
…,n). The natural gas demand of each sector is
then broken down into three parts, namely each
sector’s economic total GVAi, energy intensity
Ei
GVAi
and natural gas share of total energy con-
sumption in the sector GiEi . Based on natural gas
demand functions, indexes can be set for each
driver, and these indexes can be broken down
again to quantify the change that occurs to nat-
ural gas demand due to changes in each driver
over a period of time. This kind of index
breakdown approach is called a logarithmic
mean Divisia index (LMDI). LMDI is a common
analytical method found in energy literature.
Based on the relative changes of each variable
driving factor, it breaks changes in overall nat-
ural gas demand into the effects of three factors.
This allows the analysis of natural gas growth
prospects from the perspective of each factor’s
development trends. Due to the limitations in the
data, the influence of fuel price changes has not
been eliminated from the LMDI used in this
analysis.
Theoretically speaking, these three driving
factors will affect natural gas demand in different
ways:
• Economic activity: As economic activity
grows, the energy input required by such
economic activity grows as well, so if all other
factors remain equal, natural gas demand will
also exhibit a corresponding increase.
• Energy intensity: When the level of eco-
nomic activity remains unchanged, then as
energy consumption intensity drops, the
amount of energy required to create the same
amount of economic activity is reduced, and
thus energy demand will drop. If all other
factors remain equal, total natural gas demand
will exhibit a corresponding drop.
• Conversion to natural gas: If a given eco-
nomic sector converts from coal or other fuels
to natural gas, then natural gas demand will
increase.
2. Breakdown of factors affecting interna-
tional natural gas demand
This section presents a breakdown of natural
gas demand changes in the seven benchmark
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countries between 1982 and 2012, and for China
between 2005 and 2012, based on LMDI.1
(I) Influence of economic growth on natural
gas consumption
As economic activity increases, each sector’s
natural gas demand will increase. Figure 2.4
shows the proportion that the increase in natural
gas demand as a result of economic growth
encountered in the seven benchmark countries
between 1982 and 2012 represents in terms of
actual growth in demand (treating actual total
natural gas growth in consumption as 100%). It
is clear that in these seven benchmark countries
the economic activities in all economic sectors
grew, and each sector’s natural gas demand also
rose. However, the most notable increases were
in the residential and public utility sectors. The
possible cause of this may have been that as
incomes increased, household heating expendi-
ture rose, and this was accompanied by increased
usage of natural gas in power systems to satisfy
the increased power demands. In addition, there
was a growth in natural gas demand for manu-
facturing in each country. This is an indication
that as economic activity increases, more natural
gas is needed to satisfy the ever-growing demand
for energy.
(II) Influence of energy intensity on natural
gas consumption
Reduced economic sector energy intensity
implies that the amount of natural gas required to
generate the same output has dropped. Natural
gas demand in China, the United States, Germany
and the United Kingdom has seen a net reduction,
which is primarily due to a decline in residential
and manufacturing energy intensity (Fig. 2.5).
There are also some countries, such as the United
States, Japan and Egypt, where the mining
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Fig. 2.4 Contribution of increased economic activity in increasing demand for natural gas. Source Formulated by
Vivid Economics based on UN and IEA data
1The period over which analysis is possible for China is
relatively short, mainly due to the difficulties encountered
in obtaining the pre-2005 data required to carry out this
analysis.
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have seen increases. However, since it is not
possible to break down mining industry, public
utility and heating plant data, the underlying
causes of these increases is difficult to analyse. In
addition, over the same period of time, the
non-gas-consuming sectors of the economy of
any particular country (such as economic activity
that requires electrical power) may also exhibit
reduced energy intensity, resulting in an overall
improvement in total energy intensity of these
countries, such as that encountered in Japan. The
results of this breakdown indicate that China, the
United States, Germany and the United Kingdom
all show reduced demand for natural gas as a
result of reduced energy intensity.
(III) Influence of fuel conversion on natural
gas consumption
Among the seven benchmark countries, all eco-
nomic sectors chose to reduce usage of other
fuels and to increase the proportion of natural
gas. In other words, they achieved fuel
switching. This is a major factor behind the
increase in natural gas demand (Fig. 2.6). The
effect was particularly marked in the mining and
public utility sectors, and their fuel conversion
and the corresponding natural gas demand
increase accounted for a large proportion of
growth in consumption. In addition, China,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Turkey,
among other countries, also saw residential usage
fuel conversion, which resulted in an increase in
demand for natural gas. In the United States and
Malaysia, manufacturing exhibited a relatively
large-scale transition towards natural gas. In
Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom, the
service industry also showed similar trends.
2.1.3 The Importance of Fuel
Switching in Natural Gas
Demand Growth
Figure 2.7 is a summary of each country’s















In all countries manufacturing
has become less energy-
intensive, reducing gas demand
Improved residential gas efficiency
in the UK has resulted in a major
reduction in the demand for gas
Fig. 2.5 Influence of energy intensity changes on natural gas demand. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based
on UN and IEA data
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Fig. 2.6 Influence of fuel switching on natural gas demand. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on UN and
IEA data
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Fig. 2.7 Factor breakdown of benchmark country natural gas demand: overall results. Source Formulated by Vivid
Economics based on UN and IEA data
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1982–2012 (China 2005–2012) (each country’s
natural gas demand total change is set at 100%),
giving an indication of the relative importance of
each factor. From Fig. 2.7 we can see that, apart
from the United States, in all other countries the
influence of switching from other fuels to natural
gas on natural gas demand was greater than that
of economic activity. This shows that the main
driver behind natural gas demand increases is the
choice to adopt natural gas as a replacement for
other fuels.
Analysis of this breakdown found that the
nature of natural gas demand in the United
Kingdom was different from other countries. In
fact, all three drivers have a major influence in
the United Kingdom. Between 1982 and 2012
the United Kingdom was primarily influenced by
three major development trends:
• the “dash for gas”—many people converted
from coal to natural gas, which played a
major role in the overall fuel conversion
figures;
• growth in GDP, which made the effects of
economic activity more apparent;
• de-industrialisation and schemes to improve
household energy efficiency, which resulted
in a major increase in energy efficiency and
had an opposite effect on natural gas demand.
Even though energy intensity factors can
cause demand for natural gas to decline, the other
two factors caused natural gas demand to
increase. Each of these factors had a very sig-
nificant result, equivalent to the total change in
natural gas demand during the same period. The
experience of the United Kingdom shows that,
given the circumstances soon to be faced by
China, for instance rapid development of
domestic natural gas resources, high rates of
economic growth and the economy becoming
more service industry-oriented, factors that drive
up natural gas demand will continue to be very
significant.
Generally speaking, the seven benchmark
countries analysed each experienced a large
increase in natural gas demand. A detailed
analysis of the results based on economic sector
shows that each of the three factors has the effect
of influencing demand for natural gas as follows:
• Increased economic activity will cause natural
gas demand in all economic sectors to
increase, especially the power-hungry sectors
of housing, mining and public utilities.
• Reduced energy intensity in residential
housing and manufacturing will cause
reduced natural gas demand.
• Fuel conversion is an important driver, in
which the primary driver is the conversion of
power plants and heating facilities to natural
gas, while residential housing and manufac-
turing sector fuel conversion was also a major
factor in most countries.
2.2 Primary Factors Motivating
Switching from Other Fuels
to Natural Gas
Based on international experience, natural gas is
generally uncompetitive on pricing alone, com-
pared to other fuels. It follows that there are other
factors that contribute to the decision to switch
from other fuels to natural gas and it is therefore
necessary to explore these less-obvious factors
more deeply.
This research employs two methods to
explore the motivating factors behind fuel
switching. The first consists of cross-sectional
regression analysis conducted on the 2012 data
for OECD countries, focusing on factors
including: the share of the economy accounted
for by the service industry; whether or not there
are natural gas reserves; total natural gas reserves
(adjusted by GDP); and degree of openness to
trade. The second involves a descriptive analysis
of the majority of the world’s countries from
1980–2013 in terms of natural gas share of the
energy mix and data on motivating factors
towards natural gas, with a focus on several
variables, including service industry proportion,
manufacturing industry proportion, urbanisation
and atmospheric pollution (including PM10 and
SO2).
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2.2.1 Various Approaches to Natural
Gas Replacement
1. The seven benchmark countries primarily
switched from oil to natural gas
Each country uses oil, natural gas and coal in
various proportions to satisfy its fossil fuel needs.
As time passes, energy source structures gradu-
ally adjust. Figure 2.8 shows the fossil fuel
energy mix changes over time in China and the
benchmark countries. Each country’s energy
source structure change is shown as a pathway.
The thin end represents the 1980 energy mix, and
the thick end represents the 2012 energy mix.
The energy mix change path follows the timeline
from the thin end to the thick end.
If a country’s path moves to the top of the
triangle, this indicates that the share of natural
gas increased in that country. If a country’s curve
moves away from “Oil” in the bottom left
towards the top of the triangle, this indicates that
natural gas replaced oil, as in Egypt (pink),
Turkey (purple) and Japan (green). If a country’s
path moves from away from “Coal” in the bot-
tom right towards the top of the triangle, this
indicates that coal had been replaced with natural
gas in that country, as in United States (yellow)
and the United Kingdom (blue). If the country’s
curve goes straight up toward the top of the tri-
angle, then this indicates that natural gas has
replaced both oil and coal in that country, such as
in Germany over the past few years (grey).
China’s energy mix (red) has always been
focused on coal, with only slight changes so far.
From Fig. 2.8 it is apparent that the countries
with the fastest growth in demand for natural gas
are those switching from oil to natural gas,
whereas China is switching from coal to natural
gas. To allow a conclusion to be reached that is
of relevance to China, a large range of countries
is required for comparison, in particular those
that have converted from coal to natural gas,
even if the scope of conversion to natural gas in
these countries is smaller than that encountered
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Fig. 2.8 Natural gas replacement pathways in China and benchmark countries (1980–2012). Source Formulated by
Vivid Economics based on IEA data
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2. Main replacement pathways in countries
transitioning from coal to gas
Conversion from coal to gas is mainly
encountered in Europe, Australia and the United
States. Figure 2.9 shows the changes in energy
structure in terms of coal and natural gas for major
countries that have transitioned from coal to gas.
Curves running from the bottom right-hand corner
represent a high percentage of coal, while move-
ment toward the top left corner is toward a high
percentage of natural gas. Developed countries,
primarily in Europe, and especially the United
Kingdom, have seen a high proportion of coal
usage transition toward a high proportion of nat-
ural gas. From the perspective of overall global
trends (orange pathway) in recent years relating to
fossil fuels, coal proportions have seen some
increase, primarily due to declines in oil rather
than natural gas. The motivating factors for
European countries to switch to natural gas may
also be of relevance when considering switching
from coal to gas in China.




We conducted regression analysis on natural gas
consumption proportions and other factors for
OECD countries for 2012. The aim of this
analysis was to identify the primary motivating
factors behind OECD countries switching to
natural gas.
Based on the regression results, there were
four factors—service industry share, normalised
GDP-adjusted total natural gas reserves, degree
of openness to trade (a ratio between the
import/export totals and GDP) and current natu-
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Fig. 2.9 Changes in energy usage from coal to natural gas. Note The data represents non-renewable energy source
percentage; the data only shows countries that have experienced major transitions to gas. Source Formulated by Vivid
Economics based on IEA data
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natural gas share in OECD countries. Changes in
these four variables have a pronounced influence
on natural gas share. For example, if a member
country’s service industry share changes by 1%,
then that country’s natural gas proportion will
change by 0.86% (Table 2.1). By conducting
further computation, it can be deduced that these
four variables are responsible for 53% of the
changes in OECD member country natural gas
share. That is to say, differences in OECD
member countries’ natural gas shares can mainly
be traced back to these four variables.
When all factors are considered, service
industry share is the factor that has the greatest
effect on proportion of natural gas in OECD
member countries. Figure 2.10 shows standard
values for regression coefficients. By employing
standard regression coefficients, one can compare
the importance of such variables. The higher
the standard value, the greater the importance.
Service industry share is the most important
variable, followed by GDP-adjusted natural gas
reserve levels. Based on these results, it is clear
that service industry share is not only the most
important variable, but is also an index that can
be used as a yardstick for other driving factors.
For example, countries with a larger service
industry share could be at the stage of introduc-
ing increasingly strict controls on air quality, and
this will further increase the market share of
natural gas. However, this research does not
incorporate air quality monitoring data; other
variable factors that could explain natural gas
share, such as urbanisation, were incorporated
into the factors we considered, but did not affect
the results. This is because by 2012 the majority
of OECD member countries had already
achieved a high degree of urbanisation, and thus
there were no significant differences in urbani-
sation between them.
Table 2.1 Role of four variables in OECD country natural gas share
Variable An increase of 1% of any variable will cause:
Share of service industry
Gross value added in services sector (GVAservices/
GVA)
Natural gas share rises by 0.86%
Natural gas reserve levels (adjusted for normalised
GDP)
Reserve levels/GDP
Natural gas share rises by 0.49%
Degree of openness to trade
(Imports + Exports)/GDP
Natural gas share rises by 0.09%
Whether there are natural gas reserves or not
1 represents entirely no reserves, 0 represents the
existence of reserves
If a country does not have natural gas reserves, then natural
gas share drops 0.15%































Fig. 2.10 Regression results for 2012 natural gas share in OECD countries
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The OECD country analysis results show that
when a country has natural gas reserves and has
already entered the stage of development in
which services are the primary focus, natural gas
accounts for a very large share of the energy mix.
Domestic reserves are undoubtedly important,
because those reserves are often a country’s
cheapest source of natural gas and, regardless of
how extensive they are, they will influence the
natural gas share. This implies that countries
without natural gas reserves might not make
natural gas a primary energy source, that natural
gas would not be used for infrastructure and by
institutions, and that the import of natural gas
would not be encouraged. The OECD countries
South Korea and Japan are an exception to this,
though; their domestic natural gas reserves are
negligible, they have a high degree of openness
to trade and they restrict other energy sources,
which results in natural gas having a relatively
high share in their energy structures.
The analytical data shows the influence of
factors driving changes in the use of natural gas
in developed countries, but does not consider the
effects of urbanisation and atmospheric pollution.
These factors are of major relevance in China,
but they are less influential in OECD member
countries. The next section will therefore expand
the range of countries looked at so that a more
comprehensive range of driving factors can be
examined.
2.2.3 Further Analysis of Motivating
Factors for a Country
to Switch to Natural Gas
To further analyse the factors motivating a
country to switch to natural gas, we carried out a
comparison of data on natural gas share and
natural gas motivating factors for most of the
world’s countries for the period 1980–2013. This
permitted a more comprehensive analysis of how
changes in each country’s natural gas share cor-
related with changes in the variables. A global
dataset was built for the years 1980–2013,
including natural gas share, service industry
share, manufacturing share, urbanisation and
atmospheric pollution including PM10, and SO2
for each country. The changing trends are out-
lined in Figs. 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15 and
2.16.
1. Apart from China, service industry share
is often closely connected to natural gas
share
Changes in service industry share and natural
gas share exhibit the same trends. In other words,
when one variable changes, the other variable
changes along with it. This kind of common
trend suggests that a connection exists between
the two and all that remains is for it to be con-
firmed by statistical analysis. There is a pro-
nounced pattern in the United Kingdom, Japan
and South Korea, and many other countries also
exhibit such characteristics. In Fig. 2.11, only the
data from China fails to demonstrate a relation-
ship between service industry share and natural
gas share. Nonetheless, China’s service industry
share is similar to levels in Japan and South
Korea in 1980, so it is likely that this trend will
manifest in the future.
2. The relationship between the manufactur-
ing industry share and natural gas share is
not pronounced
Only in a minority of countries is there a
connection between manufacturing share and
natural gas share; in the majority of countries the
two do not have a pronounced relationship. Fig-
ure 2.12 shows that, with the exception of China,
Asia’s emerging markets all use natural gas to
develop their manufacturing industries. In Eur-
ope, the natural gas share continues to rise as
deindustrialisation proceeds. This implies that the
relationship between manufacturing industry
share and natural gas share could change
depending on industrial and energy mix policies,
as well as changing as a result of economic
development.
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CHINA INDIA 
UNITED KINGDOM SOUTH KOREA 
Fig. 2.11 Size of service industry and natural gas share of energy mix, 1980–2010. Note Natural gas share refers to the
share of natural gas within total non-renewable energy sources. Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA and World
Bank data
CHINA MALAYSIA
UNITED KINGDOM SOUTH KOREA 
Fig. 2.12 Size of manufacturing industry and natural gas share of energy mix, 1980–2010. Note Data is for share of
gas in primary energy. Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA and World Bank data
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CHINA INDIA
ARGENTINA SOUTH KOREA 
Fig. 2.13 Urbanisation and natural gas share of energy mix, 1980–2010. Note Data is for share of gas in primary
energy. Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA and World Bank data
Relative to coal, gas significantly
reduces SOx, NOx, PM10 and
PM2.5, which are the most
harmful air pollutants
~x3,000 more SOx from
coal relative to gas
Coal more polluting 
than gas
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Relative to coal, gas does
increase NMVOCs and
CO, the less harmful air
pollutants
Fig. 2.14 Comparison of pollution resulting from natural gas power generation and from coal power generation, per
unit calorific value. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on EEA and UNFCCC data
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CHINA JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM POLAND
Pollution limits imposed, with entry
of gas in following years
Fig. 2.15 PM10 emission levels and natural gas share of heat and power generation, 1970–2010. Source Formulated
by Vivid Economics based on EEA and UNFCCC data
CHINA UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM POLAND
Fig. 2.16 Relation between power generation, SO2 emission levels and natural gas share of heat and power generation,
1970–2010. Source Formulated by Vivid Economics based on EEA and UNFCCC data
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3. Urbanisation and natural gas share are
closely related
Urbanisation is closely related to natural gas
usage, and China is now in the early stages of
urbanisation. From Fig. 2.13 it can be seen that
urbanisation and natural gas share are closely
related inmany countries. This is very likely due to
the fact that natural gas is particularly well suited
to use as a fuel in urban environments, since it is
easily transported via networks of pipes, its com-
bustion is easily controlled and it generates mini-
mal atmospheric pollution. This is very important
to an area with a high population density. So far,
China does not exhibit this trend in the same way
as other countries, but because China is in the early
stages of urbanisation, greater demand for natural
gas may result as urbanisation progresses.
4. Many countries switch from coal to natural
gas after enacting air quality legislation
Compared to coal, natural gas is a compara-
tively clean fuel. For example, when power
generation with natural gas is compared to power
generation with coal, natural gas only results in
small amounts of the most harmful air pollutants
(Fig. 2.14). Many countries have therefore swit-
ched from coal to gas after air quality legislation
is introduced.
5. In countries where there are competitive
power markets, the natural gas power
generation share increases after PM10 re-
strictions are put in place
Figure 2.15 shows that in the United Kingdom
and Poland, PM10 emissions generated by power
generation dropped significantly in the year in
which air quality legislation was introduced.
Furthermore, the share of natural gas power
generation then increased rapidly. This shows
that in the completely competitive power markets
of the United Kingdom and Poland, even though
efforts were made to restrict PM10 emissions by
other courses of action, the cost of coal power
generation eventually became prohibitive and
power generation began its transition to natural
gas. Figure 2.15 also shows that in Japan, where
the power generation market is more regulated,
the increase in the share of natural gas power
generation has not lagged behind changes in
PM10, though there was also a marked direct
effect in the 1970s, which shows that natural gas
can be used directly to control atmospheric pol-
lution. In China, even though the share of natural
gas power generation is increasing, the total
remains relatively small, and coal power gener-
ation’s overwhelming growth suggests that the
PM10 levels are set to remain elevated.
Figure 2.16 shows that in the United King-
dom, the United States, Poland and other coun-
tries, SO2 emission levels improved significantly
after air quality legislation was enacted. The
direction taken by changes to SO2 emissions may
be similar to that for PM10 emissions, but the rate
of reduction is slower. For coal-fired power sta-
tions, compared to satisfying the restrictions on
PM10, SO2 restrictions will only be met suc-
cessfully if they are adopted at a more gradual
pace. In China, the enormous expansion of
coal-fired power stations means that SO2 levels
are set to remain high.
Many countries have implemented strategies to
improve air quality by switching to natural gas.
Analysis reveals that the approaches to imple-
menting such strategies differ from country to
country. Some countries rely on market forces and
pollution control measures which force up the cost
of coal, causing a transition to gas. Other countries
adopt natural gas development planning. The
ultimate result of these different approaches to
controlling air quality is essentially the same, but
the results in terms of controlling atmospheric
pollution become apparent at different stages.
2.2.4 Summary
The main conclusions that can be drawn from our
analysis of the drivers for transition to natural gas
are that, in the course of development, an
increase in the size of the service sector, the
pressures of urbanisation and an urgent need to
control atmospheric pollution result in all coun-
tries switching gradually to natural gas. Major
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adjustments have been made in Europe, the
United States and Australia in switching from
coal to natural gas—and this now also needs to
occur in China. At first glance, these adjustments
are a result of a growing service sector share
driving an increase in demand for natural gas, but
there is also evidence that other trends drive
demand for natural gas, such as urbanisation and
demands for cleaner air. These two factors play a
major role in the motivating the transition in
many countries. As urbanisation in China pro-
ceeds, an increasing amount of attention is being
paid to air quality, and this is likely to encourage
greater use of natural gas.
2.3 The Influence of Natural Gas
Price on Demand
As well as factors such as service sector growth,
urbanisation and air quality controls, natural gas
price also has a direct effect on energy costs, and
can play an important role in affecting demand.
This section carries out an in-depth analysis of
the relationship between natural gas price and
demand. The analysis mainly concentrates on the
experiences of OECD countries, because as they
are the primary natural gas-consuming countries,
there is relatively good data available. Further-
more, in the majority of cases, these countries
have liberalised energy price markets, making it
easier to follow the changes in natural gas pric-
ing, and easier to analyse the relationship
between pricing and demand.
2.3.1 The Relationship Between
Natural Gas Price
Changes and Changes
in Demand in OECD
Countries Is
not Pronounced
1. Natural gas demand in OECD countries
grew rapidly from relatively low levels
between 1987 and 2000
Figures 2.17, 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 show the
evolutionary progress of natural gas prices and
the demand of main sectors in the United King-
dom, the United States, Japan and Germany.
Each point represents data for a year. The colours
of the points represent annual rates of change in
natural gas demand. The vertical axis plots the
natural gas price to industry, with prices
expressed as 2010 PPP (purchasing power parity
—that is, including inflation and relative price
change adjustments). This price thus represents
changes in natural gas affordability. There is a
clear increase in natural gas prices during the
early 1980s, with a drop in 1987. Since then they
have remained fairly stable until 2000. Subse-
quently, and in particular from 2005 until the
Global Financial Crisis and the shale natural gas
revolution in the United States, prices have risen
continuously. Although industry sector gas prices
are considered, it seems that they have increased
at the same rate—the price of residential gas is
higher than that used by industry.
Based on the experience of four countries,
natural gas prices between 1987 and 2000 were
low and stable and yet, compared to other peri-
ods, natural gas demand continued to grow
rapidly. During this period, the number of years
when there was higher growth in sector demand
for natural gas was greater than in the period
when the price was higher. For example, Japan
and the United Kingdom saw more years with
increased demand during this period than at other
times (tending towards red on the scale).
2. Natural gas demand rose in many coun-
tries when natural gas prices were high
Even though natural gas prices began to rise
in 2000, in the United Kingdom, Japan and
Germany, demand for natural gas remained
consistently steady or grew. From 2000 to 2008,
natural gas prices in OECD countries actually
rose by 60%. Despite this, during the overlapping
period of 2000–2012, industrial and residential
natural gas demand in OECD countries only
dropped by 8%. This indicates that, once demand
stabilises, it is capable of withstanding wide
economic fluctuations. This could be due to the
fact that natural gas demand is not sensitive to
price changes (i.e. it is non-elastic), at least in
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terms of residential usage. Moreover, once nat-
ural gas is adopted, residents are not willing to
give up natural gas for other fuels. As a clean
fuel, allowing controllable heating and with
easily accessible exothermic properties, when
natural gas is compared to other fuel types, such
as coal, it becomes apparent that due to its
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Fig. 2.17 Relationship between growth in demand for natural gas and pricing in three sectors in the United States.
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The recent increase in prices
has made demand somewhat
more volatile
Fig. 2.18 Relationship between growth in demand for natural gas and pricing in three sectors in the United Kingdom.
Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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Fig. 2.19 Relationship between growth in demand for natural gas and pricing in industry in Japan. Source Vivid


























Fig. 2.20 Relationship between growth in demand for natural gas and pricing in the residential and industrial sectors
in Germany. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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infrastructure is in place, residents and manu-
facturers are less concerned about price. From
these observations we can see a kind of “ratchet
effect”: once natural gas demand reaches a cer-
tain level, the likelihood of switching to another
energy source is lower, therefore there is less
likely to be a reduction in demand. Only scien-
tific innovations such as electric heat pumps, that
may be capable of offering even higher-quality
heat and efficiency, will change the current
“non-elastic” state of affairs.
On the whole, during periods when natural
gas prices are rising, increases in demand for
natural gas from manufacturing, residential and
power generation sectors seem to keep
step. Despite a lack of data covering all industries
in all countries, the data that is available shows
that demand for natural gas generally increases
across the board in all sectors. Although this is
not applicable to the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and Germany, it is still appli-
cable to other major natural gas-consuming
countries such as The Netherlands and Spain.
3. No pronounced relationship between sec-
tor gas price and demand share
Figure 2.21 shows natural gas PPP price against
overall demand share in various sectors for OECD
countries in 2012. This shows that there is no pro-
nounced relationship between sector gas price and
demand share in each country; although the
industrial sector gas price in someof these countries
is relatively low, the industrial sector gas demand
share in those countries is not necessarily high.
From Fig. 2.21 it is also possible to see that the
price of residential sector gas in OECD countries is
relatively high, with residents willing to pay higher
gas charges. This could be because residential
natural gas usage requires the economies of scale,
since the transportation and delivery costs aremuch
higher. Practically speaking, there is no pro-
nounced relationship between residential demand
andgas price, since the primary replacement energy
source for residential usage is electricity. Electricity
is relatively more expensive, and natural gas is
more convenient. In fact, the high price of natural
gas doesn’t seem to have had a negative impact on
residential demand for natural gas. Over recent
years there has been a greater increase in demand
for gas for residential use than for industrial use in
OECD countries.
2.3.2 Limited Effect on Demand
of Difference in Price
Between Natural Gas
and Other Energy Sources
Economically speaking, the demand for a partic-
ular item is not only determined by its price, but
also by the price of alternatives. This suggests that
























Fig. 2.21 Relationship between sector gas price and share in OECD countries (2012). Source Vivid Economics, based
on IEA data
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natural gas demand will also be affected by the
difference in price between natural gas and other
energy sources.
1. The difference in price between natural gas
and electricity in OECD countries has not
affected the demand for gas in the indus-
trial and residential sectors
In OECD countries, the natural gas price is
lower than that of electricity in both residential
and manufacturing sectors. Compared to coun-
tries where the price of electricity is lower than
that of natural gas, natural gas has a slightly
higher share of primary energy sources, though
this effect is still not all that pronounced. Fig-
ures 2.22 and 2.23 show the relationship
between the pricing of natural gas and electricity
in different countries and the natural gas share in
the industrial and residential sectors. The dots in
the diagram represent different countries, while
the colour of the dots indicates natural gas share.
Figure 2.22 shows the residential sector,
while Fig. 2.23 shows the manufacturing sector.
These two diagrams demonstrate that pricing
competition between the residential and
manufacturing sectors has very little influence on
demand for natural gas or electricity.
2. Rate of growth in demand for natural gas
in OECD countries was especially rapid
during a period of stable relative energy
source prices
From 1987 to 2000, demand for natural gas in
OECD countries grew rapidly. However, during
that period the prices of natural gas, electricity
and coal remained relatively stable. Figures 2.24
and 2.25 both indicate this situation. For exam-
ple, during this period, looking at the actual unit
price of energy in the manufacturing sector, the
mean gas price was only 22% of the electricity
price, or around one quarter. However, compared
to the price of coal, the price of natural gas was
over three times higher, at around 320%. When
relative prices remain stable, the competitiveness
of each energy source remains unchanged, and
thus demand will not change as a result of pricing
competition between energy sources. However, it
was under precisely such circumstances that
natural gas demand nevertheless grew steeply, an

















































Fig. 2.22 Residential gas share and pricing differences between gas and electricity. Note Data is for 2012, electrical
units have been converted from MWh to MMBtu. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data














































Fig. 2.23 Industrial sector natural gas proportion and variance in natural gas and electricity price. Note Data is for


























































Gas demand increased significantly
when the competitiveness of gas
relative to electricity was stable
Fig. 2.24 Natural gas and electricity price difference and demand growth. Data source Vivid Economics quoting the
IEA
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significant role. Another conclusion that can be
drawn is that pricing competition between energy
sources is not actually all that pronounced.
Among OECD countries, competition
between oil and natural gas is only on a small
scale. In OECD countries, natural gas is gener-
ally not used as a transportation fuel, so it rarely
competes with oil. In addition, oil is now less
likely to be used for power generation in OECD
countries. Due to this, competition between oil
and natural gas is not pronounced in these
countries.
In summary, natural gas demand seems to
have no pronounced relationship to the price of
natural gas. So, even if the price of natural gas in
China remained high, it is not that likely to
reduce demand for gas. Even though in OECD
countries the price of gas is more competitive
and gas has a higher overall share, these coun-
tries have not seen an increased demand for
natural gas due to pricing competition between
different energy sources. This is a direct result of
the important non-pricing-related characteristics
of gas. These results show that even though gas
prices in China have been high in the past, other
factors such as urbanisation and atmospheric
pollution that are now confronting China will
most likely result in major growth in demand for
natural gas.
2.4 Current State of Natural Gas
Use in China and Future Trends
2.4.1 Sector Distribution and Total
Gas Consumption
in China Since 2000
1. China’s natural gas industry has grown
rapidly, but overall share is still low
Due to its relative abundance, coal has always
played a major role in China’s energy mix—its
























































The relative competitiveness of gas
versus coal has remained relatively
stable over long periods of time Industrial gas prices 
increased, then declined 
rapidly due to the 
financial crisis
Fig. 2.25 Natural gas and coal price difference and demand growth. Note Natural gas demand is for industrial and
residential usage. The red dotted line is the average level during the same period of time. Data source Vivid Economics
quoting the IEA
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less than 65%. After coal, oil is the second most
important energy source, accounting for around
20% of total energy consumption. Natural gas
consumption is the lowest, with a share not
exceeding 6%, and the low amount of clean
energy in the overall mix is a major deficiency.
In 2000, China’s natural gas consumption was
only 24.5 billion m3, with 2.2% of total energy
source consumption. This had risen to
106.9 billion m3 by 2010, having tripled in size.
However, the total energy source share only
reached 4.4%. In 2013, China’s natural gas
consumption had reached 166.0 billion m3,
accounting for 5.8% of total energy consumption
(Fig. 2.26).
By looking at production and consumption,
we can arrive at the following conclusions: first,
an energy source structure focused on coal and
oil will be hard-pressed to achieve fundamental
change over a long period of time. Second, the
importance of natural gas in China’s energy
source system is continually rising, but it is far
from occupying a central position. To increase
natural gas production and consumption would
still require major government policy support.
2. Natural gas is primarily used in manufac-
turing, power generation and residential
In terms of sector distribution in China, the
manufacturing industry has always been the main
user of natural gas. In 2000, the manufacturing
industry consumed 11.8 billion m3 of natural
gas, accounting for 48.5% of China’s total nat-
ural gas consumption. In 2003, this figure
reached 50%, the highest ever. Subsequently, the
share began to decrease, and 2010 consumption
was 57.3 billion m3 (33.4% of total natural gas
consumption).
Power generation is the sector with the fastest
growth in natural gas consumption. In 2000, the
power industry consumed 800 million cubic
metres of natural gas, only 3.3% of total natural
gas consumption. By 2006, this had doubled to
7.0%, and in 2012 it reached 23.5 billion m3,
16.0% of China’s total natural gas consumption.
Transport and residential are two other major
sectors using gas. In 2000, transport and shipping
used 880 million m3, accounting for 3.6% of
total consumption. By 2012, this had risen to
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Fig. 2.26 Chinese energy source consumption structure (%)
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Relatively speaking, the residential natural gas
consumption share has been relatively stable. In
2000, residential consumption accounted for
13.2% of overall consumption, and this had risen
to 19.7% by 2012 (Fig. 2.27).
3. Compared to other countries, China’s
natural gas prices are relatively high
In recent years, China’s natural gas prices
have increased relatively quickly. In the late
1980s, China’s natural gas price was relatively
low and stable. However, since 2000 the price of
China’s imported natural gas has risen, just as it
has in the United Kingdom and Japan, as can be
seen in Fig. 2.28. There was a decline in 2008 as
a result of the Global Financial Crisis, but the rise
continued after 2009.
Compared to other countries, at the same time
as China experienced rapid growth in demand for
natural gas it also had a relatively high natural
gas price. Figure 2.29 shows rapid growth in
demand for natural gas in OECD countries in the
1990s, but at that time prices were relatively low.
China now experiences relatively high prices, a
pronounced characteristic of the development of
natural gas. In addition, China’s natural gas
market also exhibits problems, including price
differences between users: compared with the
situation elsewhere in the world, in China natural
gas production prices are lower, residential nat-
ural gas prices are lower, but natural gas prices
for industrial use are higher.




In 2013, the State Council published the Energy
Source Development 12th Five-Year Plan. In
June 2014, the State Council issued the Energy
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Fig. 2.27 Natural gas consumption in China by sector
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Fig. 2.29 Long-term movements in natural gas price and demand in OECD countries
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(2014–2020) and in November 2014 China and
the United States published the Sino-American
Joint Declaration on Climate Change. These
important documents laid out planning and out-
lines for China’s energy source development up
to 2030. Based on these documents, China’s
energy source development plan includes several
important landmark tasks.
1. Overall energy consumption and energy
supply capabilities
Prior to updating its energy statistical data,
China set objectives for total volume of energy
development.
In 2015, China’s energy consumption will
reach 4 billion tons of standard coal. By 2020,
non-renewable energy consumption will be
controlled at around 4.8 billion tons of standard
coal, with total standard coal consumption con-
trolled at around 3.0 billion tons, a drop of
62.5% in the proportion of total energy
consumption.
By 2020, a relatively comprehensive energy
security system will have been established.
Domestic non-renewable energy source output
will have reached 4.2 billion tons of standard
coal, with energy self-sufficiency maintained at
around 85%. In addition, the oil production to
storage ratio will have increased to 14–15. By
2020, installed generating capacity of nuclear
energy will have reached 58 GW, with another
30 GW of capacity under construction.
2. Energy source structure
By 2015, non-fossil fuel’s share of energy
source consumption will have risen to 11.4%,
and non-fossil fuel’s share of installed power
generation capacity will have reached 30%. The
natural gas primary energy source consumption
share will have risen to 7.5%, while coal’s share
of consumption will have dropped to around
65%. By 2020, non-fossil fuel energy sources
will account for 15% of primary energy con-
sumption, natural gas’s share will have reached
10% and coal’s share will be controlled to within
62%. Newly added natural gas will be earmarked
to support residential usage and replace dispersed
coal usage, while a programme will be intro-
duced to encourage urban residents to adopt
clean energy sources. By 2020, urban residents
will essentially be using natural gas. By 2020, an
attempt will have been made to ensure that
standard hydroelectric power reaches around
350 million kW of installed capacity, while wind
power will reach 200 million kW of installed
capacity. The feed-in price of wind-generated
and coal-generated electricity should be the
same. Photovoltaic installed capacity will reach
around 100 million kW. The price of photo-
voltaic electricity should be the same as the
power grid electricity sale price.
By 2020, accumulated newly added proven
reserves of conventional gas will be 0.55 tril-
lion m3, with annual production of standard nat-
ural gas of 185 billion m3. By 2020, shale natural
gas production will aim to exceed 30 billion m3,
while coalbed methane production volumes will
aim to reach 30 billion m3.
3. Long-term objectives of the Chinese
government to be achieved by 2030
In November 2014, during the APEC summit,
China and the United States released their
Sino-American Joint Declaration on Climate
Change, which revealed the long-term objectives
of China up to 2030. China’s intentions are that
CO2 emissions should peak by around 2030 and
work should be carried out to try to achieve this
peak sooner. Planning outlines include 2030
non-fossil fuel energy sources rising to account
for around 20% of primary energy source
consumption.





Compared to other countries, the share of Chi-
na’s current energy source consumption
accounted for by natural gas is at a relatively low
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level. This is partly due to the available natural
resources, but as the economy and society
develop, the effects of conflicts in supply and
demand and of environmental restrictions on
resources in relation to energy consumption will
alter. As a result, the overall structure of China’s
natural gas consumption will differ from that
seen in the past.
Based on the experiences of seven countries
with similar natural environments and availabil-
ity of natural gas resources, natural gas devel-
opment is primarily influenced by growth in the
service sector as a share of economic activity,
degree of urbanisation and the urgency of con-
trolling atmospheric pollution. Europe, the
United States and Australia have all made sig-
nificant adjustments to allow for the transition
from coal to natural gas.
China has a potentially enormous demand for
natural gas. With suitable policies, the natural gas
share of energy consumption will rise consider-
ably. As China’s current economic development
enters a “new normal”, especially with the
service sector share already exceeding that of
secondary industry, and as further urbanisation
continues to take place, and in recent years much
greater attention has been paid to air quality, it
can be predicted that China’s natural gas con-
sumption will see increasingly rapid growth.
In 2000, China’s natural gas consumption was
only 24.5 billion m3, accounting for 2.2% of
total energy consumption. In 2014, China’s nat-
ural gas consumption was 183 billion m3, 5.8%
of total energy consumption. Looking at the
breakdown of consumption, the manufacturing
industry is showing a declining trend, dropping
from a high of 50% of total natural gas con-
sumption down to 33.4% currently. Power gen-
eration has risen from its 2000 share of 3.3% up
to the current 16.0%. Transport and residential
usage of natural gas have grown relatively
rapidly, with shares rising from 3.6 and 13.2% in
2000 to 10.6 and 19.7% respectively in 2012.
Looking at the long term, demand for natural gas
in China will continue to show a trend for rapid
growth.
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Unlike coal and oil, natural gas does not have an
exclusive niche. Analysis of international expe-
riences has found that growth in natural gas
consumption in other countries has come about
largely as a result of substituting gas for other
fuels. It is only substituted for other fuels when
its price is competitive compared to other energy
sources, incentivising users to adopt it. The
competitive forces that drive such changes derive
from users’ desire to have their requirements for
energy services met while reducing their energy
source costs to a minimum.
This section therefore examines the price of
natural gas that would make it competitive in
different application sectors, relative to the cur-
rently preferred fuel used in that sector.
The primary application sectors for natural
gas are power generation, transport and shipping,
urban gas, industrial fuel and natural gas chem-
ical engineering. In the power generation sector,
natural gas competes primarily with coal. In the
transport and shipping industry, it primarily
competes with diesel. In the urban fuels gas
sector, competition in residential usage is
primarily with liquefied gas, artificial gas and
electricity. In the heating and small-scale boiler
sector, natural gas primarily competes with coal.
In the industrial fuel sector, competition is pri-
marily with fuel oil, artificial coal gas and coal.
In the field of natural gas chemical engineering,
competition is mainly with coal and naphtha.
This section mostly consists of an analysis of
price tolerance in these primary markets.
3.1 Power Generation: Cost
Comparison of Gas as a
Substitute for Coal in Power
Generation
International experiences of development suggest
that power generation is an important sector for
natural gas. Natural gas power generation
accounts for 39.4% of total installed capacity in
the United States and 29% in Japan, whereas this
number is only about 3% in China. China’s
natural gas power generation therefore has plenty
of space to grow. In terms of its specific char-
acteristics as a commodity, electricity is a classic
homogenised product. Whether it is coal,
hydroelectric, gas, wind or photovoltaic power,
once it enters the grid, from the point of view of
the end user it is essentially the same. It is pri-
marily cost that affects the competitiveness of
such commodities.
* This chapter was overseen by Zhaoyuan Xu from the
Development Research Center of the State Council and
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3.1.1 Direct Cost Comparison
Between Gas Generation
and Coal Generation
In order to better compare and analyse gas power
generation competitiveness and other factors
affecting it, we adopted base-load coal power
generation as the object of reference. Based on this,
coal-fired units rely on the currently widely adop-
ted ultra-super critical unit, with an installed scale
of 600,000/1,000,000 kW. For gas-fired units, the
widely adopted 9F-grade CCGT unit was adopted,
with an installed scale of 400,000 kW. Coal power
generation baseline price was set at 550 CNY/ton
(price of 5500 kilocalorie power coal delivered to
power station), which converts to a standard coal
price of 700 CNY/ton.
1. Coal-fired power generation kWh total
cost calculation
The coal-fired power generation 1 kWh cost
primarily includes capital costs, non-fuel opera-
tional costs and fuel costs. Referring to national
energy department reports and coal-fired power
station feasibility reports, and supposing that a
coal-fired power generating unit operating cycle
is 20 years, the discount rate would be 9%.
Coal-fired generating units initially require a unit
investment of 3900 CNY/kW, with annual oper-
ating hours of 5000. Therefore, the capital cost of
1 kWh is 0.085 CNY/kWh. Other costs of a kWh
come to around 0.045 CNY/kWh. When these
are combined, the total is 0.13 CNY/kWh, a fig-
ure close to the fixed cost of a kWh. As far as fuel
costs are concerned, 300 g of standard power coal
is consumed on average, therefore the fuel cost of
a kWh is around 0.21 CNY/kWh. Combining
these three together, the overall cost of a kWh is
0.34 CNY/kWh (see Fig. 3.1).
2. Gas-fired power generation kWh total cost
Combining research data and feasibility
research report data, the initial unit investment
for a gas-fired power unit was established to be
3000 CNY/kW. Assuming that annual operating
hours are 3500 h (at peak load and intermediate
load), after conversion the capital cost of 1 kWh
is 0.094 CNY/kWh. Based on research data,
other operating costs for 1 kWh are
0.065 CNY/kWh. As regards fuel cost, depend-
ing on region and construction date, the price of
gas supplied to power stations can differ signifi-
cantly. This report uses south-eastern coastal
areas as the main reference region, and adopts a
price of 2.8 CNY/m3 as the basis for calculation.
In terms of the gas required to generate 1 kWh,
in actual gas-fired generation the differences in
gas source result in fuels having different
calorific values. There is quite a wide variation in
the amount of gas consumed in power
Yuan/kmh
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Fig. 3.1 Preliminary comparison of coal power generation and natural gas power generation costs
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generation. By combining research data, a figure
for gas consumption related to power generation
can be set at 0.18 m3/kWh, which converts to a
kWh fuel cost of 0.504 CNY/kWh. Combining
these three together, the overall cost of a kWh is
0.663 CNY/kWh. If annual operating hours were
raised to 5000 h, the 1 kWh fixed cost including
capital costs and non-fuel related operating costs
would drop, causing the cost of 1 kWh to be
reduced to 0.615 CNY/kWh.
It is apparent from this comparison that, based
on current energy source prices, the 1 kWh cost
for gas power generation is still far greater than
coal, regardless of whether 3500-h or 5000-h
operations are concerned. Looking at the direct
costs, gas-fired generating units are not compet-
itive. Even the fuel cost of gas-fired power gen-
eration alone (that is, the variable cost, or
marginal cost) is much higher than total
coal-fired power generation costs. This makes
gas-fired generating units uncompetitive com-
pared with coal-fired power generation, even if
one ignores the fixed costs or where fixed costs
have been covered by subsidies.
3. Price tolerance calculations for gas-fired
power generation
Without considering changes to other factors,
if gas-fired generating units were competitive
with coal-fired power generation, then what level
of gas price would we be talking about? Sensi-
tivity analysis shows that when the gas kWh fuel
cost is equivalent to the total cost of coal fuel, the
natural gas price would drop to around
1.9 CNY/m3, which is equivalent to European
gas price levels. At this price level, due to the
external benefits of gas-fired power generation,
the fixed cost would attract a subsidy and gas
would become competitive with coal. The sen-
sitivity analysis shows that if the total fuel gas
cost for 1 kWh was required to be the same as
the total cost of 1 kWh generated with coal, then
for an annual operation of 5000 h, natural gas
prices would need to drop to around
1.3 CNY/m3, while for 3500 h of operations it
would need to drop to around 1.0 CNY/m3,
which is trending closer to US gas prices.




Apart from the actual gas price, there are other
factors that affect the competitiveness of gas-fired
power generation, including those that have an
effect on the internal costs of gas power gener-
ation and its associated external benefits.
1. Localised production of core equipment
for natural gas power generation
In terms of core equipment, the overseas
monopolies in turbine equipment and process
control have led to long-term elevated equipment
costs, while LTP, operating and maintenance
fees are very high. An improvement in this sit-
uation would help to reduce the fixed kWh costs
for gas power generation. If unit investment
could be reduced by 15%, it would also be
possible to reduce the kWh cost by around
0.014 CNY/kWh. At the same time, localisation
of manufacture would reduce long-term mainte-
nance and inspection costs. If overall mainte-
nance fees could be reduced by 50%, this would
also bring about a reduction in the kWh cost of
around 0.01 CNY/kWh. By localising the man-
ufacture of core equipment, the associated kWh
cost could be reduced to a level around the
0.024 CNY/kWh mark.
2. Operating hours
By increasing the annual operating hours of
generating units, it is possible to reduce the kWh
fixed costs that need to be absorbed, thereby
reducing gas power generation costs to a certain
degree. However, the benefits of this decrease
progressively. Based on the configuration data in
this report, and by adopting sensitivity calcula-
tions, when generating unit operating times are
respectively increased from 3500 h to 4000, 4500
and 5000 h, the respective cost reduction will be
0.02, 0.035 and 0.048 CNY/kWh (see Fig. 3.2).
There are many factors restricting natural gas
installation operating hour increases. The first is a
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Fig. 3.2 Power generation cost analysis
high natural gas price and limited government
subsidies, which greatly shorten the hours of
power generation. Some new generating units that
form part of this research were only capable of
annual power generation of 1000 h. In some
locations, in order to cope with high gas prices, an
approach had been adopted whereby coal-fired
power stations were used as a proxy in power
generation, but no solution was sought to resolve
the fundamental issue of gas power generation
facilities sitting idle. The second is that in
south-eastern coastal areas, due to the lack of
hydroelectric and other externally generated
power for use in peak regulation, when major
fluctuations in power demand occur, the effect of
this is also felt on the operating hours of gas power
generation. At the same time, frequent starting and
stopping of operations also shortens the useful life
of generating units and increases maintenance
costs, none of which is beneficial to the long-term
operation of gas power generating units.
3. Emissions standards
China has introduced relatively strict emis-
sions standards with regard to coal-fired power
generation. In September 2014, the three com-
mittees forming the National Development and
Reform Commission issued the Coal Power
Energy Savings and Emissions Reductions
Upgrade and Reconditioning Action Plan (2014–
2020), which makes clear pronouncements
concerning strict control over emissions of
atmospheric pollutants and which requires the
atmospheric pollutant emissions concentrations
ratings of newly built coal-fired generating units
in eastern regions to conform to the restrictions
applicable to gas turbine emissions (namely that
with a baseline oxygen content of 6%, smoke and
dust, SO2 and nitrogen oxide concentration may
not exceed 10, 35 and 50 mg/m3). Emissions
ratings of newly built coal-fired generating units
in central regions must approach or achieve the
restrictions applied to gas turbine emissions,
while emissions ratings of newly built coal-fired
generating units in western regions are encour-
aged to approach or achieve the restrictions
applied to gas turbine emissions. Apart from the
addition of environmental installations, the plant
operating modes were not changed. With regard
to additional investment and the operational costs
of such environmental installations, pricing con-
versions can be made with reference to the
upgrades and modifications applied to the instal-
lations of certain current power stations and
additional environmental investment encountered
in new projects. After conversion, it was discov-
ered that in order to comply with the strictest
emissions standards, coal-fired power generation
kWh costs rise by between around 0.01 and
0.02 CNY/kWh. Large-scale generating unit
costs increase slightly less, while cost increases
are slightly higher for older and smaller units or
where coal quality is poorer.
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4. Carbon tax
The high carbon emissions of coal power
represent an important advantage for gas power.
The price of carbon or the level of carbon tax is a
critical factor influencing the competitiveness of
gas power costs. Collection of carbon taxes will
cause coal power and gas power kWh absolute
costs to both rise. However, because coal power
absolute cost increases will be greater, the dif-
ference in costs will result in the relative cost of
carbon emissions associated with 1 kWh for coal
power being greater than for gas power. Based
on various energy source emission product
coefficients provided by the Shenzhen Carbon
Exchange as well as IPCC report coefficients, it
is possible to calculate the coal power carbon
emissions as 0.8 kg/kWh and gas power carbon
emissions as 0.37 kg/kWh. As carbon prices
rises, so does the carbon emission cost for coal
power (Fig. 3.3). Taking as an example the
Shenzhen Carbon Exchange June 18, 2013
online trading opening price of 30 CNY/ton, the
total increase in the relative cost of coal power
was around 0.013 CNY/kWh. Taking as an
example the highest price listed on October 18,
2013 of 143.99 CNY/ton, this affects the relative
cost by around 0.06 CNY/kWh.
5. Auxiliary services
Gas power auxiliary services refer to the
system value of gas power in terms of adjust-
ments during peak periods and as a back-up. The
term also highlights the advantages of gas power
over coal power as regards energy quality. Cur-
rently, with there being no auxiliary services
market and no time-based power pricing mech-
anisms, capacity pricing based on a two-tier
electricity price would take advantage of the
benefits of auxiliary services. The determination
of the capacity electricity price takes into con-
sideration all aspects covered by gas power fixed
costs, and can also be understood as including
the additional investment in power capacity
required to guarantee the reliability and stability
of power supplies. Shanghai currently has power
stations that implement a two-tier system for
electricity pricing, with a gas power capacity
price of 45.83 CNY/kW/month. In large cities
such as Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, where a
two-tier system has been implemented, the
industrial power price is between 40–
44 CNY/kW/month. In overall terms, the influ-
ence of auxiliary services on competitiveness is
fairly small.
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Fig. 3.3 Coal power emissions relative cost (CNY/kWh)
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3.1.3 Conclusions Regarding
the Prospects of Gas
Replacing Coal in Power
Generation
Natural gas power generation competitiveness is
determined by various relative costs. Here, the
coal price adopted is 550 CNY/ton. Based on the
overall trends in coal prices since 2014, this is
unlikely to increase in the short term. Regarding
the natural gas price, considering that natural gas
will gradually form a globalised market, with
relatively large amounts of natural gas being
imported by China, China’s natural gas price will
be inseparable from international gas prices. As
things stand, increased marginal supply affecting
the international natural gas market primarily
comes from North American LNG, while East
Asia is mainly responsible for marginal increases
in consumption. Therefore, North American
natural gas prices will have the greatest influence
on LNG prices in East Asia. In fact, the biggest
influence will be felt in China’s south-eastern
coastal regions, where there has been the greatest
growth in natural gas power generation. Sum-
marising forecast data from various research
institutions, assuming a future US Henry Hub
natural gas price of 5 $/MMBtu, total LNG
transportation fees of 5 $/MMBtu and a CIF
price in China of 10 $/MMBtu, it would be
necessary to reduce or exempt import duty on
LNG. At the same time, for large power plant
users near LNG receiving stations, the gas
reception and piping costs can be estimated at
0.2 CNY/m3. This would result in the price of
natural gas delivered to the power plant being
2.39 CNY, which can be converted to a kWh
cost of 0.43 CNY/kWh.
1. Comprehensive cost comparison for base
loading power generation
For a base loading generating unit (5000 h),
the fuel cost based on an international gas price
of 5 $/MMBtu would be 0.43 CNY/kWh, giving
a kWh total cost of 0.541 CNY. By introducing
localisation of equipment manufacturing, it
would be possible to reduce kWh costs by
0.024 CNY. By increasing annual use to 6000 h,
costs could be reduced by 0.0185 CNY/kWh,
reducing the kWh cost of gas power to
0.499 CNY/kWh. After the cost of emissions
treatment has been applied to coal, the cost is still
only 0.36 CNY/kWh. If the carbon tax price is
120 CNY/ton, then the cost of coal power would
rise by 0.05 CNY/kWh, reaching an overall cost
of 0.41 CNY/kWh. Therefore, gas power costs
would still be higher than coal power by around
0.088 CNY/kWh. As a result of this, gas power
would not be competitive in China.
2. General cost comparison of peak regulation
When gas-fired peak regulation (annual oper-
ation of 3500 h) is compared to base loading
power generation, the greatest difference is that it
allows the advantages of auxiliary generation
services to be exploited. For example, by adopt-
ing capacity power pricing, once localised man-
ufacturing has been taken into
account, the compensatory level is around
39 CNY/kW/month, which converts to an elec-
tricity price of 0.134 CNY/kWh. At the same
time, if coal power emissions standards were very
strict, the additional pollution processing costs
would rise by 0.02 CNY/kWh. Coal power kWh
total costs would rise from 0.34 CNY/kWh to
0.36 CNY/kWh. If the carbon tax rate was 120
CNY/ton, then coal power costs would rise by a
further 0.05 CNY/kWh. This would result in total
coal power costs of 0.41 CNY/kWh, while the
gas power total cost would be 0.43 CNY/kWh.
Unless the carbon tax price is increased further, or
government subsidies are increased, gas power
will continue to lack a competitive advantage.
In overall terms, gas power lacks competi-
tiveness with coal, not only at current gas price
levels and in the current market environment, but
even when the CIF price of international LNG is
at the $10 levels, under which circumstances gas
power would still need a series of combined
measures in order to achieve market competi-
tiveness. Due to this, for a market to arise where
gas power was able to develop would not only
require changes in the global natural gas market,
but also require the implementation of a series of
wider-reaching policy measures. This would
include providing encouragement for major
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scientific breakthroughs, gaining control over gas
pricing mechanisms, streamlining the adminis-
tration of the natural gas industry, the creation of
liberalised gas and electricity pricing mecha-
nisms and the internalisation of environmental
costs and effects, particularly in terms of sensible
carbon emissions pricing. Only then would
growth in gas power generation become possible.
3.2 Transport: Analysis of Natural
Gas as a Substitute for Diesel
Starting in the 1930s, when Italy promoted usage
of natural gas in cars due to the petrol shortage at
that time, there have been over 70 years of his-
tory of gas being used as vehicle fuel. However,
transport is different from power generation in
that its use in transport relies to some extent on
user perception, energy source availability and
transportation safety, while also being affected
by external networks. The replacement of diesel
by natural gas in the field of transportation would
require system-wide adjustments and involve a
relatively complex process.
3.2.1 Primary Motivators for Natural
Gas to Replace Diesel
Looking at the development history of natural
gas vehicles, safety, cleanliness and economy
have all been primary motivators in promoting
the development of natural gas cars. After the
1973 oil crisis, national worries about the safety
of oil supplies resulted in greater attention being
paid to the development of natural gas cars. In
the 1980s, urban air quality problems resulting
from vehicle exhaust pollution attracted increas-
ing attention in Europe and North America, while
the fact that levels of gas and emissions were
much lower than petrol or diesel led to western
countries, led by Italy, paying more attention to
the promotion of natural gas cars. However,
since the 1990s, as oil product quality and
emissions control technology have improved,
petrol and diesel vehicle pollution emissions
have been greatly reduced and the advantages of
natural gas in terms of cleanliness are no longer
so pronounced. The pace of development of
natural gas-powered vehicles in Europe and
North America has now slowed. At the same
time, up until around 2005, as international oil
prices rose, the economic attraction of natural gas
became more pronounced, and there was a rapid
growth in the use of natural gas-powered cars in
developing countries with relatively abundant
gas resources.
Currently, in developed countries, oil supplies
are relatively stable and there are fairly good oil
reserves. Unless a major incident occurs, oil
security has long since stopped being a driving
factor for the development of natural gas vehi-
cles. Moreover, with advances in engine tech-
nology, the advantages of natural gas cars as
regards cleanliness have been reduced, reducing
interest in the development of natural gas cars in
developed countries. As regards economic fac-
tors, the energy consumption cost expenditure of
European and North American users is relatively
low, with more attention being paid to the driv-
ing experience, therefore without enhanced
policies to drive forward the transition, the dif-
ference in price between diesel and gas would
have no effect in terms of encouraging users to
switch.
These factors exist to some extent in China as
well, and in particular cleanliness and economy
still play a major role in the rapid development
and adoption of natural gas-powered vehicles. In
terms of cleanliness, natural gas has the advan-
tage of having a single component ingredient,
allowing the easy removal of impurities, in
addition to being of stable quality and having
excellent physical characteristics, making it easier
to improve cleanliness and meet emissions
requirements. Of course, in developed countries,
where oil quality is satisfactory and emissions
control technologies are in place, petrol and diesel
vehicles can meet the emissions levels of natural
gas vehicles. Aside from this, vehicle emissions
control requires the integration of fuel processing,
engines controls, exhaust handling and other
related technological systems and appropriately
enhanced emissions standards. In China, due to
the supply network and its locked-in nature, high
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levels of new investment in systems improve-
ments and upgrades with a long-term strategy
would be necessary to resolve problems relating
to crude oil quality, refining processes, the vehi-
cle industry and industrial standards that currently
exist; natural gas, however, offers many advan-
tages due to its cleanliness, as well as a good
tolerance towards it in petrol engines, so its
adoption would show quicker results in terms of
environmental requirements.
The fact that China is a developing country
means that economical fuel is still a major driver
behind the development of natural gas as a
transportation fuel. Fuel costs account for around
40% of operating costs, so reducing fuel costs is a
major factor in making transport businesses more
competitive. In the past few years, the significant
difference in the price of diesel and gas and
exemption from consumer taxes has resulted in
the rapid development of natural gas vehicles in
China. Taking CNG in taxis as an example, for a
period of time the CNG price was just half that of
petrol, meaning that the conversion cost could be
recovered within a few months, resulting in rapid
growth in the market for CNG in cars.
3.2.2 Natural Gas Oil Replacement
Price Tolerance in the
Urban Transport Sector
1. Taxi natural gas petrol replacement price
tolerance
Urban CNG taxis and public transport are
currently the largest markets for natural gas. CNG
taxis are mainly being adopted in second- and
third-tier cities, as well as in first-tier cities where
natural gas was introduced relatively early, such
as the cities in the Sichuan-Chongqing basin and
in Chengdu. In some cities, adoption of natural
gas fuel is almost universal. However, after rapid
development in the past, this market has slowed
in recent years. In first-tier cities where taxis did
not invest in CNG early on, the high demand for
land for urban development has made it difficult
to site natural gas filling stations, which restricts
the development of CNG taxis.
City taxis can use CNG to replace petrol, the
cost of taxi conversion being around CNY 5000.
Based on average distances travelled of
100,000 km, and the cost of conversion being
absorbed over a year, the conversion cost is
5 CNY/100 km. The price tolerance of gas used
as a replacement, based on the running costs for
gas taxis being the same as for petrol taxis, is
5.58 CNY/m3 for an international crude oil price
of 100 $/bbl, and 4.34 CNY/m3 when the inter-
national crude oil price is 60 $/bbl (Table 3.1).
2. Bus natural gas diesel replacement price
tolerance
Urban public transport is also an important
submarket for CNG and LNG applications.
Because public transport companies normally
have their own bus stations, it is possible for
them to construct LNG/CNG stations even in
first-tier cities. As a result, there is greater
potential for development.
Urban public transport vehicles can use CNG
to replace diesel, and vehicle conversion costs
around CNY 12,000. Basing calculations on
Table 3.1 Taxi price tolerance of natural gas as replacement for petrol
International price


















100 6.77 8 54 8.8 5 5.58
80 6.08 49 4.96
60 5.39 43 4.34
Data source Results of calculation
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recovering the cost of conversion over a year,
with a distance travelled of 80,000 km, the cost is
the equivalent of an additional 15 CNY/100 km.
The price tolerance of gas used as a replacement,
based on the running costs for gas buses being the
same as for diesel buses, is 5.80 CNY/m3 when
the international crude oil price is 100 $/bbl, and
4.28 CNY/m3 when the international crude oil
price is 60 $/bbl (Table 3.2).
CNG private cars and light commercial vehi-
cles also account for a share of the market, pri-
marily concentrated in second- and third-tier
cities where natural gas taxis are relatively well
developed. Private cars are normally relatively
economical low-end compact cars, such as those
costing less than CNY 100,000. In the next
10 years, the market will remain relatively stable,
and as income levels rise, new users will con-
tinue to enter the economy car market. However,
at the same time, some of the original economy
vehicle users will upgrade to mid-range and
high-end vehicles. As for penetration of electric
private vehicles, it is mainly in first-tier cities
affected by vehicle policies, and especially in
cities where license plate restrictions are in place,
that there is a considerable variance in terms of
market share when compared to CNG private
vehicles, and as far as overall numbers go, this
does not represent a major influence on the CNG
private vehicle market at the present time. There
has been relatively rapid growth in light com-
mercial vehicles in the past two years, but
numbers still remain low, as conversion of diesel
engines presents problems, resulting in low
levels of interest and indicating minimal market
growth in the future.
3.2.3 Commercial Vehicle Natural Gas
Diesel Replacement Price
Tolerance
The commercial vehicle LNG market is the sub-
market with the greatest growth, and is primarily
composed of heavy lorries, inter-city buses,
medium-sized lorries, works vehicles and other
vehicles. In terms of economic incentives or
market scale, heavy lorries are the application
market with the greatest growth potential. More-
over, long-distance inter-city buses, if travelling
over 400 km, also have a marked economic
effect, but are affected in turn by the rapid
development of high-speed rail and the quickness
of air travel. It is expected that this market will
tend to shrink. However, medium-sized lorries,
works vehicles and other vehicles only make
economic sense in regions where gas sources are
relatively inexpensive, due to their relatively low
fuel consumption. Since 2011, there has been a
rapid increase in the construction of LNG filling
stations, and the expectation is that by 2020 filling
station coverage will include major ports, indus-
trial parks and main logistics routes. Moreover, as
networks are optimised, the growth in numbers of
LNG vehicles will outrun the increase in LNG
filling stations, resulting in increased operational
efficiency and profitability of LNG filling sta-
tions, and the emergence of a self-sustaining
cycle in this industry.
We calculated the commercial vehicle price
tolerance taking inter-city long-distance heavy
lorries as an example. Inter-city long-distance
lorries can use liquefied natural gas (LNG) instead
of diesel. The purchase price of LNG vehicles is



















100 6.72 35 235 38 15 5.80
80 5.90 206 5.04
60 5.08 178 4.28
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higher by roughly CNY 90,000 than that of diesel
vehicles. Basing calculations on annual travel of
100,000 km, and recovering the cost of conver-
sion over 50% of the vehicle scrapping distance,
the calculated cost is the equivalent of an addi-
tional 45 (37.5) CNY/100 km. The price toler-
ance of gas used as a replacement for diesel, based
on the running costs for gas commercial vehicles
being the same as for diesel commercial vehicles,
is 5.15 CNY/m3 when the international crude oil
price is 100 $/bbl, and 3.67 CNY/m3 when the
international crude oil price is 60 $/bbl
(Table 3.3).
3.2.4 Ship Transport Natural Gas
Diesel Replacement Price
Tolerance
Waterborne transport relying on LNG is a sub-
market that is just starting to develop. Ships
consume considerable amounts of fuel, and
shipping routes are relatively fixed and generally
linear in their distribution. There are low external
requirements for filling station networks, and
with mature technology and commercial models,
rapid development is likely. Currently, ship fuels
are divided into light oil and heavy oil. Because
heavy oil prices are low, LNG is not competitive.
The main market for LNG is as a replacement for
light oil. Light oil use is primarily concentrated
in interior river systems and used in river trans-
port, dredging and works vessels, as well as
being used by some coastal fishing boats. Interior
river goods vessels have stable annual oil con-
sumption, have fixed routes and can normally fill
up at service areas. There are not that many
dredgers, but they have high fuel consumption,
refill frequently, have stable fuel consumption
and have relatively dense concentrations, making
it possible to construct dedicated filling stations.
These two types of user are submarkets that
could be reasonably easily developed. Even
though coastal fishing boats are numerous, they
are affected by factors such as the fishing season
and have some seasonal variances with non-fixed
routes and irregular operation, accompanied by
rapid deterioration, therefore short-term devel-
opment will be slow. Currently, LNG shipping
applications are being promoted heavily by
central and local government. Because single
unit fuel consumption is considerable, economy
of scale is particularly pronounced. Compared to
constructing an LNG filling station network,
adding filling stations along shipping routes is
much simpler and more convenient. Once con-
ditions develop, this market will easily pick up,
and it requires only a short development cycle.
Price tolerance for shipping to use LNG
instead of oil is relatively high. Basing calcula-
tions on a 2000 ton grade dual-fuel (30% die-
sel + 70% LNG) powered ship, the conversion
cost is CNY 750,000. Based on 10 journeys per
year, each voyage being 1250 km, and offsetting
the conversion costs over 5 years of voyages, the
conversion cost works out at 1200 CNY/100 km.
The price tolerance of gas used as a replacement
for diesel, based on the running costs for
gas-powered vessels being the same as for diesel
vessels, is 4.96 CNY/m3 when the international
crude oil price is 100 $/bbl, and the price toler-
ance is 3.47 CNY/m3 when the international
Table 3.3 Transport lorry price tolerance of natural gas as replacement for diesel
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100 6.72 45 302 50 45 5.15
80 5.90 265 4.41
60 5.08 229 3.67
Data source Results of calculation
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crude oil price is 60 $/bbl. Pricing parity for




Market Relating to Gas
Replacement of Diesel
Even though natural gas is currently the most
realistic alternative transportation fuel, and its
clean, low-carbon and economical qualities mean
that it has great potential in China, the realisation
of this presents many challenges. In addition to
economy, factors affecting the switch from oil to
natural gas include natural gas supply, develop-
ment of natural gas transport modes, natural gas
filling stations, consumer expectations and the
development of electrically powered cars.
1. Assurances related to natural gas
and transportation usage
In terms of natural gas fuel, users primarily
focus on assurances concerning gas supplies,
price and quality. Currently, as transitions take
place in the layout of global natural gas supplies
and demand, and China’s natural gas supplies
diversify, it can be expected that natural gas
supplies will be fully guaranteed in the future. It
is therefore to be expected that concerns about
natural gas supply guarantees will no longer play
a major role. Natural gas prices, pricing mecha-
nisms and price development trends play a more
significant role. In terms of quality, unlike in
power generation, consumers focus more on the
calorific value of natural gas.
2. Extent of deployment of natural gas filling
stations
The extent of deployment of natural gas filling
stations is an important factor affecting the con-
venience of vehicle operation. Transportation is
affected by network externalities, and as more
filling stations come on line, this will attract new
users and create wider network benefits. This
will, in turn, increase the value of new and
existing filling stations, creating a virtuous circle
that increases the use of gas in transport.
3. Development of natural gas transportation
Transportation using natural gas currently
includes CNG vehicles, LNG vehicles and LNG
shipping, and involves manufacturing or con-
version, operation, maintenance and scrapping.
CNG vehicles are primarily compact cars, light
goods vehicles and buses. Because CNG and
petrol both use a combustion engine, the manu-
facture, conversion and maintenance processes
are simple. Currently the main problem encoun-
tered is that public transport departments are
worried that converted vehicles present a safety
hazard. LNG vehicles are primarily used as
heavy lorries, light commercial vehicles,
inter-city passenger vehicles and in other
long-distance uses where vehicles consume large
quantities of fuel. They can also be used in
mining, engineering and other sectors. Vehicle
conversion requires return to the factory, but the
Table 3.4 Shipping price tolerance of natural gas as replacement for diesel
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100 6.72 950 6384 1045 1200 4.96
80 5.90 5605 4.21
60 5.08 4825 3.47
Data source Results of calculation
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technology is mature. The cost of switching from
diesel to LNG is relatively high due to the small
scale on which it occurs. In addition, LNG
vehicle repair shops are few and far between. If a
malfunction occurs, it is often necessary to return
the vehicle to the factory for repair, resulting in
inconvenience and financial losses being incur-
red by the user. LNG ships are currently in the
trial adoption stage. Depending on the type of
combustion engine that vessels rely on, conver-
sion to LNG may require a return to the factory
in order to convert the engine to the spark igni-
tion type. Alternatively, conversion may be to a
mixed diesel/LNG type engine, and appropriate
conversion schemes still require improvement
through further trials.
4. User perception also influences replace-
ment of oil-based fuels with natural gas
User perception is the subjective experience
of the user relating to the use of natural gas in
transportation, and this has an important influ-
ence on the development of natural gas trans-
portation and in the analysis of submarkets. User
perception includes three aspects: performance,
user sensitivity and usage environment.
In terms of performance, natural gas vehicles
vary somewhat from petrol vehicles. Compared
to petrol, the burn rate of natural gas is slower,
the theoretical highest burn temperature is lower,
and the amount of air required during the burn
process is greater. At the same time, to accom-
modate burning of both fuels, the engine is often
not configured to the optimal state to use natural
gas. These factors each influence the drive output
of natural gas engines, fuel efficiency and other
aspects. In terms of user sensitivity, this involves
fuel economy, power output, usage space, con-
venience and many other factors. For example,
commercial vehicles focus more on economy and
factors related to economy, whereas private
vehicles focus more on output, usage space,
cleanliness etc. In terms of usage environment,
electric cars have also been labelled as innova-
tive, technologically advanced, fashionable and
environmentally friendly alternatives to both gas
and petrol vehicles, whereas gas-fuelled private
vehicles tend to have an image of being more
affordable.
5. Other threats posed by replacement
with electric cars
Compared to natural gas vehicles, electric cars
offer some competitive advantages, and therefore
could present fierce competition to natural gas
vehicles. First, electric motor efficiency is inher-
ently higher than that of the internal combustion
engine, there being less mechanical wear in the
electric car drive mechanism; as a result of this, less
energy is consumed than with internal combustion
engine cars. Moreover, electric motors emit essen-
tially zero emissions. Second, in terms of output and
performance, output in electric cars can be
increased through simple changes to voltage, cur-
rent and frequency. Their structure is more com-
pact, while they have a flexible driving dynamic.
Finally, in terms of economy, even though current
purchase costs are high, they become more eco-
nomical as driving distance increases.
Currently, the greatest obstacle to the devel-
opment of electric vehicles comes from insuffi-
cient battery recharging facilities, in addition to
which battery costs are high and there are chal-
lenges when it comes to extending voyage dis-
tances. The potential threat that electric cars pose
to natural gas-powered cars and the space their
development occupies depends on the techno-
logical development of electric vehicles, and the
speed at which battery exchange and charging




In 2013, natural gas vehicles used around
12 billion m3 nationally. Of this, CNG vehicles
used around 10 billion m3, and LNG vehicles
used 2 billion m3. Because natural gas is still the
most practical alternative fuel for transportation
compared to other alternative fuels, it has a rel-
atively large potential for development.
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Looking at the larger picture, markets for
vehicles using CNG will gradually enter a period
of slower development, with expectations that
this growth will be slightly higher or equivalent
to natural gas consumption market growth rates.
By 2020, consumption will reach 20 billion m3,
and by 2025 it will reach 25 billion m3, after
which growth will stagnate.
LNG vehicle markets in the next 10 years will
maintain high rates of growth, with expectations
that in 2020 vehicular use of LNG will exceed
20 billion m3. By 2030, that number is expected
to reach 40 billion m3.
Shipping LNG is also an important potential
market, but conversion schemes and commercial
models have yet to be further optimised. More-
over, interior river system markets using light oil
only have small capacity, whereas coastal ship-
ping still depends on the degree of implementation
of environmental policy. Early development is
therefore expected to be slow, with later devel-
opment depending on changes in environmental
protection policies. Optimistic projections for ship
usage of LNG envisage usage exceeding 2 bil-
lion m3 by 2020, and over 10 billion m3 by 2030.
3.3 Urban Use: Assessment of Price
Tolerance for Natural Gas
to Replace Other Fuels
3.3.1 Price Tolerance is Relatively
High for Residential
Usage of Natural Gas
Urban residential usage of natural gas is pri-
marily for cooking, hot water and heating sys-
tems. Gas use indices are affected largely by
lifestyle, infrastructure and price. Based on cal-
culations in the Urban and Rural Construction
Statistical Yearbook 2012, per capita natural gas
usage across China in 2012 was 73 m3. How-
ever, in regions such as Sichuan and Chongqing,
where there are more abundant resources, the
price is lower, and where urban introduction
occurred early on, this figure reaches 120 m3. In
major cities there is a high quality of life required
and they exhibit a higher range of 70–80 m3.
Other cities generally have a range of 50–60 m3.
Residential options for energy sources include
electricity, bottled liquefied gas and natural gas.
Therefore, natural gas, liquefied gas and electricity
compete to replace each other in urban residential
usage. Since electricity replaced coal, urban resi-
dential usage of natural gas has an indirect rela-
tionship of acting as a substitute for coal.
1. Price tolerance for natural gas to replace
liquefied gas
Liquefied gas is a by-product of the oil
refining process, and its price is very much
related to the price of crude oil. When the
international price of crude oil is 100 $/bbl,
household bottled liquefied gas costs
8.23 CNY/kg, and when the international price
of crude oil is 60 $/bbl, household bottled liq-
uefied gas costs 6.64 CNY/kg.
The heat efficiency of urban residential piped
natural gas and bottled liquefied gas is around
60%. Basing calculations on the principle of
equivalent effective calorific value costs, the
price tolerance for natural gas as a replacement
for liquefied gas can be calculated as
5.62 CNY/m3 when the international price of
crude oil is 100 $/bbl and 4.54 CNY/m3 when
the international price of crude oil is 60 $/bbl
(Table 3.5).
2. Price tolerance for natural gas to replace
electricity
Electricity is a clean and efficient household
energy source. When natural gas prices are not
competitive with those of electricity, residents will
switch to using electrical appliances, for example
switching from a natural gas hot water heater to an
electrical hot water heater. Based on the available
information, residential natural gas heat efficiency
is around 75%, whereas electric hot water heat
efficiency is around 98%. Calculating the price
tolerance of natural gas to replace electricity based
on the principle of equivalent effective calorific
value cost, with current residential electricity
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prices being 0.40–0.60 CNY/kWh, natural gas
price tolerance as a replacement for electricity is
2.92–4.38 CNY/m3 (Table 3.6).
3. Natural gas price tolerance in terms of
disposable income of urban residents
Compared to liquefied gas, natural gas is
convenient, does not require bottling or transport
and avoids the inconvenience of frequent
replacement. It is symbolic of quality of life, and
thus even if natural gas use has a higher cost than
liquefied gas, residents will still opt to use natural
gas, so long as the cost is within the range tol-
erable to their income level.
According to Price Law, residential use nat-
ural gas is a public commodity and is included in
the scope of government price setting. Govern-
ment procedures must be followed, and the most
important factor from the point of view of gov-
ernment price setting is the disposable income
level of urban residents. A level of average res-
idential usage of 3% of the disposable income of
low-income residents is used as a reference,
resulting in an acceptable residential natural gas
price of 5.7 CNY/m3 (Table 3.7).
























100 8.23 50.25 60% 273 60% 34.34 5.62
80 7.43 246 5.08
60 6.64 220 4.54
Data source Results of calculation
Table 3.6 Price tolerance for residential usage natural gas replacement of electricity



















0.6 3.60 98% 170 75% 34.34 4.38
0.5 142 3.65
0.4 113 2.92
Data source Results of calculation
Table 3.7 Residential disposable income price tolerance for natural gas
Income group Per-capita disposable
income (CNY/year)














Low income 11,434 343 5.7
Data source Results of calculation
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3.3.2 Price Tolerance is also Quite
Resilient in Commercial
Service Natural Gas Use
Commercial service natural gas users primarily
include airports, government institutions,
employee canteens, kindergartens, schools,
hotels, restaurants, the catering industry, shop-
ping centres and office buildings. Individual unit
usage is far higher than that of residential users,
with usage primarily for cooking and for cooling
and heating systems. Alternatives include lique-
fied gas and electricity.
1. Price tolerance of natural gas replacing
liquefied gas
Unlike residential users of liquefied gas,
commercial service users generally use large
tanks of liquefied gas, the price of which is lower
than that of the smaller bottles of liquefied gas
used residentially. Basing calculations on the
principle of equivalent effective calorific value
costs, the price tolerance for natural gas replacing
liquefied gas can be calculated as 5.34 CNY/m3
when the international price of crude oil is
100 $/bbl and 4.31 CNY/m3 when the interna-
tional price of crude oil is 60 $/bbl (Table 3.8).
2. Price tolerance of natural gas replacing
electricity
Among commercial service and institutional
users, there is a competitive alternative relation-
ship between natural gas and electricity in the
promotion of natural gas direct combustion air
conditioning units (Table 3.9). Basing calcula-
tions on the principle of equivalent effective
calorific value costs, the price tolerance for nat-
ural gas replacing electricity can be calculated as
4.52 CNY/m3 when the international price of
crude oil is 100 $/bbl and 3.01 CNY/m3 when
the international price of crude oil is 60 $/bbl.
3.3.3 Price Tolerance is Weak
for Centralised Urban
Heating Using Natural Gas
China’s centralised heating is primarily focused in
the northern regions. The traditional areas relying
onwinter season heating are the three north-eastern
























100 7.82 50.25 50% 311 50% 34.34 5.34
80 7.06 281 4.82
60 6.31 251 4.31
Data source Results of calculation
Table 3.9 Price tolerance for commercial service usage of natural gas as a replacement for electricity

























0.6 3.60 95% 300 475 320 75% 34.34 4.00
0.5 446 3.25
0.4 417 2.50
Data source Results of calculation
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provinces, five north-western provinces, five north
China provinces and Shandong and Henan, giving
a total of 15 provinces (regions, cities), most of
which rely on coal-fired boilers. Conversion from
coal to natural gas has been carried out based on
local environmental policy requirements. Basing
calculations on the equivalent unit cost per heated
area, when the coal price is 600 CNY/ton, natural
gas price tolerance as a replacement for coal is
1.75 CNY/m3 (Table 3.10).
3.4 Industrial Use: Cost Comparison
of Natural Gas Replacing Other
Energy Sources
Natural gas as an industrial fuel is primarily used
in smelting furnaces, heating furnaces, hot
treatment furnaces, roasting furnaces, drying
furnaces and other industrial furnaces (construc-
tion materials, electromechanical, metals and
other industries) and industrial furnaces used to
generate steam for process requirements, and is
used to replace fuel oil, coal gas and coal.
3.4.1 Price Tolerance is Very Low
for Replacement of Fuel
Oil by Natural Gas
in the Glass Industry
Glass is primarily divided into flat panel glass
and special type glass. Flat panel glass is divided
into general flat panel glass and floating glass.
The general process for the production of glass
is: raw material–melting–forming–cooling–cut-
ting–packing–placement into inventory–sale.
Natural gas is primarily used at the melting stage,
the main natural gas-consuming equipment being
a glass furnace. Based on glass raw material
melting principles, glass enterprises generally use
high calorific value fuels such as fuel oil. Natural
gas may therefore act as a substitute for fuel oil
in the glass industry.
Basing calculations on the principle of
equivalent effective calorific value costs, the
price tolerance for natural gas replacing fuel oil
can be calculated as 3.25 CNY/m3 when the
international price of crude oil is 100 $/bbl and
1.94 CNY/m3 when the international price of
crude oil is 60 $/bbl (Table 3.11).




























800 20.94 30 12 36 9 12 34.34 2.25
600 30 1.75
400 24 35
Data source Results of calculation
























100 3.74 41.88 85% 105 90% 34.34 3.25
80 2.98 84 2.59
60 2.24 63 1.94
Data source Results of calculation
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3.4.2 Price Tolerance is Relatively
Weak for the Ceramics
Industry for Replacement
of Coal Gas by Natural Gas
The ceramics industry can be broken down into
four sub-industries: hygiene ceramics, articles
for everyday use, art and other ceramics.
According to the production processes for
ceramic products, the overall process is: raw
material moulding and forming—firing—cool-
ing and application of enamel—re-firing and
other steps, with natural gas primarily used in
kiln heating.
In order to guarantee the quality of the cera-
mic products, the fuel needs to be pure and
without contaminating matter and the supply
must be stable. Normally coal gas is used, but
natural gas has the potential to be a substitute.
Basing calculations on the principle of equivalent
effective calorific value costs, the price tolerance
for natural gas replacing coal gas can be calcu-
lated as 2.46 CNY/m3 when the price of coal is
600 CNY/ton (Table 3.12).
3.4.3 Natural Gas Price Tolerance is
Relatively Poor for Steam
Production as a Replace
ment for Coal
Steam is broadly used in industrial manufactur-
ing processes, with steam generated by industrial
boilers. Industrial boiler steam production does
require much fuel, and normally low-priced coal
is used. Therefore, in the industrial production of
steam, natural gas has the potential to compete as
a substitute for coal. Basing calculations on the
principle of equivalent effective calorific value
costs, the price tolerance for natural gas replacing
coal can be calculated as 1.92 CNY/m3 when the
price of coal is 600 CNY/ton (Table 3.13).



























800 20.94 3 0.7 16.75 82 34.34 2.80
600 72 2.46
400 62 2.12
Data source Results of calculation



























800 20.94 200 80 240 50 78 34.34 2.44
600 200 1.92
400 160 1.41
Data source Results of calculation
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3.5 Chemicals: Potential
for Increased Natural Gas Use
in the Production Process
Natural gas chemical engineering refers to the
use of methane, the primary component of nat-
ural gas, in manufacturing processes, the prod-
ucts of which are primarily synthetic ammonia,
methanol and hydrogen.
3.5.1 Price Tolerance of Natural
Gas is Extremely Low for
the Manufacture
of Synthetic Ammonia
Production capacity and production volume in
China’s synthetic ammonia industry are the
highest in the world, and coal and natural gas are
the main raw materials, accounting for 76 and
22% respectively. The price of the final urea
product is essentially guided by the production
cost of the coal raw material. Thus, from the
perspective of industry development, natural gas
competes as an alternative to coal in the manu-
facture of synthetic ammonia.
Basing calculations on the principle of
equivalent finished product costs, the price tol-
erance for natural gas replacing coal in the
manufacture of synthetic ammonia can be cal-
culated as 1.42 CNY/m3 when the price of coal
is 600 CNY/ton (Table 3.14).
3.5.2 Price Tolerance of Natural
Gas is Very Weak for the
Manufacture of Methanol
Production of methanol in China relies on coal
and natural gas as the main raw materials,
accounting for 63 and 28%, respectively. The
price of the urea end product is essentially guided
by the cost of the coal raw material. Thus, from
the perspective of sector development, natural
gas has a relationship as a substitute for coal in
the manufacture of methanol.
Basing calculations on the principle of
equivalent finished product costs, the price tol-
erance for natural gas replacing coal in the
manufacture of methanol can be calculated as
1.71 CNY/m3 when the price of coal is
600 CNY/ton (Table 3.15).






















800 1080 1000 1738 800 600 1.77
600 1554 1.42
400 1369 1.07
Data source Results of calculation






















800 1400 1500 2457 900 870 2.02
600 2218 1.71
400 1979 1.40
Data source Results of calculation
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3.5.3 Price Tolerance of Natural
Gas is Very Strong for the
Manufacture of Hydrogen
Natural gas has a high methane content, and when
used as the raw material in the production of
hydrogen it results in a high hydrogen yield in
addition to reducing fuel consumption, making it
the ideal raw material. The majority of the
world’s hydrogen is manufactured using natural
gas as a raw material. However, in China the raw
material most used in the manufacture of hydro-
gen is coal, although petrochemical enterprises
manufacture hydrogen using mainly naphtha.
Natural gas is primarily used in the manufacture
of hydrogen by petrochemical enterprises as an
alternative to naphtha. Basing calculations on the
principle of equivalent finished product costs, the
price tolerance for natural gas replacing naphtha
can be calculated as 7.19 CNY/m3 when the
international price of crude oil is 100 $/bbl and
4.34 CNY/m3 when the international price of
crude oil is 60 $/bbl (Table 3.16).
3.6 China’s Natural Gas Demand
Curve and Ways to Increase
Natural Gas Consumption
3.6.1 China’s Natural Gas Prices
in 2013
1. Shanghai as the baseline
In July 2013, the National Development and
Reform Commission issued the Notice
Regarding Natural Gas Prices (FGJG 2013,
No. 1246), in which a reform plan was proposed
for natural gas prices. Considering China’s nat-
ural gas market resource trends, consumption and
management distribution as a whole, Shanghai
was chosen as the pricing baseline location.
Station prices across the country in all provinces
as well as all user terminal natural gas prices
were tied to the Shanghai station price.
2. Individual subsidies for each provincial
station
The price difference between each province’s
station price and the pricing baseline of the
Shanghai station price was the subsidy. The main
factor affecting provincial subsidies was trans-
portation cost (Table 3.17).
3. End price calculations for provincial users
Provincial station price = Shanghai station price
- subsidy
City station price = provincial station
price + provincial pipeline network pipeline
transport fee
City natural gas user terminal price = city station
price + city distribution fee
Large industrial user delivery price = city station
price + provincial pipeline network pipeline
transport fee
CNG filling sales price = city station price +
CNG compression and distribution fee
LNG filling sales price = city station price +
LNG liquid filling fee
Depending on the provincial pipeline network
pipeline transport fee for each province, the city

























100 10.64 3600 1000 33,731 650 5200 7.19
80 8.51 27,185 5.77
60 6.38 20,638 4.34
Data source Results of calculation
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Table 3.17 Station price subsidies in each province
No. Province Subsidy No. Province Subsidy No. Province Subsidy
1 Shanghai 0.00 11 Shandong 0.20 21 Sichuan 0.53
2 Guangdong 0.00 12 Liaoning 0.20 22 Chongqing 0.54
3 Zhejiang 0.01 13 Hubei 0.22 23 Hainan 0.54
4 Jiangsu 0.02 14 Jiangxi 0.22 24 Ningxia 0.67
5 Anhui 0.09 15 Hunan 0.22 25 Gansu 0.75
6 Henan 0.17 16 Shanxi 0.27 26 Shaanxi 0.84
7 Guangxi 0.17 17 Heilongjiang 0.42 27 Inner Mongolia 0.84
8 Beijing 0.18 18 Jilin 0.42 28 Qinghai 0.91
9 Tianjin 0.18 19 Yunnan 0.47 29 Xinjiang 1.03
10 Hebei 0.20 20 Guizhou 0.47 30 Tibet 1.50
distribution fee, CNG compression and distribu-
tion fee and LNG liquid filling fee, the average
values are 0.2 , 0.75 , 1.5 and 2.0 CNY/m3,
respectively.
3.6.2 Natural Gas Demand Curve
for China in 2013
1. Summary of price tolerance for different
users
Based on the calculations in this chapter, when
the international price of crude oil is 80 $/bbl, and
when raw coal price is 600 CNY/ton, the terminal
price tolerance for natural gas usage by users in
various sectors is 1.4–5.77 CNY/m3. Within this
range, the price tolerance is relatively high for
residential, commercial services, vehicle and ship
transport, and natural gas manufacturing of
hydrogen, but relatively low for centralised heat-
ing, natural gas power generation, industrial fuels,
synthetic ammonia and methanol (Fig. 3.4).
During the optimisation of primary energy
consumption structures, for natural gas replace-
ment of oil as the fuel in industrial processes, the
natural gas price tolerance is 2.59 CNY/m3,
while for natural gas chemicals, the price toler-
ance of natural gas for use in the production of
hydrogen as a replacement for naphtha is highest,
with a maximum natural gas price tolerance of
5.77 CNY/m3.
In terms of natural gas as a replacement sec-
ondary energy source for electricity in residential
and commercial use, natural gas price tolerance
ranks only second to natural gas substituting
petroleum, at around 3.7 CNY/m3 (Fig. 3.5).
During the process of natural gas replacing
coal, natural gas price tolerance is generally low,
and only when it is used as a substitute for
syngas is the natural gas price tolerance relatively
high at 2.46 CNY/m3. Price tolerance for other
coal use, whether for heating, synthetic ammo-
nia, methanol production, steam boilers or power
generation, is only around 1.5 CNY/m3.
2. Construction of the natural gas demand
curve
Step 1: The total consumption of natural gas in
China of 166 billion m3 was divided
between 30 provinces, 5 categories and
16 types of user.
Step 2: The prices of alternative energies such
as coal, fuel oil, naphtha, #93 petrol, #0
diesel, LPG, electric power and data on
urban residents’ disposable income was
collated, and an evaluation of the ter-
minal price tolerance of 16 kinds of
natural gas user carried out.
Step 3: Terminal price tolerance of natural gas
users was normalised using natural gas
pricing mechanisms based on the
Shanghai natural gas benchmark price.
Step 4: The tolerance for the Shanghai bench-
mark price of the 30 provinces, 5 cate-
gories and 16 types of user was organised
from high to low, yielding the effective
China natural gas market demand curve.






















































































































































































































Fig. 3.4 Terminal price tolerance for users in various natural gas sectors
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Fig. 3.5 Terminal price tolerance of main gas market users in terms of energy substitution
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This finally yielded the 2013 China natural
gas demand curve, as shown in Fig. 3.6.
3.6.3 Implementation Model
of Effective Demand
and Actual Natural Gas
Consumption Based
on Natural Gas Price
Reform Targets
In 2013, China proposed a natural gas price reform
scheme, which set the Shanghai benchmark price
of natural gas at 3.32 CNY/m3. From the effective
demand curve of the natural gas market it can be
seen that, in 2013, China’s actual consumption
of natural gas reached 167.6 billion m3, and,
based on the Shanghai benchmark price of
3.32 CNY/m3, the corresponding effective demand
reaches 50 billion m3, which only accounts for
30% of actual consumption. The natural gas con-
sumption in urban centralised heating, power
generation, ammonia and methanol synthesis and
for most industrial fuels cannot be the effective
demand based on the Shanghai benchmark price of
3.32 CNY/m3 (Table 3.18).
In 2013, China’s actual natural gas con-
sumption reached 166 billion m3, which sub-
stantially exceeds the effective demand
calculated based on price tolerance, being a result
of various natural gas supportive policies.
1. Natural gas price reform transitional pol-
icy—gas suppliers providing subsidies of
nearly 150 billion CNY to users
The natural gas price reform scheme imple-
mented by the state specified that the civil natural
gas price would not be changed, the fertiliser
natural gas price would be slightly adjusted, and
non-residential use natural gas prices would have
a stored gas and reserve gas two-tier system
applied to them. During the natural gas price
reform transitional period, an unsatisfactory low
price policy was applied to natural gas, with
natural gas suppliers providing subsidies to nat-
ural gas consumer enterprises to ensure that users
could afford gas and that natural gas consump-
tion reached a certain level.
In 2013, the national average urban resident
terminal natural gas price was 2.15 CNY/m3 and
the average resident natural gas provincial gate
price was 1.37 CNY/m3, which was
1.50 CNY/m3 lower than the average national
incremental natural gas price. Natural gas sup-
pliers granted around 27 billion CNY of subsidies
to urban residential users based on a residential
natural gas consumption of 18 billion m3.
The average fertiliser natural gas consumption
price was adjusted slightly to around
1.80 CNY/m3, being 1.10 CNY/m3 lower than the
average national incremental natural gas price.
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Fig. 3.6 Effective 2013 China natural gas market demand curve
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Natural gas suppliers granted around 22 billion
CNY of subsidies to fertiliser users based on a
fertiliser natural gas consumption of 20 billion m3.
In 2013, the stored natural gas price in various
provinces in China was 0.88 CNY/m3 lower than
the incremental natural gas. Natural gas suppliers
subsidised non-residential stored natural gas
users to the tune of around 100 billion CNY
based on a non-residential stored natural gas
volume of 110 billion m3.
2. Special pricing policy for natural gas gen-
eration electricity prices
The Notice on Relevant Matters for Adjusting
Grid Purchase Price of Power Generation
Enterprises issued by the National Development
and Reform Commission on September 30, 2013,
besides reducing the desulphurised coal power
electricity grid price for all provinces (regions and
cities), required that the gas-fired power electricity
grid price in provinces (regions and cities) such
as Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong,
Hainan, Henan, Hubei and Ningxia should be
increased, thus easing slightly the conflicting
influences on the natural gas price. In China,
the grid price of gas power electricity is 40%
higher than that of coal power electricity (around
0.20 CNY/kWh). Based on 28.5 billion m3 resi-
dential natural gas consumption, around
570 million CNY of the cost of gas generated
electricity is transferred from power suppliers to
the user.
3. Supportive policy for natural gas use
Generous fiscal subsidies are granted in many
locations to encourage the adoption of natural
Table 3.18 Effective demand of natural gas in China based on the Shanghai benchmark price in 2013
Main purpose Actual consumption Effective demand Growth
rate (%)Quantity Proportion (%) Consumption Proportion (%)
Urban fuel gas Residential 181 10.95 147 30.95 81
Commercial
service
104 6.29 84 17.61 80




CNG taxi 59 3.57 59 12.43 100
CNG bus 32 1.94 32 6.74 100














Industrial fuels 606 36.66 88 17.45 15
Natural gas
chemical industry




41 2.48 41 8.28 100
Total 1653 100 475 100 29
Data source Calculation results
(Units of 100 million m3)
3.6 China’s Natural Gas Demand Curve and Ways … 99
gas centralised heating. Compared with
coal-fired centralised heating, the natural gas
price tolerance for gas-fired centralised heating
only reached 1.75 CNY/m3. After deducting
urban natural gas distribution costs, the provin-
cial gate natural gas price tolerance reached
around 1.00 CNY/m3. If the unit price charged
for centralised heating is not adjusted, the eco-
nomic benefits of gas-fired centralised heating
would be almost the same as those of coal-fired
central heating. Based on the stored natural gas
price of 2.2 CNY/m3 and a heating natural gas
consumption of 10 billion m3, the fiscal subsidy
granted by local government for gas-fired cen-
tralised heating reached around CNY 12 billion.
4. Coercive policy for natural gas use
In September 2013, the State Council pub-
lished the Action Plan for Atmospheric Con-
tamination Prevention, which requires the
acceleration of coal to gas conversions, with the
aim of eliminating small urban coal-fired boilers,
establishing coal-free zones etc. to speed up the
adoption of natural gas in heating boilers,
industrial boilers and thermoelectric projects.
Cities at all levels were required to rid them-
selves of coal-fired boilers with capacity less than
10 tons of steam per hour, and the construction of
coal-fired boilers with capacity of 20 tons of
steam or less per hour was forbidden. Most
industrial fuel users have a low tolerance for
natural gas prices, but based on policy require-
ments, they are now required to absorb the costs
of natural gas themselves.
Judging from the natural gas effective demand
curve, the demand for stored natural gas that
could be supported by industrial fuel users
reached 30 billion m3, while the increased cost
of CNY 27 billion associated with the other
30 billion m3 of industrial fuel consumption had
to be absorbed by the enterprises themselves,
posing challenges for the sustainable develop-
ment of natural gas-consuming enterprises.
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Natural gas, as a clean energy source, can reduce
the economic losses caused by environmental
pollution from coal and petroleum. Based on
international experience of natural gas con-
sumption development, it is clear that, while
natural gas lacks an obvious price advantage and
has even higher direct costs, it is still an effective
substitute for other energy sources. The key to
this is that restricting pollution reduces the eco-
nomic and social losses associated with
pollution.
4.1 Losses Caused by Atmospheric
Pollution in China
4.1.1 Atmospheric Pollution is a Key
Cause of Death in China
Based on World Health Organization figures, in
2010 there were 1.2 million people who died
prematurely as a result of air pollution, repre-
senting a loss of over 25 million years of healthy
living. Atmospheric pollution includes indoor
and outdoor pollution, among which outdoor
pollution is mainly caused by discharge of pol-
lutants through the use of fossil fuels, including
coal burning, automobile emissions, dust, etc.,
while indoor atmospheric pollution is caused by
leakage of hazardous substances generated dur-
ing finishing, and the lack of affordable and clean
fuels for residential use; an example of this is the
use of direct combustion of large quantities of
coal briquettes, which cause significant pollution.
In 2010, outdoor atmospheric pollution was
ranked fourth as a cause of death for residents in
China, while indoor atmospheric pollution was
ranked fifth.
From a historical point of view, prevention of
indoor atmospheric pollution in China has
improved a great deal, but outdoor atmospheric
pollution still presents serious challenges. In
1990, indoor atmospheric pollution was ranked
second as a cause of death in China. Subse-
quently, its importance dropped rapidly, and in
2010, it was ranked fifth. However, in recent
years, with rapid economic development in
China, and a lack of strict energy conservation
and emission reduction measures in many energy
production and consumption enterprises, the air
quality in China has failed to improve signifi-
cantly, and the threat of atmospheric pollution to
health remains significant. During the period
1990–2010, an average of 80–90 persons per
10,000 died of various diseases caused by
atmospheric pollution (Fig. 4.1).
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Economic activity can improve citizens’ income
and increase well-being, but the associated atmo-
spheric pollution causes losses in terms of quality
of life. A balance must be reached between eco-
nomic benefits and losses. However, health losses
cannot be directly measured in the same way as
economic output if there is no quantification of loss
of health. Previous experience shows that, if health
effects can be economically quantified in a finan-
cial index that represents losses caused by the
death of a person, this reflects the true cost of
economic development, and can act to promote
improvements in air quality.1
1. Atmospheric pollution losses in the
European Union
Based on international standards, the air
quality in EU countries is excellent. However, in
2012, the losses from primary pollutants gener-
ated by industry and energy generation still
accounted for between 0.3% and 1% of GDP
(European Environment Agency, 2014). Figure 4.2
shows estimated hazard costs per ton of pollutants
in Europe. In Europe, the hazards of CO2 cost
9.8–38.1 €/t (2005 prices), while the hazards of
PM10 cost 23,000–67,000 €/t. Other pollutants
besides particulate matter also need to be noted; in
particular, the hazard cost of heavy metal and
organic pollutants per unit weight far exceeds that
of particulate matter pollution, though the quantity
of these pollutants is less. The hazard that they
represent overall is therefore less than that pre-
sented by particulate matter.
2. Estimate of health-related losses caused by
atmospheric pollution in China
China faces worse pollution than other coun-
tries. In the main cities in China, the average
concentration of PM10 and sulphur dioxide is
respectively 5 times and 12 times the reference
value (Nielson and Ho 2013) issued by the WHO
in 2009. Significant research has shown that air
pollution and energy structure have a direct
relationship. In recent years, various methods
have been adopted in many studies to assess
health-related losses in China.
The China 2030 Report, jointly issued by the
Development Research Center of the State
Council and the World Bank in 2013, estimated
that the health-related losses caused by PM10
were equivalent to 2.8% of the GNI in 2009,
















Risks due to diet
High blood pressure
Smoking
Atmospheric particulate pollution  
Indoor atmospheric pollution due
to solid fuels  
Fig. 4.1 Top five causes of death of residents in China. Data source Vivid Economics, referred from Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation (2014)
1There are also many people who object to using money
to measure the value of life, but for the purpose of
balancing interests, this measure is still necessary.
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calculated based on the two basic parameters of
deaths caused by particulate matter discharge and
the amount of money that people are willing to
pay to reduce the risk of disease.
The New Climate Economy Report issued by
the Global Commission on Economy and Cli-
mate in 2014 estimated that the economic loss
caused by deaths of people due to PM2.5 in China
in 2010 was equivalent to 9.7–13.2% of GDP,
with a median value of around 12% of GDP. This
result was obtained by multiplying three values:
deaths caused by PM2.5, economic value of
deaths and per capita GDP. The economic value
of deaths was obtained by converting the value of
statistical life (VSL) used in the European Union,
adjusted for per capita income. In other words,
the economic value of deaths will grow together
with the growth of per capita GDP. Data for
deaths caused by PM2.5 was sourced from the
WHO’s 2010 Global Burden of Disease Study.
Matus et al. (2011) estimated the economic
loss caused by atmospheric pollution. This paper
calculated the health hazard caused by PM10 and
ozone, and the results show that in 2005 the
economic losses caused by health hazards due to
PM10 accounted for around 6% of GDP. This
paper adopted the multi-department CGE model
to calculate the losses due to atmospheric pollu-
tion health damage between 1970 and 2005,
taking into account the cost of related treatment,
reduced working capacity and extra holidays
taken. In 2005, around 60% of the losses were
due to death, 10% due to the cost of treatment
and 30% from other economic losses.
If other pollutants are brought into the equa-
tion, the economic losses of atmospheric pollu-
tion in China become even higher. These studies
only consider particulate matter (PM), including
the larger PM10 with a diameter of 10 microns
and the smaller but more harmful PM2.5. In fact,
the hazards of other pollutants such as sulphur
dioxide and nitrogen dioxide are also severe.
In general, the difficulties encountered in
research into the economic quantification of the
losses caused by atmospheric pollution in China
cause a lot of variation: the research methods,
concerns and assessment standards are different,
and the research results are also uncertain. Gen-
erally speaking, the economic loss caused by
atmospheric pollution in China is massive,
Main atmospheric pollutants (VOLY method) 
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Fig. 4.2 Hazard cost estimation for main pollutants in Europe. Note Damage calculations apply for Europe only. Data
source Vivid Economics, referred from (European Environment Agency, 2014)
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equivalent to between 3% and 12% of
GDP. Based on the results of these studies, in
2014, atmospheric pollution caused a loss of
between $300 billion and $1200 billion in
China. Given that the International Energy
Agency estimated that China’s energy supply
needed $300 billion of investment annually up to
2035, this gives a clear indication that improving
air quality would pay for itself (Fig. 4.3).
3. Other unfavourable effects of atmospheric
pollution
Atmospheric pollution not only causes direct
harm to health and economic losses, it also
reduces China’s capital labour reserves and
reduces productivity. This results in a “haircut”
being applied in terms of the actual economic
benefits of the particularly labour-centred
approach to economic activities that China relies
on. In addition, the investment attracted by the
12th Five-Year Plan and the political targets put
forward during the 3rd Plenary Session of the
18th CPC Central Committee will also be affec-
ted. The implementation of policies for expanding
urbanisation, developing the service industry,
reducing inequality, improving social insurance,
etc. will become harder to achieve, as shown in
Fig. 4.4.
4.2 The Environmental Value
of Natural Gas as a Substitute
for Coal
The environmental value of natural gas stems
from the fact that it is a clean energy substitute
for coal. Coal production, transportation and
usage cause serious environmental pollution, and
result in tremendous direct and indirect external
economic losses. However, as the costs of envi-
ronmental pollution in China are accounted for as
external economic losses, market entities causing
environmental pollution consistently fail to pay
the price of environmental pollution themselves.
Similarly, the environmental benefits of replacing
coal and oil with natural gas are not reflected in
natural gas’s market value, since the costs of
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Fig. 4.3 Economic loss caused by atmospheric pollution as a percentage of GDP. Data source The State Council
Development Research Center and the World Bank 2012, Matus et al. 2012; Global Economy and Climate
Commission, 2014
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appropriation of land, and pollution of water
resources and the atmosphere.
Underground mining causes surface subsi-
dence; mining areas suffer from ponding, flooding
and salinisation, which accelerate water and soil
erosion; and desertification causes damage to sur-
face infrastructure to differing degrees. Open coal
mining peels off the topsoil and rock stratum
covering the coal bed, destroying land resources,
and discharges spoil onto adjoining land. Coal
spoil piles up and buries land resources. Based on
relevant data, extraction of 10,000 tons of coal will
cause surface subsidence of an area of 0.2 hec-
tares, requiring relocation of two residents, while
associated spoil occupies 0.01 hectares. The eco-
nomic losses caused by land resource damage due
to extraction of one ton of coal are thus CNY 65.
During the mining process, the scale of
extraction grows and even larger quantities
of mine water are discharged, causing pollution of
the aquatic environment around mines; mean-
while, the water table drops, causing subsidence.
The commonly used coal washing process results
in large quantities of water that contains high
concentrations of sludge, silt and harmful heavy
metal ions. Large amounts of harmful substances
(especially heavy metal ions) contained in the coal
spoil heaps leach out due to rainfall and enter the
ecosystem. Based on relevant data, extraction of
one ton of coal results in the discharge of 2.3 tons
of mine water, 0.35 tons of industrial waste water,
0.05 tons of coal washing water, and 0.04 tons of
other waste water, resulting in economic losses
estimated at CNY 10 per ton of coal.
The greenhouse effect of marsh gas (the main
ingredient of which is CH4) released during coal
extraction is 21 times that of CO2, making this
one of the main gases responsible for global
warming. Large quantities of hazardous gases
such as SO2, CO2, CO etc. produced by spon-
taneous combustion of coal spoil also affect the
atmospheric environment. Based on relevant
data, extraction of one ton of coal on average
results in the discharge of 10 m3 of gas, equiv-
alent to a discharge of 138 kg of CO2, and the
estimated economic loss caused by atmospheric
pollution produced by extraction of one ton of
coal is CNY 15.
Economic losses caused by environmental
pollution during coal production per ton of coal





The geographical distribution of coal production
and consumption in China is highly unbalanced,
with coal production bases being distributed
mainly in the northern and western regions, while
coal consumption is mainly distributed in eastern
and coastal areas, determining the basic pattern
of transportation: northern coal to the south, and
western coal to the east. The average distance
coal is transported by rail is 552 km.
Coal in China is transported over long dis-
tances, and passes from the coal stores or coal
yards of mines to trains (or vehicles or vessels)
and then reaches large thermal power generation
coal yards, industrial coal consumption enter-
prise coal yards and fuel company coal yards of






Poor health places a
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Fig. 4.4 Further effects of atmospheric pollution
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transportation facilities are usually not integrated,
the lack of flow regulation exacerbated by poor
management results in serious pollution of the
surroundings at all stages of coal storage, han-
dling and transportation.
The spontaneous combustion of mined coal
not only happens in coal yards, but also after
loading on lorries or vessels. During open
stacking, handling and transportation of coal, the
coal dust contaminates wide areas and causes
serious pollution. Spraying in open coal yards
during loading and unloading to cause coal dust
to settle results in pollution of bodies of water.
Based on relevant data, there is an annual
discharge of between 200,000–300,000 tons of
harmful gas due to spontaneous combustion of
coal in China, while 10 million tons of coal dust
is produced during coal storage and 11 million
tons of coal dust is generated during coal trans-
portation. The estimated economic losses caused
by pollution from transportation of each ton of
coal are thus CNY 20.




Direct combustion of large amounts of coal has
caused serious damage to the environment in
China, while it is also the main cause of envi-
ronmental pollution.
SO2 discharge and acid rain have serious
effects on human health and vegetation, and cause
deforestation, damage to buildings and metal
corrosion. Based on calculations made by various
institutions, the economic loss caused by the dis-
charge of one ton of SO2 is as high as CNY 7000.
CO2 discharge and the greenhouse effect
seriously threaten global ecosystems and the
survival of mankind, causing shrinking forests,
land salinisation, desertification, extreme weather
events, etc. Based on the cost of carbon seques-
tration, the estimated economic loss caused by
the discharge of one ton of CO2 is CNY 110.
NOX discharges have serious effects on human
health and cause a series of diseases and
photochemical reactions, in addition to damaging
ecosystems. Based on calculations made by vari-
ous institutions, the economic loss caused by dis-
charge of one ton of NOX is as high as CNY 5000.
Dust emissions have an effect on human
health and discharge of dust into the atmosphere
will reduce atmospheric cleanliness and affect
plant photosynthesis etc. Based on calculations
made by various institutions, the economic loss
caused by discharge of one ton of dust is as high
as CNY 200,000.
Based on calculations of coal combustion
pollutant discharge quantities, the economic loss
caused by the pollution produced by one ton of




The process of coal production, transportation and
use results in serious environmental pollution.
The estimated economic loss incurred is 380–
940 CNY/t, of which production accounts for
90 CNY/t, transportation accounts for 20 CNY/t
and usage accounts for 295–830 CNY/t.
CO2 and other micro pollutants are discharged
during the natural gas usage process. Calculated
based on a discharge of 2.5 kg CO2 per m
3 nat-
ural gas, the economic loss caused by the pol-
lution due to natural gas is 0.3 CNY/m3.
Based on calorific value and efficiency of coal
and natural gas, and calculated for 550 m3 nat-
ural gas replacing one ton of coal, the natural gas
environmental value compared to coal which is
subjected to similar emissions restrictions is 0.4–
1.4 CNY/m3 and 1.4 CNY/m3 under conditions
of dispersed coal use.
4.3 Social Value of Natural Gas
as a Substitute for Coal
Besides environmental losses, coal production,
transportation and consumption processes all
cause non-economic losses to the population, for
instance non-economic losses involving mental
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and physical suffering, such as that due to the
pain caused by disease suffered by the victim,
and the pain caused to the relatives due to the
death of a loved one.
Social losses are calculated based on differ-
ence in willingness to pay and human capital.
Willingness to pay refers to readiness to pay or a
desire for compensation ascertained through
research, the calculation of which includes bid-
ding gaming methods, comparison gaming
methods and the Delphi method. Human capital
refers to the monetary loss connected with health,
including increased losses and medical expenses
due to premature death, illness or medical leave
and other factors.
4.3.1 Social Loss of Coal Production
The coal industry is the industry with the greatest
number of fatal accidents in China—annual coal
mine fatalities had reached around 6000–7000, but
dropped to nearly 4000 by 2007. Accidents in coal
mines account for 85% of workplace fatalities in
China’s mining industry, and coal mining accounts
for 50% of all mining fatalities, the highest rate in
the country. Apart from this, pneumoconiosis, an
occupational disease related to coal production,
has very serious consequences on health.
4.3.2 Social Loss of Coal Use
Environmental pollution caused by coal use seri-
ously affects people’s health. SO2 emissions have
obvious effects on the respiratory system, irritat-
ing the respiratory mucosa, resulting in acute and
chronic inflammation of the respiratory tract.
Long-term inhalation of SO2 will lead to fibre
hyperplasia of lung tissue cell walls as well as
emphysema and bronchial asthma. Smoke dust
discharge is a serious problem too. The dust
consists of particulates which can become sus-
pended in the atmosphere for a long time, and at
any time it can be directly inhaled into the res-
piratory tract. These small particulates are a car-
rier of bacteria, viruses and metallic particles, and
bring harmful pathogenic bacteria and toxic par-
ticles into the human respiratory system and the
alveoli, inducing allergic rhinitis, bronchitis and
bronchial asthma, and even malignant tumours.
4.3.3 Social Value Assessment
of Natural Gas
as a Substitute for Coal
Based on the functional relationships between
death rate and the incidence (dose-response
function) of certain diseases outlined in Atmo-
spheric Pollution in Large and Medium-Sized
Cities of China issued by the World Bank, the
contribution of coal and natural gas use to
atmospheric pollution was evaluated, while
considering the loss of life caused by mining
accidents and the social losses associated with
occupational diseases encountered in the coal
production process, providing an estimated
external environmental benefit to society of nat-
ural gas of around 0.4 CNY/m3 (Table 4.2).
Table 4.1 Calculation table for the economic loss caused by pollution produced by one ton of raw coal
Emission Discharge quantity (kg) Unit loss
(CNY/kg)









CO2 2455 2455 0.11 270 270 Calculated based on carbon
exchange value
NOX 5.40 5 27 Calculated based on pollution loss
SO2 10.40 7 73 Calculated based on pollution loss
Dust 2.30 200 460 Calculated based on pollution loss
Total 295 830




Thanks to technical progress and greater social
awareness, China has significantly enhanced its
energy conservation and emissions reduction
work in recent years. The results show that
energy conservation and emissions reduction
resulted in significant direct and indirect benefits
being achieved with limited input, providing
empirical support for the further development of
clean energy in China.
4.4.1 Targets and Main Measures for
Sulphur Dioxide Emission
Reduction During the
Period of the 12th
Five-Year Plan
In recent years, China has attached great impor-
tance to energy conservation and emissions
reduction, and has strengthened the intensity of
energy conservation and emissions reduction
work, with stated targets becoming binding
indexes listed in the Five-Year Plan and gov-
ernment planning. For example, the 11th
Five-Year Plan specified that sulphur dioxide
emissions between 2006 and 2010 should be
10% lower than those in 2005. Judging from the
actual achievements, the implementation of these
emission reduction works has seen good results.
In order to achieve the sulphur dioxide emis-
sions reduction targets during the 11th Five-Year
Plan period, two main policies were adopted by
the Chinese government.
• All newly-built coal-fired power generation
plants were required to be fitted with flue gas
desulphurisation facilities conforming to
specific standards, while most of the old
power generation plants were required to
undergo retrofitting to meet desulphurisation
standards. After the reforms, the coal-fired
power station flue gas desulphurisation
capacity was enhanced to 83% in 2010 from
the 12% adopted in 2005. Flue gas desul-
phurisation conversion costs are low. The flue
gas desulphurisation cost of a 6 million-watt
power plant is only around 3.8% of the con-
struction cost, and operational costs are
increased by 2.4%—costs that are offset by
government subsidies.
• Small, inefficient power generation plants
were to be shut down. At the end of 2005,
low-use and highly polluting small power
plants accounted for one third of national
energy production. By replacing these with
large power generation plants, costs were
reduced by a factor of 2 or 3 per million
Table 4.2 Dosage-effect function of inhalable particulate matter PM10





Mortality Person 6 100,000 500,000
Respiratory disease outpatient rate Case 12 4000 5200
Emergency cases Case 235 400 520
Restricted activity days Day 57,500 40 52
Lower respiratory tract infection/
paediatric asthma
Case 23 200 260
Asthma Case 2068 60 78
Chronic bronchitis Case 61 80,000 104,000
Respiratory disease symptoms Case 183,000 10 13
Note The values are the numbers of additional deaths, cases, or days for each increase of 1 lg/m3 in PM10
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watts. Since 2004, the average coverage of
new power generation plants has doubled. At
the same time, most of the large new power
generation plants have adopted more efficient
technology, as shown in Fig. 4.5. Based on
the shutdown policy for small power plants,
59 billion watts of small power plants were
closed during the 11th Five-Year Plan period
and replaced by larger power plants.
4.4.2 Emissions Reduction Results
Achieved During the 11th
Five-Year Plan Period
The goals of reducing sulphur dioxide emissions
were achieved. The power sector accounted for
54% and 28% of the total sulphur dioxide
emissions respectively in 2005 and in 2011,
growth in sulphur dioxide emissions being much
slower than that of other pollutants, such as
nitrogen oxides and particulate matter. A study
conducted by Harvard University and Tsinghua
University shows that the sulphur dioxide emis-
sion reduction policy achieved a major effect
with a low macroeconomic cost, and is expected
to save between 12,000 and 74,000 lives every
year, which is equivalent to CNY 8–400 billion
(Nielson and Ho, 2013). This policy shows that
China can achieve greater benefits (synergically
speaking) by improving atmospheric quality,
while greater losses result if atmospheric pollu-
tion is not controlled (Fig. 4.6).
4.4.3 Enormous Potential for Natural
Gas to Substitute for Coal
in Industrial Fuel
and Residential Heating
Considered from the point of view of pollutant
source, industrial and domestic coal use are now
major contributors. In recent years, the level of
pollution prevention and control technology in
coal-fired power generation plants in China has
improved significantly, with the proportion of
pollution produced during power generation
sharply dropping, the proportion of pollution
produced by transportation being relatively low,
and emissions improving year by year. This is
primarily as a result of improved vehicles. For
example, new urban vehicles in China must







































Fig. 4.5 Proportion of new technology use in newly built coal-fired power stations in China. Source Vivid Economics,
based on PIRA database
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greatly reduces automobile exhaust pollutant
emissions. In terms of main pollutant sources
such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, PM2.5
and organic carbon (OC), etc., industrial and
residential use are the main sources of emissions
(Fig. 4.7).
Conversion from coal to natural gas in indus-
trial and residential use is a feasible pollution
prevention and control measure. Different meth-
ods have been adopted for the control of
production-related and residential pollutant emis-
sions and the control of sulphur dioxide emissions
during the 11th Five-Year Plan. This is because the
dispersal of industrial and residential users and
their relatively small scale restricts their ability to
adopt the same end technology on a significant
scale. In contrast, the average scale of new power
generation stations inChina has tripled since 2004,
and there are now 1425 new power stations.
Despite the quantity being significant, it is still
small compared to the quantity of industrial and
residential user locations in China. Natural gas is
suitable for small-scale applications, and this
represents an economically valuable approach to
reducing coal pollutant emissions from industrial
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Fig. 4.6 Reduction of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emission during the 11th Five-Year Plan period. Data
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Fig. 4.7 Change in the sources of PM2.5 and OC (organic carbon) during the 11th Five-year Plan
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5Analysis of Medium- to Long-TermNatural Gas Demand and Supply
This section explores various aspects of the
development of industry and the economy, and
the changes in supply and demand of different
energy sources, considered in combination with
projected changes in economic growth, advances
in technology and shifts in industrial structure.
The aim is to determine the medium- to
long-term demand and supply of natural gas and
other energy sources in China.
5.1 The Natural Gas
Supply-Demand Model
In order to analyse and predict the future of
natural gas demand, a Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model was devised to reflect
medium- to long-term economic growth and
changes in industrial structure, in terms of total
demand for energy sources and the interchange-
ability between natural gas and other energy
sources. The CGE model relies on general
equilibrium theory, using actual economic data
as the initial equilibrium, and reflects optimised
decision-making by the market components
(manufacturers, consumers, government depart-
ments). Compared to general economic models,
CGE models are more often used for simulating
the effect that policies have on the economy,
whether direct or indirect, making them an
effective tool for analysing policies. The CGE
model used in this study is based on the Com-
putable General Equilibrium model developed
and maintained over time by China’s State
Council’s Development Research Center
(DRC-CGE) for dynamically simulating the
economy of China. The development of the
model began in 1997; it has been perfected over
the years and applied to studies of the effects of
China joining the World Trade Organization,
infrastructure construction, energy conservation,




The model uses 2010 as the base year and,
adopting the Social Accounting Matrix based on
2010 input-output tables of China for basic data,
simulates the economy from 2010 to 2025. it
includes economic activities from various sec-
tors, reflecting five aspects in particular:
• the manufacturing activities of various busi-
ness sectors in the economy, and the demands
stemming from such manufacturing activities;
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Development Research Center of the State Council and
Martin Haigh from Shell International, with
contributions from Baosheng Zhang and Shouhai Chen
from the China University of Petroleum, Lianzeng Zhao
from the China Petroleum Planning Research Institute,
Linji Qiao from ENN and Juan Han from Shell China.
Other members of the research group participated in
discussions and revisions.
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• the economy’s demand for products: the total
demand coming from the everyday activities
of the citizens, the government and busi-
nesses, as well as from other countries (re-
gions), including the three major demands of
consumption, investment and exports;
• the income, consumption and reserves of each
major economic body;
• foreign trade; and
• dynamic economic growth and development.
The relationships of these factors are shown in
Fig. 5.1.
In this study, the model includes all of the 46
production industries (as seen in Table 5.1),
specifically 1 from agriculture, 5 from mining, 22
from manufacturing, 3 from public works and
construction, and 14 from the service sector.
These industries illustrate the production activi-




of Natural Gas in This
Model
Compared to typical CGE models, the one used
in this study made the following major changes
to reflect influences on the supply and demand
equilibrium of natural gas.
1. Detailed representation of primary energy
production
To better reflect the input-output and inter-
changeability of various energy sources, this
study takes into account coal mining and pro-
cessing, oil drilling, natural gas extraction, oil
refining, coking, coal power, natural gas power,














































Fig. 5.1 Main structures of the CGE model used in this study
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Table 5.1 Subdivision of industries in the model of this study
Number Industry Number Industry Number Industry
1 Agriculture, forestry
and fishing industry
25 Non-metal mineral product
industry
49 Heat production and
supply industry
2 Coal mining and
preparation industry
26 Ferrous metals smelting
industry
50 Natural gas production
and supply industry
3 Petroleum industry 27 Steel rolling industry 51 Water supply industry
4 Natural gas drilling
industry
28 Non-ferrous metals smelting
and rolling industry
52 Construction industry
5 Ferrous metals mining
industry











55 Other transportation and
warehouse industry
8 Food and alcoholic
beverage industry









34 Ship and flotation device
manufacturing industry
58 Distribution and retail
industry











13 Leather, fur, feathers
(down) and related
products industry




61 Real estate industry
14 Carpentry and furniture
manufacturing industry
38 Household electrical and
non-electrical equipment
manufacturing industry
62 Rental and commercial
services industry
15 Paper making and
printing industry
39 Other electrical machinery
and equipment
manufacturing industry
63 Research, testing and
development industry
















18 Coking industry 42 Electronic component
manufacturing industry
66 Personal and other
services industry








68 Health, social security and
benefits industry
(continued)
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Number Industry Number Industry Number Industry
21 Synthesised material
manufacturing industry









46 Cultural, office machinery
manufacturing industry




47 Handicrafts and other
products (including waste
products) industry
24 Plastics and rubber
products
48 Power generation and
supply industry
nuclear power, natural gas heating, coal heating
and natural gas processing, giving a total of 14
types of energy source, thus better reflecting the
interchangeability of energy sources, especially
the potential of natural gas to replace other
energy sources.
Based on the national energy policy, this
model separately configured production func-
tions and development scales of different energy
sources, such as installed capacity of nuclear
energy, hydroelectricity, solar power and others,
in order to ensure that they are in accordance
with national planned goals.
2. Detailed representation of characteristics
of the demands of the various sectors
towards natural gas
To examine natural gas demand in detail, this
study subdivided industries, in particular indus-
tries with higher demand for natural gas. For
example, the chemical industry was subdivided
in order to reflect its demand for natural gas as a
raw material and the transportation industry was




of Natural Gas Demand
To carry out the simulated analysis of natural gas
supply and demand, and to compare various
policies, this study has devised two different
scenarios: one is the standard scenario, where the
current basic trends of economic growth are
reflected, the other is the policy-driven scenario,
which includes the effects of government policies
favourable towards natural gas demand.
5.2.1 Key Assumptions
of the Standard Scenario
In the standard scenario, backed by clearly
designed policies, relatively assertive growth
factors are observed in the Chinese economy. On
the other hand, under the influence of ambitious
government policies regarding environmentally
friendly development and innovation, there are
the following significant changes to the growth
factors:
• Changes in total population and age structure
reflecting the influence of the newest popu-
lation policy adjustments (one-child policy,
two-child policy) in terms of medium- to
long-term total population and workforce.
The population of China peaks at around
2032, when it will be around 1.463 billion,
with the workforce peaking between 2017
and 2027, at around 1 billion.
• Growth in personal consumption expenditure,
brought about by an increase in income
levels. Particularly remarkable is the reduc-
tion in the percentage of expenditure taken up
by food and other consumable goods, while
travel, leisure, education and expenditure for
other services continue to increase.
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• Policies promoting energy conservation and
emission reduction, influenced by the attempt
to bring about a “new normal” and a variety
of activities targeted at alleviating atmo-
spheric pollution, where the government
continues to push for energy conservation and
consumption reduction, raising energy effi-
ciency by between 3 and 2% points each year
(a higher rate of increase at first, followed by
a lower one).
• The new urbanisation policies progress
smoothly, and more of the rural population are
now living in cities. The urbanisation rate will
hopefully reach 70% in 2030 and 75% in 2050.
• Personal savings remain at high levels, but
this is expected to gradually reduce as per-
sonal income and level of social security
provision improve. By 2030, the personal
savings rate of urban populations should fall
by 13%, from the current rate of 38% to
around 25%.
In addition to the above factors, optimised
policies include policies that concentrate in par-
ticular on transformation of the mode of eco-
nomic development:
• A more significant ratio of renewable energy
usage, mainly represented by rapid develop-
ments in non-fossil fuel energy sources such
as nuclear power, wind power and solar
power. For nuclear power, the installed
capacity of 14.61 million MW in 2013 will
quickly grow to 58 million MW by 2020,
reaching 150 million MW by 2030 and
400 million MW by 2050. Installed capacity
of hydroelectric power plants was 280 mil-
lion MW in 2013, and will rise to 340 million
MW in 2020, 400 million MW by 2030 and
around 450 million MW by 2050. Other
energy sources such as wind power and solar
power will also grow at similar speeds.
• The government places great importance on
innovation-driven development, enabling
remarkable breakthroughs in improving
business innovation, the results of which will
contribute to an increased significance of
improvement in core areas driving economic
growth, which will become evident by the
13th and 14th Five-Year Plans, at which stage
secondary industry in China will have a high
sustainable all-factor growth rate of 4%.
• Mitigation of overcapacity is relatively
smooth, allowing industry to grow continu-
ously. This can be observed in the slowing
growth in investment in heavy and chemicals
industry while output growth stabilises, a
trend that will benefit sustained development
of the industry.
• The nurturing of tertiary industries, in par-
ticular the hastening of the development of
productive service industries and tertiary
industries, which will be beneficial in bring-
ing in new investment to monopolistic
industries previously difficult to access, such
as finance, logistics, education and health.
• As a result of financial reforms, the proportion
of the national economy accounted for by
private income increases; this is advantageous
because of raised income levels and the
improved ratio of consumption and invest-




In the policy-driven scenario, apart from making
the same assumptions as the standard scenario,
the government will also levy a carbon tax on
coal, oil and natural gas—fossil fuels that result
in greenhouse gas emissions. Pricing for this
carbon tax collected through carbon trading will
be implemented in 2015 for coal. The carbon
price (or tax rate) for the first year will be 10% of
price, rising to 20% in the second year, then
remaining at 30% thereafter. The tax rate for
petroleum (including both crude oils and refined
oils) is the tax rate for coal multiplied by the
difference in carbon emission rates, which works
out at 0.64 times the tax rate for carbon price for
coal, while the rate for natural gas is 0.2 times
the rate for coal, converted based on a coal price
of 500 CNY/ton once the rate reaches 30% (ad
valorem). This is equivalent to a carbon emis-
sions tax (or achieving a carbon price through
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carbon trading of an equivalent amount) of CNY
60 for every ton of carbon dioxide where coal is
concerned.
5.3 Natural Gas Supply
and Demand in the Standard
Scenario
5.3.1 Speed of Economic Growth
and International
Comparison
Under the assumptions of the standard scenario,
China will retain a relatively fast growth rate in
the future. In the two years after the 12th
Five-Year Plan, the average economic growth
rate is expected to be around 7.3%, with GDP
growth during the 13th Five-Year Plan at around
6.66 and 5.56% from 2021 to 2025. In the period
between 2026 and 2030, economic growth is
expected to be around 4.64%, around 3.47%
from 2031 to 2040 and around 2.73% from 2041
to 2050 (Table 5.2).
Based on simulation results, the per capita
GDP of China will continue rising at a relatively
fast rate. For example, by around 2020, per
capita GDP in China is hoped to reach $10,000
(in 2013 figures, and taking into account an
average annual 0.5% appreciation of the CNY),
while by 2030 per capita GDP in China could
reach $20,000, and $40,000 by 2050, thus
achieving a similar level to that current in Japan.
If the comparison is made using purchasing
power parity, China’s development level will be
even higher (Fig. 5.2).
Table 5.2 Growth speed and growth momentum in the standard scenario
Year 2013 2014–2015 2016–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2031–2040 2041–2050
GDP 7.68 7.31 6.65 5.55 4.63 3.46 2.73
Speed of growth
in workforce
0.3 0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.5 −0.7 −0.4
Speed of growth
in capital deposit
11.6 10.9 9.3 7.7 6.5 4.8 3.2



















China Japan Korea USA 
Fig. 5.2 Development levels in China and international comparisons in the standard scenario. Data source Figures for
China after 2013 based on model calculation results, other figures from Wind data
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In the standard scenario, the speed of growth
of China’s economy is still higher than the his-
torical speed of other “catch-up economies”,
while also exhibiting the usual sustained growth
characteristics encountered with “catch-up”
economies. For example, before 2020, there is a
possibility that per capita GDP growth in China
can be kept above 6%, exceeding the historical
figures for Japan, Taiwan and the United States,
only being lower than historical figures for
specific years in South Korea. The same goes for
the period from 2020 to 2030, when growth
speed in China will far exceed historical figures
for other countries.
Similar results were obtained from long-term
purchasing power parity calculations using the
World Bank’s International Comparison Pro-
gram. Using this programme, per capita GDP in
China will reach the level of South Korean per
capita GDP by 2030 and by 2035 it will be on a
par with Japanese per capita GDP, exceeding
per capita GDP in the USA in 2050 (Figs. 5.3
and 5.4).
5.3.2 Mid- to Long-Term Changes
in Industrial Structures
The simulation shows that the tertiary industry
ratio will continue to rise. In 2013, the tertiary
industry ratio was 46.1%, which is significantly
lower than the level of most countries at a similar
level of development. In 2015, it rises to around
48.1%, and from 2015 to 2020 it will rise by
4.9%, possibly exceeding 60% by 2030, reaching
around 65% in 2050 (Table 5.3).
From experience gained with economic
growth in other countries, as the level of devel-
opment rises, the ratio of non-agricultural
industries also goes up, especially the tertiary
industry ratio, which seems to be a general norm.
Major factors pushing the tertiary industry ratio
higher are the changes in people’s consumer
styles, increased services export ratio and rising
demand for services in various sectors, as well as
government spending. Deceleration of export
growth also holds sway over tertiary industrial



















































China Japan S. Korea Taiwan USA
1990 International round (G-Kdollar)
Fig. 5.3 Growth speed in China and international comparisons in the standard scenario. Description Data for Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan and USA drawn from historical growth figures; horizontal axis is the international dollar
calculation based on 1990 purchasing power parity calculated using Maddison’s method. Data source Figures for China
after 2013 based on model calculation results, other figures from Maddison
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manufactured goods and therefore, when other
conditions remain unchanged, a faster growth in
exports will most likely lead to a larger corre-
sponding secondary industry ratio (Fig. 5.5).
In the period from 2020 to 2025, China will
essentially complete the industrialisation process,
entering the post-industrialisation era. Looking at
the progress of industrialisation in China, the
demand for heavy industries such as steel and
concrete is approaching its peak, while the east-
ern coastal regions are on their way into the
post-industrialisation stage. This development
trend conforms to the strategic plans of the 18th
National Congress of the Communist Party of
China. This is based on two indicators: per capita
GDP (which will exceed $10,000 in 2020 (at
2013 prices) and $14,000 in 2025, achieving the
development standard for post-industrialisation)
and secondary industry’s contribution to growth
(which will be above 40% before 2020, but will
go through a period of significant decrease after
2020). This is similar to the situation in South
Korea in the 1990s (Table 5.4).
The proportion of high energy consumption
industries will begin to fall. High energy con-
sumption industries are a major factor affecting
economic structures, and if the proportion of
them is high, then economic growth requires
more environmental resources, leading to more
serious pollution. Under optimised policies,
towards the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan, it is




















































China Japan S. Korea Taiwan USA
1990 International round (G-Kdollar)
Fig. 5.4 Growth speed in China and international comparisons in the standard scenario. Data source Figures for China
after 2013 based on model calculation results, other figures from Maddison
Table 5.3 Industry structures in the standard scenario
Year 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Primary industries 10.0 9.0 7.1 6.2 5.4 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.1
Secondary industries 48.2 43.0 39.8 35.7 33.4 32.1 30.8 30.0 29.3
Tertiary industries 41.8 48.0 53.1 58.1 61.2 62.9 64.4 65.2 65.6
Data source Results from model calculation
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industries will begin a continual descent, from
accounting for 32.4% of all industries to




Even though China’s national industries show
significant optimisation in the standard scenario,
industry still accounts for a considerable pro-
portion of the economy, and along with the rise
in personal income also comes higher personal
energy use. China’s national energy consumption
is therefore expected to increase greatly in the
future. It is estimated that by 2020 total national
energy source consumption will reach 5 billion
tons, an annual increase of 3.4% from 2010 to
2020. The rise should slow between 2020 and
2030 to a 1.3% annual increase, reaching around
5.68 billion tons, and between 2030 and 2040 the
rise will be further reined into 0.8% per year, but
by 2040 the total national energy consumption
will still reach 6.06 billion tons. Around 2045,
total national energy source consumption in
China will peak and in 2050 it will stabilise at
around 6.1 billion tons (Fig. 5.7).
Even though total energy consumption will
continue to rise, energy use per unit GDP will
decline considerably, falling from 0.89 tons of
coal per CNY 10,000 GDP in 2010 to 0.62 tons
of coal per CNY 10,000 GDP in 2020, and then
to 0.43 and 0.25 tons of coal per CNY 10,000
GDP in 2030 and 2050, respectively (Figs. 5.8
and 5.9).
There will also be great structural changes in
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Fig. 5.5 Primary, secondary and tertiary industries in China and international comparisons in the standard scenario.




Country Industrialisation stage Post-industrialisation stage
United Kingdom 1760–1870 1950–
United States of America 1790–1900 1950–
Germany 1830–1913 1970–
Japan 1885–1973 1973–
South Korea 1960–1995 1995–
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Proportion of high energy
consumption industry
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60.5 61.0 60.6 
Fig. 5.7 Total energy consumption in standard scenario. Data source Results from model calculation
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Production of the most important primary energy
source, coal, will peak in around 2020 at
3.07 billion tons of standard coal, or a total of
4.3 billion tons of coal. From then onwards, coal
production will fall annually, dropping to below
3 billion tons of standard coal by 2030, below
2.5 billion tons by 2040 and around 2.26 billion
tons by 2050. As for clean energy, there will be
greater development of nuclear power and
hydroelectricity; hydroelectricity will grow from
230 to 380 million TSCE in 2020, and hope-
fully will have reached 460 million TSCE in
2030. From that point onwards, however, growth
will slow to a crawl due to limitations in
hydroelectric resources, reaching around
500 million TSCE by 2050.
Nuclear power appears to have better devel-
opment potential. Based on current plans, if
progress is smooth, nuclear power output in
China will grow from 20 to 130 million TSCE
by 2020, and then rise to 320, 550 and
760 million TSCE by 2030, 2040 and 2050,
respectively.
Looking at the final energy production struc-
ture, electricity will see the biggest expansion in
medium- to long-term energy consumption. In
2010 electricity consumption was 1.22 billion
TSCE, which is anticipated to rise to 2.65 billion
TSCE into 2030 and 2.9 billion TSCE in 2050.
Consumption of refined oil will also see further
increases, from 520 million TSCE in 2010 to
850 million TSCE in 2030 and 940 million
TSCE in 2050.
5.3.4 Demand for Natural Gas
and Main Increases
in Consumption
In the standard scenario, demand for natural gas
is expected to grow rapidly. It is expected to
approach 200 billion m3 in 2015, and exceed
300 billion m3 by 2020. By 2030 it may exceed
450 billion m3, and exceed 600 billion m3 by
2050. Limited by domestic production growth,
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Fig. 5.8 Medium- to long-term energy production structure in China. Data source Results from model calculation
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gas) are expected to see a major increase, from
50 billion m3 in 2015 to 100 billion m3 by 2020
and 180 billion m3 by 2030, stabilising by 2040
at around 200 billion m3 (Fig. 5.10).
Although fast growth is expected, growth in
other energy sources, and in particular power
generation, is rising, therefore the ratio of total
energy sources accounted for by natural gas still
lags quite a long way behind target levels. It is
expected that natural gas will make up 6.0% of
total energy sources by 2015, which is somewhat
less than the goal of 7.15% set out in the 12th
Five-Year Plan. In 2020 it will be 8.0%, which is
still lower than the planned goal of 10%
(Fig. 5.11).
In terms of the main areas where natural gas
consumption is growing, the most important is
gas use in power generation. If use of natural gas
in power generation becomes economically
competitive, allied with strengthened attempts to
improve air quality, it is likely that natural gas use
in power generation may rise from 25 billion m3
in 2015 to 50 billion m3 by 2020, and the figure
should then double and exceed 100 billion m3 by
2030, finally stabilising after 2040 at around the
160 billion m3 mark. Other than natural gas use
in power generation, there are three other major
natural gas uses: central heating, transport and the
chemical industry.
In the medium to long term, to achieve green,
clean power generation it is essential that power
source structures are optimised. One major
aspect of the optimisation of generation would be
a reduction in output of coal-based generation
and a drop in the proportion of the total resources
that it accounts for. Based on simulation analysis,
the standard scenario is that coal power genera-
tion in China will peak at 5.1 trillion kWh in
around 2020 and then decline from there on, to
around 4.9 trillion kWh by 2030, going down
further to 4.1 trillion kWh by 2040 and further
still to 3.2 trillion kWh in 2050.
The reduction in coal power generation must
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Fig. 5.9 Medium- to long-term energy consumption structure in China. Data source Results from model calculation.
Note Raw coal refers to coal used for purposes other than generating electricity or coke refining
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generation. In the standard scenario, the biggest
growth lies in nuclear power, while there is also
much room for growth for natural gas power
generation. Natural gas power generation will
rise quickly from 77 billion kWh in 2010 to
280 billion kWh by 2020, 620 billion kWh by
2030 and around 920 billion kWh by 2050.
Similarly, wind power, photovoltaic electricity,
hydroelectricity and nuclear power will also
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Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2015 natural gas
proportion reaches 7.15%, 2020 reaches 10%
(sales volume reaches 350 billion cubic metres)
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Fig. 5.11 Medium- to long-term changes in ratio of natural gas consumption in China. Data source Results from
model calculation
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5.4 Natural Gas Supply
and Demand
in the Policy-Driven Scenario
In the standard scenario, even though natural gas
consumption in China will rise to 300 billion m3
by 2020, 450 billion m3 by 2030 and 600 billion
m3 by 2050, it would still not reach the goals set
out for natural gas development in the medium-
to long-term energy development plan of the
12th Five-Year Plan. This indicates that, in order
to achieve those goals, in addition to the current
arrangements for energy sources, policies that are
more effective must be put in place to boost
natural gas demand.
5.4.1 Total Natural Gas Supply
and Demand
Among the various possible economic measures,
the most effective would be the much-vaunted
pricing policy based on carbon trading and other
ways of realising a carbon price. Under the
pressure of a global push for reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, the introduction of a
carbon tax could help to encourage society to
reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The use of natural gas
produces much less carbon than coal or oil, and
thus carbon pricing will help to further promote
the replacement of coal and oil with natural gas.
In the policy-driven scenario, the demand for
natural gas will increase, due to changes in rel-
ative energy source prices that are advantageous
to natural gas. Due to the sensitivity of natural
gas to pricing depending upon different uses, the
increase in demand encountered will vary. Some
uses, such as household use of natural gas,
already contribute a substantial proportion, and
thus the increase would be limited in these areas.
Other uses, such as power generation and heat-
ing, which are more sensitive to pricing, will see














































Fig. 5.12 Medium- to long-term power generation structural changes in China. Data source Results from model
calculation
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With the right policies in place, natural gas
demand in China could be expected to reach
344.7 billion m3, achieving the planned goal of
350 billion m3 stipulated in the 12th Five-Year
Plan. By 2030, natural gas consumption may
approach the level of 580 billion m3, and be
around 800 billion m3 by 2050.
5.4.2 Effects on Pollutant Discharge
of Natural Gas Consumer
Demand Growth
Under the influence of policy, demand for natural
gas will grow and will replace major coal
applications, so the use of natural gas will be
effective to some degree in restricting emissions
of various pollutants (Fig. 5.14).
Based on emissions of 2.46 tons of CO2,
8.5 kg of SO2 and 7.4 kg of nitrogen oxides for
every one ton of standard coal burned (when
approaching zero emissions, each one ton of
standard coal burned results in 0.14 kg of SO2
and 1.12 kg of nitrogen oxides), under the
policy-driven scenario, natural gas consumption
will increase from 183 billion m3 in 2014 to
575.6 billion m3 by 2030, equivalent to at least
522 million tons of standard coal based on
calorific value. Based on this, it would be pos-
sible to reduce emissions to 418 million tons of
SO2 and 4.354 million tons of CO2 (replacing
20% of near-zero emission coal-fired power
generation and 80% of dispersed coal use) by
2030. This is the equivalent of 21.3% of the
national SO2 emissions total of 20.439 million
tons in 2013. There will also be a reduction in
nitrogen oxides emissions of 2.339 million tons,
which is the equivalent of 10.5% of the national
nitrogen oxides emissions total of 22.274 million
tons in 2013. Moreover, by 2020 there will be
further reductions of CO2 emissions by
172 million, of SO2 emissions by 1.794 million
tons and of nitrogen oxide emissions by
964,000 tons.
In a policy-driven environment, it is possible
to markedly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In
a baseline scenario, greenhouse fossil fuel energy
consumption in China is expected to continue to
grow in terms of emissions in China each year
from the 13th Five-Year Plan to 2030. In 2015,
greenhouse gas emissions caused by fossil fuels
are expected to reach 9.51 billion tons (due to
carbon exchange and other factors, greenhouse
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Fig. 5.13 Natural gas supply and demand in the policy-driven scenario. Data source Results from model calculation
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is not equivalent to the total national emissions
total), and by 2020 will approach 10.5 billion
tons, an annual increase of 1.93%. By 2030 it
will approach 11 billion, growing annually by
0.95% from 2020 to 2030, peaking in 2033 at
approximately 11.08 billion tons. Subsequently
it will gradually decline. In a policy-driven
environment, because overall fossil fuel energy
consumption will see a major reduction, the
resulting greenhouse gas emissions also mark-
edly drop. In 2015, there is expected to be a
reduction in emissions of approximately 400
million tons compared to the baseline scenario.
CO2 emissions reductions from 2020 to 2030
will be approximately 1.7 billion tons.
5.4.3 Main Areas of Natural Gas
Demand
In the policy-driven scenario, areas where natural
gas demand would grow quickly are still the ones
more sensitive to costs and prices, namely natural
gas power generation, transport and the chemi-
cals industry, while changes in demand remain
relatively small in other areas such as domestic
use. For example, with the policies in place,
compared to the standard scenario, domestic use
would only rise by 5 billion m3 by 2050, while
for natural gas power generation the consump-
tion in 2030 would be 45 billion m3 higher
compared to the standard scenario. Natural gas
heating possesses tremendous potential and is
very sensitive to costs. With policies in place it
could be hoped that consumption might rise by
30 billion m3 by 2030.
Based on the simulation results, in the
policy-driven scenario natural gas consumption
in China reaches 600 billion m3 by 2030. Of that
total, urban use (including vehicular and water-
borne transport) accounts for 35%, while 32%
goes to power generation, 27% to industrial fuels
and 6% is used in the chemicals industry. Urban
use mainly consists of cooking, hot water for
everyday use, gas use in public utilities (airport,
government departments, staff canteens, kinder-
gartens, schools, hostels, hotels, restaurants,
malls, offices etc.), centralised heating, cen-
tralised air conditioning and being used by
vehicles and ships. As for industrial use, natural
gas is used as fuel for equipment used in various







Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2015 natural gas
proportion reaches 7.15%, 2020 reaches 10%
(sales volume reaches 350 billion cubic metres)
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Fig. 5.14 Ratio of natural gas in total energy sources in the policy-driven scenario. Data source Results from model
calculation
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petrochemicals, textiles, aluminium oxide, tita-
nium dioxide, fire-resistant materials, carbon
resources and so on. In the chemicals industry,
natural gas is mainly used as an ingredient for the
synthesis of ammonia and methanol and in
hydrogen production. In power generation, nat-
ural gas is used in peak regulation power sta-
tions, thermal power stations and by distributed
energy source users. There is, therefore, massive
potential natural gas demand (Table 5.5).
5.4.4 Demand Curve for Natural Gas
in China in 2030
1. Predicted replacement energy source price
series
With consideration given to the long-term
trends in international oil prices, this analysis is
based on an international oil price of $80 per
barrel (Table 5.6).
2. Demand curve for natural gas in 2030
The demand for natural gas in China in 2030
is expected to be 576.6 billion m3, subdivided
between 31 provinces and 16 types of user.
Assessment of terminal natural gas price toler-
ance for all users in all provinces was carried out
based on the local price of replacement energy
sources. Conversion was then carried out based
on the Shanghai benchmark price conversion,
with the natural gas price tolerance based on the
Shanghai benchmark being ranked from high to
Table 5.5 Natural gas consumption based on primary usage (100 million m3) according to use







181 11.0 520 9.03 187
Commercial
services
104 6.3 300 5.21 188
Centralised
heating




CNG taxis 59 3.6 160 2.78 171
CNG buses 32 1.9 90 1.56 181
LNG lorries 33 2.0 550 9.56 1567







157 9.5 640 11.12 308
Thermal
power stations
126 7.6 1060 18.42 741
Distributed
energy sources
4 0.2 130 2.26 3150




Ammonia 152 9.2 185 3.21 22
Methanol 61 3.7 106 1.84 74
Hydrogen
production etc.
41 2.5 70 1.22 71
Total natural gas consumption 1653 100 5756 100 248
Data source Results from model calculation
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(CNY/t) (CNY/L) (CNY/kg) (CNY/kWh)
1 Xinjiang 316 2553 7096 5.86 5.74 7.19 6.83 0.36 0.53
2 Gansu 507 2553 7155 6.01 5.85 7.24 6.88 0.46 0.51
3 Qinghai 519 2553 7252 6.00 5.86 7.24 6.88 0.36 0.45
4 Tibet 507 2727 7083 6.00 5.86 8.20 7.79 0.36 0.45
5 Ningxia 478 2553 6959 6.03 5.83 5.76 5.48 0.43 0.45
6 Shaanxi 450 2553 7126 6.01 5.83 6.30 5.98 0.55 0.50
7 Shanxi 460 2595 6988 6.08 5.88 7.62 7.24 0.50 0.48
8 Inner
Mongolia
444 2595 7080 6.04 5.83 7.62 7.24 0.48 0.47
9 Henan 565 2594 6990 6.04 5.85 6.86 6.52 0.60 0.56
10 Hubei 628 2594 6993 6.04 5.85 8.49 8.07 0.60 0.57
11 Hunan 606 2594 6997 6.08 5.90 8.03 7.63 0.65 0.59
12 Jiangxi 666 3722 6990 6.07 5.88 6.85 6.51 0.65 0.60
13 Anhui 674 3722 6985 6.06 5.87 6.93 6.58 0.65 0.57
14 Yunnan 539 2727 7018 6.18 5.98 7.62 7.24 0.48 0.48
15 Guizhou 506 2727 6991 6.16 5.95 8.20 7.79 0.51 0.46
16 Sichuan 561 2727 7028 6.19 6.02 7.28 6.91 0.58 0.47
17 Chongqing 534 2727 6974 6.19 6.01 6.98 6.64 0.63 0.52
18 Guangdong 675 3548 6992 6.09 5.89 8.23 7.82 0.69 0.61
19 Guangxi 677 3548 7000 6.14 5.94 8.44 8.02 0.59 0.53
20 Fujian 661 3722 6982 6.08 5.89 7.98 7.58 0.61 0.45
21 Hainan 678 3548 6960 6.14 5.94 8.19 7.78 0.66 0.61
22 Jiangsu 632 3722 6978 6.07 5.86 7.40 7.03 0.64 0.53
23 Zhejiang 701 3722 6978 6.07 5.88 8.14 7.73 0.65 0.54
24 Shanghai 615 3722 6946 6.35 6.24 7.20 6.84 0.69 0.62
25 Beijing 580 2595 6953 6.36 6.26 7.62 7.24 0.62 0.49
26 Tianjin 580 2595 6950 6.03 5.83 7.62 7.24 0.63 0.49
27 Hebei 596 2595 6993 6.03 5.83 7.02 6.67 0.56 0.52
28 Shandong 556 3722 6988 6.03 5.84 7.81 7.42 0.67 0.55
29 Liaoning 499 2891 7352 6.03 5.83 7.47 7.09 0.53 0.50
30 Jilin 645 2891 7320 6.03 5.83 6.51 6.18 0.58 0.53
31 Heilongjiang 623 2891 7394 6.03 5.83 6.33 6.01 0.58 0.51
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low, yielding the demand curve for natural gas in
China in 2030 (Fig. 5.15).
3. Various integrated policies would be
required in order to achieve a 575.6 billion
m3 natural gas consumption
If a pricing policy is not implemented,
achieving a target of 575.6 billion m3 of natural
gas consumption by 2030 would require a series
of alternative policies to be introduced. Based on
the national natural gas pricing reform plan of
2013, with an international oil price of $80 per
barrel as the basis, it is calculated that the
benchmark Shanghai natural gas price would be
2.6 CNY/m3. Looking at the effective demand
curve for natural gas, the planned natural gas
consumption in China by 2030 would be
575.6 billion m3, and with reference to the
benchmark Shanghai natural gas price of
2.6 CNY/m3 and effective consumption of
206.7 billion m3, this would account for 32% of
estimated demand. Urban natural gas centralised
heating, power generation, synthesis of ammonia
and methanol, and the majority of usage as fuel
in other industries would not satisfy the condi-
tions for generation of effective demand capacity
based on the benchmark Shanghai natural gas
price of 2.6 CNY/m3 (Table 5.7).
At the current energy source pricing levels,
market forces alone would not push demand for
natural gas up to the goal of 575.6 billion m3. Sys-
tematic design of policy which reflects the environ-
mental and social value of natural gas is necessary.

































Demand (108 x m3)
Natural gas chemicals Urban fuel Vehicular and waterborne Industrial fuel Natural gas power generation 
Fig. 5.15 Demand curve for natural gas in China in 2030
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Table 5.7 Market demand for natural gas in China in 2030 (100 million cubic metres)










520 9.03 516 28.30 99
Commercial
services







CNG taxis 160 2.78 160 8.77 100
CNG buses 90 1.56 90 4.93 100
LNG lorries 550 9.56 366 20.09 67


















Methanol 106 1.84 2 0.12 2
Hydrogen
production etc.
70 1.22 70 3.84 100
Total natural gas consumption 5756 5756 100% 1824 100
Data source Results from model calculation
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6Analysis of China’s Natural Gas UsePolicies and Suggested Reforms
6.1 Development of China’s
Natural Gas Use Policy
6.1.1 The Encouraging Consumption
Stage
Before the Shaan-Jing natural gas pipeline began
operation in 1997, China’s only gas pipeline to
reach a length of over 350 km was the Hong
Kong offshore gas pipeline (Yacheng–Hong
Kong, 778 km). Owing to the lack of
cross-regional gas pipelines, natural gas in China
was characterised by being produced in nearby
fields. At that time, the two most important
markets for natural gas were Sichuan and the
North East. The Sichuan Basin has a long history
of developing natural gas and already has a
highly developed network of pipelines. The
North East gas fields can produce high-quality
oil-associated gas. The main uses of natural gas
are primarily in the chemical industry, where it is
used to produce methanol and fertilisers. Much
associated gas is vented or consumed by oil
companies during production. Urban gas and
industrial fuel usage is limited to areas adjacent
to sources, and only constitutes a fraction of total
natural gas consumption (see Table 6.1).
China’s natural gas exploration in the 1990s
was extremely fruitful. In total, nine large gas
fields and 32 medium-sized gas fields were dis-
covered. Taken together, these make up the six
major gas regions of Sichuan, Ordos, Tarim,
Qaidam, the East China Sea and the Ying-Qiong
area, of which the Jingbian gas field is the largest,
with proven reserves of 290.09 billion m3. The
discovery of large natural gas reserves stimulates
the construction of long-distance gas pipelines.
These include the Shaanxi gas entry to Beijing,
western gas being piped east, Sichuan gas being
piped east and offshore gas terminals. In 2003
the IEA noted that the development of China’s
natural gas market had many obstacles to over-
come, the first being increasing demand for
natural gas. At that time, the main problems
facing the natural gas industry were competing
with cheap coal and creating demand for, rather
than restricting use of, natural gas.
6.1.2 Restricted Usage Stage
With the completion of the western gas piped
east project, a new era in the development of
China’s natural gas markets commenced. The
markets changed from being regional to being
national, freeing up supply and leading to a sharp
increase in production. This brought about a shift
in market trends. There had previously been
worries that there were not enough consumers of
natural gas, but suddenly there was not enough
supply to meet the demand. In 2005, the National
* This chapter was overseen by Zhaoyuan Xu from the
Development Research Center of the State Council and
Martin Haigh from Shell International, with
contributions from Baosheng Zhang and Shouhai Chen
from the China University of Petroleum, Lianzeng Zhao
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Development and Reform Commission tried to
adjust prices in order to regulate the use of nat-
ural gas. This led to the decision to revise the
manufacturer’s natural gas pricing mechanism,
raising the manufacturer’s natural gas price by an
appropriate amount, encouraging gas use effi-
ciency, optimising gas use structures and pro-
moting healthy and sustainable development of
industrial gas use, all in order to ensure supplies
to the Chinese natural gas market. It was made
known that all oilfield gas not subject to planning
would be treated as second-grade gas and would
be priced based on the government guidelines at
980 CNY/1000 m3. Price increases would be
limited to 10%, but there would be no bottom
limit. The price of first-grade gas was raised by
an appropriate amount, the government being
responsible for price regulation, with upper and
lower limits of 10% (see Table 6.2).
The 2005 natural gas price adjustment still
failed to effectively curb the rapid growth in
demand for natural gas. This was largely due to
the price of gas being relatively low, concentrated
development of the gas-based chemicals industry
in areas adjacent to gas production sources and a
mad rush to develop low added value, short
industrial chain methanol and fertiliser plants in
various areas. In August 2007, in order to resolve
the conflicts arising in supply and demand, the
National Development and Reform Commission
issued a new natural gas use policy. The Com-
mission divided natural gas use into four distinct
categories (priority, permitted, restricted and
prohibited) and took an interventionist policy
toward its use. Such measures prioritised
eco-friendly urban gas uses (see Table 6.3).
6.1.3 Flexible Restrictions Stage
The Chinese government has implemented many
policies to meet the growing domestic demand
for natural gas. First, it aimed to limit large-scale
natural gas and chemical projects. Second, it
raised gas prices to encourage natural gas pro-
duction and imports. Between 2002 and 2012,
China’s natural gas production more than dou-
bled, from 32.7 to 107.2 billion m3. During this
time, China was also actively importing overseas
resources. On May 25, 2006 the first shipment of
LNG entered Dapeng Bay in Shenzhen from
Australia’s North West Shelf. This marked the
beginning of a new era for China’s imports of
natural gas. In 2010, the Central Asian gas
Table 6.1 China’s natural gas consumption structure in 1998 (excluding Hong Kong)











89.64 18.53 24.12 56.68 13.6 202.57
Percentage 44.25 9.1 11.9 28 6.7 100
Data source National Bureau of Statistics















690 710 660 560 660
Industrial
gas
875 725 660 585 920




134 6 Analysis of China’s Natural Gas Use Policies …
pipeline began delivering gas to China and in
2013 the China-Burma pipeline was brought
online. Based on the Natural Gas Development
Plan, China’s annual imports of natural gas will
reach 93.5 billion m3 by 2015, which will
account for one third of the entire gas supply.
This increase in the supply of offshore gas
resources, in conjunction with the rapid increase
and growth of domestic natural gas production,
means that the hitherto problematic situation of
China’s gas supply has been greatly eased.
In October 2012, the National Development
and Reform Commission adapted its policy on
natural gas use (see Table 6.4) and relaxed
restrictions on a number of specific gas use
fields:
• In terms of policy objectives, there was no
longer an emphasis on relieving conflicts
between supply and demand. Encouragement
of a low-carbon economy was added, as was






Urban gas 1. Cities (especially medium-large cities), residential cooking, boiling water and
other residential uses
2. Public service facilities (airports, government offices, canteens, nursery
schools, schools, hotels, restaurants, shopping centres, office buildings, etc.)
3. Natural gas vehicles (especially dual-fuel vehicles)
4. Distributed co-generation and CCHP users
Permitted Urban gas 1. Centralised heating (in city centres)
2. Individual household heating
3. Central air conditioning
Industrial gas 4. Industrial fields in which natural gas may replace oil or LPG, such as for
building materials, machinery, textiles, petrochemicals and metallurgy
5. Industrial fields in which natural gas is a more sustainable substitute than coal
gas, or is economically beneficial. Examples include building materials,
machinery, textiles, petrochemicals and metallurgy and other industrial fields
where adoption of natural gas offers relatively high environmental and
economic benefits
6. Building materials, machinery, textiles, petrochemicals, metallurgy
Natural gas power
generation
7. Construction of natural gas peak regulation infrastructure for main power
loading centre(s) in regions with sufficient natural gas supplies
Gas chemical
industry
8. Economically beneficial hydrogen gas projects that consume gas on a small
scale
9. Ammonia and fertiliser producers that would be incapable of moving or
category 1 and 2 users to which the regulations do not apply
Restricted Natural gas power
generation




2. Extension of pre-existing synthetic ammonia facilities relying on natural gas,
conversion of synthetic ammonia facilities from coal to natural gas
3. Carbon 1 chemical engineering projects with primary methane-based
products, including acetylene and chloromethane
4. New synthetic ammonia projects relying on natural gas, other than those
included in item 9 of category 2
Prohibited Natural gas power
generation
1. Construction of base-load natural gas power stations in 13 large-scale coal
mining regions including Shaanxi, Mongolia, Shanxi and Anhui
Gas chemical
industry
1. New construction or extension of methanol production facilities relying on
natural gas
2. Projects for the replacement of coal with natural gas for the production of
methanol
6.1 Development of China’s Natural Gas Use Policy 135






Urban gas 1. Urban areas (especially medium-large cities), residential cooking, boiling
water and other residential usages
2. Gas used for public service facilities (airports, government offices, canteens,
nursery schools, hospitals, hotels, bars, restaurants, department stores, office
buildings, stations, welfare offices, old people’s homes, harbours, pier
terminals and bus stations)
3. Natural gas vehicles (especially dual-fuel and liquefied natural gas vehicles),
including city buses, taxis, commercial vehicles, passenger vehicles,
sanitation lorries and other transport vehicles that rely on natural gas as fuel
4. Centralised heating (in city centres)
5. Gas air conditioning
Industrial gas 6. Building materials, machinery, textiles, petrochemicals, metallurgy
7. Interruptible hydrogen manufacturing projects relying on natural gas
Other users 8. Natural gas distributed energy projects (comprehensive energy efficiency
above 70%, including the use of renewable energy sources)
9. As fuel in sea-going, river-going and lake-going vessels (including
gas-fuelled and dual-fuelled vessels) that rely on natural gas (especially LNG)
10. Towns that have an emergency and peak regulation natural gas storage
facilities
11. Coalbed methane (marsh gas) power generation projects
12. Natural gas co-generation projects
Permitted Urban gas 1. Individual household heating users
Industrial gas 2. Projects in which natural gas is used as a replacement for oil or LPG, such as
building materials, machinery, textiles, petrochemicals and metallurgy
3. New projects where natural gas is used as fuel, including building materials,
machinery, textiles, petrochemicals and metallurgy
4. Projects where the adoption of natural gas as a replacement for coal offers
environmental and economic benefits, including building materials,
machinery, textiles, petrochemicals and metallurgy




6. All natural gas power projects excluding item 12 in the first category and item
1 in the fourth category
Gas chemical
industry
7. Natural gas hydrogen production projects excluding item 7 in the first
category
8. Small natural gas liquefaction facilities for peak regulation and storage
Restricted Gas chemical
industry
1. Extension of existing natural gas-based ammonia plants and conversion of
ammonia plants from coal to natural gas
2. Carbon 1 chemical engineering projects with primary methane-based
products, including acetylene and chloromethane
3. New urea fertiliser projects that use natural gas as raw material
Prohibited Natural gas power
generation
1. Base-load power generator construction projects in 13 large-scale coal mining
regions including Shaanxi, Mongolia, Shanxi and Anhui (excluding coal bed
methane (marsh gas) power generation projects)
Gas chemical
industry
2. New construction or extension of natural gas-based methanol plants and
downstream methanol production projects
3. Projects for methanol manufacturing using natural gas as replacement of coal
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increasing the proportion of primary energy
sources accounted for by natural gas.
• Restrictions applicable to natural gas power
were relaxed, but the prohibition on gas
power construction projects (excluding coal-
bed methane (marsh gas) power generation
projects) in 13 regions with large-scale coal
bases continued, including Shaanxi, Inner
Mongolia, Shanxi and Anhui. The categories
of other natural gas-based power generation
projects were changed from “permitted” or
“prohibited” to “highest priority” and
“permitted”.
• There was relaxation of restrictions on use of
natural gas as an industrial fuel, in centralised
heating and by interruptible users in the fields
of building materials, machinery and elec-
tronics, textiles, the petrochemicals industry,
metallurgy and other industrial fields, who
had their categories changed from being
“permitted” to “highest priority”.
6.2 “Optimisation” of Natural Gas
Use Structures and Policies
China’s policy on natural gas use clearly states
that one of its main goals is to optimise the
structure of natural gas use. So what exactly are
“optimised” gas use structures, and how is their
“optimisation” to be achieved?
6.2.1 China’s Natural Gas Use
Structure
The structure of natural gas usage refers to the
proportion of natural gas used in different areas
relative to overall consumption. Before 2000,
due to a lack of inter-regional pipelines, oil field
production self-usage and chemical engineering
adjacent to oil fields accounted for the vast
majority of China’s natural gas consumption.
Urban gas and gas used for generating power
accounted for a very small proportion (see
Table 6.5). Once long-distance pipelines were
brought online, the gas-using regions spread
from being concentrated around oil and gas fields
towards the more economically advanced central
and eastern regions (see Table 6.5). In 2013, out
of a total consumption of 166 billion m3 of nat-
ural gas in China, urban gas (including gas used
in vehicular and waterborne transport) and
industrial fuel consumption together accounted
for 67% of total consumption.
6.2.2 Worldwide There Is no Such
Thing as “Optimised” Gas
Use Structure
In 1998, the chemical industry accounted for
44.5% of Chinese natural gas consumption. By
2007, this proportion had dropped to 30%. In
2007, when natural gas use policy was introduced,
the structure of China’s natural gas use was far
Table 6.5 2003–2011 China natural gas use structure
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Oil field internal use 79.44 72.77 78.88 77.44 85.59 104.41 117.40 129.55 126.04
Power generation and
heating
7.54 12.74 18.78 29.49 70.74 73.92 127.91 180.80 215.90
Industrial fuels 45.71 70.22 89.69 99.62 116.29 153.24 155.75 183.29 264.5
Chemical engineering raw
materials
128.13 122.90 141.44 177.42 207.05 200.03 176.84 187.28 233.48
Transport and logistics 18.82 26.16 38.01 47.24 46.88 71.55 91.07 106.70 138.35
Commercial use gas 6.85 9.18 10.79 13.16 17.11 17.75 23.96 27.24 33.64
Residential 79.43 102.63 143.39 170.10 177.70 226.90 264.38
Other gas use 14.14 9.12 12.77 16.09 20.92 23.64 26.00 27.14
Total 286.49 328.11 466.14 559.77 703.14 811.92 894.27 1067.76 1303.46
Unit 108 m3
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from ideal, mainly reflected by the chemical
industry accounting for a disproportionately large
proportion of total natural gas consumption. In
light of this, the natural gas chemicals industry
should have been classified as a restricted or
prohibited gas use field. In 2011, gas use in the
chemical industry dropped to 18%, then 15% in
2013. In 2012, when the National Development
and Reform Commission issued the gas use pol-
icy, the main objectives were still optimising gas
use structure and restricting and prohibiting use of
natural gas in chemical engineering.
Global natural gas use structures can be divi-
ded into three types: a balanced structure type, a
mainly power generation type and an urban gas
use type. The United States is a typical balanced
structure, with urban gas, power generation and
industrial gas (including industrial fuels and gas
for use in chemical engineering) each constituting
roughly one third. Japan, South Korea and Russia
use natural gas predominantly for power genera-
tion. Japan, for example, used 94.5 billion m3 of
natural gas in 2010, of which 60% was used to
produce electricity. After the Fukushima nuclear
accident in 2011, an even higher proportion of
natural gas was used to generate electricity.
Consumption of natural gas in The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, two Western European
countries, is predominantly urban. In 2010, the
Dutch consumed 43.6 billion m3 of gas, of which
urban gas accounted for 56%, industrial fuels for
33% and power generation usage for 11% (Canqi
2014: 1–2). Looking at the historical develop-
ment of China’s natural gas output in the light of
the experiences of other countries, it is clear that
there is no such thing as a standard optimised
structure in terms of natural gas use.
Even though there is no standard optimised
structure, it doesn’t mean that standards don’t
exist for the optimisation of natural gas use. The
National Development and Reform Commission
in its policy on gas use proposed that the use of
natural gas should be optimised according to
three criteria: social benefit, environmental ben-
efit and economic benefit, though it does not
define what is meant by social, environmental
and economic benefits. However, based on the
order in which they apply to gas use, “social
benefit” refers to living standards and the guar-
antee of residential gas supplies, in order to avoid
social unrest due to gas shortages. This is why
the domestic uses of cooking and boiling have
been listed as prioritised areas of gas use. Envi-
ronmental benefits include the reduction of
emissions. This is the reason for the inclusion of
gas-powered vehicles, centralised heating,
industrial fuels, distributed energy resources and
co-generation in the “permitted” and “top prior-
ity” categories. Finally, economic benefits con-
cern profits derived from market sales, and
therefore it is the overruling factor in deciding
the prioritisation of natural gas use. The “opti-
misation” of natural gas use structures should
therefore seek to maximise social, environmental
and economic benefits.
6.2.3 Market Pricing Adjustments
Would Automatically
Result in “Optimisation”
of Natural Gas Use
Structures
In order to “optimise” natural gas use structures,
the National Development and Reform Com-
mission developed a specific gas use policy. This
policy also classifies the use of gas as being
either highest priority, permitted, restricted or
prohibited, and thus established the order of
priority. Chinese economist Hua Ben analysed
the capacity and affordability of five markets in
the lower reaches of the Yangtze in terms of
power generation, urban gas, industrial and
commercial fuels, transportation fuels and
chemical raw materials. He then performed a
feasibility study on natural gas, concluding that,
given that natural gas costs 2.5 times more for
the same calorific value when compared to coal
and other fuels, a combined cycle power plant
cannot compete with coal power generation in
terms of basic load and can only be used for peak
regulation. Urban use of gas fuel is less
price-sensitive, but the volume used is limited.
Industrial and commercial gas use is the largest
end user market for natural gas. CCHP systems
improve natural gas pricing tolerance and are
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currently key to the efficient use of natural gas in
China. LNG has advantages as a vehicle gas fuel.
Compared to coal, natural gas is not economi-
cally viable for use as a raw material in the
chemical engineering industry. Based on Hua
Ben’s theoretical results, there is absolutely no
need for the government to implement gas use
policies, as price adjustments will automatically
result in “optimisation” of gas use structures and
natural gas is not economically viable for use in
power generation or as a raw material in chem-
ical engineering.
Regarding the problem of the use of natural
gas in chemical engineering, however, it is likely
that natural gas producers and local governments
in gas-producing areas may have applied differ-
ent methods of calculation. Where natural gas
producers are concerned, due to the natural gas
price being controlled by the government, rev-
enues from external sales of natural gas are
limited, while they are required to provide peak
regulation and ensure supplies. However, devel-
opment of industrial natural gas use near oil and
gas fields is stable, since natural gas costs less
when the price doesn’t include a transport ele-
ment. In addition, there is no regulation of the
price of chemical products, allowing higher
levels of income to be achieved. From the per-
spective of local governments in natural
gas-producing regions, external sale of locally
produced natural gas results in meagre earnings
from resource tax (5% of the selling price).
Therefore, local development of a natural gas
chemical industry will not only help increase
local tax revenue and provide employment, but
can also promote local economic development.
When one does the math, this is an additional
impetus for natural gas producers and govern-
ments in gas-producing regions to develop the
natural gas chemicals industry.
A basic approach to “optimising” gas use
structure involves natural gas tax reform and
environmentally-friendly policy, accompanied by
reorganisation of the natural gas pricing mecha-
nisms, all which should work together so that
natural gas projects that bring greater social and
environmental benefits have access to greater
economic benefits as a result. It is preferable to
reduce the effects of government intervention in
specific markets to a minimum. Experience of
government interference in natural gas markets
between the mid-1950s and the 1980s in the
United States has already taught us the lesson
that, whether pricing controls or usage controls
are employed, neither are helpful in the devel-
opment of a healthy natural gas industry.
6.3 Natural Gas Use and Natural
Gas Price Controls
6.3.1 Natural Gas Price Control
Policies in China
Due to the existence of a monopoly in the natural
gas market, it has been difficult for market pric-
ing mechanisms to emerge, and thus natural gas
prices have always been controlled by the gov-
ernment in China. The prices at which upstream
corporations sell natural gas are determined by
the National Development and Reform Com-
mission, and the prices at which the downstream
corporations sell natural gas are determined by
pricing departments within local government.
Before the natural gas price reforms of June
2013, the National Development and Reform
Commission set manufacturers’ natural gas pri-
ces according to the price of alternative energy
sources (limiting increases to 10%, with no bot-
tom limit), with gas being priced differently for
different uses. In the natural gas price reforms of
2013, the National Development and Reform
Commission decided to use alternative energy
sources as a pricing reference, and, based on
considerations of the main directional flow of
natural gas market resources and pipeline costs,
established gate prices by the netback market
value method. The gate prices are set temporarily
and adjusted annually, and no further distinction
is made regarding different uses, while the goal is
to merge stored gas and incremental gas prices
within three years. In the second half of 2014,
international oil prices fell drastically, based on
the price adjustment formula established in 2013,
the National Development and Reform Com-
mission then issued the Notice on Reorganising
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the Price of Non-Residential Natural Gas on
February 28, 2015, merging the prices of stored
gas and incremental gas, as well as partially
lifting the control over gate prices for commer-
cial users. After adjustments, the maximum nat-
ural gas gate price for each province was as
shown in Table 6.6.
6.3.2 The Effect of Pricing
Mechanisms in Keeping
Natural Gas Prices Low
Prior to June 2013, the National Development
and Reform Commission set different prices for
various uses of natural gas (see Table 6.7), but to
a certain degree this pricing scheme conflicted
with the natural gas use polices at the time. For
example, gas use for chemicals was one of the
areas prohibited by the policies, but in order to
keep the price of fertilisers low, a relatively low
price was set for natural gas used in fertilisers,
which then acted as a signal that such usage was
encouraged. Urban fuel gas use (non-industrial)
was one of the natural gas use areas given
priority by gas use policy, resulting in a lower
price for supplies. However, even though the
lower prices were beneficial for increasing mar-
ket demand, it did not encourage greater supply.
Due to there being a shortfall between supply and
demand in the natural gas market, and for
financial reasons, upstream enterprises prioritised
supplies to higher priced users such as stable
industrial users, who could support a higher
price, which did not actually benefit the devel-
opment of gas as an urban fuel.
Under strict government control, natural gas
prices in China remained at a relatively low level
for a long time. in 2012, the land-based natural
gas price (excluding tax) for domestic manufac-
turers was 1.06 CNY/m3 (1.2 CNY/m3 with tax
added), which was equivalent to only a quarter of
the WTI oil price at that time, a quarter of the
CIF value of imported LPG, a third of the CIF
value of imported fuel oil, half of the CIF value
of imported Central-Asian natural gas, or a
quarter of the CIF value of imported Qatar LNG.
In 2012, the average price of residential gas in 36
major cities was 2.43 CNY/m3, while LPG was
priced at 7.65 CNY/kg and residential electricity
Table 6.6 Maximum
natural gas gate prices by
province (region, city) after
2015 price adjustments
Province Maximum gate price Province Maximum gate price
Beijing 2700 Hubei 2660
Tianjin 2700 Hunan 2660
Hebei 2680 Guangdong 2880
Shanxi 2610 Guangxi 2710
Inner Mongolia 2040 Hainan 2340
Liaoning 2680 Chongqing 2340
Jilin 2460 Sichuan 2350
Heilongjiang 2460 Guizhou 2410
Shanghai 2880 Yunnan 2410
Jiangsu 2860 Shaanxi 2040
Zhejiang 2870 Gansu 2130
Anhui 2790 Ningxia 2210
Jiangxi 2660 Qinghai 1970
Shandong 2680 Tibet 1850
Henan 2710
Unit CNY/103 m3 (including value added tax)
Data source Pricing variation order (2015)351: Notice on reorganising the price of
non-residential natural gas, issued by the National Development and Reform
Commission
140 6 Analysis of China’s Natural Gas Use Policies …
Table 6.7 Baseline manufacturer’s prices (first-gate station) for domestic land-based natural gas after May 2010 price
adjustments
Name of oil/gas field Type of user Manufacturer’s baseline price
(CNY/103 m3)
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was priced at 0.53 CNY/kWh. The calorific
value of natural gas is 8000 kcal/m3, for LPG it
is 12,000 kcal/m3 and for electricity it is
860 kcal/kWh. In other words, for the same
calorific value the price of natural gas was only
48% of the price of LPG, and 49% of the elec-
tricity price. Although a lower price for natural
gas is beneficial in the short term for promoting
gas use, it does not reflect the market value of
clean and efficient energy sources, while also
contributing to the conflicts between supply and
demand, thus affecting both the supply of
resources and sustainable healthy natural gas
market development.
6.3.3 The Influence of a High Fixed
Price for Natural Gas
In the 2013 natural gas price reform, the price
restrictions on high-cost gas sources, such as
LNG and unconventional natural gas, which
make up a sixth of the entire market, were lifted,
allowing the market to determine prices instead.
However, price controls were kept in place for
domestically produced and pipeline gases, which
account for the remaining five-sixths of the
market supply. Based on the 2013 natural gas
price reforms, incremental gas was adjusted to
85% of the price of alternative energy in one
move, and classifications according to usage
were no longer applied. The price of stored gas
was raised by 400 CNY/1000 m3, while the
price of domestic gas was not adjusted (see
Table 6.8). Against the backdrop of insufficient
overall natural gas market supply, removal of
pricing restrictions on high-cost gas sources and
adjusting the pricing mechanism for natural gas
by a reasonable amount should have encouraged
supply and alleviated conflicts between supply
and demand. However, this was not a successful
move as far as encouraging natural gas con-
sumption, and resulted in a lack of market
demand for natural gas.
In the 2013 price adjustments, the volume of
stored gas was 112.0 billion m3, but for
Table 6.7 (continued)
Name of oil/gas field Type of user Manufacturer’s baseline price
(CNY/103 m3)
























Sichuan going east pipeline 1510
Data source Circular (2010)211 of the NDRC “Increasing the base price of domestic on-shore natural gas”
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incremental gas it was only 11.0 billion m3,
accounting for 91 and 9% respectively. Although
incremental gas only accounts for a small share,
its price rose more, directly affecting the growth
of market demand for natural gas. Taking the
Beijing gate price of 3.14 CNY/m3, for example,
for the same calorific value it would cost 3.5
times more than coal (calorific value of
5500 kJ/kg, 620 CNY/ton), 0.87 times the price
of oil fuel (calorific value of 10,000 kJ/kg,
4520 CNY/ton), and 0.70 times the price of LPG
(calorific value of 12,000 kJ/kg, 6700 CNY/ton).
Given the relatively high distribution costs, at
this price natural gas is less competitive. In 2014,
economic development in China entered the
“new norm” era, and economic growth began to
slow, while dropping coal prices and abundant
hydroelectricity resulted in reduced demand for
natural gas for power generation. The growth in
natural gas consumption has been significantly
lower than that predicted, with growth for last
year of only 8.9%, which was considerably
lower than the average of 17.4% over the last
10 years.
6.3.4 Removal of Natural Gas Price
Restrictions Would See
the Disappearance
of Natural Gas Use
Policies
Government natural gas price regulation, whe-
ther it is set high or low, is detrimental to creating
equilibrium between supply and demand in the
market and encouraging sustainable development
of the natural gas industry. The experiences of
the United States and China in managing the
natural gas industry reveal that government
restrictions on natural gas prices tend to cause a
serious imbalance of market supply and demand,
resulting in the need for further direct govern-
ment intervention. Moreover, experience in the
United States also indicates that with the removal
of price restrictions the market will actively
reallocate resources, and this automatically
increases social benefits and optimises the eco-
nomic gains associated with natural gas to their
maximum potential. The best method to ensure
the environmental benefits of natural gas is to
Table 6.8 Gate natural gas prices by province after the 2013 price reform
Province Stored gas Incremental gas Province Stored gas Incremental gas
Beijing 2260 3140 Hubei 2220 3100
Tianjin 2260 3140 Hunan 2220 3100
Hebei 2240 3120 Guangdong 2740 3320
Shanxi 2170 3050 Guangxi 2570 3150
Inner Mongolia 1600 2480 Hainan 1920 2780
Liaoning 2240 3120 Chongqing 1920 2780
Jilin 2020 2900 Sichuan 1930 2790
Heilongjiang 2020 2900 Guizhou 1970 2850
Shanghai 2440 3320 Yunnan 1970 2850
Jiangsu 2420 3300 Shaanxi 1600 2480
Zhejiang 2430 3310 Gansu 1690 2570
Anhui 2350 3230 Ningxia 1770 2650
Jiangxi 2220 3100 Qinghai 1530 2410
Shandong 2240 3120 Xinjiang 1410 2290
Henan 2270 3150
Unit (CNY/thousand m3)
Data source Pricing Notice (2013)1246 of the National Development and Reform Commission concerning adjustment
of the natural gas price
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increase the cost of pollution abatement associ-
ated with highly polluting fuels.
Among the different uses of natural gas,
household use has the highest tolerance towards
rising prices, not being sensitive to changes in
gas price. Based on statistics for 2012, the
national household use of natural gas was only
17.85 m3/month per household, while in Beijing
households it was 18.5 m3/month per household.
Given the gate price of 3.14 CNY/m3, even after
adding the distribution and peak regulation costs,
the price of natural gas for household use would
not exceed 5 CNY/m3. In terms of competition
between natural gas and electricity, with the
price for household electricity use being
0.54 CNY/kWh, if the price of natural gas for
household use exceeds 5 CNY/m3, household
users will stop using natural gas. Even if calcu-
lated at 5 CNY/m3, the average natural gas
cost for each Beijing household is
only CNY 90/month. As the average annual
disposable income for Beijing citizens was
CNY 40,321 in 2013, natural gas consumption
accounted for less than 1% of household income.
When compared to coal, natural gas has
advantages as an industrial fuel. For example, it
has a better calorific value, is capable of raising
temperatures more quickly, is clean and
non-polluting, and it can be easily switched on
and off. It is also effective in tackling problems
such as sulphur dioxide and phenol emissions,
tarring and particulate pollution, thus improving
quality and economic effectiveness in industries
such as pottery, glass and non-ferrous metals,
which also increases its competitiveness. When
considered from the point of view of China’s
overall energy needs, China has only limited
natural gas supplies, therefore natural gas could
never completely replace coal. From the point of
view of the atmosphere as a whole, “coal con-
version to gas” does not completely overcome
this problem, the more important issue being to
increase clean coal use. The main uses for natural
gas in the chemical industry are the production of
ammonia and methanol, and these are the most
sensitive to price changes in natural gas.
Regardless of whether ammonia or methanol
production is concerned, coal is a serious com-
petitor with natural gas for use as raw material in
the chemicals industry. At the same time as the
ratio of coal use in energy source structure is
being reduced, coal prices are falling, thus
offering greater advantages to the coal chemicals
industry than to the gas chemicals industry. If
natural gas pricing mechanisms were liberalised,
this would result in a decline in natural gas’s
share of use in the chemicals industry, without
the need for government intervention.
6.4 The Relevance of the 1978 U.S.
Natural Gas Policy Act for China
In 1978, during the international oil crisis, in the
face of panic caused by lowering domestic pro-
duction and natural gas reserves on the brink of
exhaustion, the United States Congress passed
the Fuel Use Act (FUA), restricting oil and nat-
ural gas in power generation and for industrial
purposes. The legislative background and the
contents of the Fuel Use Act are similar to some
extent to the “Natural Gas Use Policy” adopted
by the National Development and Reform
Commission. The way in which the FUA affec-
ted development of the natural gas industry in the
United States provides a valuable reference for
policies affecting China’s natural gas industry.
6.4.1 Legislative Background
In order to protect the interests of independent
producers and the end user, and prevent natural
gas manufacturers and pipeline operators from
colluding in monopolistic profiteering, in 1954
the Supreme Court of the United States gave its
decision against Phillips Petroleum Co., autho-
rising the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to
regulate interstate natural gas wellhead prices.
The FPC stipulated that wellhead prices must be
determined “based on historical costs”, regard-
less of stored amount, alternative energy source
prices or changes in consumption. The main
effect of this was to protect the short-term
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interests of consumers. However, it interfered
with the investment necessary for manufacturers
to increase future supply. In 1973, the production
of natural gas in the United States reached a
peak, at an annual volume of 615.4 billion m3,
and then began to fall. In 1978 production was at
555.8 billion m3, and in 1986 it was as low as
454.7 billion m3, dropping by a quarter from
peak levels (see Fig. 6.1).
In October 1973 the first oil crisis broke out,
causing massive oil price inflation, and yet the
natural gas wellhead prices remained under reg-
ulation, worsening the natural gas supply situa-
tion. The price regulation caused an increase in
demand and insufficient supply, and when com-
bined with the effects of the oil crisis, this led to
natural gas supply shortages in the United States
in the 1970s. Between 1976 and the winter of
1977, at the worst point of the natural gas
shortage, more than 9000 factories were forced to
suspend production, 750,000 people lost their
jobs and hundreds of schools in the Midwest and
Northeast had to be closed, causing several bil-
lion dollars of losses to the US manufacturing
industry. That period in the development of the
US natural gas industry is now referred to as the
“era of failure”.
The catalyst for the Fuel Use Act was the peak
gas theory, which predicts that natural gas will
eventually be depleted after peak production is
reached. In 1976, Exxon Oil published a report
said to be the result of research conducted by
over a hundred top geologists and geophysicists.
The report stated that the total remaining natural
gas resources in the United States were only
287  1012 cf (around 8  1012 m3). In fact,
from 1976 to 2012, the actual natural gas pro-
duction in the United States was close to
20  1012 m3, and at the end of 2012 there were
still discovered resources of 8.5  1012 m3.
6.4.2 Contents of the Legislation
Since the natural gas wellhead price restrictions
only applied to interstate natural gas trade,
pipeline companies buying natural gas within a
state were not affected by the FPC price controls.
As a result, there were no supply shortages in the























































































Fig. 6.1 Changes in production and consumption of natural gas in the United States from 1970 to 2012
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approached, while the northern schools and
commercial establishments had to close because
of the lack of natural gas supplies, Texas was still
using natural gas as a replacement for oil and
coal in power generation, rather than shipping it
up north. There were suggestions that the price
restrictions should be lifted to let natural gas be
traded at market prices. However, the public
utilities representatives of both the major parties
decided to trust the “experts” and their theory of
resource depletion. They believed that the signs
of depletion were already recognisable, and they
felt that deregulation of natural gas prices was a
selfish, short-sighted and idiotic solution. In their
opinion it was necessary to continue with
resource protection subsidies, terminal usage
controls and pricing control, which would raise
efficiency and ensure fairness all round.
In May 1978, the United States Congress
passed two acts: the Power Plant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act (FUA) and the Natural Gas Policy
Act (NGPA). The NGPA was mainly a redesign
of the regulatory regime and categorisation of
natural gas well types, raising the price of natural
gas from “old wells”, and partially removing
price restrictions on “new wells”. The FUA is a
supplementary act to the NGPA, authorising the
Department of Energy (DOE) to issue orders
restricting the use of natural gas to specific
industries, in an attempt to directly control the
use of natural gas. Apart from forbidding the
building of new natural gas power plants and
industrial boilers, the FUA further demanded that
factories should abandon fuel switching capa-
bilities, while encouraging factories using natural
gas to switch to using other fuels. After 1990, the
use of natural gas was banned in power plants
and industrial boilers. In the transitional period,
use of natural gas in public works was restricted
to consumption volumes equivalent to those
encountered during the energy crisis from 1974
to 1976.
6.4.3 Implementation
In the process of setting out the FUA, the United
States Congress firmly believed that natural gas
resources were in the process of being depleted,
and could not possibly have predicted that an
excess of natural gas would arise. Yet, while the
ink was still wet on the FUA, Secretary of
Energy James Schlesinger announced that there
were predicted natural gas reserves in excess of
the 1  1012 ft3. He did state, however, that this
“bubble” was only temporary. While the “bub-
ble” lasted, the Department of Energy supported
a delay in switching to coal as demanded by the
FUA, and encouraged industrial fuel users cap-
able of switching energy sources to use “surplus”
natural gas instead of oil.
The loosening of restrictions on wellhead
prices increased the supply of natural gas, with
high fixed prices limiting demand, and
“take-or-pay” contracts locking up a large vol-
ume of higher-priced natural gas, which caused a
“bubble” to occur in the natural gas market, with
supply exceeding demand. As this bubble econ-
omy persisted, the FUA’s restrictions on natural
gas use became a historically significant mistake
and resulted in the market imbalance worsening.
In 1981, Congress overruled the FUA’s power
plant requirements and then in 1987 Congress
repealed the FUA and withdrew all the regula-
tions responsible for restricting natural gas
consumption.
6.4.4 Lessons for Natural Gas Usage
Policy in China
The Natural Gas Use Policy, as adopted by the
National Development and Reform Commission,
is not only similar in content to the 1978 Fuel
Use Act of the United States, they also share a
similar background, market environment and
policy climate.
• The natural gas market in China has been
growing rapidly since 2000; demand for nat-
ural gas has been rising, but the growth in
domestic production remains slow, leading to
increasing reliance on imported natural gas.
This is similar to the uncertainties regarding
future energy source supplies in the United
States during the 1970s.
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• The United States had yet to carry out natural
gas industry reforms in the 1970s, and pipe-
line transportation and sales of natural gas
were bundled together. The situation in which
natural gas wellhead price restrictions were
put into place was therefore similar to that
when the Natural Gas Use Policy was enacted
in China.
• Natural gas prices in China have been fre-
quently adjusted since 2000, and from 2013
onwards natural gas prices were pegged to oil
prices and LPG prices. Lifting regulation of
unconventional natural gas and imported
LNG prices would have the same effect as
when the United States removed “new wells”
pricing regulation in the FUA of 1978.
• Due to the higher value of natural gas, there
has been a great deal of activity in develop-
ment of unconventional natural gas in China,
while a large number of natural gas import
contracts have been signed with offshore
partners. This is also reminiscent of how,
after “new well” price regulation was lifted in
the United States in 1978, there was extensive
development of extraction of the more
expensive “deep-level gas”.
• After suffering more than a decade of short-
ages, United States pipeline companies
eagerly signed long-term “take-or-pay” con-
tracts with gas suppliers at high prices, in
order to ensure capacity to satisfy the
demands of users lower down on the supply
chain, thus creating the conditions necessary
for the “bubble” to occur. Contracts in the
natural gas market in China are also in the
form of “take-or-pay”, and when supplies
come under pressure, local governments opt
for a “give me gas, disregard the price”
approach out of fear.
• Due to the effects of the long-term shortage in
the United States, in 1980, industrial and
public power generation natural gas con-
sumption was 20% lower than in the 1970s,
with many industries having learned how to
switch fuels and save energy; nearly all new
power plants were coal- or nuclear-powered.
As gas prices continue to rise, it will become
difficult to continue using natural gas in
power generation in China, and enthusiasm
for natural gas in industrial uses will fall, with
coal-fired power stations preferring to adopt a
clean coal use approach rather switching to
gas.
In a 2013 forecast, the gap between natural
gas supply and demand in China would be as big
as 22.0 billion m3. In fact, due to the National
Development and Reform Commission’s large-
scale adjustment of pipeline gas prices in June,
stored gas price went up by 400 CNY/103 m3,
while the incremental gas price is now pegged
against alternative energy sources, pushing it
upwards to 1380 CNY/103 m3. This has resulted
in many gas power stations adjusting their power
generation plans and has resulted in a decline in
industrial gas use. In addition, with relatively
warm winters, China National Petroleum Cor-
poration was actually able to put gas into storage
during the winter, all of which are signs of an
excess in supply. What we can learn from the
FUA in the United States is that it is necessary to
make timely adjustments, and to repeal natural
gas use regulations when it becomes necessary.
6.5 Policy Recommendations
for Encouraging Natural Gas
Use
The pressures of environmental protection and
emission reduction mean that China needs to be
more active in developing natural gas and
encouraging its use. The nature of current natural
gas use policies in China is such that, when
demand exceeds supply and pricing mechanisms
are no longer effective, the government interferes
with supply and demand directly, mainly by
applying restrictions to gas use in specific sec-
tors. In the past decade, with the widespread
development of natural gas sources, China has
reached a stage where a range of locally pro-
duced gas, gas synthesised from coal, imported
pipeline gas and imported LNG is available,
greatly boosting the available quantity and sta-
bility of natural gas supplies. The “shale natural
gas revolution” in the United States teaches us
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that as technology for natural gas extraction
develops, the extent of natural gas reserves
available for extraction will increase. As natural
gas prices in China are adjusted to more
acceptable levels, the scale of supply has
increased, and there has been a reversal in the
previous supply-demand scenario, currently
manifesting as a lack of demand. China must
therefore alter its current policy of restricting
natural gas use, and instead promote and





The energy supply in China is said to be
“coal-heavy, oil-deprived and short of gas”. Even
though various sources of natural gas have been
introduced in the last decade, vastly enhancing
the natural gas supply capacity, in the face of the
tremendous demand for energy in China, the
supply of natural gas available to China is still
limited. Natural gas is not likely to completely
replace coal, although it could be prioritised to
replace dispersed coal use. In OECD countries,
the ratio of coal used for power generation is
78%, while 90% of coal consumed in the United
States is for power generation. Dispersed coal
use is relatively concentrated in the steel and
concrete industries, but very dispersed coal use is
rare. In terms of total coal consumption in China,
only half of it is used for power generation, the
other half being used in dispersed coal burning.
Of dispersed coal burning uses, half is used in
metal smelting and cement sintering and other
relatively concentrated uses, for which coal is
essential, the other half being used in heating,
textiles, paper manufacturing and other very
dispersed fields. When coal use is too dispersed,
energy efficiency is low and large volumes of
pollutants result, resulting in increased pollution
control costs. Natural gas substitution would
therefore apply mainly to the replacement of very
dispersed coal use.
Since coal is relatively cheap, natural gas does
not have a competitive advantage in terms of
price, therefore businesses prefer coal based
purely on economic considerations. Encourage-
ment of the replacement of coal by natural gas
mainly comes from environmental protection
policies.
• More rigid emission standards should be
stipulated and, whether for concentrated or
dispersed coal uses, all users should stay
within emissions targets. By internalising
what was originally an external cost of using
coal, the competitiveness of natural gas
would improve.
• A new supervisory structure should be
devised, so that concentrated coal use can be
supervised in real time and online, in order to
prevent companies from installing but not
using emission reduction and pollution con-
trol facilities, or only using them from time to
time.
• In areas subject to urban planning or areas
affected by acid rain, coal burning should be
restricted or prohibited.
• Where gas supplies allow, in facilities where
the cost of restricting emissions is too high or
where it would be impractical to introduce
emissions restrictions, conversion to gas
could be obligatory. For those in regions
where conditions do not allow for gas sup-
plies, construction of new installations which
require dispersed coal use which are not
absolutely necessary in terms of everyday life
should not be permitted. At the same time,
more efforts should be put into building gas
infrastructure, so that more regions could opt
to use natural gas.




The key to increasing the ratio of natural gas in
total energy source consumption structures is the
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development of natural gas power generation.
Natural gas power generation is clean, occupies
less space and provides effective peak regulation.
It is well suited for provision of supplementary
power to large cities or megacities. In developed
countries, natural gas power generation usually
takes up around 40–60% of total natural gas
consumption. In China, on the other hand, only
15% of total natural gas used is for power gen-
eration. While there is much space for develop-
ment, the biggest hurdle for expansion of natural
gas power generation is the relatively high cost
of natural gas power compared to coal power.
Based on calculations, the cost of coal power
generation is only 0.34 CNY/kWh, whereas
natural gas power generation costs as much as
0.65 CNY/kWh (annual power generation of
35,000 h), or 0.615 CNY/kWh (annual power
generation of 5000 h). Under the current subsidy
regime, natural gas-generated power is more
expensive and there is no incentive for power
grid companies to buy natural gas-generated
power. With a high natural gas price, there is
nothing to be gained from natural gas power
generation, and power generating companies
have shown little interest in it.
There are two ways to promote natural gas
power generation, both of which aim to improve
the economic benefits of natural gas power
generation. The first method involves introducing
local production of core technology, especially
the manufacturing of gas turbines, so that unit
investment costs and long-term maintenance and
inspection costs can be lowered. The second
method is to increase power generation opera-
tional cycles, lowering the fixed cost of each
kWh of electricity produced. However, the
amount of leeway gained in terms of lowering
costs is very limited. Based on calculations,
using locally manufactured core technology
would only bring the cost of power generation
down by 0.024 CNY/kWh. Increasing the length
of the power generation operational cycles would
move natural gas power generation towards
playing a base-loading role, lessening the gains it
can achieve as a supplementary power source in
peak generation. Currently there are no auxiliary
service markets or peak/trough electricity pricing
mechanisms in China. The main policy adopted
has been subsidising natural gas power genera-
tion by setting a higher electricity price. In large
cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, a
two-part tariff is charged for electricity, the
capacity price being 40–46 CNY/kW month,
basically covering the fixed costs of natural gas
power generation. On top of the two-part tariff,
auxiliary service markets should also be devel-
oped, switching from government regulation of
prices to market-regulated prices to provide such
subsidies.
6.5.3 Strengthen Planned Guidance
to Promote Natural Gas
in Transportation
For transportation, the gases used are mainly
CNG and LNG, which replaces petrol, diesel and
ship fuel. Based on data provided by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Department, around a
quarter of all atmospheric pollution in China
comes from exhaust gases. When natural gas is
used as a replacement transportation fuel, vehi-
cles emit less carbon dioxide compared to
oil-burning vehicles, and they hardly emit any
other pollutants such as nitrogen oxide and sul-
phides. Furthermore, the relatively large gap
between natural gas and oil prices, and the
absence of goods and services tax, means that
natural gas vehicles are more economical than
oil-burning vehicles. For example, in the case of
a taxi that runs on CNG, there was a period of
time when the price of CNG was half that of
petrol, and hence the investment of several
thousand CNY required for conversion could be
recovered in a matter of months. Backed by
atmospheric pollution control measures and its
economical characteristics, use of natural gas in
transportation in China has been growing
quickly, from 97,000 vehicles in 2005 to 2.3
million natural gas-powered vehicles in 2014; the
associated annual gas consumption reached
22.5 billion m3, making up 12.3% of total natu-
ral gas consumption. LNG filling stations
increased from 241 stations in 2011 to 2000
stations in 2014.
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As natural gas transportation technology
matures, it brings more economic benefits, but
there are specific hindrances to the development
of natural gas use in the transportation sector.
Unlike household, industrial, power generation
or other uses where the users stay in a fixed
location, natural gas used in transportation is
supplied to moving users and relies heavily on
supply networks. Natural gas fuel, filling stations
and transportation form the core of the natural
gas transport use value chain, each segment
affecting the decision of a user on whether to
choose natural gas over all other alternatives; this
in turn may slow down or hamper the develop-
ment of natural gas use in the transportation
sector. As the natural gas supply situation in
China improves, the supply of natural gas fuel is
assured for the foreseeable future. However, the
government still needs to strengthen planning
and guidance and refine related policies and
standards, in order to increase the provision of
infrastructure such as natural gas filling stations
and standardised filling services, thus ensuring
that the natural gas filling station network better
fulfils the mobile needs of transportation and
logistics users, thereby attracting users to adopt







In China, urban natural gas use is considered to
be one of the benefits of city life. Since resi-
dential gas is associated with very low profit
margins, with supplies sometimes being provided
at a loss, the financial shortfall due to cheap
household natural gas is made up by charging a
higher natural gas price to the industrial and
commercial sectors. For example, after the
upstream natural gas prices were adjusted in
2013, the Beijing gate price for stored gas was
2.26 CNY/m3 and for incremental gas was
3.14 CNY/m3, but government pricing depart-
ments set the price of residential use gas at
2.28 CNY/m3. It is clear that sales to household
users were made at a loss, compensated for by
industrial and commercial use. The subsidisation
of household natural gas use by the industrial and
commercial sectors is in fact passed on to society
in its use of products and services. The higher
household income is, the more hot water and
heating a household uses, and the more it benefits
from the natural gas subsidies. In contrast,
households with lower incomes, or households
that are not natural gas users or that only use a
small amount of natural gas, would not benefit
from, or only benefit slightly from, these subsi-
dies. That households with higher incomes
should benefit more from such subsidies cannot
be seen as fulfilling the original objectives of
government policy and is hardly fair.
Not only is an all-encompassing subsidy for
household natural gas use unfair, it is also
unsustainable and unnecessary. On the one hand,
there is much room for growth in household
natural gas use, and with volumes expected to
increase from the 2012 figure of 28.8 billion m3
to 54.8 billion m3 by 2020, the continuance of
such subsidies would be enormously difficult. On
the other hand, household natural gas use is less
price-sensitive, and hence there is no real need
for subsidies. From the point of view of eco-
nomic competitiveness, as long as the price is
lower than 4 CNY/m3, natural gas will still be
competitive against oil fuel, LPG and electricity.
City dwellers use an average of around 60 m3,
and even if the price of each cubic metre goes up
by CNY 1, the annual increase is still only CNY
60. In 2013, low-income urban households (the
lowest 20%) had a disposable income of CNY
11,434, and an increase in natural gas expendi-
ture of CNY 60 is equivalent to only 5% of
disposable income. Therefore, the price of natu-
ral gas for household users could definitely be set
above the cost of supplying the gas, cancelling
the cross-subsidising between household use and
industrial and commercial use, reducing the cost
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of using natural gas to the industrial and com-
mercial sectors, and thus encouraging the growth
of industrial and commercial natural gas use. As
for the specifics of the price adjustments, local
governments should decide the timing and
magnitude of them.





The key to encouraging the use of natural gas in
power generation as well as in the industrial and
commercial sectors is to improve the competi-
tiveness of natural gas against coal. If consider-
ing the price alone, natural gas cannot compete
against coal, as the fuel cost per kWh of coal
power generation is a mere CNY 0.21, while that
of natural gas is CNY 0.50. As a clean energy
source, natural gas has an environmental value,
and when competing against coal this environ-
mental value could be considered as the external
environmental cost of coal. The external cost of
coal burning could be broken down into specific
pollutant emissions costs, such as dust, nitrogen
oxides and sulphur dioxide, in addition to a
carbon emissions cost. With increased invest-
ment, the pollutants released by coal burning can
be lowered to a level close to that encountered
where gas is used as the fuel. Newly constructed
coal-burning power stations can basically
achieve the same level of atmospheric pollutant
emissions as natural gas power stations (when
baseline oxygen content is 6%, dust, sulphur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides concentrations are
respectively above 10, 35 and 50 mg/m3), while
the increase in investment cost for each kWh
is only CNY 0.01–0.02. Therefore, simply str-
engthening enforcement of environmental regu-
lations and restricting release of air pollutants
would not effectively increase the competitive-
ness of natural gas against coal in the power
generation sector.
Another method for boosting the competi-
tiveness of natural gas is the levying of a carbon
tax, but while a carbon tax can narrow the gap
between the costs of coal power generation and
natural gas power generation, thereby making
natural gas comparatively more competitive, it
would nonetheless increase the absolute cost of
both forms of power generation. A better way of
making natural gas more competitive is to set a
carbon allowance for each kWh, and fully utilise
trading of carbon emission rights. For example, if
coal power generation has a carbon emission of
0.8 kg/kWh while gas power generation’s carbon
emission is 0.37 kg/kWh and the government
sets the carbon allowance at 0.7 kg/kWh, then
coal power stations have to purchase 0.1 kg/kWh
of emission rights from the market, while natural
gas power stations have 0.33 kg/kWh of emis-
sion rights for sale. If there are only coal and
natural gas power generation to choose from,
then the electricity generated by coal cannot
exceed 3.3 times the amount generated by natural
gas; in other words, the proportion of the quan-
tity of natural gas power generation would be
23% of total power generated, otherwise there
would be insufficient emissions rights available
for purchase by coal power stations. This would
allow the government greater flexibility to adjust
the natural gas power generation ratio, getting
gas power generators to directly subsidise natural
gas power generation, and forcing coal power
generation to provide a direct subsidy to gas
power generation, thereby taking full advantage
of the environmental value of natural gas.
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PART II
Analysis of Gas Supply for China
1. China’s natural gas resource volume is con-
tinually growing. According to the latest survey
results (2013), China’s conventional and
low-permeability natural gas geological resource
volume is 52 trillion cubic metres, with techni-
cally recoverable resource volume of 32 trillion
cubic metres. In 2014, China’s conventional
natural gas production volume was 128 billion
cubic metres, with ground coalbed methane
production reaching 3.6 billion cubic metres and
shale natural gas production reaching 1.3 billion
cubic metres. It is expected that by 2020, China’s
natural gas production volume will be approxi-
mately 260–330 billion cubic metres, and by
2030 that number will reach approximately 430–
560 billion cubic metres. In order to accelerate
China’s natural gas development, the develop-
ment path should be made clearer, by adjusting
the minimum exploration investment, maintain-
ing reasonable prices, establishing trading
mechanisms and trading platforms for proven
natural gas reserves and accelerating unconven-
tional natural gas development. Small- and
medium-sized enterprises should be given special
encouragement to join the unconventional natu-
ral gas development industry. In addition, based
on international experience, system reforms
should be extended to enhance the momentum of
natural gas development and encourage
innovation.
2. In 1993, China changed to become an
importer of crude oil. In 2007, China became a
natural-gas-importing nation. In just 7 or 8 years,
by 2014, China’s natural gas import dependency
rate had exploded to 32%. This is a significant
development. In future, the import status of nat-
ural gas will have a marked influence on supply
and demand in China. Looking at natural gas
supply and demand from a global perspective,
natural gas resources are relatively plentiful, and
natural gas will account for a large proportion of
global energy consumption in future, playing a
larger role than in the past. However, the drop in
international oil prices has brought enormous
uncertainty to the future development of the
international natural gas market. It is expected
that in the coming years imports of natural gas
into China will rapidly increase, growing from 53
billion cubic metres in 2013 to 167 billion cubic
metres in 2020, including 70 billion cubic metres
of LNG and 97 billion cubic metres of pipeline
natural gas. By 2030, imports of natural gas will
have grown further, to approximately 210–240
billion cubic metres, with approximately 75 bil-
lion cubic metres of LNG and 135–165 billion
cubic metres of pipeline gas. If domestic natural
gas, especially shale natural gas, production
volume achieves a market increase as a result of
breakthroughs in technology and policy, then by
2030 China’s natural gas import dependency can
be kept to below 40%.
3. Since the West–East Gas Pipeline com-
menced operation in 2004, China’s natural gas
infrastructure has rapidly developed. As of the
end of 2014, a pipeline distribution deployment
of nearby suppliers has been formed from west to
east and from offshore to onshore, providing
coverage to all provinces except Tibet. The two
major import resource deployments of pipeline
gas and LNG have also been completed, opening
up access to Sino-Asian pipeline gas,
Sino-Myanmar pipeline gas and LNG import
channels. There are also underground storage and
LNG receiving stations to act as major peak
shaving options, covering coastal regions, gas
production regions and the area around the Bohai
Gulf. However, there are also shortages in pipe-
line construction and in underground pipeline
reserve peak shaving facilities. In order to guar-
antee continued stable operation of China’s nat-
ural gas infrastructure design, it is recommended
that a safe and stable national natural gas
infrastructure operating system be built. To
strengthen infrastructure construction capabili-
ties, there should be unified infrastructure plan-
ning, and construction investment should be
diversified. To increase infrastructure usage effi-
ciency, a fair third-party access (TPA) operations
and management platform should be created.
4. Constructing a robust natural gas reserve
peak shaving system is an effective approach for
dealing with mid-term natural gas supply inter-
ruptions and ensuring stable operation of the
natural gas industry as well as stability within the
economy and society. Currently, China’s natural
gas reserve construction is in its infancy, and the
peak shaving demands being faced are signifi-
cant. The existing reserve peak adjustment
capabilities are insufficient, and price and oper-
ations mechanisms have obvious issues. The
peak shaving and emergency response assurance
mechanisms are both insufficiently robust and
present problems and challenges. The secure
supply of natural gas should be made an impor-
tant component part of national security, accel-
erating the construction of reasonable reserve
systems suited to the scale of market demand
while giving greater attention to the formulation
of natural gas peak shaving emergency response
reserve planning, focusing on reserve facility law
and regulatory construction, and clarifying nat-
ural gas business reserve obligations so as to
promote natural gas peak shaving emergency
response reserve facility construction. Active tax
and price policies should be released to reform
reserve gas management regimes and construct
prompt and flexible warning systems for emer-
gency response, continually improving China’s
natural gas supply assurance capabilities as well
as its risk mitigation capabilities.
154 Analysis of Gas Supply for China
7China’s Natural Gas ResourcePotential and Production Trends
7.1 Natural Gas Resource Potential




According to estimates of China’s natural gas
resources, China’s conventional and
low-permeability natural gas geological resource
volume amounts to 68 trillion m3, of which
40 trillion m3 is technically recoverable.
Onshore conventional and low-permeability nat-
ural gas resources are primarily distributed in the
three large basins of Sichuan, Erdos and Tarim.
Marine natural gas resources are primarily dis-
tributed in the Pearl River Estuary, the
South-East Qiong and the East Sea Basin.
From a systematic appraisal of 121 regions in
42 coal basins (groups), China’s onshore coalbed
methane resources located less than 2000 m
underground amount to 36 trillion m3.
Technically recoverable resources less than
1500 m underground total 11 trillion m3. These
are primarily distributed in China’s northern
Qinshui Basin, Erdos Basin, the Yunnan-
Guizhou-Guangxi area and the Eastern Yunnan
Western Guizhou Area. In terms of geologic
sequence, they are primarily from the Carbonif-
erous, Permian and Jurassic. According to national
shale natural gas resource potential survey
appraisals and the identification of the most
promising regions, China’s onshore shale natural
gas geological resources located less than 4500 m
underground total 134 trillion m3, with 25 tril-
lion m3 of recoverable resources, primarily dis-
tributed in the Sichuan Basin and surrounding
areas (Table 7.1).
China’s gas hydrate resources are also very
abundant, and are primarily distributed in the
South China Sea and East China Sea regions, as
well as in the permafrost of the Tibetan Plateau.
Geological resources are approximately
102 trillion m3, and this is currently one of
China’s most abundant sources of clean energy,
with the potential for large-scale development
and the basic conditions in place to become a
mainstream clean energy source (Table 7.2).
7.1.2 Changes in Natural Gas
Resource Assessments
China has conducted five rounds of systematic
national natural gas resource assessments. In
1986 the first round found that China’s natural
gas geological resource volume was
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the Development Research Center of the State Council
and Shangyou Nie from Shell International Exploration
and Production. It was jointly completed by Xiaowei
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the State Resource Department Oil and Gas Centre,
Xiaoli Liu from the National Development and Reform
Commission’s Energy Office, Guang Yang and Jianhong
Yang from the China Energy Research Institute’s
Natural Gas Centre, Xiaobo Ju and Beijing Yao from
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156 7 China’s Natural Gas Resource Potential and Production Trends
approximately 34 trillion m3. In 1994, the sec-
ond round found that natural gas resources were
38 m3. In 2007, the third round found that,
spread over 115 land and near-shore regions
containing oil and gas basins, China’s conven-
tional natural gas resources were 35 trillion m3,
with recoverable resources of 22 trillion m3. In
2012, the fourth round found that natural gas
geological resources were 52 trillion m3, with
recoverable resource volume of 32 trillion m3.
The fifth round, in 2013, found that natural gas
geological resources were further increased to
68 trillion m3, with recoverable resources rising
to 40 trillion m3. In short, China’s natural gas
resource volume is continually increasing. This is
especially clear from the 2013 results, which
showed a marked increase over 2012 (Table 7.3).
Looking back at the history of exploration and
development, it is clear that natural gas resources
continually change along with the development
of exploration. As demand continues to grow,
natural gas exploration and development expands
to satisfy it, with ever-increasing resource types
and resource volumes. Progress in the develop-
ment of oil and gas geological theory and tech-
nology is continually expanding the types of
natural gas and their scope, generally pushing
natural gas toward a trend of ever-expanding
development. Also, the influence of price chan-
ges will cause short-term fluctuations in the
amount of natural gas that is judged economi-
cally recoverable.
7.2 Proved Natural Gas Reserves
7.2.1 Conventional Natural Gas
China’s natural gas exploration and development
lagged behind oil, with generally low levels of
exploration. According to BP’s annual statistical
review, since 2006, proved natural gas reserves
have consistently maintained high rates of growth,
with annual proved natural gas original reserve
volumes of over 500 billion m3. Since 2010,




Assessment time (years) 1986 1994 2007 2012
Geological resources (trillion cubic metres) 33.6 38.04 35 52
Recoverable resources (trillion cubic metres) 22 32
























Fig. 7.1 China’s annual increase in proved conventional natural gas reserves. Source Ministry of Land and Resources
annual press conference materials
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reserves have exceeded 600 billion m3. Indeed, in
2012 and 2014, proved geological reserves were
each nearly 1 trillion m3 (Fig. 7.1). Conventional
proved natural gas reserves are primarily in the
Tarim Basin, Sichuan Basin and Erdos Basin. In
addition, deep within the Songliao Basin there has
also been rapid growth in proved reserves. As of
2013, China’s proved natural gas geological
reserves were 9.66 trillion m3, with technically
recoverable reserves of 5.54 trillion m3.
The basins in Sichuan, Erdos, Tarim, Son-
gliao, Chaidamu and Zhungeer are now the six
major mainland natural gas exploration areas.
Ying-Qiong and the East China Sea have become
the two major near-shore exploration areas,
forming a basic layout of eight large natural gas
exploration areas. Erdos, Sichuan and Tarim are
the three major gas regions with reserves over
1 trillion m3.
China’s proved natural gas reserve regions are
relatively concentrated, and are primarily dis-
tributed in the western region, which accounts for
83% of resources, while the east region and
offshore areas account for the other 17%.
From 1986 to 1990, proved natural gas source
reserve growth was relatively small and less than
40 billion m3. In 1991–1995, growth was close
to 100 billion m3, and in 1996–2000 growth was
150 billion m3. In 2001–2005, growth rose
considerably to approximately 300 billion m3,
while during 2006–2010, the growth was over
320 billion m3. In 2011–2013, conventional
proved natural gas resources growth exceeded
600 billion m3 for three years in a row, with an
additional 616.4 billion m3 added in proved
conventional natural gas reserves in 2013. In
2014, newly added proved conventional geo-
logical reserves reached 943.7 billion m3, mark-
ing an increase of 53% year on year.
Conventional proved natural gas volume
increased consistently, setting a foundation for
large natural gas production volumes.
7.2.2 Coalbed Methane
In 2012, national proved coalbed methane
reserves added 134.4 billion m3, rising year on
year by 2.5%. In 2013, national proved coalbed
methane reserves added 23.6 billion m3
(Table 7.4). Proved coalbed methane geological
reserves are 575.4 billion m3, with technically
recoverable reserves of 285.0 billion m3, showing
rapid growth in proved coalbed methane reserves.
Three-quarters of coalbed methane reserves orig-
inate from Qinshui Basin, while one quarter is
from the Erdos Basin, with proved reserves of
coalbed methane relatively sparse in other areas.
In 2006, proved coalbed methane wells and
developed wells numbered 1373, a figure which
then increased rapidly, so that by 2014 there
were 18,000 coalbed methane well drillings.
Over many years of exploration, the Qinshui
Basin has become an especially large coalbed
methane region, with 400 billion m3 of geologi-
cal reserves. The eastern edge of the Erdos Basin
has become a target gas region, with over
100 billion m3 of geological reserves, and the
coalbed methane industry development has good
foundations.
7.2.3 Shale Natural Gas
As of the end of 2013, China had not submitted
proved reserves of shale natural gas. In June
2014, China’s first proved shale natural gas
reserves passed review and inspection by the
relevant authorities. The proved reserve is located
in Sinopec’s Fuling Gas Field Jiaoshiba Region
Coke-1 Well 3, over an area of 106.45 km2, and
the layers incorporating shale natural gas are a
Wufeng group within Longmaxi. Experts believe
that the Lingpei Shale Gas Field is a typical shale
natural gas field. The gas field reservoir layer is a
marine deep-shelf quality shale with significant
Table 7.4 Coalbed
methane newly added
proved reserve data table
Time (year) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Proved geological reserves
(100 million m3)
225 244 1299 1311 1344 236
Source Ministry of Land and Resources annual press conference materials
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thickness and very high abundance. Distribution
is stable, depth is suitable, and there are no
intervening layers in between, markedly different
from conventional gas deposits, and having the
characteristics of typical shale natural gas, being
similar to North American typical marine-shelf
shale natural gas indicators. The Peling Shale Gas
Field is a high-quality marine-shelf shale natural
gas field that has excellent quality and quantity of
resources. There is a high formational pressure,
the natural gas components are good, gas well
production volumes are high, and there have been
good results seen from mining attempts. There
has been a high production volume from pilot
wells, with long periods of stable production. An
expert appraisal panel has determined proved
shale natural gas volume to be 106.5 billion m3.
As of June 30 2014, the Jiaoshiba region’s 29
wells with pilot mining recorded total daily gas
production of 3.2 million m3, with accumulated
gas production of 611 million m3. As part of
this, the first exploration well Coke IHF has
recorded stable production for a year and a half at
60,000 m3 per day, with an accumulated gas
production of 37.69 million m3.
7.3 Growth of Natural Gas
Production
7.3.1 Conventional Natural Gas
Prior to 1995, China’s natural gas production
growth was slow, rising from 14.3 billion m3 in
1980 to 17.4 billion m3 in 1995. From 1995 to
2005, natural gas production accelerated, grow-
ing from 17.4 billion m3 to nearly 50 billion m3,
an average annual growth of 3.2 billion m3.
Since production reached 50 billion m3, annual
average growth has been approximately
8 billion m3. By 2012 it had reached
107.2 billion m3, 117.0 billion m3 in 2013 and
128 billion m3 in 2014, with net annual growth
of 9.4% (Fig. 7.2). Since 2000, China’s natural
gas production volume growth has been
approximately 9.6%, and annual average growth
for natural gas over the next 10 years or so is
expected to be roughly 9–10%.
Since 2007, conventional natural gas con-
sumption volume has exceeded natural gas
production volume, and natural gas imports
have continually increased. By 2013, China’s
conventional natural gas consumption volume
had reached 166 billion m3 (see Fig. 7.3). In
recent years, natural gas consumption volume
has grown by 12%, markedly higher than
natural gas production growth. Domestic natu-
ral gas production volume is still unable to
meet the needs of domestic natural gas
demand, with imports of natural gas continu-
ally increasing.
7.3.2 Coalbed Methane
China’s coalbed methane production volume
includes both extraction and coal mine well

























































































Fig. 7.2 Natural gas production volume in China. Source BP, 2014
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extraction-based coalbed methane, and does not
consider well drainage coalbed methane. As of
2011, China’s ground extracted coalbed
methane was 2.3 billion m3, with 2012 ground
extracted coalbed methane production volume
of 2.57 billion m3, a growth of 13% year on
year. Coal mine region coalbed methane pro-
duction grew by 9.9% year on year, with the
rate of growth dropping during the same per-
iod. By 2013, ground extracted coalbed
methane production volume was
2.93 billion m3, growing by 13.7%. In 2014,
ground extracted coalbed methane production
volume was 3.6 billion, marking a large jump
upward (Table 7.5).
As of 2012, there were seven constructed
coalbed methane development projects, with
eight development projects in progress. Ground
development coalbed methane production
capacity construction had reached 4.9 billion m3.
In the past two years, new regions and new
development projects have continually opened
up, providing huge momentum for coalbed
methane industry development. For example, the
Baode 1 billion m3 production capacity con-
struction, the Yanchuan South 500 million m3
production capacity construction, the Mi’nan
Region East 1.5 billion m3 construction capacity
construction and the Nanzhuang South 1 bil-
lion m3 construction plans are all under way.
Moreover, total production capacity of approxi-
mately 1.5 billion m3 will be developed through
projects including Shouyang, Liulin, Changzi,
Mabi and Shunan.
Coalbed methane exploration and develop-
ment exhibits a marked trend toward new
regions, new layers and new sectors:
• In recent years, coalbed methane exploration
has continually seen breakthroughs at depths
lower than 800–1000 m, with coalbed
methane seeking relatively good single well
production volumes. For example, in the
Yanchuan Region at depths of 1497–1503 m,
daily gas production has been relatively high
at 3600 m3, while the Qinshui Basin in
Zhengzhuang at a depth of 1337 m has
achieved daily gas production of 2336 m3.
Deep coalbed methane breakthroughs have
resulted in a marked expansion in the explo-
ration and development of coalbed methane.
• In recent years there have also been significant
breakthroughs in low-rank coal exploration,
for example, in Huainan single-well daily
production volumes at 660–880 m have been
1000–2100 m3, Hui Chun has seen stable
single-well production of 1500–2200 m3 at
450–550 m and Yilan has seen stable
single-well production of 1000–1200 m3 at





Time (year) 2011 2012 2013 2014
Production volume (100 million m3) 23 25.7 29.3 36
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Fig. 7.3 Conventional natural gas consumption volume in China. Source BP, 2014
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Binchang and other places, low-rank coal
regions have achieved production volumes of
over 1000 m3. Breakthroughs in low-rank
coal have opened up the door to develop-
ment of coalbed methane in northern regions,
where low-rank coal is distributed.
• Taking the Erdos Basin Hedong region as a
representative of the North China Palaeozoic
coal stratum, there are typical coalbed
methane, tight natural gas and shale natural
gas characteristics between the layers. How-
ever, comprehensive development of multiple
types of natural gas resources has not yet seen
a breakthrough. In recent years, the Hedong
region has increased exploration efforts within
the coal stratum seeking tight sandstone gas,
with marked breakthroughs already achieved
and 6000–50,000 m3 of production volume of
tight natural gas already achieved, and indi-
vidual well production volumes also higher.
7.3.3 Shale Natural Gas
In 2012 China released the Shale Gas Develop-
ment Plan (2011–2015), in which there were
plans that by 2015 proved shale natural gas
reserve volumes would be 600 billion m3, with
200 billion m3 recoverable. In 2015, shale natu-
ral gas production was expected to be
6.5 billion m3. Based on calculation of
115 billion m3 of natural gas as 100 million tons
of oil, 6.5 billion m3 of shale natural gas is
equivalent to 5.65 million tons of oil.
According to the latest information released
by the Ministry of Land and Resources, in 2014
China’s shale natural gas production volume was
1.3 billion m3. As part of this, Jiaoshiba shale
natural gas production volume approached
1.08 billion m3, and shale natural gas production
in Chuannan and other regions was
200 million m3. The main natural gas production
layers were in section 1 of the Wufeng-
Longmaxi Formation.
From the perspective of exploration progress,
China has achieved shale natural gas flow
objectives in formations including the
Qiongzhusi Formation, Wufeng-Longmaxi For-
mation, Longtan-Dalong Formation, Yanchang
Formation, Xujiahe Formation, Ziliujing Forma-
tion and others. Currently, only the
Wufeng-Longmaxi Formation has achieved suc-
cessful large-scale development, with other target




According to current natural gas increase
trends, forecasts for conventional and uncon-
ventional natural gas production are as
follows.
7.4.1 2020 Production Volume
Forecast
1. Forecasts based on the existing system
Based on the annual average growth of natural
gas production volume in the past several years of
8–10 billion m3, conventional natural gas annual
average production volume is forecasted to be
8 billion m3. By 2020, conventional natural gas
production volume will reach 180 billion m3.
Based on target forecasts for shale natural gas
production volumes from the Chongqing and
Sichuan regions, by 2020, shale natural gas pro-
duction volume will be 40 billion m3. Coalbed
methane production volume data primarily shows
a trend for growth in the extraction of coalbed
methane, and by 2020 this will reach around
10 billion m3. Production volume total for natu-
ral gas will be 230 billion m3 (not including
coalbed methane) (Fig. 7.4).
2. Forecast in a partially changed existing
system
With the system unchanged on the whole, and
only conducting new system explorations for
shale natural gas in Chuannan and Chuandong,
achieving shale natural gas development in
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general pilot regions for construction forecasts,
conventional natural gas annual average growth
will remain unchanged at 8 billion m3, and by
2020 will reach 180 billion m3. In Chuannan and
Chuandong, if new system trials for shale natural
gas development are conducted, by 2020 shale
natural gas production volumes will be
60 billion m3. Coal formation coalbed methane
and tight natural gas general development efforts
will be strengthened, with forecasts that by 2020,
coalbed methane production volume will be
15 billion m3 and tight gas and shale gas pro-
duction volume within coalbed methane areas
will be 15 billion m3, for a total of
270 billion m3 (not including coalbed methane)
(Fig. 7.5).
7.4.2 2030 Annual Production
Forecast
1. Forecast in existing system
From 2020 to 2030, conventional natural gas
production annual growth rate will remain
unchanged and maintain at 8 billion m3. By
2030, conventional natural gas production vol-
ume will be 260 billion m3. In Chuannan and
Chuandong Longmaxi Formation, shale natural
gas production volume will rise, with other shale
natural gas formation production volumes also
seeing breakthroughs. Shale natural gas produc-
tion will rise from 40 billion m3 in 2020 to
80 billion m3. Ground-extracted coalbed














Fig. 7.5 Natural gas production forecasts in a partially adjusted system environment (100 million m3)














Fig. 7.4 Existing system natural gas production volume forecasts (100 million m3)
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methane production volume will reach 20 bil-
lion m3, while coal formation tight natural gas
and shale natural gas production volume will
reach 20 billion m3. Large-scale statistical coal-
bed methane production will be 40 billion m3,
for a total of 280 billion m3 (not including
coalbed methane).
2. Forecast in a partially changed existing
system
If oil prices remain at the current normal level,
enterprise natural gas profitability will rise, and
enterprises will be more motivated to produce
natural gas. If conventional proved natural gas
reserves remain at a high level from 2010 to
2020, this will cause 2020–2030 annual pro-
duction volume acceleration to rise slightly to
10 billion m3, and reach 280 billion m3 by 2030.
If Chuannan and Chuandong shale natural gas
new system pilots are particularly effective, and
if they are expanded to achieve commercial
breakthroughs in other shale natural gas systems,
then by 2030 shale natural gas production vol-
ume will reach 150 billion m3. Coalbed methane
production volume will remain at 40 billion m3.
Total natural gas production volume will be
470 billion m3 (not including coalbed methane).
China’s natural gas production volume
growth is controlled by myriad factors, including
geological factors that can be resolved through
technological progress. However, system and
mechanism factors are also ubiquitous, and clo-
sely influence gains, and are difficult to resolve
quickly. Cost factors in recent years have become
an important factor affecting natural gas industry
development, and since 2003 exploration and
development costs have continually risen. If
these cannot be effectively controlled, it will
cause a marked influence on China’s natural gas
industry development and production volume
goals. As a result, China’s natural gas production
volume increases could slow, and may be
hard-pressed to exhibit explosive growth.
7.5 Accelerating the Development
of China’s Domestic Natural
Gas Resources
7.5.1 Clarify Development Paths
Different paths of development require different
policy measures. Given a clear development
path, specific policy measures can be formulated
to promote natural gas development.
1. No change to the existing systems and
mechanisms
This path of development is an extension of
the existing development paths. Based on State
Council rules regarding oil and natural gas
licensing, natural gas exploration, development
and pipeline shipping will all be operated by
existing state-owned oil companies. This busi-
ness approach has the advantage of achieving
intensive development of natural gas, and facil-
itates large-scale development. However, costs
are also very high, and overall prices are some-
what excessive. This is especially true for prices
in natural gas production regions, and supply
markedly lags behind demand. For example,
Sichuan, Chongqing, and Xinjiang natural gas
prices and supply volumes have no marked
advantage. Such a system causes cost increases
for enterprises using natural gas as an energy
source and source material.
2. Using change to strengthen market guid-
ance and diversify development
Another path of development is to change the
existing licensed operation system, and to use
enhancements to market mechanisms to intro-
duce multiple ownership system enterprises to
develop natural gas and to carry out additional
exploration, thus realising diversified develop-
ment. Through market competition, the strongest
and most competitive survive, carrying out new
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natural gas explorations, development projects
and supply investments. This development
approach requires that many issues are addres-
sed, including high-quality preparation and fair
allocation of mineral rights, the market liberali-
sation of oil and gas project services, the inde-
pendent operation of natural gas pipelines and
fair access to them, marketing and trading of
proved reserves, and strong and effective over-
sight. Otherwise, major problems will arise that
will destroy the market reforms.
It is suggested that existing systems and
mechanisms are suitably adjusted, appropriately
opening up conventional oil and gas operating
rights by first opening up oil and gas mineral
rights to large state-owned energy enterprises,
such as state-owned energy enterprises that
already hold shale natural gas mining rights, or
opening up conventional oil and gas mining
rights to energy enterprises that have already
entered the oil and gas sector overseas, guiding
these enterprises in their entry into domestic
conventional and unconventional oil and gas
exploration and development sectors.
7.5.2 Adjust Lowest Exploration
Commitments
In 1996, China’s Mine Law and subsequent
accompanying legislation prescribed that oil and
gas mine exploration rights holders had to invest
at least 5000 CNY/km2 in the first year,
7000 CNY/km2 in the second year and
10,000 CNY/km2 in the third year. In the past,
the low levels of exploration spending commit-
ment did not take inflation into account. Because
oil prices have gradually risen since 2003, oil
company exploration and development costs
have also seen constant increase. Thus 10 years
ago one exploration well only required CNY
3000–5000, whereas now CNY 10,000–20,000
might be needed to drill that same well, with
some well fees being even higher.
Because of the steep increase in costs,
maintaining such low exploration spending
commitments has essentially led to annual
declines in investment because of the changed
price calculations. Previously, an CNY
100 million exploration commitment could drill
three exploratory wells, whereas now only one
can be completed for the same outlay. Physical
exploration commitments by area are only one
third to one fifth of their level 15 years ago.
A large area abundant in natural gas may thus
be seriously lacking in survey work, severely
impacting natural gas discovery and reserve
production growth.
Shale natural gas tender region bidding stan-
dards and management requirements have raised
the conventional oil and gas region lowest
exploration commitment by a factor of 3–5 from
current levels, with each square kilometre having
a lowest exploration commitment of CNY
30,000–50,000. An increase in the lowest
exploration commitment will increase survey
efficiency and promote prompt exits from
regions, thus reducing the occupied area of var-
ious sectors and changing the current situation in
which areas are marked out but not explored. At
the same time, the current system of authorisa-
tion through advance application could be
changed, following the example of the shale
natural gas region transfer approach, which uses
a competitive mode to transfer existing conven-
tional oil and gas blocks. International conven-
tions provide examples of how to formulate
effective block exit mechanisms. A regulatory
team should be set up to oversee implementation
of legislation and systems.
7.5.3 Maintain Reasonable Prices
Currently, calls for natural gas price increases are
very loud, demanding that natural gas be priced
at 70% of oil prices according to heating value.
As a basic energy and a source material for
economic and social functioning, a natural gas
price that is too high or too low is not beneficial
to overall development of the economy. When
the price is too low, producer investment
momentum is insufficient and natural gas devel-
opment is restricted. When natural gas prices are
too high, this will keep a large quantity of
potential consumers out of the market, which is
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not beneficial to the economic development of
the nation as a whole. In recent years, low natural
gas prices in the United States have played an
important role in economic recovery, and this is
worth taking into consideration.
In the past 10 years, China’s natural gas
reserve growth has been rapid, but production
volume annual growth has been less than
10 billion m3. The reason for this is the gap
between oil and natural gas heating value prices,
especially with the existing special licensed
operation system and high oil prices, which have
made enterprises more willing to invest in oil
production. Recently, oil price drops have caused
oil and natural gas heating value pricing to
become equivalent, and given China’s relatively
high natural gas price, oil companies have
become more enthusiastic about the production of
natural gas. In order to reach a natural gas price
that both providers and buyers can accept in the
market, the natural gas exploration and develop-
ment market should be appropriately opened, and
prices can then be formed through competitive
mechanisms, thus establishing a relatively rea-
sonable mechanism to set natural gas prices.
Different development mechanisms will result
in different price-forming mechanisms. Therefore,
natural gas price problems must be resolved after
clarifying natural gas development mechanisms.
7.5.4 Establish Trade Mechanisms
and Trade Platforms
for Proved Natural Gas
Reserves
In recent years, China’s annual average proved
natural gas geological reserves have consistently
exceeded 500 billion m3, and it is expected that
this will continue to grow fast for the next few
years. However, proved reserves have not been
promptly developed, and some have even
remained undeveloped for long periods of time.
The reason for this is partly due to that portion of
proved reserves lacking effective economic
momentum.
It is recommended that a trade mechanism be
established for proved and difficult-to-utilise
reserves, permitting this portion of reserves to
enter the market and be transferred. This will
allow them to reach the hands of enterprises that
can economically effectively develop such
resources and thus achieve prompt development
and exploration. In such a system, enterprises can
transfer proved reserves to recover their explo-
ration costs, while development enterprises can
purchase reserves to obtain development oppor-
tunities. In order to guarantee the prompt devel-
opment of these reserves, it is important to avoid





China has abundant unconventional natural gas
resources, of which shale natural gas and coalbed
methane are independent mine types, and are the
focus of unconventional natural gas develop-
ment. Shale natural gas can be developed rapidly,
and success has already been seen in Chongqing
Fuling Jiaoshiba, with a breakthrough also seen
in Chuannan region, where success was realised
within a single year.
1. Pilot zones for shale natural gas develop-
ment in Chuannan and Chuandong
Since 2009, when CNPC deployed and
implemented its Wei 201 Well and formally
began shale natural gas exploration, shale natural
gas production volume reached 1.3 billion m3 by
2014. This demonstrates that shale natural gas is
quick to enter production, quick to achieve effi-
ciency and quick to develop.
The shale natural gas formation in the south-
ern and eastern portions of the Sichuan Basin is
the Longmaxi Formation. Based on CNPC and
Sinopec shale natural gas resource assessment
results, this shale natural gas formation has shale
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natural gas geological resource volume of
1.9 billion m3 in Chuannan and Chuandong,
with recoverable resources of 4.5 trillion m3.
Shale natural gas presents relatively low devel-
opment risks, and has resource foundations and
technical foundations to carry out scaled
development.
Chuannan and Chuandong Longmaxi For-
mation are important areas when it comes to
allowing shale natural gas to break through to
large-scale production. Based on annual pro-
duction of 60 billion m3 by 2020, and calculat-
ing for stable production for 30 years,
1.8 trillion m3 of shale natural gas recoverable
resources are needed. It would only take a pro-
portion of the 4.5 trillion m3 of recoverable shale
natural gas resources in Chuannan and Chuan-
dong to achieve that goal. This means that by
developing the pilot construction in Chuannan
and Chuandong, it will be possible to effectively
mobilise the Longmaxi Formation to provide
sufficient shale natural gas to meet the long-term
goal of 60–100 billion m3 of shale natural gas
per annum by 2020. At the same time, it is also
possible to explore the direction which oil and
gas system reform should take in the future using
pilot regions here.
2. Additional support to coalbed methane
development
Additional support for coalbed methane
development could be provided with policies that
encourage profitability in the sector, with the aim
of reaping benefits for energy security and the
environment.
The first goal of enterprises when they
develop coalbed methane is to obtain coalbed
methane commodities and to make profit. There
is another major objective for surface and
underground extraction of coalbed methane in
coal mining regions though: to ensure coal mine
safety and to reduce gas emissions. In many
respects, obtaining the coalbed methane
commodities is actually the secondary aim.
These two different mindsets require corre-
spondingly different policy measures.
• Coalbed methane development in coal mining
areas is motivated by safety and environ-
mental protection considerations. Working
closely with coal mining and developers,
plans need to be advanced by five years in
order to deploy surface extraction suitably far
ahead of well extraction, by deploying Lao-
tang drainage and other coalbed methane
projects.
• Policies that encourage and facilitate coalbed
methane can harness independent enterprises
to carry out coalbed methane extraction at
scale across multiple mine sites. Policies,
especially subsidies that promote coalbed
methane development, are primarily directed
at enterprises that directly use this portion of
coalbed methane (gas).
• When not involved with coal mining, coalbed
methane development is a commercial activ-
ity, and can be promoted by
incentive-focused industrial policy. Some
coalbed methane mining regions are not
within coal planning regions and coal mining
regions in the next 10–20 years. The coal
mining in these regions is commercial coal-
bed methane development, and coal mining
safety and environmental problems do not
arise. Such activity should not enjoy the
preferential policies applied to coalbed
methane development in coal mining areas. It
is sufficient simply to use the current prefer-
ential development policies in such cases.
It is worth noting that subsidy policies that
lack a time limit will cause enterprises to develop
a reliance on national subsidies, resulting in the
coalbed methane industry remaining in an
immature state of development for longer than
would otherwise be the case, rather than devel-
oping healthily and robustly.
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Case 1: Establishing a 100 billion m3
Shale Natural Gas General Pilot Region
in the Sichuan Basin
The current international oil price is low,
and US shale oil and gas companies have
suffered the impact of this and even been
forced to apply for bankruptcy protection.
Asian LNG spot prices are also trending
lower. However, looking to the long term,
supply shortages and high import prices
will be the major problems faced by
China’s natural gas development. Shale
natural gas development is still a strategic
choice for China’s natural gas development.
The Sichuan Basin’s abundant shale natural
gas resources and favourable development
conditions make it possible to carry out
pilots to test general reforms strategies. By
using optimised systems and mechanisms, a
preliminary shale natural gas development
can be scaled up and commercialised to
achieve annual production of 100 billionm3
by 2025 in this large shale natural gas
region. This is not only a strategic choice to
increase secure domestic natural gas supply;
it also represents an unusually attractive
investment opportunity.
1. Sichuan Basin has the basic condi-
tions in place
During multiple surveys of Sichuan and
Chongqing, and after meetings with mul-
tiple investors and engineering technicians,
and collecting opinions from the relevant
experts regarding shale natural gas devel-
opment resource conditions, technology,
equipment, engineering, investments,
applications, environmental loads and
other factors, it is our opinion that with the
appropriate system and policies, the
Sichuan Basin will become a leading
region for shale natural gas development in
China. By 2025, this region could feasibly
achieve 100 billion m3 of shale natural gas
production volume. The reasons are out-
lined below.
(I) Resource conditions are guaranteed
The Sichuan Basin’s shale natural gas
resources are abundant, and there are wide
distributions of two marine shelves of
substantially thick black shale. According
to Sinopec data, total shale natural gas
resources in the entire Longmaxi Forma-
tion and Qiongzhusi Formation amount to
40 trillion m3. Of this, the Longmaxi For-
mation marine shelf shale natural gas has a
promising area of 75,000 km2 that has
already seen development breakthroughs,
with a shale natural gas resource volume of
25 trillion m3 and recoverable resources of
3.7 trillion m3. As part of this 75,000 km2,
there are 35,000 km2 of shale natural gas
resources whose conditions are superior
and geological resources of nearly 14 tril-
lion m3, with recoverable resources of
28 trillion m3. If development is only
pursued in the high-quality shale natural
gas area of 20,000 km2 of the Longmaxi
Formation, beginning in 2015, the explo-
ration and well layout planning could be
completed and approximately 10,000 wells
could be deployed within 2015–2025. By
2025, annual production of 100 billion m3
could be achieved. Moving forward, active
wells would number around 800, achieving
stable production for 20 years. It could be
said that as far as resource volume is
concerned, Sichuan and Chongqing
entirely satisfies the requirements to
establish a region with annual production
of 100 billion m3.
(II) Development technology and
equipment is assured
Currently, China has preliminarily come to
terms with shale natural gas geophysics,
well drilling, well completion, pressure
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fracturing and other technologies, giving it
the ability to drill shallow water wells of
3500 m as well as staged fracturing.
Non-seismic geophysical prospecting
identification and forecasting technology,
wholly-mobile rail drills, large-scale frac-
turing vehicles (3000 model, 3500 model),
construction environment protection tech-
nology and other factors are now at similar
levels of advancement to those seen inter-
nationally, and breakthroughs have also
been achieved in domestic bridge plug
manufacture. Compared to internationally
mature technologies, China now only has
shortcomings in drill geological position-
ing, on-drill measurements and
micrometre-nanometre structure and com-
position analysis. However, the majority of
well-known oil services companies from
abroad are now participating in China’s
shale natural gas development, and can
provide vital technologies. Sinopec’s
Chongqing Fuling (Fuling) Shale Gas
Field has entered commercial develop-
ment, attesting to the fact that China’s
shale natural gas development technology
is now up to par. In addition, China’s shale
natural gas core equipment, such as sets of
drills, fracturing vehicle groups, well tools
and accompanying project services, all
have powerful capabilities, with existing
domestic drill quantities and drill produc-
tion capacities entirely meeting the
requirements placed on well drilling
quantities during construction and produc-
tion stages.
(III) Good mining efficiency, guaran-
teed economic benefit
As of November 30, 2014, Sinopec (Ful-
ing) Region had completed fracturing test
gas sites at 69 wells and obtained medium
to high production of shale natural gas
flows, with an average well test production
volume of 320,000 m3 per day. Based on
unhindered flow volume of 1/3, 1/4 and 1/5
accompanying set production, average
single well annual production volume is
approximately 21.60 million m3 or higher,
with average single well costs of CNY
80 million (including exploration, mining
and shipping). Adding simple processing
such as water extraction to this, well costs
are less than 1.5 CNY/m3, whereas current
shale natural gas well prices are
2.78 CNY/m3. If a national financial sub-
sidy of 0.4 CNY/m3 is added in, the actual
price is 3.18 CNY/m3, and single well
annual revenue once production stabilises
could reach CNY 68.688 million. In addi-
tion to Fuling Region’s shale natural gas
mining achieving commercial viability, in
the Chuanning, Changning and Weiyuan
region the shale natural gas is buried rela-
tively deep, but shale natural gas and
conventional gas overlap in distribution
and both possess general economic value.
The eastern Chongqing region and Western
Hubei region shale natural gas areas also
feature light oil, and the economic value of
mining this is also relatively high. The
economic success of the Sichuan Basin’s
shale natural gas development is
guaranteed.
(IV) Environmental controls can draw
on experience elsewhere, and min-
ing water is assured
Currently, the United States has over
10,000 shale natural gas wells, and with
the participation and oversight of regula-
tors and the public, there have been no
environmental incidents affecting society.
The majority of the shale natural
gas-producing layers in the Sichuan Basin
are at over 2000 m in depth, and so long as
casing work is handled appropriately or
assurance measures are added (such as
installing an encircling casing), fracturing
water has no chance of permeating into the
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water table system. In terms of water
usage, water usage volume for
100 billion m3 of gas is approximately
100 million L3 of water, which is 1.6% of
the water usage of Sichuan Province. Since
the Sichuan Basin has abundant water
resources, these water resources are
entirely assured. However, recently in the
United States, including Texas, there have
been reports of small earthquakes and other
events caused by development of shale
oil/gas that are worthy of public attention.
2. A shale natural gas development
pilot area should be established
quickly
Basing calculations on annual production
of 100 billion m3, an investment of CNY
800 billion would be required during the
construction and production period (2015–
2025 well completion for around 10,000
wells). Based on the current system (rely-
ing only on CNPC’s south-west branch
companies and Sinopec’s south-west
branch companies to invest), capabilities
are extremely limited. This is especially
true for the Longwangmiao large gas field
discovered by CNPC’s south-west branch
company, with reserves of over 400 bil-
lion m3, located in central Sichuan. Con-
ventional gas field construction likewise
requires a large quantity of investment into
exploration and development. Therefore,
there is a need for new ideas for shale
natural gas development, and it is recom-
mended that a general pilot zone for shale
natural gas development be constructed in
the Sichuan Basin and surrounding areas.
With a controlled and safe environment,
preliminary trials can be attempted,
restructuring shale natural gas development
using a new model, with new mechanisms
and new rules. This will promote shale
natural gas development and also offer new
points of reference for China’s oil and gas
reforms so that successful experiences can
be replicated and promoted. Important
measures include:
(I) Innovative mining rights manage-
ment and market access
management
The first issue is mining rights manage-
ment. Resources that the three major oil
companies have not begun to produce,
explore or are in the process of developing
and exploring should be the subject of
tenders. The second issue is market access.
Not only should other state-owned enter-
prises be introduced, but also private
enterprises and foreign investment enter-
prises. In terms of foreign investment
enterprise entry, not only should large
transnational corporations be introduced,
but small and medium-sized oil and gas
enterprises with abundant experience and
innovative capabilities should also be
enabled to enter. These enterprises have
played a critical role in the shale oil and
gas revolution in the United States. In
terms of foreign investment access, so long
as technical and environmental standards
are met, and national security reviews are
passed, foreign investment enterprises
could enter in an independent fashion.
(II) Make use of the economic advan-
tages offered by mixed ownership
CNPC and Sinopec have taken steps
towards establishing new ownership para-
digms, for example CNPC has established
the Sichuan Changning Natural Gas
Development Co., Ltd in Changning and
Sinopec has established Chongqing Shale
Gas Exploration and Development Co.,
Ltd in Chongqing, each of which is a
mixed ownership company. Mixed own-
ership offers state assets, private assets and
7.5 Accelerating the Development of China’s Domestic Natural Gas … 169
foreign assets the opportunity to enter the
shale natural gas development sector. It is
also beneficial to central government
enterprises, enabling greater use of societal
capital and more rapid development. With
local state-owned asset participation, there
is greater breadth for enabling resettling,
road repairs and natural gas nearby utili-
sation. With private enterprise and foreign
enterprise participation, company govern-
ment can be improved, thus raising the
level of mining efficiency and service. The
next step in shale natural gas development
mixed ownership reforms requires efforts
in terms of corporate governance, strategic
co-ordination and the division of labour
and partnerships. In order to improve
overall activity, it is not enough simply to
overlook mechanism transitions to obtain
monetary funds. Likewise, the sole focus
should not be on bringing in mixed capital,
while essentially refusing to allow outside
investors to participate in the correspond-
ing management and operational activity.
(III) Exploring effective shale natural
gas regulatory models
It is possible to aim to create a pilot zone
for policy systems, management standards,
oversight rules and regulatory systems
relating to shale natural gas exploration,
development, storage, and shipping usage
within 2–3 years, including information
search and sharing platforms. In terms of
environmental oversight, central govern-
ment standards and policies should be
established, with local organisations
implementing the environmental regula-
tion. The Ministry of Environment is in the
process of researching the establishing of
shale natural gas development assessment
guidelines. These could be tested in this
region, with a preliminary launch and
implementation of national norms and
standards for such aspects as land usage,
vegetation restoration, water resource
usage, waste water processing, waste
processing, gas emissions, drilling and well
completion. In terms of geological material
and information sharing, comparison can
be made to the United States’ administra-
tive legislation approach to the mandatory
collection of shale natural gas geological
information, thus establishing a geological
engineering information management
platform with government-controlled
resource information. This will achieve
information sharing and promote highly
efficient development.
Case 2: Chinese Coalbed Methane
Production Volume Forecasts
1. Coalbed methane resources
China has abundant coalbed methane
resources, which are typically found in
multiple coal basins with multiple coal
formations and a wide variety of coal types
and coalbed methane deposits. Due to the
wide variance in the coal-containing basins
in China, subsequent construction and
restructuring is intense, resulting in a very
complex geological environment for coal-
bed methane resource deposits in China.
Coalbed methane resources are primarily
distributed in China’s north, north-west,
south and north-east regions.
China’s proved coalbed methane vol-
umes have grown rapidly. In 2012,
national proved coalbed methane reserves
grew by 134.4 billion m3, rising year on
year by 32.2%. In 2013, national coalbed
methane exploration proved new reserves
of 23.577 billion m3. Proved coalbed
methane geological reserves now sit at
575.4 billion m3, with technically recov-
erable reserves of 285 billion m3.
The regions that are abundant in coalbed
methane are primarily the Qinshui Basin,
the Erdos Basin and the Yunnan Guizhou
North Depression. In 2012, new proved
geological reserves in the Qinshui Basin
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were 90.242 billion m3, with the Erdos
Basin newly adding proved coalbed
methane reserves of 37.11 billion m3. The
Yunnan Guizhou North Depression in 2012
deployed and implemented 11 assessment
wells and three well groups, for a total of 18
wells as production capacity experiments.
A total of 17 wells have achieved coalbed
methane flows, with single well daily pro-
duction capacity of 500 m3.
2. Coalbed methane reserve forecasts
(I) Characteristics of coalbed
methane-intensive regions in China
Coal layer gas factors are generally asses-
sed by usage of gas per ton of coal,
absorption saturation, concentration of
methane and resource abundance. Gas per
ton of coal is gas volume, and is a deter-
mining factor in coalbed methane resource
quantity. Resource abundance is a general
reflection on the amount of gas in the coal
and the thickness of the coal layer.
Absorption saturation is a gas volume
factor related to gas mining feasibility.
Methane concentration is a major standard
in assessing gas quality.
Regarding regional distribution, average
coalbed methane gas volume is highest in
southern China, followed by the north-east
regions and northern China. The
north-west region has the lowest amounts.
The methane concentrations of each region
are similar, and from highest to lowest are:
southern China, northern China, the
north-west and the north-east. The average
resource abundance in each region varies
significantly, with the north-west region
markedly higher than other regions, fol-
lowed by the north-east. Northern China is
slightly lower than eastern China, with
southern China the lowest. Average
absorption saturation is led by north-east
China, followed by southern China,
northern China and the north-west.
From the perspective of coalbedmethane
layers, the Permo-Carboniferous, upper
Permian series and Lower and Middle
Jurassic series are representative of good gas
contents. Other eras are relatively poor.
From a general analysis, the northern
region’s major basins have good gas con-
tents in the Permo-Carboniferous, and this is
the primary gas layer for important basins.
From the perspective of coal rank dis-
tribution, the resource volume of high coal
rank lean anthracite III (Ro = 1.9–2.5%) is
7.8 trillion m3, accounting for 21.1%. The
resource volume of medium-rank gas/lean
coal (Ro = 0.7–1.9%) is 14.3 trillion m3,
accounting for 38.9%. Low coal rank
brown—long flame coal (Ro < 0.7%)
resource volume is 14.7 trillion m3, and
accounts for 40%.
(II) Key target areas for coalbed
methane exploration
Based on summarising coalbed methane
abundance patterns and gas characteristics,
there are 18 target regions that have been
selected nationwide as preferential loca-
tions, including Pucheng, Ji County—
Hancheng, Shenmu, Hengshanbao, Ning-
wunan, Panguan, Gemudi, Pingle, Changji,
Dajing, Wuermu, Wushenqi,
Sanjiang-Mulinghe, Huolinhe and Yimin.
Of these, six are Class I target regions, five
are Class II target regions and seven are
Class III target regions, giving a total area
of 54,700 km2. The target Class I coalbed
methane resource volume for the region is
3.63 trillion m3, primarily distributed in
the Qinshui, Erdos, Zhunge’er and Ningwu
basins. Coalbed methane geological con-
ditions are good, representing coalbed
methane near- and mid-term reserve and
production volume realisation target areas.
Class II and Class III areas have a total of
2.87 trillion m3 of resource volume, and
are distributed across Tuha, Santanghu,
Sanlian Basin, eastern Yunnan and Wes-
tern Guizhou, and the Pingle Basin, and
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have potential for mid- to long-term
reserve growth and subsequent replace-
ment blocks. As part of this, the Qinshui
Basin south portion Jincheng region, Erdos
Basin south-east region Ji County—
Hancheng region, and the Zhunge’er Basin
south-east Changji-Dajing are promising
coalbed methane regions with reserves of
100 billion m3 (Table 7.6).
This research is based on national
coalbed methane reserve historical data, in
conjunction with coalbed methane geo-
logical characteristics and resource distri-
bution traits, making use of the Weng
model method and Gompertz method to
forecast proved coalbed methane reserves
and production volume. It is expected that
by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan, 10
advantageous target regions will see newly
added proved geological reserves of
700 billion m3. During the period of the
13th Five-Year Plan, the scope of explo-
rations will be further expanded to south
China, and the north-east and north-west
regions, with newly added proved reserves
of 350 billion m3 in the Qinshui Basin,
Erdos Basin, Zhunge’er Basin, Ningwu
Basin and Erlian Basin. From 2013 to
2030, annual proved reserves will be at
approximately 100 billion m3. After 2030,
as coalbed methane exploration and
development technology continues to pro-
gress, coalbed methane at 2000–4000 m
will also be possible to confirm and mine,
with large increases in proved reserves
expected in coalbed methane (Table 7.7).
(III) Coalbed methane production vol-
ume forecasts
As coalbed methane exploration and
development technology matures and
mining costs drop, coalbed methane
development will become larger-scale and
will develop toward greater industrialisa-
tion, gradually forming 10–15 coalbed





2015 2020 2025 2030
New proved geological reserves 7000 3500 4800 7200
Accumulated proved reserves 8619 12,119 16,919 24,119
Data source Ministry of Land and Resources and other material analysis and preparation
Table 7.6 National coalbed methane results of selection of favourable target regions













I Qinshui Qinshui north 200–1200 8–17/2 10–32 5150 11,864
Erdos Erdos east 300–1500 7–22/2–3 9–20 7430 11,805
Zhunge’er Changji-Fukang 300–1000 25–32/3 5–15 7010 7460
Qinshui Yangquan-Heshun 150–1300 9–12/2–3 8–35 1200 2500
Ningwu Ningwu south 800–1500 11–14/1 11–21 534 1665
Sanlian Huolinhe 300–900 7–34/5 5–8 380 1025
Data source Ministry of Land and Resources and other material analysis and preparation
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model and the Gompertz method to anal-
yse China’s future coalbed methane pro-
duction volume growth, it is expected that
2015 coalbed methane production volume
will be 4.6 billion m3, rising to
10–30 billion m3 by 2020. From 2021 to
2030, 20–30 coalbed methane production
bases will be established, with
40 billion m3 of production volume by
2030 (Table 7.8).
Case 3: Forecast of China’s Coal
Methane Production Potential
1. Coal methane development
With the implementation of a sustainable
development strategy and the strengthen-
ing of environmental and other policies,
domestic natural gas consumption markets
are continually expanding, and there are
more channels and more methods of
expanding the natural gas resource supply,
and optimising the gas source structure has
become an important strategic part of
optimising the national energy structure.
Converting coal region resources into nat-
ural gas can to a certain degree supplement
China’s shortage of conventional natural
gas supply.
China has approved its first two coal
methane projects: Keqi, with coal methane
production capacity of 4 billion m3/year,
divided into three series, with each series
having production capacity of
1.33 billion m3; and Qinghua, with
5.5 billion m3/year, divided into four
stages of construction. The first stage has
production capacity of 1.375 billion m3/year.
In 2013 the two coal methane projects in total
had gas volume of 31 million m3.
Approved and in-progress coal methane
projects include the Fuxin and Huineng
coal methane projects, with total produc-
tion capacity in the region of 5.6 bil-
lion m3/year, and expectations to begin gas
supply in 2015. In-progress and operating
coal methane projects are listed in
Table 7.9.
Table 7.9 Operating and in-progress coal methane projects
Type Project name Date of
operation
Scale Total production capacity
(100 million m3)
In operation Datang Keqi Coal Methane Project 2013 13.3 40
Xinjiang Qinghua Coal Methane Project 2013 13.75 55
Under
construction
Huineng Coal Methane Project 2015 – 16
Liaoning Datang Fuxin Coal Methane
Project
2015 – 40




Data source Public materials analysis and organisation
Table 7.8 National coalbed methane production growth forecasts (100 million m3)
2015 2020 2030
Production volume 45 100–300 400
Data source Ministry of Land and Resources and other material analysis and preparation
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2. Progress in coal methane project
planning and construction
In recent years, China has seen an acceler-
ation in approvals of coal methane projects,
primarily concentrated in Inner Mongolia
and Xinjiang. As of the end of June 2014,
the NDRC had approved 18 coal methane
projects, with a combined production
capacity of 84.2 billion m3/year. Provincial
planning and filing showed 37 projects
with production capacity scale of
129.6 billion m3/year. Operating pro-
jects, or those with road permits and
approvals, as well as those under con-
struction, had a total production capacity
of 230.9 billion m3/year. Currently, only
a small number of these projects have
begun construction, and considering that
current natural gas prices are a problem, as
well as the current policy environment, not
all projects will necessarily be finished. It
is also not a given that the completed
projects will be able to satisfy the load of
production, but production capacity will
still offer basic assurances for China’s
natural gas supply security (Table 7.10).
Table 7.10 China’s current coal methane projects with road permits




Xinmeng Energy Investment Co., Ltd Coal Methane Project 40
2 Inner
Mongolia





State Grid Inner Mongolia Guxinganmeng Coal Methane Project 40
4 Inner
Mongolia
Huaneng Yimin Coal Methane Project 40
5 Inner
Mongolia
Inner Mongolia China Star Energy Limited Coal Methane Project 40
6 Xinjiang Huaneng Xinjiang Coal Methane Project 40
7 Xinjiang China Power Investment Corporation Xinjiang Huocheng Coal
Methane Project (three phases)
60
8 Xinjiang Xinjiang Fuyun Guanghui Coal Methane Project 40
9 Xinjiang China Coal Energy Xinjiang Coal Methane Project 40
10 Xinjiang State Grid Pingmei Coal Methane Project 40
11 Xinjiang Xinjiang Longyu Coal Methane Project 40
12 Xinjiang Huadian Xinjiang Coal Methane Project (Xiheishan coal methane) 40
13 Xinjiang Sinopec Great Wall Energy Coal Methane Project 80
14 Xinjiang Xinjiang Yili Xintian Coal Methane Project (Xinwen phase one) 20
15 Xinjiang Suxin Energy Xinjiang Coal Methane Project 40
16 Xinjiang CPCEC Yinan Coal Methane Project (three phases) 60
17 Shanxi CNOOC Shanxi Datong Coal Methane Project 40
18 Anhui Anhui Huai’nan Coal Methane Project 22
Total 842
Data source Public materials analysis and organisation
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3. Coal methane production potential
analysis
According to the construction progress of
coal methane projects, and in conjunction
with project construction cycles and pro-
duction capacity plans, an arrangement has
been made of all coal methane project
production capacity.
Projects in 2020 with full road permits
will have total production capacity of
84.2 billion m3/year, and, considering they
are based on three phases, with basic
commencement post-2018, by 2020 it will
be possible to achieve two-phase scaled
capacity of 60 billion m3/year, reaching
95 billion m3/year in 2025 and
102 billion m3/year in 2030.
However, what is worthy of note is that,
moving forward, coal methane develop-
ment still faces many uncertainties. One
factor is the currently relatively low inter-
national oil and natural gas prices, which
have greatly inhibited the profit space for
coal methane, especially given significant
difficulties with project cost difficulties.
A second factor is water consumption and
environmental pollution, which causes
significant controversy. Therefore, while
coal methane production capacity will be
built in the future, specific production
capacity is nonetheless still highly
uncertain.
Case 4: Rural Organic Waste Natural
Gas Effects and Policies
It has been estimated that nearly 76% of
organic waste in China comes from agri-
culture, with crop stalks and livestock
manure being the two major sources.
China’s villages have 600 million tons of
crop stalks dispersed among fields, and
farmers generally deal with these by
burning them, which is inefficient and not
environmentally friendly. As livestock
intensity becomes increasingly concen-
trated, concentrated processing of manure
is a problem that not only hinders enter-
prise development but also endangers the
rural environment. Resolving rural
organic waste transitioning has always
been one of the major issues facing agri-
culture. Beijing Deqingyuan has explored
a series of technical models that transform
rural organic waste into clean energy, and
their experience is worthy of attention and
wider promotion.
1. Improving rural environments and
changing rural energy usage
structures
Beijing Deqingyuan is an egg producer in
Beijing that has won industry fame and
market share by giving its eggs an “identity
document” (using edible ink to print the
brand name, production date and a fraud
prevention code on each egg’s shell).
However, after they expanded their pro-
duction scale, they discovered there were
also attendant environmental problems,
with 2 million laying hens producing the
same amount of manure each day as
300,000 people. If this waste is not pro-
cessed, it causes contamination to the
groundwater and soil. To this end, Beijing
Deqingyuan specially established a clean
energy company to resolve the problem of
transforming and using chicken manure.
After several years of study, a break-
through took place in the three technical
areas of sand removal, high-concentration
purity extraction and biological desul-
phurisation, achieving power generation
from chicken manure methane in 2007.
Following on from this, they next devel-
oped a mixed-source material production
of methane gas from crop stalks and
chicken manure, making natural gas after
purification compression. The break
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throughs in these technologies have yiel-
ded feasible solutions to bring about rural
organic waste transformation and to allow
farming using renewable energy.
The first point to note is the improve-
ments to organic waste conversion and to
the rural environment. Deqingyuan can
process 100,000 tons of manure per year,
equivalent to reducing CO2 emissions by
71,000 tons, and 35 tons of nitrites. A total
of 25,000 tons of crop stalks are processed
annually, equivalent to a CO2 reduction of
40,800 tons and 25 tons of nitrites. Not
only has the manure generated by chickens
been used effectively, the approach has
also provided a solution for the problem of
stalk burning that farmers have always
faced.
Also notable is the formation of a full
industry chain. Deqingyuan’s methane
power generation plant achieved connec-
tivity in 2009 with North China Power
Grid, and now produces upward of 14 MW
of power annually, along with
160,000 tons of organic fertiliser. In 2013,
biogas sales revenue was CNY 600,000. In
2014, this reached CNY 2.7 million. The
remaining liquid methane biogas residue is
processed into solid and liquid organic
fertiliser, with annual production of
160,000 tons of organic fertiliser sold to
local farms in Yanqing and prompting the
development of 10,000 Chinese mu of
organic apples and 120,000 acres of envi-
ronmentally friendly corn crops. Through
ordered procurement, 60% of Yanqing’s
corn is purchased, which is then used to
process into chicken feed to be fed to the
3 million layer hens at the farm. Thus a
complete industry chain has been created:
ecological cultivation, food processing,
clean energy, equipment manufacturing,
organic fertilisers, agriculture and organic
planting.
Finally, there is the improvement to
rural production and living conditions that
has occurred. Deqingyuan transports the
natural gas generated from purification and
compression by tanker truck to various
village facilities for tank storage. It is then
sent via pipeline to countless homes. In
2013, biogas was supplied to 2000 homes,
which had risen to 5000 homes by July
2014, with a further rise to 7000 homes
expected. Deqingyuan and Yanqing
County are co-operating in new biomass
energy projects, with plans within the next
three years to enable the 10,100 homes in
39 villages within Yanqing County to use
biogas. During an on-site survey of the
area, we found that farmers used liquid
methane and remnant methane to carry out
organic planting, selling the organic apples
they produced to consumers, while the
environmentally friendly corn was sold to
Deqingyuan to raise chickens. The farmers
no longer cooked, heated their homes and
bathed in hot water that was reliant on crop
stalks and coal, ending their high expen-
diture on coal. This has resulted in an
enormous change to their living and
working conditions.
2. Potential for larger-scale rural
organic waste energy conversion
The first factor behind this scheme’s suc-
cess is the mature technology:
• Cow manure and chicken manure con-
tain approximately 10–15% sand. In the
past, due to technical restrictions on
sand removal, pure chicken manure
could never be used as a source for
fermentation of methane gas. After
Deqingyuan invented organic separa-
tion technology, achieving separation
of chicken manure sand and organic
materials, it was possible to extract over
80% of non-soluble solids from chicken
manure.
• The methane gas produced after fer-
mentation of livestock manure contains
2000–5000 ppm of hydrogen sulphide.
Traditional methods were never able to
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solve the problem of desulphurisation.
However, Deqingyuan invented
bio-desulphurisation of methane gas,
using sulphur-consuming bacteria to
turn sulphurised hydrocarbon into ele-
mental sulphur. It is a low-cost
approach and does not generate sec-
ondary pollution.
• Conventional methane concentrations
are generally 2–5%. After Deqingyuan
invented high-concentration methane
gas fermentation technology, chicken
manure fermentation and crop stalk
fermentation concentration rose to 10–
15%, which reduced water consump-
tion and fermentation system area by
over 50%.
• Deqingyuan invented a mixed-source
material fermentation technology that
used crop stalks as a source of carbon,
liquid methane as a source of nitrogen
and fermenting microbes to achieve
joint fermentation. This resolved vari-
ous problems during fermentation,
including saturation of stalks, floating
of stalks, rapid hydrolysis of zymo-
phytes by the stalks, as well as the need
for large swathes of land. The com-
pany’s membrane purification equip-
ment uses only one-tenth of the area of
similar projects, and has reduced
energy consumption by over 50%.
The second factor behind the scheme’s
success is a more reasonable economic
approach:
• Investment costs are low. Deqingyuan’s
newly constructed daily production
8000 m2 biogas project can satisfy the
residential gas use requirements of
10,000 households with an investment
cost of approximately CNY 30 million,
CNY 16 million lower than industry
competitors.
• Gas production costs are lower.
Deqingyuan, because it can collect and
use the various source materials it
requires from the area 20 km around
the methane gas station, has an average
gas manufacture cost of 2 CNY/m3,
which is markedly lower than the gas
price currently provided in the city of
Beijing (Beijing’s current natural gas
station pricing is 3.28 CNY/m3).
• There has been an increase in economic
value: 1 m3 of methane gas can con-
ventionally be generated into power at a
value of CNY 1.19, whereas Deqin-
gyuan’s membrane purification method
enables conversion of 1 m3 of methane
into CNY 2.4 worth of natural gas, thus
achieving added value of 1.21 CNY/m3
of methane gas.
The third success factor behind the
scheme’s success is the greater economic
utility to farmers. Deqingyuan sells the
natural gas to farmers at a price of
2.5 CNY/m3, while also accepting the crop
stalks provided by farmers, converting
these source materials into natural gas and
costing the farmers that provide crop stalks
very little actual expense. Taking a
household of 3–4 people as an example, in
the past, costs would be CNY 100–120 per
month using tank storage liquefied gas,
whereas this is now only CNY 30–40 per
month using biogas.
3. Policy recommendations
The first recommendation is that support
for rural and small town biogas and pipe-
line network construction should be
increased. As the pace of urbanisation and
rising living standards quickens, China’s
natural gas consumption is entering a per-
iod of rapid growth, and natural gas supply
and demand conflicts are being high-
lighted. If all of China’s 600 million tons
of crop stalks were fully utilised, annual
production of methane gas could reach
120 billion m3, providing 71.6% of 2013
total natural gas consumption. Livestock
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manure can also be converted into pro-
duction capacity of 122 million tons of
standard coal. These organic wastes are
significantly concentrated, and crop stalks
are concentrated in grain-producing
regions while manure is concentrated in
livestock-cultivating areas. Forestry left-
over materials are concentrated in forest
regions, while industrial waste is concen-
trated in agricultural product processing
plans, with the characters of the major
portions being concentrated, thus facilitat-
ing promotion of rural and small and
medium-sized town energy construction. It
is recommended that a perspective be
borrowed from energy supply and demand
and from rural development, starting anal-
ysis of the issue at the level of overall
national strategy and deployment in order
to provide the best policy support for rural
organic waste resource energy conversion.
The second recommendation is to
resolve the problems faced by enterprises
in energy conversion innovation. During
our Deqingyuan survey, enterprises repor-
ted that some current policies do not sup-
port enterprises in innovating. For instance,
there are grid connection issues. After
ensuring sufficient rural gas usage, the
remaining biogas has no channel through
which it can be sold, and it is recom-
mended that biogas be permitted to merge
with urban natural gas pipeline networks to
allow access to natural gas companies
involved with urban sales.
The third recommendation relates to
pricing problems. Currently, Deqingyuan’s
natural gas sales price is 2.5 CNY/m3,
while Beijing’s industrial user gas price is
3.65 CNY/m3 and transportation and
shipping gas prices are even higher. It is
recommended that biogas sales prices be
freed up to open market competition.
The fourth recommendation relates to
tax waivers. Currently, China does not
provide price subsidies for biogas, and also
collects 17% VAT. Considering biogas’s
low carbon impact on the environment, and
given that a certain amount of policy sup-
port is given to development for solar
power, wind power, and biofuel energy, it
is recommended that biogas be exempt
from VAT.
Case 5: Upstream Policy for Uncon-
ventional Oil and Natural Gas
Unconventional oil and natural gas devel-
opment and production is a development
trend in the majority of regions worldwide.
Currently, the United States and Canada
are leaders, followed by Argentina and
Australia. Russia, the United Kingdom and
other nations have also attempted to ensure
that their shale natural gas/oil resources
have potential. This paper summarises
financial policies in the United States (on-
shore), the United Kingdom, Canada,
Russia, Argentina and Malaysia, focusing
on unconventional resource development
incentive measures and making recom-
mendations for China.
1. Argentina1
With the exception of China, Argentina
has the world’s largest shale natural gas
resources while at the same time also being
one of the nations with the most abundant
shale oil resources (after Russia, the United
States and China) (Nulle 2014: 60).
Currently, Argentina is implementing a
special licensing rights regime. Since 1991,
all licences have been managed under a
special licensing fee/tax collection system,
including special rights usage fees, income
1Argentina summary materials are sourced from
HIS PEPS, WoodMac and Apache Enterprise website.
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taxes, provincial sales taxes, other signing
deposits/lease amounts and oil/gas export
tariffs. This system was implemented dur-
ing the period of economic crisis in 2002
and has continued on to the present day.
In 2014, Argentina passed the new Oil
and Natural Gas Law, prescribing special
licensing usage fees and permit issuance
systems controlled centrally, and also giv-
ing management rights to various provin-
cial regulatory institutions. Prior to the
launch of this approach, oil and natural gas
licensing and operational jurisdiction
belonged to the provincial governments.
Thus provincial governments could benefit
by issuing their own oil and gas rights
licences.
ENARSA plays a purely commercial
role, owning all unlicensed near-sea
exploration on federal land within 12
nautical miles of the shore. All activities in
these regions must be conducted in
co-operation with ENARSA.
To describe Argentina’s upstream
industries as “uncertain” would be very
apt. The RSC system was changed to the
current licensing rights usage fee/tax
regime, and the existing laws thus
entirely covers the “2006 Short Law”,
giving oil and gas jurisdiction to provincial
governments (with the exception of federal
marine regions).
In order to satisfy national demand,
Argentina has consistently increased use of
the oil and gas industries. In recent years,
energy demand has continually grown, and
the government has admitted that it must
become more involved, and thus it has
implemented multiple investment incentive
measures in the hope that the newly passed
Oil and Natural Gas Law (October 2014)
will help attract investment in unconven-
tional industries. Some particular features
are:
• The bidding procedure and licensing
rights usage fee system is controlled by
the central government, and provincial
governments are only responsible for
handling oversight.
• Provincial oil and gas company prefer-
ential equity holdings in the exploration
stage have been cancelled.
• Conventional and unconventional
assets are differentiated, with uncon-
ventional asset development terms
extended to 35 years (as opposed to
25 years) and exploration terms limited
to 13 years.
• The minimum investment required to
secure international prices for 20% of
the crude produced was reduced to US
$250 million from US$1 billion (for
3 years). This provides a window of
opportunity for small exploration and
production companies. However, anal-
ysis by Woodmac has shown that 20%
of export volume over 3 years has
essentially no effect on improving pro-
ject IRR. Removing the 3-year restric-
tion, on the other hand, would increase
IRR dramatically.
• The Gas Plus project, which raises the
price of natural gas produced using
unconventional gas deposits.
• Establishment of an unconventional
production permit, allowing 5 years of
pilot production to establish commer-
cial viability, and the splitting of adja-
cent geological concessions into units.
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• Once the pilot project stage is complete,
unconventional project licensing usage




• Provide 20% of export supply.
However, there are still many problems
that have yet to be addressed, and resolving
these could achieve a lot of what is hoped
to be realised:
• Pre-emptive measures must be taken to
address problems of a lack of trained
labour and labour allocation. One
example of such measures is the pro-
vince of Neuquén, which improved
shale natural gas technical capabilities
by establishing an Unconventional Oil
and Gas Field Technology Centre.
• Lack of an environmental regime:
Because existing oil and gas fields are far
from communities, there is no problem at
present, but as the industry develops,
problems could potentially arise.
For many reasons, it is difficult to say
whetherArgentina has actually succeeded in
increasing unconventional sector activity,
but it has certainly encouraged unconven-
tional resource development recently, and
appears to be on the right course in its efforts.
However, the government must avoid the
trap of intervening in current success, or it




• Provincial areas—Provincial authorities
Regulatory Authority
• Federal level: Energy Secretariat—Has overall
responsibility for the hydrocarbons sector.
Responsible for policy formulation and
regulation
(continued)
• Provincial level: Provincial authority—In
general, regulatory duties fall on the same
person responsible for licensing
NOC
• ENARSA—Created in 2004 by Law
No. 25.943. The company is owned by the
government (53%) and the provincial
governments (12%), with the remaining 35%
listed in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange
• Most provinces have their own Provincial
Companies (e.g. G&P Neuquén)
2. Canada2
Canada (one of the countries with the most
abundant shale resources in the world)
implements a tax/licensing rights system
through provincial governments. Multiple
factors determine basic system adjust-
ments, such as contract terms, production
circumstances, oil prices and so on. Even
though there is no obligation to supply
domestically, operators must still obtain
government approval to export resources.
Canada’s various provinces play a
greater role by being in charge of imple-
menting and overseeing operators. The
majority of provincial governments have
their own regulatory institution to carry out
licensing and oversight of oil and gas
operations: for example, in Saskatchewan
the Oil and Natural Gas Office of its
Department of Energy and Resources, and
in British Columbia the Ministry of Energy
and Mines and the Oil and Natural Gas
Division.
Generally, with the exception of New-
foundland, no province has a NOC. In
2007, the Energy Act prescribed that
Canada should have an energy company to
hold and manage oil and natural gas
interests. Nalcor Energy seems to have
played this role, and this company has also
2In addition to HIS PEPS and WoodMac, materials
relating to Canada are sourced from Manitoba and Alberta
government websites as well as oil and natural gas PWC
tax collection reports.
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co-operated in participating with New-
foundland’s three marine development
projects.
Essentially all governments have used
licensing to capture economic lease funds
—when oil prices rise, the government
revenues increase, and when prices are
low, the limits are adjusted. In order to
avoid continual changes, a price connec-
tion mechanism was established, with the
majority of governments already linking
licensing rights usage fees with oil prices,
production and contract years (Fig. 7.6).
According to some provincial finance
systems, the licensing fee rate taxes prior to
recovery of investment costs are different,
allowing contractors to recover costs with
relatively low risk. There are also some
provinces that implement multi-tiered fee
rates based on rates of return, thus forming
a tiered mechanism.
Canada’s Provincial Institutions
• British Columbia Ministry of Energy, Mines
and Petroleum Resources—The Oil and Gas
Commission
• Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy and
Resources—Petroleum and Natural Gas
Division
• Minister of Energy—The Alberta Energy
Regulator
• Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development Canada (AANDC)—Northern
Oil and Gas Branch of the AANDC
• Canada Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board
• Canada—Newfoundland and Labrador
Offshore Petroleum Board
• The Ministry of Energy in Alberta
• Department of Energy, Mines and Resources of
Yukon
• Ministry of Natural Resources in Québec
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Fig. 7.6 Licensing rights usage fee structure
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Canada’s three tiers of taxes:
• First tier: Federal income tax collected
for “taxable income” from oil and nat-
ural gas projects.
• Second tier: Provincial income tax
(differentiated from federal taxes by the
different tax-exempt amounts for each
province) collected for “taxable
income” from oil and natural gas
projects.
• Third tier: A provincial and national
resource tax collected for ownership
rights of Canada’s resource assets. In
order to allocate some tax amounts to
the provincial governments, the federal
tax has a 10% exemption. These
exemptions are only applicable to
income generated within Canada.
Like many countries, Canada has taken
a very active role in terms of policy, and is
very willing to use tax exemptions/
reductions/offsets to provide correct
incentives. Currently, overall measures
taken are as follows:
• Early-stage 10% Investment Tax Cred-
its (ITCs) for oil and natural gas
projects.
• Provide other ITCs for scientific
research and experimental development
(SRED) activities to incentivise indus-
try innovation.
• Unused tax offsets can be carried for-
ward over 20 taxation periods.
• Unconventional projects enjoy higher
capital cost subsidy rates, directly
affecting the taxes that contractors pay.
• Implemented programmes include
encouragements for tight natural gas
and shale natural gas development net
profit licensing rights, low production
capabilities usage fee reductions, oil
sand usage fee programmes, marginal
oil field usage fee programmes and so
on. These are aimed at satisfying
special needs related to resources
and/or geographical restrictions, and
many other programmes are available.
In order to encourage innovation, the
Canadian government connects oil prices
to production and usage fee structures,
along with various tax exemptions, which
play an important role in upstream industry
development. For example, the develop-
ment of steam-assisted gravity drainage
technology was highly beneficial to oil
sand projects.
3. Malaysia
Malaysia has a series of highly optimised
and stable systems that implement various
financial terms based on production vol-
ume share contract (PSC) terms—the
most recent revenue-over-cost PSC con-
tract conducting licensed business
(Fig. 7.7).
In conjunction with IOCs, Malaysia’s
Petronas uses an exploration and develop-
ment subsidiary (Petronas Carigali) as a
joint venture enterprise investor (some-
times as operator) to participate in
upstream industry activities. In addition, it
also uses the subsidiary company MPM to
act in a regulatory capacity, overseeing all
of the nation’s upstream industry activities.
According to PSC requirements, IOCs and
operators (including Petronas Carigali) pay
usage fees and taxes to MPM and the local
government. In the majority of contracts,
Petronas Carigali holds incidental interest
rights to all exploration regions, generally
between 15 and 25% (negotiable).
Recently, Malaysia has introduced a
Risk Service Contract (RSC) to increase
activity both in mature fields and in stran-
ded fields.
Recently, Malaysia has begun imple-
menting risk service contracts (RSCs) to
strengthen the development of oil and gas
fields and latent oil and gas fields. This
includes terms that not only protect
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contractors from downside risk but also
limit the upside. (It should be noted that
Petronas is not permitted to sign this type
of contract. The contract’s main purpose is
to encourage and cultivate local Malaysian
enterprises to participate in upstream oil
and natural gas projects).
The potential for Malaysia in uncon-
ventional resources has not yet been
recognised, and the country is in the pro-
cess of learning from the experience of
other nations (Australia and Canada). In
fact, recent industry reports state that Pet-
ronas could be able to partner with US
company Hess to assess and learn how to
develop China’s unconventional
resources/shale oil or shale natural gas.
As cost structures change, or when new
cost structures arise (as was the case with
marine oil), Malaysia’s government adjusts
Petronas’s and its own proportions of
ownership to achieve a balance. At differ-
ent periods, the government has used a
variety of mechanisms, including reduc-
tions to taxes and usage fees, acceleration
of depreciation, reduction of export tariffs
and so on, to attract more investment. In
1985s revised version, there were many
adjustments that improved the rate of cost
recovery, adding to the profits of contrac-
tors while encouraging exploration and
development of small gas and oil fields
found through earthquake research. At the
same time, Petronas’s participation became
mandatory, allowing it to play a larger role.
In 1991, the government launched marine
oil incentive measures and subsequently
signed revisions of contracts with more
attractive terms for two oil fields with
Mobil Oil, exhibiting the pragmatic style
of the government and regulatory institu-
tions. The increase in contractor profits and
the proportion of cost recovery, as well as
reductions in taxes and export tariffs, have
raised revenue proportions for these con-
tracts, prompting development of marine
oil.
In terms of adjustment to financial terms
in the macro environment, Malaysia has
always been very pragmatic and flexible.
When appropriate, it will take suitable
measures to attract more investment and
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Fig. 7.7 Malaysia production share contracts. Note In 1976 and 1985, R/C production share contracts were based on
40 mmboe reserve volume. Moreover, deep-sea production share contracts assume oil volume of over 1 bnboe
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turn standard PSC development into R/C
PSC, increasing average purchase promo-
tions of contracts and enabling one to see
Malaysia’s time arrangements during a
transitionary period. The pragmatism of
Malaysia is also seen at appropriate times
when the country is expanding state pro-
jects and encouraging commercial struc-
tures, and the country does not use a
general structure (for example, an
enhanced oil recovery project increased
production of mine oil and used relatively
relaxed rules).
4. Russia3
Russia currently has many types of con-
tract. They are briefly summarised below:
• Government reserve: A financial sys-
tem based on export taxes and mineral
extraction taxes—usage fees (also
called “licensing rights”).
• Government control: Terms of 5–7–
25 years (according to “Underground
Law”) for underground exploration
and/or exploration or production licen-
ces that are distributed through auction
or tender.
• Product share agreements (PSAs):
Even though such agreements do still
exist in Russia, they should no longer
be part of any new project contract
templates, now that the PSA law has
been revised.
• Strategic Industry Law and “Under-
ground Law” amendments regarding
“strategic oil and gas fields”: Russia’s
institution in charge of underground
management is Rosnedra, which comes
under the country’s Ministry of Natural
Resources. Rosnedra is responsible for
managing all issues related to the issu-
ing and revocation of permit, as well as
licensing.
• NOCs: NOCs (Gazprom, Rosneft and
Zarubezhneft) have special status.
Gazprom monopolises pipeline exports
and must hold at least 50% of shares in
offshore projects. In fact, infrastructure
is monopolised by Gazprom and Ros-
neft.
Whether or not a project is approved is
determined by project type—foreign com-
pany direct licensing and foreign company
shares in Russian companies, as well as
joint ventures between foreign and Russian
companies, are each restricted by a specific
category of laws.
In order to encourage the commerciali-
sation of unconventional resources, Russia
has implemented several financial and
regulatory incentive measures to attract
investment in the sector:
• Starting with a resource consumption
deduction of 1%, a 15-year zero mine
tax and reduced remote-region export
tax, as well as an extension of explo-
ration permit periods from 5 to 7 years,
have been implemented.
• Profit-based taxation for some projects
and a complete revision of the licensing
system for unconventionals is currently
under way, as well as the introduction
of finance terms to attract investment
into Russian unconventional resources.
Russia has among the most abundant
reserves of unconventional resources of
any country, and this approach could be
slowed due to recent sanctions placed
on Russia by the West.
3In addition to HIS PEPS and WoodMac, reference was
also made to Shell reports on Russia.
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• In order to support conventional
resource development, VNIGUI,
VNIGNI and the Shpilman Research
Institute are in the process of studying
the legal status of unconventional
resource projects in Russia—defini-
tions, resource types, reserve reports,
permit issuances, commitments and
regulation.
Some traditional problems, such as local
authorities presenting complex processes
and bureaucracy, continue to cause foreign
investment to be hesitant to enter Russia.
Based on macro environment changes,
Russia’s systems are also continually
changing. One example is that after a new
law was passed in December 2013, private
companies obtained the right to export LNG.
5. United Kingdom4
As a country whose oil sector is relatively
mature in its development, the United
Kingdom is continuing to implement sim-
ple licensing usage fee/tax regimes. Cur-
rently, special licensing only exists in
Northern Ireland, with all other regions
already essentially being purely tax
regions. Unconventional resources follow
similar systems to conventional resources,
but there are also special exemptions aimed
at encouraging their development.
Through the newly established Energy
Development Unit, the United Kingdom’s
DECC issues production, exploration, and
development licences, which provide
operators with well drilling/development
permissions and construction permits for
exploration and production activities. Well
drilling/development and construction
permits are issued by local authorities, and
require interaction between various local
government institutions.
Unconventional activities are relatively
new (compared to the United States) and
management methods await further
improvement.Mineral resources are all state
assets, but an industry group, UKOOG,
wishes to launch a new method of com-
pensating the communities affected by the
shale gas operations, involving fixed fees
and a linkage to total revenue. This model
has been welcomed by the UK government.
In 2003, all oil and gas field usage fees
were discarded, with post-2003 approved
oil and gas revenue taxes being annulled.
Oil and gas income taxes approved after
2003 were waived, and in 2006, as the oil
price rose, surcharges were introduced. In
addition, since the price environment was
not sufficiently attractive, various types of
tax exemption were introduced. All of this
shows that the UK government took active
and timely measures to intervene. Fur-
thermore, based on different oil and gas
field history, the United Kingdom has dif-
ferent tax collection structures, thereby
achieving lease fee risk sharing through a
positive balance between government and
operators.
With regard to unconventional resour-
ces, the following incentive measures have
already been announced:
• for surrounding supplementary expen-
diture applicable to scope expansion for
shale and unconventional oil and gas
resources—an extension of the loss
structure carry forward period to 10
accounting periods (originally 6); and
• “pad” subsidy for shale projects (the
definition of a “pad” is a well and
mining area; a portion of generated
revenue is exempted from the sur-
charge, reducing the tax rate from 62 to
30%) (Fig. 7.8).
4In addition to HIS PEPS and WoodMac, material sources
also include the DECC and UKOOG websites.
7.5 Accelerating the Development of China’s Domestic Natural Gas … 185
Wood Mackenzie used the Namurian
shale region cost hypothesis (as well as
three cases of oil well production capacity)
to carry out an analysis of the new condi-
tions and calculate product break-even
price (the pad has five producing oil
wells, and another five will begin produc-
tion in five years). The scenario’s config-
uration is essentially based on three
different tax circumstances:
• the current land permit regime (not
including small oil field subsidies);
• a new pad allowance based on 50% of
all capital expenditure—this expendi-
ture can be used to offset payable SCT
from profits over the following five
years, and all subsidies can be carried
forward;
• a new pad allowance based on 75% of
all capital expenditure—this expendi-
ture can be used to offset payable SCT
from profits over the following year, and
all subsidies can be carried forward.
However, negative appraisals still exist,
and the government is currently solving
these. It is now permitted to transfer
cross-pad exemptions from failed pads to
successful pads (though this must be done
within three years), and it is also permitted
to replace operating asset development
discounts (in the early stages companies
could not implement oil/natural gas sales
revenue development periods unless there
was reinvestment into the British mainland
shelf). Subsidies can be used to pay capacity
fees and fair trade expenses.
Financial incentive plans have
improved the competitiveness of British
shale natural gas in Europe. However, oil
well efficiency and local approval process
simplification are keys to the success of










































Fig. 7.8 UK shale finance system competitiveness (Woodmac study)
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UK Regulatory Framework
• Minister of Energy and Climate Change: Oil
permit licences are issued following a decision
by the minister
• DECC: Responsible for the issuance of oil
licences, with specifics overseen by the EDU
• UOGO: UOGO is DECC’s internal
unconventional oil and gas activity direct point
of liaison
6. United States—Mainland5
Unlike other countries, land owner mineral
asset resources ownership rights are the
foundation of the US upstream industry
investment regime. In the majority of
cases, this means that mainland resource
ownership rights belong to the individual,
and thus there are no licence-issuing
institutions and only private leasing. For
federal and state land, the government will
issue lease agreements based on direct tax
collection and usage fee systems.
The United States works on a federal
system, and thus the majority of laws and
regulations governing the oil and natural
gas industry are determined and imple-
mented by the states. The federal govern-
ment is responsible for federal lands
(namely federal water regions such as the
Gulf of Mexico (GOM)) and interstate
trade, including interstate pipelines.
The US government’s regulatory systems
(state and federal) are relatively optimised
and efficient.
Historically, US regulatory systems
have created an overall environment and
then a series of conditions that support
private investment development. In order
to support mining industry development,
the United States has consistently avoided
nationalisation. The current shale revolu-
tion is also a result of this overall
environment.
After eliminating the price controls on
natural gas and its shipping (deregulation),
the United States began to rely on the
market to satisfy demand (increased sup-
ply). Shipping capability rights and pipe-
line ownership rights are separated,
allowing producers to compete with pipe-
line capacity.
Interestingly, the US government offers
direct support for public research and
development expenses. For example, the
primary goal of the Eastern Shale Gas
Project (1975–1992) was the development
of shale natural gas production technology.
The United States also offered direct
funding support for several industry pilot
programmes such as the first multi-break
horizontal well in 1986. It also gave its
assistance to the 1991 hydraulic fracturing
law in conjunction with water level wells
company Mitchel Energy. After several
decades of stable industry development,
US technology and professional assistance
is far ahead of the rest of the world’s oil
and natural gas industries (the United
States has the world’s largest quantity of
well exploration equipment).
Based on the positive experiences of the
United States, some recommendations are
(based on Nulle 2014):
• flexible land transfer rules and flexible
commercialised statement requirements;
• advance provision of reliable pipeline
and shipping infrastructure usage
rights;
• implement free prices and guarantee
prices;
5In addition to HIS PEPS and WoodMac, reference was
also made to Nulle (2014), the Eenergy website news
section and Daniel Johnston’s work on financial terms.
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• import expert labour and equipment
capabilities;
• encourage high-cost/risk unconven-
tional development tax regimes;
• provide direct R&D support, and
improve geological and technological
knowledge and skills;
• enable free return of profits to investors;
and
• stability in terms of laws and policies.
The US government’s measures have
seen broad success, but it is worth noting
that this success was obtained only after a
long period of time, and was the result of
multiple policies (financial incentives,
R&D funding support, deregulation) and
structural elements related to the US eco-
nomic and regulatory system (capital
availability, mine asset private ownership
(land owners also benefit), stability, high
degree of professional technology and
experienced human capital, existing pipe-
line capacity tenders and so on).
Effects of Financial Incentives
The federal government implements specific
policies for unconventional resources, and these
policies were launched in 1980 and expired in
2002. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Act played
an important role, for example in offering
subsidies to unconventional resources developed
from shale natural gas and in the formulation of
the “Intangible Development Cost Expenditures”
provisions, which permitted producers to write
off a large portion of development costs as
expenses. The government’s share of revenue
derived from primary producers on the Outer
Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico is very
low. Indeed, because of fee usage refunds and tax
offsets, there is an effective 0% royalty rate
7. Recommendations for China
1. Encourage provincial/community
management of shale oil/gas
development and production: In the
United States, Canada and Argentina,
local authorities/governments play a
critical role and for a period of time
there are direct regulatory institutions.
Sometimes, provinces (such as in
Argentina) will invest in partnerships
and form joint venture enterprises
(rather than being an “incidental”
partner).
2. Implement low licensing usage
fees/tax rates for unconventional
natural gas to provide tax reductions
and exemptions: In some countries
(such as Canada), tax rates are linked to
actual oil prices, and this allows
investors to know what the tax burden
is at different oil price levels without
having to adjust strategy based on
changes in oil price. For example,
Russia is currently considering a can-
cellation of unconventional oil/natural
gas mineral extraction tax, and mineral
extraction tax is a significant tax burden
for Russian companies. Other tax
leverages include tax carry forward
(such as in the UK).
3. Extend unconventional oil and gas
field small-scale trials, exploration
and production terms: Formulate
transition timetables. In the majority of
countries, shale oil/gas field licences are
extended for 5–10 years.
4. Deregulate, and introduce competi-
tion mechanisms: Provide reliable
pipelines and shipping infrastructure
usage rights in advance and cancel
price controls, which is believed to be
the key to the US’s success. In partic-
ular, separate shipping infrastructure
usage rights from pipeline ownership
rights, allowing producers to compete
over pipeline capacity.
5. Support development of dedicated
operation companies: The government
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plays a unique role in development
R&D and in supporting dedicated
operation enterprises. These companies
can provide effective assistance to
accelerate the development and pro-
duction of China’s shale natural gas/oil.
To this end, the government should
support the development of Chinese
companies or foreign professional
technology companies, with particular
attention given to the growth and
development of small-scale enterprise,
which plays a vital role.
Case 6: Mexico Oil and Natural Gas
Industry Upstream Opening Policies
In 2013, Mexico revised its national con-
stitution in an attempt to revitalise its oil
and natural gas industry. Mexico’s gov-
ernment took specific and transparent
measures to promote Bid Round Zero.
During this period, Pemex submitted an
application and obtained 83% of proved oil
field/natural gas field mining rights and
21% of unproved oil/gas area exploration
rights. This was viewed as an effective and
practical method to balance the nation’s
overall interests and the interests of the
country’s oil companies. At the same time,
it also offered sufficiently attractive
opportunities for foreign business and pri-
vate investors.
It is recommended that China use the
Round Zero procedure to enable existing
licensed state-owned oil companies to
name portions they wish to hold and the
portions that can be provided to new
investors, thereby prompting investment
and in the mid- to short-term accelerating
change in unconventional energy shale
natural gas production volume. Using this
approach, China could improve
non-renewable energy structure usage effi-
ciency for natural gas while at the same
time controlling the degree of reliance on
foreign imports—which has already grown
from 0% in 2005 to 32% in 2013.
1. Mexico prior to 2013: awaiting
change
Mexico’s oil industry history is very long,
with oil discovered for the first time back
in 1904. Production volume had reached
150,000 barrels/day by 1917. The IOC
likewise rapidly joined, helping to raise
oil production volume. By 1921, Mex-
ico’s oil daily production had exceeded
530,000 barrels, accounting for one-fourth
of the world’s total production volume.
However, fierce disputes between unions
and the IOC ultimately led to Mexico
nationalising all assets of the IOC in
1938, and through this establishing a
NOC. Since then, PetroleosMexicanos
(Pemex) has always been the sole rights
holder of Mexico’s oil and natural gas
resources.
For more than 70 years, Pemex had
operated its own oil and natural gas busi-
ness under the ISC. Such a monopolising
national oil company has gradually become
sluggish, partly because budget and finan-
cial management has been tightly con-
trolled by Mexico’s Ministry of Finance
and Public Credit. As seen in the diagram,
Pemex’s production volume reached its
peak in 2004–2005, with daily oil output of
approximately 3.6 million barrels, and
daily natural gas production of approxi-
mately 3 billion ft3. Since 2004,
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production volume continuously dropped,
and the prospects appeared bleak. Wood-
Mac made forecasts of rapid decline in
production volume over the following
several years. Mexico was then awaiting
change.
In order to relieve production volume
declines, Mexico launched an energy pol-
icy reform in 2008, allowing Pemex to
outsource some mature marginal oil, gas
fields and service contracts. The IOC was
not particularly enthused. In 2011, Pemex
licensed out production volume based on
oil and gas fields in two service contracts to
French company Schlumberger and UK
company Petrofac. In 2012 and 2013,
Pemex again held two service contract
tenders and still only attracted international
service companies (Fig. 7.9).
Deep Water Bay, Mexico has consis-
tently been a major success story for the
US oil and natural gas industry. Deep
Water Bay, Mexico is on par with West
Africa and Brazil and is known as the
world’s golden triangle for exploration and
production. However, despite having the
majority of jurisdiction over the GOM,
Mexico is essentially behind all other
industry participants, and has conducted no
production of deep water oil/natural gas.
Recently, the US shale natural gas/oil
revolution has been another jolt to Mexico,
since a portion of the shale oil/gas dis-
tributed in Texas should, from a geological
perspective, extend into Mexico.
The Mexican government and Pemex
have realised that radical change is needed
and that the time has come to start a new
chapter in the history of oil and gas in
Mexico.
2. Energy reforms in 2013 with the rise
of a new president
On December 1, 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto
became president of Mexico. His party PRI
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The PAN had been the ruling party from
2000 to 2011. The PRI had controlled
Mexico since 1928, ruling for 71 years.
In August 2013 President Nieto sub-
mitted an energy reform bill with a total of
27 specific laws to the Mexican congress.
The congress had to pass the bill and
execute reforms. By December 2013,
Mexican law prescribed that once again it
was permitted for international oil compa-
nies and private investors to invest in oil
and natural gas through three types of
contracts: service contracts; production
volume or profit-sharing contracts; and
licence contracts (Fig. 7.10).
3. Round Zero: Balance between pro-
tecting national oil company interests
and attracting foreign investment
Pemex, in terms of the overall oil industry,
is far behind China. China has multiple
national oil companies, including the top
three, CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC. These
three companies are all listed on the
NYSE.
In order to use Pemex equity to protect
overall national interests, in 2014 the
Mexican government took the unique
approach known as “Round Zero”. Pemex
had to submit its choices for retaining and
abandoning oil and gas fields prior to
March 2014. The government’s regulatory
institution energy minister and CNG had
six months to decide which oil fields/Pods
would be retained by Pemex. In order to
retain any production assets, Pemex had to
explain its capabilities in the application
regarding technology, assets and opera-
tions. In terms of exploration area, Pemex
likewise had to show that it had explored
wells and/or was currently exploring
underground areas.
Based on estimates by the CNH, the
result of Round Zero was that Pemex
retained approximately 83% of proved
reserves (2P reserves), as well as 21% of
2P Reserves
 Round 0 outcome for Pemex before opening of Mexican energy sector for IOCs
Perspective Resources
Available to IOCs through
2015 or future Bid round
Available to IOCs through
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Fig. 7.10 Mexican NOC prior to reforms
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unproved reserves. For the held assets of
Pemex, this still allowed it to invite foreign
investment and transnational companies to
co-operate in exploration/development/
production.
4. Mexico’s Round 1 Bid Round: What
to expect in 2015?
Since December 2014, the CNH has begun
to carry out the first round of bidding in
stages, including for shallow water explo-
ration, shallow water development, land
and major production field Chicontepec
capital injections, unconventional energy
and deep water. The CNH has continued to
invite potential international investors to
participate in the Round 1 Bid Round.
Since June 2014, the drops in oil prices
have forced the Mexican government to
reconsider whether or not to make 2015 the
year to attempt attracting international oil
company investment. The current decision
appears to be to carry out all bidding
rounds according to plan, including the
most attention-grabbing deep water por-
tion. The date for completion of bidding is
reportedly mid-July 2015. Leading inter-
national oil companies, including Chinese
national oil companies (such as CNOOC)
and other foreign national oil companies,
are expressing great interest in this first
round of bidding in Mexico. There is still
some concern within the industry about
whether Mexico will continue to fully
control and occupy the oil/natural gas
assets, whether there will be major changes
to Pemex and whether there will be
attractive financial terms for major deep
water regions so as to accelerate explo-
ration and mining of deep water oil and gas
in Mexico.
Of course, the industry has also con-
sistently recognised the speed and deter-
mination of the Mexican government in its
energy reforms, as well as its detailed and
transparent approach. This includes the
Round Zero opening up of over 20% of
proved reserves and 80% of unproved
reserves to international oil companies.
It is worth considering whether these
methods are suitable to China, especially
given its attempts to accelerate unconven-
tional energy and shale natural gas explo-
ration and development and to speed up
progress attracting suitable international oil
companies and private funding.
Another issue the oil and natural gas
industry should consider is whether Mex-
ico can maintain its open policies if there is
a leadership change after Nieto’s six-year
term (see Fig. 7.11).
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Case 7: Analysis of the Approach to
Opening Up Upstream Industries in Oil
and Natural Gas in Various Countries
Generally speaking, the opening up of a
country’s oil and natural gas industry is
closely linked to its natural resources and
its development strategy. For example, in
an oil and natural gas-exporting nation
with abundant resources and good mining
conditions, the terms on potential investor
contracts will be stricter. Thus in Saudi
Arabia, oil exploration and development
are essentially not open to outside interests.
Instead, Saudi Arabia hires international
service companies to provide their oil
industry with technical services. In
importing nations with few resources and
difficulties with mining, the degree of
openness is greater. For example, in the
United States, Canada, the United
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Fig. 7.11 Mexico’s Round Zero reform prospects
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Kingdom, Australia and other OECD
nations, oil and natural gas upstream
industries are entirely open. The tax and
royalty system between the nation and
states/provinces ensures that their interests
are protected. In terms of shale natural gas,
US private land owners can also discuss
royalties from the engaged company
(Fig. 7.12).
Upstream contract terms are of four
types, from stringent to loose:
• Service contracts (or Technical Ser-
vice Agreements (TSA), Enhanced
TSA): Countries employing this
approach are primarily countries with
very abundant oil and gas resources,
such as Qatar, Iraq and Mexico. Inter-
national oil companies and international
service companies are each able to
apply for these terms. However, Qatar
and Iraq only employ international oil
companies, using their comprehensive
management for oil and gas develop-
ment. It is worth noting that in recent
years Mexico only used service con-
tracts, but has been unable to change its
precipitous slide in oil and gas pro-
duction. They are therefore in the pro-
cess of using new and more attractive
contracts to attract foreign investment
and technology, especially in deep
water oil and gas exploration and
development.
• Fixed margin contracts: Some coun-
tries, such as the UAE and Nigeria
(mainland), have used a special contract
term approach. For each barrel of oil
produced, the foreign party obtained a
fixed return, for example $1 per barrel.
This term’s downside for foreign par-
ties is a low rate of return, but the
benefit is that there is very little
investment risk and a high degree of
certainty. For the country in question,
this term’s greatest weakness is that it
encourages cost controls by investors.
• Production sharing contract (PSC):
In 1972, Indonesia led the way in
proposing PSCs. This is an interna-
tional approach, and in particular a
popular approach in third-world coun-
tries, that encourages foreign invest-
ment. It caters for the interests of both
the country in question and the foreign
parties. Investors generally assume all
exploration risks and expenses. Prior to
the discovery of commercial opportu-
nities, they receive their reward by
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volume sharing. It is worth noting that
investors see large differences in shared
proportions, and the recovery factor
(also known as the R-factor) determines
the differences.
• Tax and royalty: In Western countries
such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and others,
domestic oil companies and foreign oil
companies are essentially competitors
on the same playing field. On average,
tax systems offer investors rates of
return that are slightly higher. However,
this also depends on the degree of tax-
ation. Some countries, such as Canada,
use a tax rate that is linked to interna-
tional oil prices, which enables inves-
tors to have a measure of certainty
regarding investment risk. However, tax
systems are not equivalent to a loss of
control by the country in question.
Using a tax system still allows the
nation to continue to play an important
role, especially in signing off on oil and
gas exploration and development licen-
ces, approval environments and safe
production plans. The country can also
use increases or decreases in tax rates to
encourage or inhibit a given direction of
development.
In summary, the more oil and gas
resources there are, the more that nations
tending to export will prefer to use TSAs.
Moreover, in oil and natural gas-consuming
nations, countries with open markets tend
toward using tax and royalty methods.
Some countries such as Nigeria offer
fixed-return contracts where land develop-
ment is not particularly difficult and risk is
low, and offer production volume sharing
contracts for marine oil mining where there
is higher difficulty and greater risk.
In China, conventional oil and gas sec-
tors use relatively general production
sharing contracts. Shale natural gas is
buried deeper, there are greater difficulties
and costs in its development, and it is sold
domestically. If it is hoped to attract more
domestic and foreign investors to join in
shale natural gas exploration development
ventures, then a reasonable improvement
would be to offer PSC or tax and royalty
systems that are more attractive than Chi-
na’s existing production volume sharing
contracts.
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8International Natural Gas Supplyand Quantities Available to China
8.1 Preface
This section analyses potential future changes in
international natural gas market supply and
demand and the available natural gas import
volume for China, as well as what reasonable
measures China should take, including suitable
policy adjustments, to promote its own natural
gas supply and demand security.
Currently, China’s natural gas market is in a
key stage of development, with demand, supply
and system mechanisms each undergoing intense
change. This state of flux is having a major effect
on the evolution of the natural gas market.
The NDRC has already issued goals and policy
measures1 that differentiate base supply gas and
incremental increase volume, and that merge the
price structure of the two different types of gas
by the end of 2015, setting a general road map
for natural gas market reforms.
However, as the price of natural gas continues
to rise, there will inevitably be impacts on
downstream demand, and backward energy
replacement by some users (using coal instead of
natural gas) and other phenomena could occur.
There are also some who believe that the con-
tinued increase in natural gas prices will lead to
natural gas supply in China exceeding demand in
2017 (Jiaofeng et al. 2014). In addition, the large
fluctuations in international oil market prices
seen recently will inevitably have a far-reaching
influence on the evolution of China’s natural gas
market. How to determine the future supply and
demand circumstances for the natural gas market
is thus of critical importance to the smooth exe-
cution of China’s natural gas pricing reforms.
In 2013, China imported approximately
53 billion m3 of natural gas, which already
accounted for 32% of total consumption volume.
How natural gas future imports change will
undoubtedly have a significant impact on the
structure of China’s supply and demand. Because
natural gas imports are long-term (the contract
length is long) and stable (take-or-pay), it is still
possible to rely on current circumstances to make
some reasonable predictions about imports and the
* This chapter was overseen by Zhonghong Wang from
the Development Research Center of the State Council
and Shangyou Nie from Shell International Exploration
and Production. It was jointly completed by Xiaowei
Xuan, Yingxie Yang, Yongwei Zhang, Jiaofeng Guo,
Weiming Li, Beiqing Yao, Tao Hong and Yuxi Li from
the State Resource Department Oil and Gas Centre,
Xiaoli Liu from the National Development and Reform
Commission’s Energy Office, Guang Yang and Jianhong
Yang from the China Energy Research Institute’s
Natural Gas Centre, Xiaobo Ju and Beijing Yao from
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1See National Reform and Development Commission
Notice Regarding Conducting of Natural Gas Price
Formation Mechanism Pilot Sites in Guangdong and
Guangxi Autonomous Region (FGJG [2011] No. 3033);
National Reform and Development Commission Notice
Regarding Adjustment to Natural Gas Price (FGJG [2013]
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No. 1246); National Reform and Development Commis-
sion Notice Regarding Adjustment to Non-Residential
Reserve Natural Gas Price (FGJG [2014] No. 1835).
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near future, even though there may still be some
uncertainty regarding a contract’s final process of
execution. Such predictions could be highly sig-
nificant in helping to understand the changing
trends inChina’s natural gasmarket and could thus
contribute to better natural gas price reforms.
This chapter is broken down into three parts.
There is first a discussion of current international
natural gas supply and potential future changes.
This is followed by an analysis of China’s cur-
rent natural gas imports and future trends.
Finally, recommendations are made regarding
future natural gas trade policy for China.
8.2 Current and Future Sources
of Global Natural Gas Supply
8.2.1 Current and Projected Global
Natural Gas Resources
According to IEC determinations, current global
natural gas resources are approximately
784 trillion m3 (28,000 trillion feet3). Based on
current consumption levels, this could last sus-
tainably for approximately 200 years or more.
Based on proved resources that are recoverable
with today’s economics and technology, the
global natural gas resource reserve to production
ratio is 54.8 (BP 2014: 20). Therefore, on the
whole, the future supply of global natural gas
resources is relatively ample.
In the global energy layout, natural gas is
playing an increasingly important role. In the
past 10 years (2005–2014), global natural gas
consumption growth has been around 2.7%,
making it the fastest-growing energy type (BP
2014). The IEA estimates that natural gas con-
sumption will continue to maintain relatively
strong growth up until 2030, when growth rates
will be at approximately 2% (IEA Current Poli-
cies Outlook) (see Fig. 8.1). According to fore-
casts by Shell, natural gas supply and demand
will rise from 3.1 trillion m3 in 2010 (3100 bil-
lion m3) to 5 trillion m3 (5000 billion m3) in
2030.
In addition, according to an analysis by
ExxonMobil (2014), global energy consumption
growth will be approximately 1% from 2010 to
2040, whereas natural gas growth will reach
1.7%, markedly higher than overall energy con-
sumption growth. It is clear that natural gas will
play a more significant role in global energy
structures moving forward.
Data source: Shell Analysis
Note: all the tight gas / shale gas is calculated to standard value LPG































2010 2020 2025 2030
Fig. 8.1 Growth in global natural gas supply and demand totals
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8.2.2 Global LNG Trade Development
For long periods, global natural gas trade has
focused on pipeline imports as the major shipping
mode, but as liquefied natural gas (LNG) tech-
nology develops, LNG is accounting for a larger
proportion of trade. Beginning in 1959 with the
world’s first shipment of LNG across the ocean,
by 2013, 320 billion m3 of the total international
natural gas trade of 1 trillion m3 is LNG, 32% of
total trade volume (IGU 2014) (Fig. 8.2).
LNG trade volume growth has broken through
the shipping restrictions of pipeline natural gas,
helping Japan, Korea and other countries to import
natural gas. In addition, for countries facing geo-
graphical restrictions, LNG has also expanded
potential import sources, helping to lower import
risks. Moreover, LNG is more flexible than pipe-
line natural gas, and can change its export desti-
nation according to market changes. Thus LNG
trade circulation has had a major influence on
global natural gas trade layouts and supply and
demand relationships as well as price trends.
8.2.3 Trends in Global LNG Trade
Since 2000, the global LNG trade volume annual
average growth rate has reached approximately
5%. This trend will continue for the foreseeable
future. At the same time, global LNG trade struc-
ture is becoming more complex. In 1990, there
were eight LNG exporting nations and nine
importing nations; those numbers are now up to 27
and 31, respectively. It is accepted that in the next
10 years, the number of LNG exporting nations
will rise to 50 and the number of importing nations
to 25. As changes to trade networks add to
uncertainties over market supply and demand
relationships, the future structure of global natural
gas trade is going to become more complex.
Figure 8.3 shows the 2012 production capac-
ities of the major LNG exporting regions and their
respective proportions. In 2012, global LNG
annual production capacity was nearly 390 bil-
lion m3. Qatar was the largest exporting nation,
with production capacity of 77 billion m3,
accounting for 27% of global capacity. Together
with other Middle East nations such as Oman,
Yemen and UAE, and North African countries
such as Egypt and Algeria, 47% of global LNG
production capacity was controlled by the Middle
Eastern and North African regions, followed by
south-east Asian regions including Malaysia and
Indonesia, which accounted for 23% of produc-
tion capacity. This is then followed by Australia
and other African countries, which both account
for approximately 9%, and then South America
with 7% and Europe, including Russia, with 5%.
8.2.4 Developments in the Global
LNG Export Market
In recent years, global LNG supply deployments
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Fig. 8.2 International LNG trade volume (1990–2013). Source IGU (2014)
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Australia’s production capacity is in the process
of rapid expansion, and is expected to exceed
that of Qatar, making it the world’s largest LNG
producer. It is in the process of investing in the
construction of seven LNG projects, with pro-
duction capacity totalling approximately 85 bil-
lion m3. Adding the in-progress projects of its
neighbouring country Papua New Guinea brings
the total to 95 billion m3. Following this is the
United States, with its successful development of
shale natural gas, which has potentially trans-
formed it from a natural gas-importing nation to a
natural gas-exporting nation, with in-progress
projects alone reaching 25 billion m3. Figure 8.4
shows global regional in-progress projects, with
a total of approximately 130 billion m3.
If all the in-progress projects are completed as
expected, global LNG production capacity will
grow from around 390 billion m3 in 2012 to
approximately 520 billion m3 in 2017. The pro-
portion accounted for by Australia and Papua
New Guinea will rise from 9% in 2012 to 25%,
with the proportions of the Middle East and
North Africa dropping from 47 to 36%. The
United States’ proportion will rise from essen-
tially zero to about 5%. This means that the
Middle East and North Africa in natural gas
supply markets will see their leading positions
weakened, and market competition will be fur-
ther strengthened (Fig. 8.5).
In addition to in-progress projects, there are
also many LNG projects in planning or being
proposed. There is capacity of about 30 bil-
lion m3 in projects that have already submitted a
final investment decision, and 370 billion m3 in
projects that are in some stage of Front-End
Engineering Design. There is another total of
500 billion m3 (IGU 2014) in projects that have
submitted a motion but which are still in prelim-
inary stages. Of course, not all projects will be
completed, especially those in the early stages,
and there is a variety of factors and risks that could
end in their cancellation. However, this does show
that current international LNG supply markets are
in a relatively active state. In addition to Australia,
the United States and Canada are two countries
that will join the list of LNG-exporting nations
and which have major potential for exports: East
Africa’s Mozambique and Tanzania, which have
both discovered major deep sea natural gas fields.
The exports from these countries will have a








Fig. 8.3 Global natural gas regional production capacity (2012). Source PFC global LNG supply and demand report
(2013) and IGU global LNG report (2013)
200 8 International Natural Gas Supply and Quantities …
layouts, and will affect the interests and risks for
China’s natural gas imports.2
8.2.5 Growing Natural Gas Demand
in China, India and Other
Emerging Markets
In the long term, natural gas demand growth will
come primarily from China, India and other
emerging economic entities. In Europe, North
America, Japan and other developed nations, due
to weakness in economic recovery and replace-
ment with cheap coal, as well as subsidies given
toward renewable energy development among
other factors, natural gas consumption growth
will be limited. Developed nations are seeing
sustained increases in natural gas demand in the
transportation sector, especially with increased
controls and higher emissions standards, as well
as growth in natural gas consumption in marine
shipping fuels. However, on the whole, devel-
oped nations will see relatively stable natural gas
demand growth moving forward (Fig. 8.6).
By comparison, non-OECD emerging nations
will have the strongest demand for natural gas.
As economic development and income levels
rise, emerging economic entities will see grow-
ing demand for natural gas. At the same time, the
majority of emerging economic entities still have
relatively low levels of expansion of natural gas
usage, leaving major room for growth in the
future. Moreover, due to strengthened atmo-
spheric pollution governance and the need to deal
with climate change, emerging nations will turn
more toward natural gas for new momentum.
LNG plants under construction
US Southeast Asia Central and Southern
America
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Fig. 8.4 Global in-progress LNG plant regional production capacity. Source Collected and assembled from PFC
Global LNG Supply and Demand Report (2013), company reports and authors
2For the influence of LNG development in Australia, the
US, and Canada on Chinese imports, further detailed
analysis will be provided in the section dealing with
China’s Future LNG Imports.
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8.2.6 The Influence of Oil Price
Declines Future Natural
Gas Trade
International crude oil prices dropped from over
$100 per barrel in June 2014 to a low of CNY 43
in January 2015, driven by the US unconven-
tional oil and gas revolution, which has seen
major increases in US crude oil production vol-
umes, falling international oil market demand
and various other factors. By May 2015, the price
was at approximately $60 per barrel. Because
many natural gas contract prices are linked to the
price of oil, international crude oil price fluctu-
ations also immediately set off major changes in
the international natural gas market, and will
have far-reaching impacts on future natural gas
trade layouts (Fig. 8.7).
In the short to medium term, in terms of
demand, the JKP price has dropped from
$20/MMBtu in 2014 to $7. This means a reduced
cost for natural gas-importing nations such as
China, especially for spot and short- and
mid-term contracts. For suppliers, the largest
impact is felt by existing projects and in-progress
projects, such as the projects currently under
construction in Australia, where some project
investments will face sunk cost. Because many
projects are established based on the economic
expectation of high oil prices, a major drop in oil
prices will lower the expected gains from the
projects, and some could even face losses.
In the long term, major oil price drops affect
natural gas projects that are in planning. These
projects can have their progress halted as a result,
for example the Browse project in Australia and
the Pacific Northwest project in Canada, which
have currently delayed the time for making their
final investment decision.
A drop in international oil prices also causes
Asian natural gas exports to lack their previous








Fig. 8.5 Global LNG regional production capacity (2017 existing and in-progress capacity). Source Collected and
assembled from PFC Global LNG Supply and Demand Report (2013), company reports and authors
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Global LNG demand (2013 - 2025)
Global LNG demand (2013 - 2025)
Fig. 8.6 Global LNG future supply and demand layout
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mechanisms are different from Asia, and are not
linked to oil prices but are directly determined by
supply and demand of natural gas itself. When oil
prices plunge, US natural gas price advantages
are markedly reduced, and Asian market demand
is thus reduced, so a portion of projects could turn
toward Europe or Latin America, while another
portion could be cancelled. It could be said that
international oil price drops have the effect of
reshuffling the deck for natural gas trade, causing
markets to enter a new phase of balancing out.
If Japan’s Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster
of 2011 is said to have ignited a new wave of
natural gas export, international oil price drops can
be viewed as having poured cold water on that
momentum and resulted in a more conservative
approach. As can be expected, sustained low oil
prices will cause natural gas international supply
reductions, and this to a certain degree will help
natural gas prices to avoid becoming excessively
low. However, in the long term, what will allow
natural gas to find a new stable price will rely upon
many factors, and there are many major uncer-
tainties. Another trend is that LNG industry par-
ticipants will work hard to co-operate to reduce
LNG project expenses while increasing their pro-
jects’ economic competitiveness.
8.3 China’s Current Natural Gas
Imports and Future Trends
8.3.1 China’s Current Natural Gas
Imports
In 2013, global natural gas consumption was
approximately 3.5 trillion m3, with natural gas
trade totals of 1 trillion m3. LNG accounted for
about one third of this, while pipeline natural gas
accounted for two thirds. China’s 2013 natural gas
imports were 53.4 billion m3, at an average price of
10.4 $/MMBtu (about 2.6 CNY/m3) (Chen 2014).
As part of this, LNG imports were approximately
25 billion m3, at an average price of 10.5 $/
MMBtu. Pipeline natural gas imports were
approximately 28 billion m3, at an average price of
10.4 $/MMBtu. China’s natural gas consumption
volume, imports of natural gas, LNG imports and
pipeline imports correspond to 4.8, 5.3, 7.6 and
4.2% of global amounts, respectively (Table 8.1).
In terms of LNG, China’s major import sour-
ces are Qatar, Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Import volumes are 9.2, 4.8, 3.6 and 3.3 bil-
lion m3, respectively, at prices of 17.9, 3.5, 8.1
and 3.9 $/MMBtu. In terms of pipeline gas, major
importing nations are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,














Fig. 8.7 WTI oil price trends (2004–2015). Source Energy Information Administration, US
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Myanmar and Kazakhstan, with import volumes
of 24.4, 2.9, 1.0 and 0.10 billion m3, respec-
tively, at prices of 9.6, 9, 3.5 and 11.5 $/MMBtu.
Looking at the numbers, Turkmenistan is
currently China’s largest importer, accounting for
47.1% of all natural gas imports, followed by
Qatar, Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia,
accounting for 17.7, 9.3, 7.0, and 6.4% of import
volumes, respectively. These five countries
account for 87.4% of China’s import volume.
From the perspective of price, Qatar’s LNG price
is highest, at 17.9 $/MMBtu (approximately
4.48 CNY/m3), and the Australian LNG price is
the lowest, at 3.5 $/MMBtu (approximately
0.88 CNY/m3) (Fig. 8.8).
Compared to other international natural gas
prices, China’s current imported natural gas
average price of 10.4 $/MMBtu is in the
mid-range, and much higher than the price on the
Henry Hub of 4 $/MMBtu. However, it is
markedly lower than Japan’s imported LNG
price (approximately 16 $/MMBtu) and roughly
equal to the imported natural gas prices of the
United Kingdom NBP3 (about 10.4 $/MMBtu)
and Germany (about 11.3 $/MMBtu) (Fig. 8.9).
Overall, since China began importing natural
gas in 2006, import volumes have risen rapidly
and import prices have also markedly risen. As
Australia and other nations that signed early
import contracts with China have had their
import contracts come to term, China is now
seeing a new wave of natural gas contract sign-
ings, which are having a decisive influence on
China’s future natural gas imports.
8.3.2 Potential Source Nations
for China’s Future LNG
Imports
1. Australia
Australia currently has 22 proposed LNG
projects, with annual production capacity of a
total of 200 billion m3. These projects are at
different stages of development. Of these, seven
projects are under construction and represent
85 billion m3 of annual production capacity,
with 50 billion m3 of signed sales contracts,
primarily with China, Japan and South Korea. As
part of this, China and Australia have signed
contract agreements for approximately 20 bil-
lion m3: 5 billion m3 between CNOOC and
Queensland Curtis, 4.7 billion m3 between
CNPC and Gorgon and 10.5 billion m3 between
Sinopec and Australia Pacific. This results in
China importing 25 billion m3 of natural gas
from Australia, accounting for over 35% of
signed LNG contract agreements.
From the perspective of project progress,
Australia’s project development is in a leading
position, with seven projects planned to





















LNG Total: 250,100 million m3
Price: 10.5 $/MMBtu
Proportion: 14.9%
Qatar 92 17.9 17.7
Australia 48 3.5 9.3
Malaysia 36 8.1 7.0
Indonesia 33 3.9 6.4
Pipeline Total: 284,100 million m3
Price: 10.4 $/MMBtu
Proportion: 16.7%
Turkmenistan 244 9.6 47.0
Uzbekistan 29 9 5.6
Kazakhstan 1 3.5 0.1
Myanmar 10 11.5 1.9
Source “BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2014)” and author calculations
3NBP, National Balancing Point. This is the UK’s virtual
gas trading hub price.




















Fig. 8.8 Chinese natural gas import sources. Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2014)
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China LNG import price
Turkey pipeline import price
Fig. 8.9 Comparison of China’s natural gas import prices and other international natural gas prices. Source Michael
Chen (2014)
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commence prior to 2017. Moreover, because of
advantages in geographical location, shipping
fees to China are lower compared to the United
States and Canada. However, these projects in
Australia are all scheduled to develop simulta-
neously, causing source material and labour
market shortages and price increases that have
caused project cost rises. In some projects, for
example Gorgon, costs have even risen by as
much as 40% (Forster 2013). These cost increa-
ses could affect natural gas pricing. In addition,
even if cost increases are only temporary, sub-
sequent projects could face similar problems, and
Australia could face issues of insufficient natural
gas supply. This problem could then further
affect subsequent projects. These risks must be
considered as China further signs LNG purchase
contracts, especially since so many LNG con-
tracts have already been signed with Australia.
2. United States
The US shale natural gas revolution is cur-
rently changing American and even global
energy market layouts. According to materials
from the US Energy Information Administration,
in the past several years, American shale natural
gas production volume increases have seen an
over 20-fold increase. Today, the United States
has surpassed Russia to become the world’s lar-
gest natural gas producer. Research by interna-
tional consulting company ICF has shown that
the United States can use the natural gas reserves
held as of 2011 for 130 years of consumption.
Shale natural gas development has drastically
reversed the United States’ reliance on imports.
In 2007, the United States was still planning to
invest enormously in the construction of natural
gas import ports, whereas as of July 2014, there
were 29 LNG export projects currently seeking
approval from the Department of Energy, for a
total of 430 billion m3.
American natural gas export targets include
the FTA and non-FTA nations. According to the
United States Natural Gas Act, revised in 1992,
natural gas approvals for export to FTA nations
can be obtained automatically, but to export to
non-FTA nations requires authorisation from the
Department of Energy, and approval is only
given if the proposal is in the interests of the
American public. China is a non-FTA nation.
The United States has seen fierce debate over
the last two years about whether it should export
natural gas. Opposition to export includes US
manufacturers, the chemical industry and other
natural gas downstream enterprises, who believe
that exporting natural gas will cause domestic
natural gas prices to rise, as well as American
environmentalists, who believe that shale natural
gas will harm water resources as well as add to
greenhouse gas emission increases. Supporters of
exporting natural gas include natural gas upstream
development enterprises and free market sup-
porters, who believe that export of natural gas will
be beneficial in stimulating the US economy and
creating jobs. There are also some international
energy political considerations that relate to
whether American exports of natural gas will help
put an end to halts placed on European nations by
Russia. Finally, based on its analysis and research,
the US Department of Energy believes that export
is on the whole beneficial to American economic
interests, and thus approved a series of natural gas
export projects. By July 2014, there were seven
projects that had received approval, with a total of
100 billion m3 of capacity exporting to non-FTA
nations, including Sabine Pass (2.30 billion m3),
Freeport (20 billion m3), Lake Charles (20 bil-
lion m3), Cameron (18.0 billion m3), Cove Point
(8.0 billion m3), Jordan Cove (8.0 billion m3)
and Oregon LNG (13.0 billion m3).
The major reason for American natural gas
attracting such excitement from natural gas
buyers is that US LNG imports improve the
diversification of import sources in those
nations. This diversification is in two respects:
one is in terms of geographical location, since
prior to this natural gas exports primarily came
from the Middle East and North Africa. The
other is from the perspective of pricing mech-
anisms. For a long period, international natural
gas pricing was essentially linked to oil prices,
but due to its own natural gas market, and
because natural gas markets are somewhat
independent from oil markets, the United States
prices domestic natural gas using the natural gas
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price on the Henry Hub as a baseline. Thus the
natural gas exported from the United States
might not be entirely linked to oil prices, and
provides a hedge against oil risk in natural gas
import channels. From the perspective of actual
price, the US Henry Hub price is currently
between $3 and $5. In the long term, it could
rise, especially if international oil prices plum-
met. There is also the consideration that the
majority of US export ports are in the GOM,
and require the Panama Canal in order to reach
Asia, and shipping fees are going to be more
expensive than Australia.
From the perspective of project progress, the
United States currently only has one LNG project
under construction, Sabine Pass, which is expec-
ted to be completed in 2015/2016. However,
American LNG has been the focus of significant
attention, especially among Asian buyers such as
in Japan, South Korea, India and China, with
approximately 120 billion m3 of natural gas
already signed under purchase contract: 65 bil-
lion m3 signed with portfolio players, 23 bil-
lion m3 with Japan, 7 billion m3 with Spain,
9 billion m3 with India and 7 billion m3 with
South Korea. Currently, China has not signed any
natural gas purchase agreements or contracts.
3. Canada
Canada’s LNG projects got under way later
than those in Australia and the United States.
Currently, there are proposals for a total of 19
LNG projects for a total of 355 billion m3. No
project has as yet entered construction. Approx-
imately 20 billion m3 have already been signed
under some kind of purchase agreement and
contract, including 5.8 billion m3 between
CNPC and Pacific Northwest, 830 million m3
between Huadian and Pacific Northwest, and
1.38 billion m3 under a memorandum between
Guangzhou Natural Gas Group and Woodfire.
As far as distance is concerned, Canada is
closer to China than the United States, and thus
shipping fees will be slightly lower. Moreover,
political barriers could be less of a problem.
Project development has lagged behind Australia
and the United States, and thus there is significant
project uncertainty. At the same time, in some
communities, including the native residents,
opposition is still an important factor holding
back project progress. In addition, severe weather
and the need to construct infrastructure could
increase the project development costs and thus
affect future natural gas prices. Regardless, as a
long-term potential natural gas-exporting nation,
Canada’s natural gas export dynamics and
development are worthy of attention and study.
8.3.3 Trends in China’s Future
Natural Gas Imports
1. Trends in LNG imports to China’s
Since China’s natural gas consumption has
increased rapidly in recent years, the three major
oil corporations are actively seeking out opportu-
nities to purchase natural gas from international
natural gas markets to satisfy future demand.
Table 8.2 shows long-term signed LNG contracts
that China currently holds, including sales and
purchase agreements, heads of agreement and
memorandums of understanding. It is estimated
that in the next few years China will see rapid
growth in LNG imports. New LNG imports from
Australia will be largest part of this increase, rising
from approximately 5 billion m3 currently to
25 billion m3 by 2015. Other LNG import
increases currently planned will be from Russia
(approximately 4 billion m3), Papua New Guinea
(approximately 3 billion m3) and from third par-
ties (approximately 9 billion m3). In addition,
China is currently in talks with Canada to sign a
purchase of LNG contract letter of intent or
memorandum of understanding for approximately
8 billion m3.
However, these projects are still uncertain.
First, contract letters of intent or understanding
could potentially endwithout the final transition to
a purchase contract taking place. In addition, while
these projects plan to begin imports to China in
2017–2019, they have still not entered construc-
tion, and the repercussions of the international oil
price drops could introduce uncertainty into the
expected timeframe. For example, the Pacific
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Northwest project recently announced a delay in
the project’s final investment decision due to
international oil price drops. Therefore, even if in
the long term international oil prices support the
continued progress of these projects, they are still
very likely not to be executed until after 2020.
Taking this into consideration, China is likely to
see a rise in LNG imports from the current
25 billion m3 to approximately 57 billion m3 in
2020. By 2030, if theCanadian contract is realised,
LNG imports will rise to approximately 65 bil-
lion m3. Two east African countries are also likely
to become LNG-exporting nations in the latter half
of the 2020s.
Looking at importers (see Table 8.2),
CNOOC accounts for a major share of the cur-
rent LNG long-term contracts, and has signed
contracts for approximately 30 billion m3. Sino-
pec and CNPC currently have approximately
14 billion m3 and 20 billion m3 of LNG con-
tracted, while Huadian Group and Guangzhou
Natural Gas Group have signed for 0.83 bil-
lion m3 and 1.28 billion m3 in LNG contracts
respectively (Fig. 8.10).
In addition to long-term contracts, spot and
short-term contracts are also used to import nat-
ural gas. In 2013, Chinese spot imports of LNG
were approximately 5.4 billion m3, accounting
Table 8.2 China’s LNG long-term contracts
Type Exporting
nation






Spot Australia Withnell Bay CNOOC 4.55 2006 2030
Spot Indonesia Tangguh CNOOC 3.59 2009 2033
Spot Malaysia Malaysia LNG
Tiga
CNOOC 4.14 2009 2029
Spot Qatar Qatargas CNOOC 2.76 2009 2034
Spot Portfolio seller Portfolio CNOOC 1.38 2010 2024
Mid-/long-term Portfolio seller Portfolio CNOOC 6.90 2015 2035
Contract letter of intent Portfolio seller Portfolio CNOOC 2.07 2019 2039
Purchase contract Australia Queensland
Curtis
CNOOC 4.97 2014 2034
Spot Qatar Qatargas CNPC 4.14 2011 2036
Purchase contract Russia Yamal CNPC 4.14 2018 2038
Purchase contract Australia Gorgon CNPC 3.10 2014 2033
Purchase contract Australia Gorgon CNPC 2.70 2014 2033
Purchase contract Australia Australia Pacific Sinopec 10.49 2015 2035
Purchase contract Papua New
Guinea
PNG LNG Sinopec 2.76 2014 2034
Contract letter of intent Canada Pacific
Northwest
Sinopec 4.14 2019 2039
Contract agreement Canada Pacific
Northwest
Sinopec 1.66 2019 2039
Contract agreement Canada Pacific
Northwest







Source International Group of Liquid Natural Gas Importer (GIIGNL), LNG Industry 2006–2014, and author compiled
and organised
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for around 22% of the total LNG import volume,
slightly less than the current global LNG spot
transaction volume percentage of all trades of
27%. As shown in Fig. 8.11, global spot
transactions have seen a rising trend in recent
years, primarily due to their flexibility, which
allows them to top up supply shortages from























































Fig. 8.10 China LNG imports. Source International Group of Liquid Natural Gas Importer (GIIGNL), LNG Industry
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LNG spot trade percentage (right axis)
Fig. 8.11 Global spot trade market change trends this year. Source GIIGNL 2013. Data source International Group of
Liquid Natural Gas Importer (GIIGNL), LNG Industry in 2013
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between different LNG markets. As China’s
natural gas trade market develops, awareness of
risk aversion will strengthen and the construction
of a natural gas financial market is sure to result
in spot and short-term markets also seeing further
growth through natural gas import increases.
Taking 20–25% as an estimate of spot LNG
trade’s percentage of total LNG trade volume, by
2020 spot LNG trade volume could reach
approximately 10 billion m3, and approximately
15 billion m3 by 2030.
2. China’s LNG receiving station construc-
tion trends
Natural gas receiving stations are a critical
part of the infrastructure for the LNG trade chain,
and can also restrict the ability to import natural
gas. China’s first LNG receiving station, the
Shenzhen Dapeng Receiving Station, started
operations in 2006. China currently has LNG
receiving station capacity of 45.4 billion m3/year
(33.4 MMt/y), with projects under construction
of 40 billion m3/year (29 MMt/y). There is also
planned construction of 140 billion m3/year
(102 MMt/y).
Based on these figures, by 2020 China’s LNG
receiving station capabilities could reach 85–
225 billion m3/year, which would enormously
surpass the possible scope of future LNG imports.
These planned projects could be increased or
reduced along with China’s natural gas demand
and international natural gas trade market chan-
ges. However, considering current signed natural
gas long-term contracts and expressions of intents
on the part of China, at first sight it seems clear
that the overall capabilities of China’s LNG
receiving stations will not be a bottleneck for the
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Fig. 8.12 China natural gas receiving station construction
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3. China’s future pipeline natural gas
imports
China’s existing pipeline natural gas imports
primarily come through central Asia and
Myanmar, with the future Russian pipeline set
to become a major import source as well
(Table 8.3).
The Central Asia line is divided into the four
lines: A, B, C and D. The A and B lines are
sourced from Turkmenistan and currently have
capacity of 30 billion m3/year. The C line is
25 billion m3/year (10 billion m3 from Turk-
menistan, 10 billion m3 from Uzbekistan and
5 billion m3 from Kazakhstan, began operation
in June 2014). The D line shipping capability is
30 billion m3/year and is expected to open in
2016. The Myanmar line began operation in
August 2013 and by August 2014 had
imported 4 billion m3, with capacity for
12 billion m3/year.
With regard to Russia, currently Russia and
China have signed an East Line contract as of
May 2014, with shipment capabilities to reach
38 billion m3/year. The Western Line has had a
memorandum of understanding signed as of
November 2014, and could include scope of
30 billion m3/year. Of course, until a formal
contract is signed, nothing is certain. Although
both projects are slated to commence prior to
2020 (the Eastern Line in 2018, and the Western
Line in 2019), the actual start time could yet be
after 2020. First, since 2014, Russia’s project
progress and development has slowed, with
approvals not yet obtained from the Russian
government. In addition, Russia’s geographical
location and severe weather, among other factors,
will make it more difficult for the project to make
progress. Moreover, the Eastern Line and Wes-
tern Line both require large quantities of funds,
labour and resources to be invested, which is a
challenge for Gasprom, especially as interna-
tional oil prices have dropped.
In summary, it is expected that in 2020 Chi-
na’s pipeline imports will be in the region of
97 billion m3. In 2030, China’s pipeline import
capacity will reach approximately 135–165 bil-
lion m3, with the main uncertainty in this figure












300 300 Gas sourced from Turkmenistan, having entered operation in
December 2009 and October 2010 respectively
C line 250 250 Gas source: Turkmenistan (10 billion m3), Uzbekistan (10
billion m3) and Kazakhstan (5 billion m3), began operation in
June 2014
D line 300 Expected to begin operation in 2016
Myanmar 120 120 Began operation in August 2013, and as of August 2014 had
received 4 billion m3
Russia 380–680
East line 380 Began construction in September 2014, expected to open in
2018
West line 3000–6000 Came to understanding memorandum in November 2014,
expected to open in 2019. Signed intention is for 60 billion m3,




Data source Company websites, news, and author collected and arranged information
212 8 International Natural Gas Supply and Quantities …
coming from the progress of Russia’s Western
Line.
4. China’s future natural gas import trend
outlook
In summary, given the long-term LNG and
pipeline contracts that China has already signed,
China’s natural gas imports will grow rapidly in
the next few years, from 53 billion m3 in
2013 to 167 billion m3 in 2020, including
70 billion m3 from LNG and 97 billion m3 from
pipeline natural gas. By 2030, imported natural
gas will further expand to approximately
210 billion m3, including 75 billion m3 in LNG
and 135 billion m3 in pipeline supply. If Rus-
sia’s Western Line is able to implement its
30 billion m3, then imported natural gas will
grow further to around 240 billion m3, including
75 billion m3 in LNG and 165 billion m3 in
pipeline supply.
Figure 8.13 shows China’s 2030 natural gas
import source country proportions based on
long-term contract calculations. Currently signed
contracts and intentions clearly indicate that
Turkmenistan and Russia will become the major
natural gas importers to China, each accounting
for approximately 30%. Following this will be
Australia, whose natural gas imports will account
for 12%. Another approximately 30% will be
sourced from eight nations, including Myanmar,
Qatar, Uzbekistan and Papua New Guinea, as
well as from third-party natural gas suppliers.
This is a major change from the figures in 2013:
the proportion of China’s imports that are sourced
from the Middle East will have been reduced the
most, from 17.7% in 2013 to just 3%. Turk-
menistan’s proportion will move from nearly 47
to 30%, while Russia will move from 0 to 32%. In
addition, Australia will see a slight increase. It is
clear that from 2020–2030, China’s will increase
the diversity of its natural gas import sources,
primarily by achieving historical breakthroughs
with Russia in natural gas contract negotiations,
thus enabling China to reduce its reliance on
Central Asia’s natural gas (Fig. 8.14).
What should be noted is that the predictions of





















Spot & short-term contracts
Russia
Canada
Fig. 8.13 China’s future natural gas imports. Note Long-term contracts include purchase contracts, co-operation
intention agreements and memorandums of understanding
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above are based on natural gas import capabilities
and quantity of contracts. However, import
capabilities are not entirely equivalent to the
quantity of actual imports. For example, after a
pipeline is constructed, the volume of actual
shipments can be less than its maximum shipping
capability. Moreover, even though natural gas
long-term contracts are relatively stable, they are
still not completely fixed, and both parties are still
able to negotiate and make adjustments according
to actual changes in circumstances. Thus China’s
actual natural gas import volume in the future will
be determined not only by import capabilities and
contracts, but also by domestic demand.
At the same time, the risks and uncertainties
facing China’s future natural gas imports must be
acknowledged:
• First, the global natural gas market structure
still presents several variable factors. Many
Front-End Engineering Design projects are in
planning stages and may not be ultimately
completed, especially those in early stages,
which could be influenced by various factors
and risks and cancelled. Currently there is
significant export potential in Australia, the
United States and Canada, and various project
planning capabilities are very promising, but
how these projects will ultimately affect the
global natural gas trade is hard to say.
• Second, international oil price changes pre-
sent a major variable to the international trade
in natural gas. A drop in international oil
prices represents a reshuffling of the cards,























Fig. 8.14 Future Chinese natural gas import source nation proportions. Source GIGNL and author collection and
arrangement
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new process of balancing out, and long-term
natural gas prices will have their new points
of balance determined by multiple factors.
There are significant uncertainties, and this
will affect China’s interests and risks as it
imports natural gas.
• Furthermore, along with cost increases,
political risk and various other factors are also
having significant influences on future Chi-
nese natural gas imports. Currently, Aus-
tralia’s in-progress projects are seeing
significant cost increases, while if China
wishes to achieve imports from the United
States and Canada, there are significant
political barriers that must be overcome,
presenting major political risks. Therefore,
even if China insists in future upon a strategy
of natural gas import diversification, the
success of this strategy will still depend on
the circumstances of the international natural
gas market and the political environments
within individual nations.
• Finally, there is a certain amount of uncer-
tainty over China’s future imports of pipeline
natural gas. Even based on current circum-
stances, pipeline natural gas imports will play
a determining role in future natural gas
imports for China, but the final realised
pipeline natural gas import volume is as still a
significant variable. For example, in the
Russian pipeline natural gas project, actual
project progress since 2014 has not been
ideal, and the project has encountered diffi-
culties as a result of Russia’s geographical
location and severe weather. Russia still faces
a major challenge to satisfy the enormous
requirements for funding, labour and resour-
ces that are necessary to complete the project.
In brief, looking at the current LNG contracts
and pipeline natural gas agreements, Chinese
natural gas imports are set to expand. However,
close attention must be paid to risk and uncer-
tainty, as well as to the rapid changes in inter-
national circumstances and specific conditions in
nations which can lead to fluctuations in
international natural gas markets. China must
prepare for a rainy day and make suitable
preparations to ensure its own security of supply
as it pursues a strategy to diversify natural gas
imports.
8.4 China’s Natural Gas Trade
Policies and Recommendations
for Reform
8.4.1 China’s Current Natural Gas
Trade Policies
China’s natural gas trade policies can be grouped
into the following major sectors, based on the
stages of the natural gas import process:
• Commodity trading policy: Treating natural
gas as a trade commodity while managing
imports. This includes answering questions
such as: Do domestic entities have the right to
import natural gas? Do approvals from rele-
vant authorities need to be obtained? Are
approvals from authorities required for a
domestic entity to sign a contract with a for-
eign company?
• Facility construction and operation policy:
After natural gas is imported into China,
managing facilities (receiving stations, gas
reserve pipeline networks etc.), construction
and operation. This includes answering
questions such as: Which entities can con-
struct receiving stations and other infrastruc-
ture? Are approvals required, and how are
they handled? What policies are there for
infrastructure operation? How are policies
implemented?
• Price and taxation policy: Policies relating
to imported natural gas pricing and taxes.
This includes answering questions such as: Is
there regulatory interference in imported
natural gas pricing? For imported natural gas,
what tax policies apply, for example subsidies
and tax rebates?
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1. Commodity trading policy
In terms of the foreign trade sector, natural gas
does not constitute a state-run commodity, and is
viewed as a “general commodity”.4 At customs,
conducting natural gas trade does not require
prior approval, with customs currently oversee-
ing statistics for natural gas commodity trading.
Requirements for corporate reporting and filing
have also been cancelled, making it no different
than other general commodities.
Therefore, in theory, natural gas imports are
open to all qualifying enterprises, and there is no
substantial barrier arising from commodity trad-
ing policies. So long as the business scope
includes “natural gas trade” (when handling
administration for industry and commerce regis-
tration) and all Ministry of Commerce approvals
have been obtained (routine procedures), the
enterprise can carry out natural gas import busi-
ness, and the signed trade contracts do not require
approval and review from relevant authorities.
2. Facility construction and operation policy
The main facility construction and operation
policy approvals are at the facility construction
stage. According to national policy, a construc-
tion project beyond a certain size requires
approval from the NDRC, and natural gas sector
building construction is included within the
scope of approvals. Currently, there are different
policy directions for the different natural gas
facilities. For LNG receiving station project
construction, since receiving capabilities are far
ahead of actual shipping volume, China is strictly
controlling such projects. For pipeline networks
and gas reserves and other facilities, China is
implementing an attitude of encouragement,
encouraging various ownership systems to par-
ticipate in gas reserve facility investment, con-
struction and operation.5 Therefore in practice
the true barrier to an enterprise conducting LNG
trade is whether or not it has corresponding
facilities to accept the imported natural gas.
Even if the nation is attempting to encourage
more enterprises to participate in natural gas
import trade, thereby expanding imports,
enlivening markets and increasing the degree of
competitiveness, thanks to restrictive factors such
as the limit on receiving stations, there is still
only a limited number of enterprises engaged in
natural gas trade markets (the three major oil
companies, Huadian, Jiufeng, ENN and a small
number of other companies).
Regarding receiving station construction,
third-party access is not yet in place (policies
have just been released) and thus various entities
still wish to construct their own receiving sta-
tions. As a result, current receiving station
capabilities have become much greater than
actual shipping volume, but even so, domestic
parties are still actively seeking to build new
receiving stations. At the same time, the NDRC
is strictly controlling construction of new
receiving stations. In practice, whether or not
approval can be obtained depends on an interplay
between the central government, local govern-
ment and enterprises, and there is a lack of
openness and transparency in the approval stan-
dards and procedures, resulting in significant
uncertainties.
With natural gas trade being restricted by
facilities such as receiving stations, and receiving
station construction also being closely controlled
by the central government, the core question
affecting natural gas trade is therefore: Can cur-
rent domestic receiving station facilities provide
true third-party access?
There is already a clear provision that has
been provided in the recently released Natural
Gas Infrastructure Construction and Operation
Management Measures (implemented April 1
2014):
4See Commerce Department Office Opinions Regarding
Several Issues Involving LNG Commodities, June 5,
2007.
5See NDRC Guiding Opinions Regarding Acceleration of
Reserve Gas Facilities, April 5, 2014; NDRC Opinions
Regarding Establishment of Effective Mechanisms to
Ensure Stable Supply of Natural Gas, May 5, 2014.
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Natural gas infrastructure operators shall announce
and provide information regarding service condi-
tions, obtained service procedures, and remaining
service capacity, fairly and justly providing all
users with pipeline shipping, storage, gasification,
liquefaction, and compression services.
Natural gas infrastructure operators may not use
their control of infrastructure to exclude other
natural gas operators. Where service capacity
exists, users meeting requirements may not be
refused provision of service, or be presented with
unreasonable requirements. Existing users prefer-
entially obtain natural gas infrastructure service.
However, the third-party access policy
requirements for natural gas infrastructure
described above are somewhat vague, lacking
specific details and a relevant series of proce-
dures, and thus lacking practicality. In reality,
because of the imperfection of the above policy
provisions, and also due to current market
structure, monopolistic powers are still strong,
and without proper regulation the current policies
relating to third-party access are essentially a
blank document. As far as international natural
gas pipeline trade is concerned, the enormous
investment involved and complex geopolitical
factors, and the extreme requirements these place
on the relevant entities, currently appear to have
resulted in an exclusive monopolistic structure,
and in the short term this is unlikely to see fun-
damental change.
3. Price and tax policy
There are no review and approval require-
ments for trade commodity natural gas prices.
So, from a policy perspective, natural gas price
decisions are open, and are decided by the buyer
and seller involved in the trade. This is particu-
larly true of LNG, though in pipeline natural gas
pricing there is indirect reliance on national
negotiating power. However, this reliance is
indirect, and pipeline natural gas contracts are
still ultimately determined by the two parties
involved in the trade. In terms of tax policy,
policies on VAT rebates or discounts on natural
gas imports are determined and adjusted by the
Ministry of Finance. As China’s natural gas
pricing becomes better adjusted in the future, this
practice could be halted (Table 8.4).6
8.4.2 Recommendations
for Adjustments
to China’s Natural Gas
Trade Policy
1. Encouragement imports and focus on
expanding domestic production
In terms of natural gas import policy focus,
China needs to balance three main conflicting
factors: dealing with environmental pollution; the
continued growth of domestic natural gas con-
sumption as economic growth and residential
living standards rise; and ensuring natural gas
supply security. The first two require more nat-
ural gas usage, and to a certain degree will result
in the import of more natural gas. The third,
however, requires restraining natural gas import
dependency at a certain level, and thus there
could be a need to take some sort of control of
the rapid growth of natural gas imports.
In the next period of time (from the present to
2020, 2030), the direction that should be taken in
terms of natural gas import policy is: prudent
encouragement. This is because currently Chi-
na’s natural gas sector’s most fundamental
problem is how to rapidly increase domestic
consumption of natural gas, and whether it be in
terms of proportion of energy consumption
(6.5%) or residential diffusion rate (16%),
domestic natural gas consumption is still in need
of major increase. Considering that as economic
development increases and residential living
standards rise there will be a greater requirement
for energy consumption models, there is a need
6Relevant policy references: Finance Department General
Administration of Customs National Tax Bureau Notice
Regarding Issues Surrounding Ratio-Based Return Import
Stage VAT for 2011–2020 Imported Natural Gas and
Pre-2010 “Central Asia Pipeline” Project Imported Nat-
ural Gas (CGS [2011] No. 39); Finance Department
General Administration of Customs National Tax Bureau
Notice Regarding Adjustments to Imported Natural Gas
Preferential Support Policies (CGS [2013] No. 74); and
Finance Department General Administration of Customs
National Tax Bureau Notice Regarding Adjustments to
Preferential Tax Policy Natural Gas Import Projects (CGS
[2014] No. 8), April 21, 2014.
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for energy consumption that is more efficient,
safer and cleaner. From this perspective,
domestic natural gas consumption has entered a
stage of rapid growth, and there is already strong
inherent growth momentum.
Given the serious need to control environ-
mental pollution, especially in terms of limiting
atmospheric smog, a major increase in domestic
natural gas consumption has become a pressing
measure that must be addressed. So, driven by
the need to rapidly increase natural gas domestic
consumption, the formulation and announcement
of policies for this sector must address this major
issue. Thus policy incentives to increase natural
gas supply and promote natural gas domestic
consumption should be enacted.
At the same time, given that China has
abundant natural gas resources (including con-
ventional and unconventional gas), and that
current exploration and development levels are
still relatively low, ensuring natural gas supply
security requires controlling external reliance on
natural gas to a certain level, and therefore
increasing natural gas imports to satisfy growing
domestic demand for natural gas is not a viable
option. A more reasonable policy is, at the same
time as expanding natural gas imports, to give
greater attention to domestic natural gas pro-
duction, implementing a principle of “the nation
first”. In this way, natural gas import growth can
be encouraged to satisfy domestic demand while
also preventing dependency on imports and as
domestic natural gas production volumes quickly
rise. Therefore, if import dependency is to be
controlled to a reasonable level without inhibit-
ing imports, then creative efforts should be made
to increase the domestic production volume—
and this will also solve the dilemma caused by
domestic natural gas consumption being insuffi-
cient. In addition, even at the same level of
imports, import methods (import source diversi-
fication, contract and pricing diversification) and
domestic infrastructure conditions (whether gas
reserve and peak shaving capabilities are suffi-
cient, and whether pipeline network facilities are
well established) also have an important influ-
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In summary, China on the one hand needs to
enact policies that are supportive and encourag-
ing toward natural gas imports, effectively
expanding them and striving to diversify the
country’s import sources and import modes. On
the other hand, it must also focus on expanding
domestic production and optimising relevant gas
reserves, pipeline networks and other facilities.
Therefore, China should take the following atti-
tude toward natural gas import policies in the
coming years: prudent encouragement.
2. Make LNG an integral part of China’s
natural gas supply
Given the unique properties of LNG, its
flexibility and the natural gas consumption cen-
tres nearby China’s eastern regions, LNG can be
used in peak shaving and complementary
approaches. In addition, international experience
has shown that connecting Chinese LNG pro-
curement with international markets can intro-
duce and promote competition, which will in turn
promote market liberalisation in the China’s
natural gas market.
In the European Union market, LNG both
balances out EU natural gas supply and demand
and also balances out global LNG markets. This
is beneficial to EU natural gas consumers, and
LNG in Chinese markets can play a similar role.
LNG can promote market openness while also
playing a role in optimising energy structures,
giving consumers greater benefits and also
prompting further progress in the market liber-
alisation of the China’s natural gas market.
3. Diversify imported natural gas, encourag-
ing multilateral participation
China should take measures on the interna-
tional market for import of natural gas. First, it
should include long-term, mid-term, short-term
and spot portfolios to facilitate increased flexi-
bility to deal with and control market changes.
Second, integration should be achieved with oil
indexes and reserve typical diversified pricing
indexes. Furthermore, when assessing price
competitiveness, full consideration must be given
to project risk, commercial structure and other
factors, and through rolling contracts suited to
one’s own supply/demand balance, procurement
of LNG can be achieved to relieve risk and
achieve a natural gas supply portfolio that is
sourced from diverse geographical locations.
At the same time as this, it is important to
encourage more large-scale end users to purchase
natural gas from international LNG markets.
Whether it is power companies or large urban fuel
enterprises, all of these will bring benefits to the
market. This is because this will help to reduce
intermediary stages and improve natural gas
value chain efficiency. In order to achieve this
goal, it is necessary to have third-party access,
which is a key to supporting liberalisation.
4. Strengthen regulation promoting
third-party access
Policies in the Chinese natural gas trade sector
tend, on the whole, to be open and encouraging,
though some specific rules still need to become
more practical. This openness is clear from
policies such as: seeking to diversify the coun-
tries imported from; importing more natural gas
to resolve the issue of “domestic natural gas
consumption being insufficient”; and promoting
increased market supply while raising market
competitiveness. Therefore, whether it is treating
natural gas imports as a commodity, open trade
and encouraging third-party access to facilities or
VAT rebate discount policies, on the whole,
further natural gas imports are being encouraged.
However, in reality, the construction and
operation of receiving stations and other facilities
have become key influences on natural gas
imports. Third-party access has become a core
issue affecting Chinese natural gas trade. Based
on the current policies, even though there are
relevant provisions, there is still a lack of
common-sense workability and there is a major
doubt as to how effective they will be.
Thus, on the one hand it is important to
achieve better standard processes and greater
openness and transparency in the approval of
building new receiving stations and other facili-
ties. On the other hand, it is necessary to learn
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from international experience in order to bring in
rules for third-party access and effectively
strengthen the relevant regulation.
8.5 Conclusions for Chinese Natural
Gas Supply and Availability
In summarising domestic natural gas production
volume and international natural gas available
volume, we can come to the following prelimi-
nary conclusions:
• China’s natural gas available volume total
will rise from 234–239 billion m3 in 2015 to
425–495 billion m3 in 2020. The 640–800
billion m3 in 2030 will be a relatively stable
and ample supply: Specifically, by 2015, the
amount is expected to reach 234–239 billion
m3. As part of this, conventional gas pro-
duction volume will reach 140 billion m3,
shale natural gas will reach 6.5 billion m3,
coalbed methane will reach 4.5 billion m3,
imported pipeline gas will reach 39–42 billion
m3 and imported LNG will reach 39–41 bil-
lion m3.
By 2020, the amount is expected to reach
425–495 billion m3. As part of this,
conventional gas production volume will
reach 180 billion m3, shale natural gas will
reach 40–60 billion m3, coalbed methane
will reach 10–30 billion m3, coal methane
production will reach 30–60 billion m3,
imported pipeline gas will reach 95 billion m3
and imported LNG will reach 70 billion m3.
By 2030, the amount is expected to reach
640–800 billion m3. As part of this, conven-
tional gas production volume will reach 260–
280 billion m3, shale natural gas will reach
80–150 billion m3, coalbed methane will
reach 40 billion m3, coal methane production
will reach 50–90 billion m3, imported pipe-
line gas will reach 135–165 billion m3 and
imported LNG will reach 75 billion m3.
• From the perspective of natural gas avail-
ability structure, domestic conventional
gas proportion will drop, and domestic
unconventional gas proportion will rise,
with a rise in import pipeline gas and a
drop in LNG imports: In 2015, conventional
gas proportion of total production volume
availability will reach 60%, while shale nat-
ural gas will account for approximately 2.7%,
coalbed methane approximately 2%, import
pipeline gas approximately 17–18% and
imported LNG approximately 17%.
In 2020, conventional gas proportion of total
production volume availability will drop to
36–42%, while shale natural gas will account
for approximately 8–13%, coalbed methane
approximately 2–7%, coal methane will
account for 7–13%, import pipeline gas
approximately 19–22% and imported LNG
approximately 14–16%.
In 2030, conventional gas proportion of total
production volume availability will be 33–
42%, while shale natural gas will account for
approximately 11–21%, coalbed methane
approximately 4–6%, coal methane will
account for 6–13%, import pipeline gas




Conventional gas 1400 1800 2600–2800
Shale natural gas 65 400–600 800–1500
Coalbed methane 45 100–300 400
Coal methane 0 300–600 500–900
Import pipeline 390–420 970 1350–1650
Imported LNG 390–410 700 750
Total 2290–2340 4270–4970 6400–8000
Data source Analysis based on Ministry of Land and Resources and State Council
Research Center study results
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approximately 18–25% and imported LNG
approximately 9–12%.
• From the perspective of foreign reliance,
China’s reliance on foreign natural gas will
continue to rise significantly and be con-
trolled to within 36% by 2030: In 2015,
China’s reliance on foreign natural gas was
approximately 33–35%, while in 2020 that
number will reach approximately 33–39%. If
domestic natural gas, especially shale natural
gas, production volume achieves major
increases through breakthroughs in technology
or policy, then in 2030China’s foreign reliance
in natural gas will be at approximately 27–
36%. Namely, by 2030, China’s reliance on
foreign natural gas can be controlled within
36%. However, the prerequisite is that
domestic natural gas production, especially
unconventional natural gas, sees a break-
through increase (Tables 8.5, 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8).
Table 8.6 2015 China natural gas supply volume and structure















1400 65 45 50 390–410 390–420
Total 1560 780–830
2340–2390
Data source Integration, analysis, and compilation of study results from the Ministry of Land and Resources and other
institutions
Table 8.7 2020 China natural gas supply volume and structure













1800 400–600 100–300 300–600 700 950
Total 2600–3300 1650
4250–4950
Data source Based on the above analysis and compilation
Table 8.8 2030 China natural gas supply volume and structure
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Total 4300–5600 2100–2400
6400–8000
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Case 9: Global natural gas/LNG market
outlook
1. Global energy and natural gas mar-
ket development
Global energy demand is continuing to
rapidly grow, especially in nations and
regions outside of OECD countries. As
populations quickly grow and economies
flourish, people have more numerous
channels through which to obtain reliable
power supply, and this will cause demand
to grow for energy across the world by
50% from 2010 to 2050 (Shell 2014).
In the past several decades, natural gas
has consistently been one of the fastest
growing energies. From 2005 to 2014,
average annual growth maintained at
approximately 2.7% (BP 2014). Currently
it is commonly recognised that up to 2030,
natural gas demand will maintain annual
average growth rates of 2% (IEA, Current
Policies Outlook). Global natural gas
resource reserves are massive and broadly
distributed, and at current production
speeds can be used for more than
200 years.
With the exception of the United States,
growth in unconventional resources in
other countries is very uncertain, because
these countries have very little or no
momentum toward production. Argentina
(23 trillion m3; source: US Energy Infor-
mation Administration) could have the best
development conditions, but faces severe
financial and non-technical risk limitations.
Even though, according to the US EIA,
China has approximately 32 trillion m3 of
unconventional resources, the Chinese
government recently adjusted its recent
development expectations for shale natural
gas downward by half, and thus China’s
energy growth could be reduced. (China’s
natural gas is distributed across 500 basins,
but because there are currently only a few
companies, and there is a lack of interna-
tional company involvement in this sector
to carry out development, complex terrain,
costs, infrastructure construction, waste
water treatment and technical innovation
insufficiencies and other problems are
faced).
The national authorities and relevant
policies will affect long-term LNG
demand growth, and it is not a case of
simple determination of project cycle
costs, especially in Europe and Asia.
Policymakers incorporate four aspects into
energy policy portfolios, namely energy
security, cost and competitiveness, envi-
ronment and health, and energy avail-
ability. The choices they make will
determine the energy structure of nations
and regions.
This means that even though broad
areas have become homogenous in terms
of energy growth, nonetheless local and
short-term dynamic factors have a high
degree of uncertainty and changes are
occurring rapidly.
2. Global LNG market outlook
Since 2000, global LNG demand has
grown at a rate of approximately 5%, and
this trend will continue for the foreseeable
future (BP 2014).
In the past 10 years, there have been 31
nations engaged in LNG imports, and 27
nations engaged in export. Therefore, LNG
demand and supply has enormously
diversified, and estimates are that in the
next 10 years, LNG demand nations and
supply nations will grow respectively to 50
and 25.
Looking to the long term, LNG growth
in demand will primarily come from Asian
emerging markets (in particular China,
India, and south-east Asia) and Europe.
Even though LNG is only in early stages of
development in the transportation sector,
nonetheless LNG has major potential to
become an important niche market.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan cur-
rently account for approximately 60% of
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the global LNG market, and will continue
to be a major demand centre in a moving
world. Even though as nuclear power
returns and renewable energy develops
(especially solar power) Japan’s demand
for LNG will be limited, LNG demand will
still continue to remain at a high level.
Another uncertainty is future degree of
market liberalisation.
In south-east Asia and India, because
domestic gas reserves are declining, and
because electricity and other industries are
increasing demand for LNG, south-east
Asia and India LNG demand will increase
further. The major uncertainty in this
region is price tolerance and the infras-
tructure construction needed for import and
shipping of LNG.
China’s policy to increase natural gas
market share is critical. Given China’s
released policies for pollution control and
GDP growth, China has already and will
continue to become a market with rapid
growth in natural gas. China has the
potential to influence global market bal-
ance and price levels. Uncertainties are
potential slowdowns in GDP growth, as
well as degree of implementation of
ambitious policies.
With regard to Europe, in addition to
local production and pipeline import
energy, LNG offers flexible supply. Europe
has ample regasification capabilities (in
2013 for each 140 mtpa, 40 mtpa could be
produced), and the region could become a
flexible market for LNG. Europe’s LNG
used in transportation sectors has potential
for growth, especially in marine shipping,
because strict air quality laws will drive a
fuel switch.
From 2010 to 2013, Europe’s economic
growth slowed, and with cheap American
coal and significant subsidies in Europe for
renewable energy development, natural gas
demand in Europe was pushed lower. Even
though to a certain degree the factors
causing this reduction will exist in the long
term, European market natural gas demand
could still rebound, with the precondition
being reduced import of coal and reduc-
tions in subsidies supporting renewable
energy growth.
3. Global LNG supply
By 2030, the United States, Australia,
and Eastern Africa LNG supply will
account for over 80% of total supply
(source: 2015 Shell analysis).
• North America has already proposed
utilising its over 6 million tons/year
production capacity for LNG export
(shared equally between the United
States and Canada).
• A total of over 44 million tons/year of
natural gas has already received a final
investment decision and is under con-
struction (locations all in the United
States). North American natural gas
supply quantities rely upon permits,
financing, construction costs and speed.
Russia and Australia have a potential
new project list. Cost increases and
non-technical risks have slowed the pro-
gress of many projects. In addition, sanc-
tions could delay or destroy the Russia’s
LNG plans.
Eastern Africa (primarily Mozambique
and Nigeria) could in the next 10 years
become new gas supply sources. Chal-
lenges faced include the fact that Eastern
Africa has large swathes of undeveloped
regions, and the majority of companies are
not LNG companies with stable market
presence.
• Nigeria’s non-technical risks (such as
political, regulatory and financial
uncertainties, damage risks and
domestic power demand) continue to
represent the major obstacles to LNG
supply growth.
• Due to domestic market demand, Egypt
has seen a reduction to zero LNG
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exports, and will even need to import
LNG. Egypt is currently actively seek-
ing LNG exporters (and has already
signed contracts with Algeria’s Sona-
trach and Russia’s Gazprom; additional
natural gas supply could come from
Israel or international enterprises).
• Qatar has not yet clarified its direction
post-2016 for its northern oil fields, and
thus there exists some supply uncer-
tainty. Despite this, Qatar has 77 mtpa
of LNG supply capability, and because
it is equidistant from Europe and Asia,
it will continue to hold an important
price-determining position.
• For Middle Eastern regions, the
removal of sanctions on Iran could
bring about major effects, and natural
gas supply is able to catch up to
domestic demand growth. Therefore,
LNG imports will be incorporated into
planning.
4. A focus on North American markets
The United States was once one of
Shell’s largest markets, and now is
preparing to export LNG. Potential export
projects have not been announced for
300 mtpa in the United States and over
130 mtpa in Canada.
Initial project liquefaction costs
will be relatively “low” (approximately
$3.5/MMBtu) (addition of LNG import
end), but subsequent costs will succes-
sively rise (we have already seen the initial
price of <$3/MMBtu rise to the current
quote of >$4/MMBtu) (Fig 8.15).
Such projects are equivalent to tradi-
tional Asia Pacific project levels, and are
even at HH$4/MMBtu.
Other barriers are: approval, construc-
tion speed, construction costs (labour) and
users seeking resource portfolios (if major
Asia Pacific users restrict North American
project development risks to 20–30%, then
this will turn into 100 mtpa supply).
However, the former view of Ameri-
can LNG being “cheap” has changed, as oil
prices have significantly dropped. Add to
this the market uncertainty (for example
Japan’s deregulation of electricity), and
this has caused users to limit LNG invest-
ment portfolio Henry Hub quoted supply
volumes.
Therefore, when users are unwilling to
sign large volumes of Henry Hub quoted
long-term agreements, project final invest-
ment decisions will face major challenges,
because final project investment decisions
require the support of long-term agreements.
5. Global LNG market is more active
We have seen continuous increases in
the market share held by natural gas in
fundamental energy. Other energy indus-
tries are continually growing, but natural
gas growth rates have been faster. We
expect that in the next 20 years, global
natural gas demand will grow at an annual
rate of 2–3% (Fig. 8.16).
As natural gas usage increases,
cross-border natural gas trade using
pipelines and LNG will continue to
increase.
The growth in natural gas trade requires
that natural gas import and export infras-
tructure continue to receive investment.
Large new pipeline projects are contin-
ually achieving progress. For example, last
year an early announcement was made of
the Sino-Russian natural gas pipeline
export project having early stage shipping
volume that should reach 38 billion
m3/year, with the possibility of further
increases. LNG has also become a major
part of natural gas trade. Currently, LNG
accounted for 10% of natural gas trade, and
this will rise to 15% by 2025.
In recent years, LNG supply and
demand has markedly diversified. There
are now 30 LNG importing nations and 20
exporting nations, with this expected to
change in the next decade to 50 LNG
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exporting nations and 25 importing
nations. This is different from the situation
in the 1990s when the global LNG market
was only 50 million tons per year, and













Lake Charles Exports 
Gasfin







































































POTENTIAL NA LNG SUPPLY (MTPA)
Location
0




























Fig. 8.15 North American LNG supply. Source IHS Cera. * Potentially located near Valdez
226 8 International Natural Gas Supply and Quantities …
From now until 2025, a major change
will occur as North America rises as a
substantive natural gas exporting region.
6. Recommendations for China
(I) Multiple supply channels to ensure
energy supply security
In the past decade, China’s natural gas
consumption volume growth has been
fierce, and in 2014 reached 183 billion m3.
In addition, natural gas supply has com-
prised domestic supply, pipeline natural
gas imports and liquefied oil and gas
imports. This shows that diversified sup-
plies are an important guarantee for energy
security. In the next decade, the govern-
ment has designated the natural gas portion
of energy structure to grow from 4% to
over 10%. This will require multiple sup-
ply channels to satisfy market demand.
Furthermore, considering the market scale
at that time, the wide diversity of supply
channels will play an important role in
guaranteeing energy security.
In the north-east Asian regions of Japan
and South Korea, reliance is on single
natural gas supply sources, and this is
markedly different from China. Precisely
because of this diversity in supply portfo-
lios, China enjoys benefits when procuring
natural gas from international markets,
ultimately helping Chinese consumers.
(II) LNG’s unique role makes it an
integral part of China’s natural gas
supply portfolio
Considering that China has constructed
import channels to import natural gas via
pipeline corridors (whether it be from
Western Central Asia, Eastern and Western
Russia or south-western Myanmar), and
these are maturing by the day, this case
study focuses on the possible choice of
LNG as a supply source on the interna-
tional market.
Given that LNG has the unique prop-
erties of being flexible and near to the
eastern consumption centres, LNG can
play a unique role in peak shavings and as
a complement to pipeline gas.
In addition, prior experience has shown
that because Chinese LNG procurement is















Fig. 8.16 Global natural gas import and export
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this can introduce and promote competi-
tion, through which Chinese natural gas
liberalisation can be catalysed.
Previously we have discussed the role
of LNG in EU markets. On the one hand it
balances out EU natural gas supply, while
on the other it balances out the global LNG
market, benefiting natural gas consumers in
the European Union. We have reason to
believe that LNG can also play a similar
role in the Chinese market, but it is
important to realise that the reason that
LNG could play such a role in the EU was
because of the historical progress of market
liberalisation. Therefore, we would say that
LNG on the one hand can promote market
opening, bringing benefits to consumers,
while on the other hand it can also assist as
China completes the liberalisation of its
natural gas market.
(III) LNG procurement considerations
By observing similar markets, it is
possible to obtain some lessons:
1. Experienced LNG buyers on interna-
tional markets often have a diversified
portfolio, including long-term,
medium-term, short-term and spot
portfolios to facilitate improvements to
flexibility and to meet market changes.
They also have a connection to oil
indexes or a hub as a platform of
diversified pricing mechanisms,
because when the market changes, for
example when oil prices change, the
price competitiveness of each sales and
purchase agreement will likewise
change. In addition, when assessing
price competitiveness, it is necessary to
wholly consider project risk, commer-
cial structure and other factors, thus
avoiding only considering price labels,
otherwise it is not a valid comparison.
LNG supply portfolios must have a
diversity of geographical sources.
Another commonly made error is to
believe one is smarter than the market
and able to manipulate the market.
Therefore, a commonly seen method of
risk avoidance is to procure LNG
through rolling windows to satisfy
one’s own supply and demand
balances.
2. If more numerous large end users can
purchase natural gas from international
LNG markets, whether it be power
companies or large urban fuel enter-
prises, this would bring benefits to the
market. This is because such actions
help to reduce intermediary stages and
make the natural gas value chain more
efficient. To achieve this, though,
third-party access is needed, and this is
a key factor to supporting progress in
liberalisation. We are very happy to see
companies such as Huadian becoming
active in the realm of liberalisation.
3. However, this is not to say that every
enterprise should be encouraged to
establish its own receiving terminal and
carry out importing, since this would
cause a large quantity of infrastructure
to be less than amply utilised, resulting
in price wars and ultimately harming
the sustainable and healthy develop-
ment of natural gas markets. In this
regard, we recommend that managers
make adjustments through formulation
of game rules rather than artificial
controls.
4. As regards the game rules for the nat-
ural gas sector, including natural gas
pipeline networks and receiving station
infrastructure, management standards
are extremely important. This is
because as pipeline network standardi-
sation becomes more mature and plays
a greater role, it will increase natural
gas value chain transparency, thus
improving market efficiency. Taking
the European Union as a typical mature
market, they primarily use the follow-
ing typical pipeline management rules
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to manage major issues: (a) requiring
non-discriminatory third-party access
rule restrictions; (b) capacity auctions,
balance, pricing, distribution and
receipt issuance; (c) holding full nego-
tiations; (d) natural gas delivery pipe-
line network capacity release and
price schedules; (e) auction trades
held in secondary markets; (f) separa-
tion of input/output, separation of
capacity/commodity; (g) third-party
access to receiving stations, gas stor-
age, and pipeline networks, whether it
be established through bilateral negoti-
ations or based on TPAs.
5. Maintaining natural gas/fuel oil portfo-
lios is also of assistance, because this
will enable natural gas users to optimise
gas portfolios through switching, thus
avoiding gas users seeking to resolve
all problems through LNG SPA, which
pushes LNG purchase contract negoti-
ations into a stalemate.
Case 10: China international pipeline
natural gas imports
China has an advantageous geographical
location for pipeline natural gas imports,
with Russia to its north, central Asia
(especially Turkmenistan) to its west and
south-east Asia (especially Myanmar).
Existing and planned import pipeline
capacity is approaching 190–200 billion
m3/year, which is likely to be one quarter
to one third of the natural gas consumption
volume of China expected in 2030.
Pipeline gas imports are one of the three
main supply sources forChina,with the other
two being domestic natural gas production
and LNG imports (respectively having mul-
tiple supply channels). These three funda-
mentals ensure China’s natural gas supply
while also forming competition with regard
to baseline prices, thus satisfying the natural
gas demand that continues to grow in China.
Regarding the greatest factors of
uncertainty for these international natural
gas pipeline imports, they are as follows:
1. Russia’s natural gas supply base for the
east-west line.
2. Whether Russian companies have the
ability to develop the eastern Siberian
natural gas field and create natural gas
pipelines and deliver natural gas within
the promised timeframe. Given that the
United States and European Union are
implementing sanctions on Russia, this
is especially critical.
3. In order to enrich client groups, what
decisions will Turkmenistan make? For
example, participating in the Turk-
menistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
(TAPI) natural gas pipeline and/or
overcoming legal and political difficul-
ties to co-operate with Azerbaijan and
directly supply Turkmenistan natural
gas to Europe through Azerbaijan and
Turkey.
1. Pipeline natural gas import sources
As can be seen from Table 8.9, the
world has 14 nations whose conventional
natural gas reserves exceed 100 trillion m3,
and based on its advantageous geographi-
cal location, China can import natural gas
from essentially any country.
Currently, Iran, which is subject to
United Nations sanctions, has the largest
proved natural gas reserves in the world,
with proved conventional natural gas
reserves of nearly 120 trillion m3. If
developed, Iran will very likely become
like Qatar, another LNG and unconven-
tional natural gas supplier to China.
Russia and Turkmenistan have natural
gas resource reserves that respectively rank
second and fourth globally. Russia
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produces 605 billion m3 of natural gas
each year, to satisfy enormous domestic
demand and to meet 30% of Europe’s
demand for natural gas. Their reserve
mining term is 52 years, which is relatively
short compared to other major natural gas
resource reserve nations. Russia has also
promised to supply China with nearly
90 billion m3 of natural gas per year
through the Eastern and Western lines. In
doing so, unless new resources are dis-
covered, Russia’s reserve mining term will
be markedly shortened. This could perhaps
explain why Russia is so urgently wishing
to develop unconventional natural gas,
including its domestic coalbed methane
and shale natural gas.
In comparison, the landlocked Turk-
menistan has 617 trillion m3 of proved
natural gas and over 280 years of natural
gas reserves to mine. It is also very likely
to enrich its own natural gas demand
market, supplying natural gas to China,
Russia and Iran. Two considerations for
the future are worth noting:
• TAPI can provide natural gas to two
countries with major populations—
India and Pakistan. According to pre-
vious reports, Chevron and other US
companies are looking to join this plan,
and recent reports show that French
company Total might also participate in
relevant discussions.
• The European Union urgently wishes to
increase its supply diversity, and the
pipeline through TAPI is one important
potential source. The European Union,
including Vice President of the Euro-
pean Commission Maroš Šefčovič, is
actively encouraging Turkmenistan to
plan out this pipeline (Financial Times
2015), despite the fact that in the short
term there are many legal and political
roadblocks to its achievement. If the
TAPI pipeline is realised, Europe and
China could face direct price
competition/connectivity.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and other
central Asian nations are not major natural
gas reserve nations, and in the foreseeable
Table 8.9 Most proved
conventional natural gas
reserves by country
Proved reserve quantity 2013 production volume R/P
Trillion m3 Trillion feet3 1 billion m3/year Year
Iran 33.8 1193 167 202
Russia 31.3 1104 605 52
Qatar 24.7 872 159 155
Turkmenistan 17.5 617 62 282
United States 9.3 330 688 14
Saudi Arabia 8.2 291 103 80
UAR 6.1 215 56 109
Venezuela 5.6 197 28 199
Nigeria 5.1 179 36 141
Algeria 4.5 159 79 57
Australia 3.7 130 43 86
Iraq 3.6 127 0.6 5980
China 3.3 116 117 28
Indonesia 2.9 103 70 42
Source BP Data Review (2014) (only conventional natural gas)
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Fig. 8.17 Major natural gas resource reserve nations and China’s potential natural gas export nations








Imported natural gas pipelines (operation)
Central Asia natural gas pipeline Line A 15 2009
Central Asia natural gas pipeline Line B 15 2010
Myanmar-China 1 12 2013 Not yet at full load operations (>50% idle capacity)
Sub-total 42
Imported natural gas pipelines (planned)
Central Asia natural gas pipeline Line C 25 2014 10 billion m3 comes from Turkmenistan,
10 billion comes from Uzbekistan,
and 5 billion comes from Kazakhstan
Central Asia natural gas pipeline Line D 30 2016 2017
Siberian pipeline 38 2018 2021 Signed natural gas export agreement.
Under construction
Siberian pipeline extension 30




Pipeline import capacity total 207
Source WoodMac, HIS. Basic arrangement by study group
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future there is still limited possibility for
them to become natural gas pipeline supply
nations to China.
In south-east Asia, Myanmar is currently
supplying approximately 5 billion m3 of
natural gas per year to China through Yun-
nan. Likewise lacking in natural gas are
south-east Asian nations, and Myanmar is
currently supplying Thailand with pipeline
gas. Recently, Myanmar successfully
obtained a deep sea oil tender, attracting the
attention of large transnational companies.
According to geological analysis, these deep
sea regions have the potential to have more
natural gas than oil. In the next 5–10 years,
could Myanmar find a large quantity (larger
than 1 trillion m3) of deep sea natural gas to
become the Mozambique of Asia? If it does
happen, China should consider making
Myanmar’s (deep sea) natural gas another
source of pipeline delivery. It could neces-
sitate a round of competition, withMyanmar
perhaps hoping to develop other LNG mar-
kets in Asia to improve its own export
capabilities in LNG, for example Japan and
South Korea, so as to expand its buyer
nation group.
2. Existing and planned natural gas
import pipelines
Table 2.16 lists the import natural gas
pipelines from Russia, Central Asia and
Myanmar to China. Currently, China’s
pipeline import capacity is approximately
40 billion m3/year, but this is not to say
that each line is always at capacity. In
2013, China’s pipeline import volume was
approximately 25 billion m3, accounting
for approximately 15% of China’s natural
gas consumption of 166 billion m3.
Once they are fully completed, these
pipelines will have total capacity of nearly
200 billion m3/year, and will account for one
quarter to one third of all of China’s estimated
natural gas consumption by 2030. Therefore,
the focus of the 13th Five-Year Plan may not
be confirming added pipeline natural gas
import volume, but joint efforts with Turk-
menistan, Russia andMyanmar to ensure that
theseprojects canbecompletedon time so that
China can import pipeline natural gas at a
competitive price (Fig. 8.17, Table 8.10).
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9Analysis of China’s Natural GasInfrastructure Development Strategy
9.1 Current Development
of Natural Gas Infrastructure
Since the West-East Pipeline began operating in
2004, China’s natural gas infrastructure has
developed rapidly. As of the end of 2014, a
pipeline network distribution layout has been
formed with the West-East Pipeline, marine gas
and near-region supply, providing coverage to all
provinces with the exception of Tibet. There are
also both pipeline gas and LNG import resource
channels, opening up central Asia’s pipeline gas,
central Myanmar’s pipeline gas and marine LNG
import channels. There is also underground gas
storage and LNG receiving stations as two major
peak shaving methods, covering the seaboard
region, gas-producing regions and regions
around the Bohai Sea.
9.1.1 Current State of Infrastructure
Development
As of the end of 2014, China had constructed
82,000 km of natural gas pipeline, of which
23,300 km are national trunk pipelines, 16,500 km
are national branch pipelines and 13,800 km are
provincial trunk pipelines, with major progress
achieved in termsofurbangas pipelinenetworks. In
addition, 11 LNG receiving stations have been
built, with total receiving capacity of 39.40 mil-
lion tons. Constructed underground gas storage
bases number 19, with total warehousing capacity
of 45.2 billion m3 and designed working gas vol-
ume of 15.1 billion m3, and effective working gas
volume of 4.2 billion m3.
1. Natural gas pipeline networks
Since the 1960s when China built its first
natural gas pipeline, the “Bayu Line”, over many
decades of development, China’s natural gas
pipelines have undergone significant growth.
This is especially true with the 2004 West-East
Pipeline, which accelerated China’s natural gas
pipeline construction. As of the end of 2014,
China had the West-East Pipeline, Shaanxi-
Beijing Line, Sichuan to East Gas Pipeline Pro-
ject, the Yuji Line and China-Myanmar natural
gas pipeline as major national trunk pipelines,
and the Jining Line, Zhongwu Line, Zhonggui
Line and Huaiwu Line as major connection
pipelines, with regional pipeline networks
between the Yangtze River Delta, Sichuan and
* This chapter was overseen by Zhonghong Wang from
the Development Research Center of the State Council
and Shangyou Nie from Shell International Exploration
and Production. It was jointly completed by Xiaowei
Xuan, Yingxie Yang, Yongwei Zhang, Jiaofeng Guo,
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the State Resource Department Oil and Gas Centre,
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Yang from the China Energy Research Institute’s
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Chongqing, and North China. This has achieved
a long-distance transport pipeline connectivity to
major consumption markets, as well as to
underground gas storage and LNG receiving
stations, providing coverage to all provinces with
the exception of Tibet and preliminarily forming
a national natural gas grid.
2. LNG receiving stations
As of the end of 2014, China’s operating,
approved and under construction LNG receiving
stations numbered 15, of which 11 were cur-
rently in operation, and four had been approved
and were under construction, located in over
10 provinces and regions including Guangdong,
Fujian, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Huainan, Jiangsu,
Liaoning, Shandong, Tianjin, and Tangshan.
Currently operating LNG receiving stations have
a receiving and unloading capability of
39.40 million tons per year, which is equivalent
to 55 billion m3 of natural gas. In 2014, annual
imported LNG resources amounted to
18.79 million tons, equivalent to 26.3 billion m3
of natural gas (Figs. 9.1 and 9.2).
3. Underground storage
As of 2014, China had constructed the fol-
lowing underground storage facilities: Lamadian
North, Dazhangtuo, Ban 876, Banzhong North,
Ban 808, Ban 828, Jinyun, Jing 58 Storage, Wen
96, Suqiao, Xiangguo Temple, Hutubi, Shuang 6
and Bannan. These were primarily distributed in
eight provinces—Jiangsu, Tianjin, Hebei,
Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Chongqing
and Henan—with total designed capacity of
45.2 billion m3 and designed total working gas
volume of 15.1 billion m3 and effective working










Fig. 9.1 China’s natural gas pipeline network distribution
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9.1.2 Assessment of Development
Levels and Existing
Problems
1. Pipeline construction capacity shortcomings
With the completion and operation of the
West-East pipeline in 2004, China’s natural gas
pipeline length reached 25,000 km. In 2010,
after the West-East Pipeline 2 and the Sichuan to
East Pipeline, China’s natural gas pipeline length
reached 56,000 km. As of the end of 2014,
pipeline network length was 82,000 km, with
natural gas consumption volume having reached
183 billion m3. According to the natural gas
industry development experience of the United
States, when consumption volume is 130 bil-
lion m3, pipeline length was 175,000 km.
Whether it is in terms of satisfying China’s nat-
ural gas usage demands or when compared to the
history of developing nations, China’s natural
gas pipeline construction is markedly
underdeveloped.
As of the end of 2014, China’s natural gas
pipeline network distribution capabilities were
240 billion m3, with natural gas consumption
exceeding 128 billion m3. Based on market con-
sumption volume of 1.2 fold as a peak shaving
demand, the required pipeline distribution capac-
ity was 220 billion m3. From this it is clear that the
current pipeline network distribution capabilities
can only meet the market demand of the next
several years, and if future natural gas market
development is to be supported, accelerated pro-
motion of pipeline network facility construction
will be required (Fig. 9.4).
Tianjin FLNG completed construc on by end of 
2013. Phase I capacity is 2.2 million tons/year.
Tangshan LNG completed construc on by end of 
2014. Phase I capacity is 3.5 million tons/year.
Qingdao LNG completed construc on by end of 
2014. Phase I capacity is 3 million tons/year.
Jiangsu Rudong LNG put into opera on in 
2011. Phase I capacity is 3.5 million tons/year.
Shanghai LNG completed construc on in 2009. 
Phase I capacity is 3 million tons/year.
Fujian Pu an LNG put into opera on in 2008. Phase I capacity 
is 2.6 million tons/year. Phase II is 5 million tons/year.
Guangdong Shenzhen Dapeng LNG put into opera on in Jun 2006. Phase 
I capacity is 3.57million tons/year. Phase II is 6.7 million tons/year
Dalian LNG completed construc on in 2011. Phase 
I capacity is 3 million tons/year.
Zhejiang Ningbo LNG put into opera on in 
2012. Phase I capacity is 3 million tons/year.
Hainan LNG put into opera on in 2014. Phase I 
capacity is 2 million tons/year.
Guangdong Zhuhai LNG put into opera on in 2013. 
Phase I capacity is 3 million tons/year.
Fig. 9.2 LNG receiving station distribution map
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Beijing 58 Gas Storage: Designed Capacity is 
750 million m3 and put into opera on in 2010
Lamadian Gas Storage: Designed capacity is 
2.5 billion m3, and put into opera on in 
1993
Hutubi Gas Storage: Designed 
capacity is 4.51 billion m3 and 
put into opera on in July 
2013.
Yulin Gas Storage Facili es: 
Designed capacity is 6 billion m3
Xiangguosi Gas Storage: Designed capacity is 
2.28 billion m3. Gas has been injected since 
July 2013.
Wen 96 Gas Storage: 
Designed capacity is 295 
million m3 and was put into 
opera on in 2012.
Jintan Gas Storage: Designed 
capacity is 210 million m3. 
Owner: Hongkong China Gas
Jintan Gas Storage: Designed 
capacity is 210 million m3. 
Owner: Sinopec
Jintan Gas Storage: Designed 
capacity is 241 million m3
and gas injec on had started 
in 2011.
Double 6 Gas Storage: Designed 
capacity is 1.6 billion m3and 
major structure had been 
completed in Sep 2012. 
Dagang Gas Storage Facili es: 
Designed capacity is 2.27 
billion m3 and had been put 
into construc on during 
2000-2006.
Suqiao Gas Storage: Designed 
phase I capacity is 400 million 

















































Fig. 9.4 China’s natural gas pipeline construction
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2. Development of LNG infrastructure
Since 2006 when the Dapeng LNG facility was
completed, China’s LNG receiving station con-
struction speed has gradually accelerated. As of
the end of 2014, constructed and operating LNG
receiving stations numbered 11 in total, with
receiving and offloading capacity of 39.40 mil-
lion tons per year, equivalent to 55 billion m3 of
natural gas.
Because current LNG receiving stations pri-
marily satisfy city demand in a radius around the
receiving station itself, and each region’s natural
gas development has had a relatively long and
staged development, LNG receiving stations are
quick to enter production once they are com-
pleted. Also, because of regional preferential
development of urban fuel, and limited increases
in volume, in order to resolve the lack of market
space for LNG receiving stations as a result of
their rapid growth, accompanying fuel gas plants
have been established to consume the exceed gas
volume. As markets continue to develop, urban
gas demands are gradually growing, and price
tolerance is higher than power plants, making it
easy for a power plant to have ample gas volume
in early stages of development of a receiving
station, but once the market develops to need
LNG as a major gas source, the power plants
could see supply shortages.
Therefore, China’s current LNG receiving
stations have played an important role in
increasing supply capacity, and their strong abil-
ities in terms of peak shaving offer critical effects
in maintaining secure and stable operation of the
market. However, their rapid growth can lead to
uneven development of natural gas infrastructure.
3. Shortage of underground gas storage peak
shaving capability
China’s natural gas peak shaving method is
primarily based on underground gas storage.
Location is very particular for gas storage, with
long construction cycles and a significant quan-
tity of gas required to build the reserve. Under-
ground gas storage has high requirements for
geological conditions, and it is difficult to find
suitable locations. Salt cavern underground
storage facility construction periods are long, for
example the Jinyun underground storage location
took over 10 years from commencement of
construction to operation. In addition, under-
ground gas storage requires significant input for
the initial reserve, and with a designed gas vol-
ume of 200 million m3, approximately 100 mil-
lion m3 are required as an initial reserve.
China’s research and construction of under-
ground storage began relatively late, and there is a
relatively major gap as compared to developed
nations. According to operational experience in
foreign markets, if natural gas market operational
risk remains at relatively low levels, then the
storage dissipation ratio (referring to the ratio
between natural gas peak shaving volume and
natural gas demand volume) should reach 15%. In
2014, China’s natural gas apparent consumption
reaches 183 billion m3, with underground storage
peak shaving volume of 4.2 billion m3, making
peak shaving volume account for less than 3% of
total natural gas consumption, thus meaning that
peak shaving capabilities are severely lacking.
9.2 Opportunities and Challenges
9.2.1 The Energy Development
Strategy Action Plan
(2014–2020)
The Energy Development Strategy Action Plan
proposed major development of natural gas, with
non-renewable energy consumption totals to be
controlled by 2020 to within 4.8 billion tons of
standard coal, and natural gas to account for over
10% of non-renewable energy consumption.
Based on principles of developing land and
marine resources and conventional and uncon-
ventional sources, acceleration of conventional
natural gas production would be sought, resolving
development battlements as quickly as possible in
unconventional natural gas, thus prompting nat-
ural gas reserve production volume growth.
Based on the gas supply layout involving the
West-East Pipeline, the North to South Gas
Pipeline and the Sea to Land Pipeline, natural gas
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pipeline and reserve facilities were to be con-
structed more rapidly, thereby forming a national
natural gas trunk pipeline network connecting
production regions and consumptions regions.
There was a clear proposal to reach over
120,000 km of natural gas trunk pipeline by
2020.
9.2.2 Policy Catalyses Rapid
Development
of the Natural Gas
Industry
“Several Opinions Regarding Establishing an
Effective Mechanism to Ensure Stable Natural
Gas Supply” proposes acceleration of the
development of natural gas supply, with
400 billion m3 of natural gas supply capability by
2020 and striving to reach 420 billion m3, sup-
porting the progress of the “Coal to Gas” project.
Further support is proposed for various market
entities to participate equally in gas reserve facil-
ity investment, construction, and operation, with
various regions to strengthen their gas reserve
peak shaving facilities, LNG receiving stations,
and storage facilities. “Guiding Opinions of the
NDRCRegardingAcceleration of Progress inGas
Reserve Construction” proposes strengthening
the sense of urgency regarding gas reserve facility
construction, speeding up in-progress construc-
tion and encouraging various ownership models
for construction and operation of gas reserves.Gas
reserve facilities are the guarantee for safe and
stable natural gas operation, and the nation sup-
ports various entities in participating in gas
reserve facility construction, operation and man-
agement, promoting the construction of such
facilities.
9.2.3 The Atmospheric Pollution
Prevention Action Plan
In order to deal with atmospheric pollution and
to improve air quality, the Atmospheric Pollu-
tion Prevention Action Plan was formulated,
which proposes an acceleration of clean energy
substitution, raising supplies of natural gas, coal
natural gas and coalbed methane. By 2015,
newly added natural gas trunk line pipeline
capabilities will reach over 150 billion m3,
offering coverage to Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the
Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta.
Optimisation of natural gas usage methods will
be overseen, adding new natural gas that pref-
erentially ensures residential usage or substitu-
tion of coal, thus encouraging development of
natural gas distributed energy and other highly
efficient utilisation projects while limiting the
development of natural gas chemical engineering
projects. This approach enables an orderly
development of natural gas peak shaving power
stations. Infrastructure for natural gas is an
important assurance for market development,
and the powerful implementation of “Coal to
Gas” has accelerated efforts in infrastructure
construction.
9.2.4 Existing Pipeline Network
Capabilities Are
Insufficient
According to resource support and market demand
analysis, it is expected that by 2020, China’s nat-
ural gas market demand for natural gas will be
400 billion m3, and by 2030 it will be 600 bil-
lion m3. If 1.1 times the demand volume can pro-
vide resource supply assurance, demand volume of
1.15 times shipping capabilities can assure market
distribution. By 2020, pipeline network distribu-
tion capabilities should reach 260 billion m3/year,
and 690 billion m3/year in 2030. As of the end of
2014, China’s resource distribution pipeline net-
work capabilities were 240 billion m3, only satis-
fying 52% of distribution demand expected for
2020 and 35% that of 2030. There is a need to
accelerate promotion of infrastructure construction
to satisfy the needs of market demand.
9.2.5 Peak Shaving Capabilities Are
Severely Lacking
Calculating based on 15% at the storage dissi-
pation ratio, in 2020 China’s natural gas market
demand will be 400 billion m3, and peak shaving
demand will be 60 billion m3. By 2030, peak
shaving demand will be 90 billion m3. Currently,
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underground storage peak shaving capabilities
are only at 4.2 billion m3, and LNG receiving
stations have peak shaving capability of 2.6 bil-
lion m3, calculated based on 0.2 times that steady
distribution of gas at market peak shaving. From
this it is clear that current peak shaving facility
capabilities are far from adequate to meet future
natural gas market peak shaving demand.
9.2.6 Increasing Pressure for Safe
Operations
As natural gas markets continue to grow, infras-
tructure construction is likewise building, and
there is increasing pressure for safe and steady
operations. Currently, China’s trunk pipelines
continue to use a point-to-point resource supply,
with different operators lacking interconnectivity
between their pipelines. Provincial trunk line
investment entities are more diversified, and
pipeline supplies do not intersect. At peak gas
periods, resource allocation is impossible, and
when a pipeline network encounters malfunction
there is no effective energy response approach. In
future, China’s natural gas trunk pipelines should
establish interconnectivity and provincial trunk
lines should be freely allocable.
9.3 Natural Gas Infrastructure
Development Strategy
China’s overall natural gas business and policy
guidance has formulated natural gas develop-
ment objectives, proposing a natural gas infras-
tructure development strategy to guide the rapid
development of natural gas infrastructure.
9.3.1 Guiding Considerations
Taking the safe and stable operation of national
pipeline networks as a target function, infrastruc-
ture construction should be planned to achieve
diversified supply. The aim should be to construct
flexible allocation infrastructure systems,
strengthening gas pipeline hub construction,
speeding up peak shaving facility construction,
establishing interconnectivity and securing gas
supply systems that can be flexibly allocated.
Modern natural gas industry systems need to be
constructed, with stable supply, efficient operation
and co-ordinated upstream, midstream and down-
stream development, and a national unified infras-
tructure development strategy needs to be
established.
9.3.2 Development Objectives
Bearing in mind the guiding considerations for
natural gas infrastructure development, and in
the context of China’s natural gas industry
development, the natural gas infrastructure
development goals for China by 2030 are as
follows:
• Achieve interconnected gas supply systems
for various operators at top-tier natural gas
pipelines. Pipeline network length will reach
150,000 km by 2020, and gas delivery
capability will exceed 460 billion m3.
2030 will see 250,000 km of pipeline net-
work and gas delivery capability of over
690 billion m3.
• Achieve a four-pronged layout that includes
West-East Pipeline, North to South Pipeline,
Sea to Land Pipeline, and local supply. Opti-
mise the natural gas supply and allocation
stations in Ningxia Zhongwei, Hubei, Hebei
Yongqing, Shanghai and Guangdong Wuqu.
Construct six major underground reserve
groups in the central plains region, northern
China, the north-east, in Changqing, in the
north-west and in the south-west. Aim to
achieve 62 billion m3 of peak shaving capa-
bility by 2020, with an effective underground
reserve working volume of 44 billion m3.
Achieve 90 billion m3 of peak shaving capa-
bility by 2030, and an effective underground
reserve working volume of 77 billion m3.
• Establish four major LNG import channels
based on north-west China-Asia imports,
south-west China-Myanmar imports, northern
China-Russia imports and eastern imports.
From 2020 to 2030, achieve 85 billion m3 of
distribution capability on the China-Asia
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Lines A, B, C and D, with 12 billion m3 of
capability on the China-Myanmar line, 38–
68 billion m3 on the China-Russia line, and
100 million tons of receiving capability
through LNG imports.
9.3.3 Development Strategy
In order to guarantee that China’s natural gas
infrastructure is designed for safe and stable
operation, interconnected systems between the
nation’s various entities involved in natural gas
infrastructure should be firmly established. To
strengthen infrastructure construction capabili-
ties, there should be overall planning for facility
construction, building up diversity of investment
and implementation. Finally, in order to improve
infrastructure usage efficiency, fair third-party
access operation and management platforms
should be created.
As natural gas market demand further grows,
China’s natural gas infrastructure must be further
optimised, and by 2020 important pipeline con-
structionmust be completed, including the China-
Russia natural gas pipeline, the West-East Pipe-
line 3,West-East Pipeline 4,West-East Pipeline 5,
Shaanxi-Beijing, Xinjiang coal methane pipeline,
Erdos coal methane, coastal arteries and the
Sichuan-Chongqing-Hubei natural gas pipeline.
There is also a need to bring national pipelines to
150,000 km, with long-distance distribution
pipelines to reach 44,000 km. By 2030, based on
market demand, efforts will intensify in large
pipeline network deployments, with the newly
addedWest-East Pipeline 5,West-East Pipeline 6,
the China-Russia east-west pipeline and con-
struction of at least 250,000 km of national
pipelines with long-distance distribution of up to
60,000 km and gas distribution capabilities to
exceed 690 billion m3.
The ultimate goal in achieving interconnect-
edness between different operating entity
infrastructure is to achieve secure and stable
operations, reasonable resource allocation and
connection between resources and markets and
between gas reserves and markets. The impli-
cations of interconnectivity between the infras-
tructure of various operating entities are:
(1) national long-distance trunk pipelines are
interconnected through hub stations and con-
nection lines; (2) provincial trunk pipelines are
freely allocated through split hubs; (3) under-
ground gas reserves and LNG receiving stations
are connected to national long-distance trunk
pipelines; and (4) neighbouring provincial and
municipal markets form a regional network.
1. National long-distance trunk pipeline
interconnectivity
China’s long-distance trunk pipelines are
primarily constructed by CNPC and Sinopec,
with CNOOC primarily constructing marine gas
shore connection and LNG receiving station
external distribution pipelines. Long-distance
trunk pipeline interconnectivity is not only to
achieve connection with internal pipelines of oil
companies, but also to achieve connection with
pipelines between oil companies. National
long-distance trunk pipeline interconnectivity
relies on pipelines connected by central hubs and
through connection lines.
Forming central hubs: Based on China’s
current natural gas infrastructure development
and future infrastructure development, central
hubs are to form in Ningxia Zhongwei, Hebei
Yongqing, Hubei, Shanghai and Guangdong. As
part of this:
• Ningxia Zhongwei is a point of coalescence
between western resources and eastern distri-
bution, sending western gas to eastern distri-
bution systems, and connecting to theXinjiang
coal methane pipelines and Shaanxi Beijing
line systems, the Zhongwei-Jingbian pipeline,
the Zhonggui Line and other pipelines. This
achieves connection between imported
China-Asia gas, Xinjiang gas fields, Changq-
ing gas fields and Xinjiang coal methane.
• Hebei Yongqing is the hub for northern
China, and connects the Shaanxi-Beijing line,
the China-Russia natural gas pipeline, the
north China gas reserve groups and the
Tianjin-Hebei resource pipeline. In northern
China it adjusts natural gas supply, optimis-
ing natural gas resource allocation and
relieving demand for gas at peak periods.
• Hubei has many national long-distance trunk
pipeline channels, and is the point of
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coalescence for the central and southern
region hubs, forming a connection with
Xinjiang conventional gas, Xinjiang coal
methane, imports from the China-Asia line,
imports from the China-Russia line,
Sichuan-Chongqing conventional gas and
Sichuan-Chongqing shale natural gas.
• Shanghai is China’s natural gas market cen-
tre, and from the perspective of supply
structure, Shanghai is the central hub for
West-East Line 1 and 2, the Sichuan to East
pipeline and other important natural gas lines
while also receivingEast Sea gas and importing
a large volume of LNG. From its characteris-
tics, Shanghai is a natural gas trading centre but
also a national natural gas pricing baseline
location, and in future will become an impor-
tant natural gas hub for China.
• Asan important resourcehub,Guangdong is set
tobecomeapoint of integration formultiplegas
sources. From the perspective of supply struc-
ture, there is pipeline gas,marine gas and LNG,
with pipeline supply including the West-East
Line2, theXin’aozheline, theWest-EastLine3,
marine gas and multiple LNG receiving sta-
tions.Fromtheperspectiveofproperties,supply
resources includeconventionalnaturalgas,coal
methane and LNG.With a variety of resources
coming together, it is a complex province with
national gas sources.
Construction of connection lines: Connec-
tion lines are important complementary resource
bridges between national long-distance trunk
pipelines, with constructed examples being the
Cheng Zhong Gui Line, the Huai Wu Line and
the Ji Ning Line. Of these, the Zhong Gui con-
nects the West-East Pipeline, Changqing gas
fields, Sichuan-Chongqing gas region and the
China-Myanmar pipeline resources. The Huai
Wu line connects the West 1 Line, West 2 Line
and the Zhong Wu Line. The Ji Ning Line
connects the Shaanxi-Beijing Line, the West 1
Line and the Rudong LNG resources.
China’s coastal LNG receiving stations pro-
vide supply essentially point-to-point, with
supply regions and peak shaving capabilities
being limited. Moving forward, the focuses of
construction for connection lines will be along
coastal arteries, with pipelines to connect
receiving stations from Liaoning Dalian LNG to
Guangxi’s North Sea LNG receiving stations,
with intermediary LNG receiving stations, mar-
ine gas to shore pipelines and the transited
national trunk pipelines (Fig. 9.5).
2. Provincial trunk line free allocation
China’s various provincial natural gas
infrastructure entities are diverse, with national
enterprises and private corporations competing
with one another, and without interconnected
business communications, which causes over-
lapping construction of infrastructure, low usage
efficiency and an inability to optimally allocate
resources. Provincial natural gas infrastructure
must form a unified management and operations
platform, carrying out unified planning and
construction for provincial infrastructure while
unifying operations and management, resource
co-ordination and distribution. Provincial trunk
line interconnectivity is required to achieve
flexible allocation of resources and prefecture-
level dual gas source supply deployment.
Current provinces in China that have only one
provincial natural gas company include: Beijing,
Tianjin, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang,
Guangdong, Shaanxi, Anhui, Inner Mongolia,
Hubei and Chongqing. Provinces with two or
more provincial natural gas companies include:
Shanxi, Jiangxi and Hunan. Each provincial nat-
ural gas company’s business model can be cate-
gorised as: unified purchase of resources, agent
distribution, mixed operation, monopolistic con-
struction of infrastructure and free construction.
In order to realise the goals of provincial pipeline
unification planning, provincial trunk line free
allocation and provincial market balanced devel-
opment, each province should actively establish
provincial natural gas companies, with unified
operation and management from the provincial
natural gas companies, whose business models
should be divided into two categories:
• The first category includes provincial trunk
line unified planning, staged implementation
and unified purchase of resources. In order to
avoid overlapping infrastructure construction
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Fig. 9.5 Interconnectivity between various entity natural gas infrastructures across the country
and the resulting inefficiencies, there should
be overall planning for provincial natural gas
infrastructure. Based on the degree of market
development, staged implementation should
take place, with provincial trunk lines and
peak shaving and allocation facilities con-
structed and operated by provincial natural
gas companies. Resource procurement should
be procured in unison by the provincial nat-
ural gas companies, with the natural gas
resources that provincial users require nego-
tiated with the provincial natural gas com-
pany and sold at a standard price that is not
differentiated by distance.
• When infrastructure construction stages are in
line with the above, but provincial companies do
not carry out resource procurement and sales,
the downstream users carry out negotiations
directly with upstream gas suppliers, and gas
suppliers then distribute the natural gas through
the provincial natural gas companies. The
provincial natural gas companies collect a
management and distribution fee, and down-
stream users pay resource fees to the upstream
gas supplier and a distribution fee to the
provincial natural gas company. To safeguard
the interests of users relatively distant from
long-distance pipelines, provincial natural gas
companies provide a uniform price to users
within the province.
3. Underground gas reserves and LNG receiv-
ing station peak shaving co-ordination
Currently, China has two major large peak
shaving facilities. One is underground gas reserves,
and the other is LNG receiving stations. Of these,
the underground gas reserves are distributed across
the mainland and are distributed via pipeline. For
these, the peak shaving principle is to adjust
between long-distant and nearby pipelines. LNG
receiving stations are distributed along the coast-
line, with their peak shaving principle being
adjustment of nearby supplies and liquid adjust-
ments. After 2020, underground reserve peak
shaving will be the primary approach, with auxil-
iary peak shaving from LNG receiving stations.
Two types of peak shaving facilities: Cur-
rently, China’s natural gas peak shaving facility
capabilities are limited and are far from being able
to satisfy future development demands, given that
peak shaving capabilities should reach 62 bil-
lion m3 by 2020 and effective underground gas
reserve volume will need to be 44 billion m3. By
2030, peak shaving capabilities must reach
90 billion m3, with effective underground reserve
volume of 77 billion m3.
Based on China’s current natural gas cir-
cumstances, in future the country’s newly built
underground gas reserves will primarily rely
upon exhausted oil and gas deposits. By 2030 a
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group of six reserves will be formed in the cen-
tral plains region, northern China, the north-east,
in Changqing, in the north-west and in the
south-west. As part of this, the central plains
reserve group connects the Yu Ji Line, Xin’aozhe
Yu Lu Sub-Trunk Line and the West 2 Line
Tai’an Sub-Trunk Line. The northern China
group connects the Shaanxi-Beijing Line and the
China-Russia import pipelines. The north-east
group connects the China-Russia import pipe-
lines. The Changqing group connects the
Shaanxi-Beijing Line and the West-East Pipe-
line. The north-west group connects to the
West-East Pipeline. The south-west group con-
nects the Zhong Gui Line and shale natural gas
external distribution pipelines.
LNG receiving stations are connected through
coastal arteries, and exchange resources with
coastal region natural gas markets during peak
shaving. Using tanker trucks for external distri-
bution, peak shaving is provided for urban fuel
and enterprise LNG reserve gas.
Regional peak shaving method distribution
and options: Reserve facilities for natural gas are
an important measure used to ensure the safe and
stable supply of natural gas, and form an integral
component part of natural gas delivery systems.
Currently, the construction of gas reserve capa-
bility is lagging seriously behind, and according
to national natural gas pipeline network layouts,
the construction of such facilities should be
accelerated, aiming to ensure that natural gas
peak shaving emergency response requirements
are met. In long-distance pipelines, details must
be determined according to specific local needs,
ensuring reasonable deployments, clear focal
points and staged implementation of accessory
construction of peak shaving facilities.
There was relatively early construction of gas
reserve facilities in provinces and cities, includ-
ing Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning,
Jilin, Heilongjiang and Shandong, and these
regions have good foundations. Moving forward,
the focus will be on gradual optimisation of
existing gas reserves and newly built under-
ground reserves, complemented by small and
medium LNG facilities and LNG receiving sta-
tion storage. In conjunction with existing gas
storage facilities, there will be optimised con-
struction within exhausted oil deposits in Liaohe,
Dagang, North China, Daqing and Shengli,
including Liaohe Shuang 6, Qi 13, Shengliyong
21, Dagangban South, North China Su 1, Gong
20, Su 4, Su 49, Guxinzhuang, Wen 23, Saqing
and Jilin oil fields.
Gas reserve facility conditions are relatively
poor in Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Priority
should be given to constructing LNG reservoirs,
with underground storage and small and medium
reserves as auxiliary peak shaving systems. Pri-
mary projects include the Jiangsu salt cavern gas
reserve and the Jiangsu oil field exhausted oil
deposit gas reserve. Prior to 2015, the focus had
been on LNG gas reserves, relying on Jiangsu
and Zhejiang existing LNG receiving station
expansions to grow LNG reserves, thereby
forming an LNG gas reserve system comprising
Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan and
Yunnan have focused on LNG receiving station
reserves, with small and medium storage and
underground gas reserves, as well as small and
medium liquefaction facilities providing auxiliary
support. This region is working to construct an
LNG reserve system prior to 2015 that is based on
the LNG receiving station expansions in Fujian,
Guangdong and Hainan, so as to satisfy regional
peak shaving demand. Prior to 2030, once a rea-
sonable network has been established, new LNG
receiving stations will be constructed to increase
gas reserve capabilities, while at the same time
building a certain amount of underground gas
reserve working gas volume, thereby establishing
multiple interrelated peak shaving measures that
satisfy local gas reserve system needs and the
needs of the surrounding region.
Anhui, Hubei and Hunan have a certain
amount of advantageous geography, and can
mainly construct underground gas reserves, with
auxiliary peak shaving systems of LNG small
and medium reserves and small and medium
liquefaction facilities. Major projects include
Hubei Yingcheng, Yunying and Huangchang salt
cavern gas reserves.
Shanxi, Henan, and Sichuan must use
exhausted oil and gas deposits to build
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underground gas reserves while at the same time
using upstream gas fields to resolve a portion of
peak shaving problems. This is supplemented by
peak shaving of users that can have supplies
halted and small and medium liquefaction facility
peak shaving. Major projects include
Zhongyuanwen 23, Zhongyuanwen 96 and
South-West Xiangguosi, among other exhausted
oil and gas deposit gas reserves.
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xin-
jiang are focused primarily on underground gas
reserves for their gas reserve systems, building
gas reserves from exhausted oil and gas deposits,
including in Xinjiang Hutubi and Yulin.
4. Regional networks between provinces
Due to administrative zoning and approval
procedures, regional pipeline networks are pri-
marily concentrated within provinces (with the
exception of long-distance pipelines and con-
nection lines that run between provinces),
resulting in relatively large differences in natural
gas consumption between neighbouring provin-
cial economies. In future, government guidance
and support for construction of trunk line con-
nections between provinces will allow resource
supplementation, and thus boost the development
of regional natural gas markets and optimise the







Infrastructure development involves foreign
import pipelines, LNG receiving stations,
national trunk long-distance pipelines, provincial
pipelines and underground gas reserves, among
other facilities. As part of this, pipeline network
construction is critical to developing the natural
gas market, but currently China’s natural gas
infrastructure is primarily constructed and
operated by three large oil companies that have
not established effective interconnectivity. As
infrastructure continues to be optimised and
interconnection of infrastructure deployments
becomes critical to ensuring the secure and stable
operation of the national natural gas network,
effective infrastructure interconnection will
become increasingly important, with the con-
struction of Xin’aozhe, the West 4 Line, West 5
Line, China-Russia East-West Line, coastal
receiving stations and underground gas reserves.
Only with effective co-ordination in planning
stages to form a complete industry chain can
effective infrastructure connectivity be realised.
Therefore, government intervention is required to
create entities to oversee infrastructure con-
struction and to strengthen oversight and controls
of such development.
The major reason for a low degree of infras-
tructure planning is the lack of review mecha-
nisms for planning construction projects. There is
planning for projects, but no subsequent
follow-up regarding progress in project imple-
mentation. A review needs to be carried out of
enterprises involved in the planning of infras-
tructure projects at the national level, reviewing
project implementation progress and timeline
goal completion, taking measures to reward and
penalise as required. A review should also be
carried out for departments involved in provin-
cial infrastructure, with consistent review criteria;
provincial departments should actively imple-
ment relevant work involving the planning of
provincial projects, working hard to co-operate
and creating review systems for units under their
supervision to promote active construction of
infrastructure and optimise the outcomes of the
practical work.
9.4.2 Promote Construction of
Entities and Investment
Diversification
The country encourages and supports various
forms of capital participation and investment
structure in the central planning of natural gas
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infrastructure. The three major oil companies
should release investment and construction rights
to national trunk pipelines, introducing private
capital. Some of the provincial natural gas
company monopolies on provincial infrastructure
construction need to be broken. The introduction
of private capital to infrastructure construction
can increase participation in construction and
improve the capacity for it.
The construction of CNPC West 3 Line
brought together equity from the national social
insurance fund council, an urban infrastructure
industry investment fund and Baosteel Group,
diverging from the previous model of investment
contribution that was monopolised by CNPC’s
own investments and for the first time allowing
private capital to be included in natural gas
long-distance pipeline construction. The planned
West 4 Line, West 5 Line and Xin’aozhe, among
other national natural gas trunk pipelines, should
carry out joint investment construction with pri-
vate capital, based on the West 3 Line model.
The uniformity seen in national long-distance
pipeline construction entities has not yet been
disrupted completely, though, and entities out-
side the three major oil companies should be
introduced to diversify investment in the nation’s
long-distance pipelines.
Provinces with provincial natural gas compa-
nies should co-operate actively in investments
with qualified private capital, accelerating the
construction of provincial infrastructure. Pro-
vince sub-trunk pipeline construction rights
should be fully opened, and permission should be
granted for qualified enterprises to construct and
operate infrastructure within the ambit of
national and local government planning.
9.5 Establishing Fair Third-Party
Access to Infrastructure
9.5.1 Create the Conditions
for Third-Party Access
As at the end of 2014, China had put into oper-
ation 16 natural gas national trunk pipelines,
over 80 national sub-trunk pipelines, 11 LNG
receiving stations and 19 underground gas
reserves. There are no statistics available
regarding the operating conditions of most
infrastructure. By using open and fair operating
systems, it would become possible to learn about
infrastructure operating conditions, and excess
capabilities could be put to use. When natural gas
pipeline network facility operators have excess
pipeline network facility capabilities, they can
fairly open their pipeline network facilities to
third parties, providing delivery, storage, gasifi-
cation, liquefaction and compression services. In
this mutually beneficial scenario, good use of can
be made of facility capabilities while ensuring
that existing users continue to have access to
services, with a preferential order based on
signed contracts with newly added users so as to
realise fair, non-discriminatory open usage of
natural gas pipeline network facilities.
Considering the fact that third-party access
conditions are not yet mature, barriers between
companies are difficult to eliminate, though some
suggestions to catalyse third-party access are as
follows:
• Construct third-party review institutions
to fairly and equitably verify excess
infrastructure capabilities: Considering the
lack of transparency regarding infrastructure
excess capabilities and the difficulties
involved in downstream user verification,
which result from asymmetry in information,
third-party independent verification institu-
tions should be established in order to fairly
and equitably verify oil and gas pipeline
infrastructure, storage, gasification, liquefac-
tion and compression excess capability.
• Pipeline network independence: Currently,
infrastructure enterprises provide transmis-
sion, storage, gasification, liquefaction and
compression services while at the same time
having businesses such as exploration and
sales. This has resulted in local or partial
monopolies within the natural gas industry at
its various stages of development. Partition
production shipping and sales business. At
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the sales stage, break the monopolies to
achieve highly efficient infrastructure usage.
At the same time, due to the uniqueness of
natural gas shipping and the heavy reliance on
pipeline networks, separate national pipeline
networks into several independent pipeline
networks, with competition and co-operation
between and among them to achieve highly
efficient infrastructure utilisation.
• Enterprise establishment and implementa-
tion measures: On June 24, 2014, CNPC
reviewed and passed in principle the CNPC
Natural Gas Group Oil and Gas Pipeline
Network Infrastructure Open Access Imple-
mentation Measures (Pilot), stipulating that
oil and gas pipeline network facilities be
fairly opened, as well as assigning manage-
ment responsibilities to the relevant depart-
ments. Each enterprise should establish and
implement measures based on its own
infrastructure operating capabilities, operating
costs and operating scope, including time
used, scope and price.
• Infrastructure interconnectivity, fee rates
and liberalised market operation: Through
connectivity between pipelines and other
infrastructure, break through natural gas
transmission stage monopolies. Pipeline
transmission fees should be liberalised in







According to the Natural Gas Development
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, natural gas infrastruc-
ture interconnectivity and services for third-party
access should be implemented. At the end of the
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, China will achieve
partial connectivity of its pipelines, and have the
conditions in place to achieve third-party access.
The utilisation of excess infrastructure capa-
bility cannot be entirely resolved simply by
establishing operating entities, and each facility’s
operations can only be fully understood by the
operating entity, with third parties unable to
obtain information about them. Therefore, open
and transparent oil and gas management and
operation release platforms must be established, to
cover all existing excess capacity in the infras-
tructure, with operators allowing third-party
access to terms and fees, and operator-related
contact information. Third parties should carry out
specific negotiations with operators based on their
needs. Because the status of infrastructure opera-
tors can be variable, they should provide the latest
data relating to their infrastructure operations to
the platforms, and the platform can then provide
timely updates that are publicly available.
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10Analysis of China’s Peak Shavingand Natural Gas Storage Systems
Natural gas security is one of the core components
of energy security, and is an important component
part of national security. Experience in many
nations has shown that the establishment of a
robust natural gas storage and peak shaving sys-
tem is an effectivemeans to address short-term and
mid-term natural gas supply halts and to ensure
natural gas industry stable operation as well as
stability in the economy and society itself. As
China’s natural gas demand continues to grow,
scaling up this infrastructure in various ways and
reasonable deployments of effective
emergency-response natural gas reserve systems is
the direction and long-term goal of China.
10.1 Importance of Natural Gas
Reserves for Peak Shaving
As China’s economy continues to grow quickly
and living standards are rising, as a clean,
high-quality and efficient energy, natural gas’s
share of China’s energy consumption is gradually
increasing. Since the official completion in 2004
of the West-East Pipeline project, natural gas
consumption has rapidly expanded, and in 2014 it
reached 183 billion m3, more than a double the
figure in 2004. At the same time, China’s natural
gas transmission pipeline network is also con-
tinually growing and being optimised, with nat-
ural gas now among main energies used in urban
operations and development and involved in daily
lives and urban economic functions. If natural gas
supply encounters a shortage or halts, this sig-
nificantly affects lives and the security of society.
In recent years, China has seen some major
shortfalls in natural gas supply in some regions,
with winter shortages even leading to a lack of
supply for urban residential heating or for taxis
wanting to refuel. As a result, ensuring natural
gas supply security is of utmost political and
economic significance for gas supply enterprises
and the cities that use gas. Establishing a natural
gas peak shaving reserve emergency response
system that corresponds to the scale of city
demand is an important undertaking for the sake
of China’s natural gas supply security.
Systems of natural gas involve upstream pro-
duction, midstream transmission and downstream
utilisation stages, and if any stage exhibits prob-
lems, this will affect the stable operation of the
entire system. Because downstream users include
residents, public services, commerce, industry,
power plants, vehicles and air conditioning unit
users, various types of user use gas in their own
patterns, resulting in fluctuations in gas usage that
can result in peaks and troughs in demand.
Moreover, the room for production adjustments
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in upstream production is limited, and normally
20% additional gas volume can be provided at
most, making it difficult to satisfy actual peak
demand. Therefore, it is necessary to establish
peak shaving emergency response facilities to
satisfy the peak demand and to deal with sudden
gas supply halts.
China’s large-scale use of natural gas has only
just begun, and natural gas reserve construction
is still in its early stages. From the perspective of
current development, as China’s gas usage
grows, the requirements for secure supply will
grow. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate
China’s natural gas market development layout
and reserve facility construction, and also to
learn from overseas experience in constructing
natural gas reserve systems.
10.2 Issues and Challenges
10.2.1 Rapid Increase in Natural Gas
Consumption and Peak
Period Demand
1. China’s natural gas demand continues
to grow
China’s natural gas consumption growth has
been rapid. As China’s natural gas resource
exploration and development continues to see
breakthroughs, proved reserves and production
volumes are rising, especially in the
Shaanxi-Beijing line, West-East Pipeline and
other project locations that are currently involved
in commercial operation. China’s natural gas
industry has entered a stage of rapid growth, and
natural gas consumption markets are expanding
quickly, with natural gas accounting for an
ever-rising proportion of energy consumption
structure. In 2014, China’s natural gas con-
sumption volume reached 183 billion m3, mark-
ing a six-fold increase over 2000, and annual
average growth of 15%. The proportion of nat-
ural gas among non-renewable energy con-
sumption structure has risen from 2.3 to 6%.
For a significant period into the future, as
China’s emerging industrialisation and
urbanisation accelerates, there will be increasing
pressure to improve regional environmental
quality and to deal with climate change, actively
adjusting energy structures to promote energy
conservation and emissions reductions. This is
especially true for atmospheric pollution pre-
vention and other environmental protection
policies that will be the major policy direction of
China in the future, powerfully developing nat-
ural gas and other low-carbon energies. This is
already a strategic task in the sustainable devel-
opment of energy in China.
China’s natural gas demand will continue to
grow rapidly, leading to it becoming one of the
major consuming nations of natural gas in the
world. The research team believes that in a
baseline scenario, natural gas demand in 2015 is
likely to approach 200 billion m3, surpass
300 billion m3 in 2020, exceed 450 billion m3 in
2030, and exceed 600 billion m3 in 2050. In a
policy environment of implementation of more
active and effective environmental and energy
transitioning (such as carrying out carbon trading
or collecting a carbon tax), China’s demand in
2020 could reach 344.7 billion m3, essentially
reaching the goal of 350 billion m3 noted in the
12th Five-Year Plan. By 2030, consumption
volume would be likely to reach 580 billion m3,
and approach 800 billion m3 by 2050.
2. Urban fuel grows fast, as does peak
period demand
Since 2000, China’s natural gas consumption
structure has tended toward diversification, with
urban fuel becoming the fastest-growing sector
of gas usage. From 2000 to 2013, China’s urban
fuel natural gas rose from 4.3 to 73.2 billion m3,
with the proportion of total consumption volume
rising from 17.6 to 40%. Moving forward, with
emerging urbanisation and industrialisation
requiring more energy support, and at the same
time as ecological cultural construction is
strengthening efforts in lifestyle improvements
and environmental protection, urban gas in China
is set to be pushed toward continued rapid
growth in four respects in particular:
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• newly added natural gas users, accelerating
the use of LPG and artificial coalbed methane
as a replacement in residential gas usage;
• changes made by multiple provinces in rela-
tion to coal boiler standards for PM2.5, with
increased gas use for heating;
• gas used in transportation and other accom-
panying infrastructure, which will see rapid
rises; and
• distributed energy projects that will succes-
sively enter production.
The rapid growth in urban fuel has greatly
increased natural gas peak demand. In recent years,
in order to improve atmospheric environment
quality, northern Chinese regions such as Beijing
and Tianjin have developed large quantities of
natural gas heating users, including large gas
power plants, gas boilers and residential
wall-installed heaters. Winter season natural gas
usage has skyrocketed. Taking Beijing as an
example, its heating season (November–March
each year) accounts for approximately 76% of
annual gas usage, with winter and summer peak
and trough having a ratio of 12.5:1. Currently,
eastern Chinese region winter seasons have yet to
implement residential heading, but they also exhi-
bit seasonal characteristics, as peak values occur in
the hot summer period and there is a peak to trough
ratio of 1.6:1. CNPC’s West-East Pipeline
company has calculated winter peak demand based
on northern and eastern Chinese region natural gas
usage load curves, and the two regions’ seasonal
peak demands are respectively 31 and 4% of
annual gas usage volume (Table 10.1).
In the future, as various regions increase
usage of gas heating, seasonal peaks and troughs
will continue to increase. According to forecast
data by CNPC in 2013 for China’s various
regional natural gas demands, as well as com-
parative operation of peak shavings in northern
and eastern regions in China, it is possible to
calculate China’s natural gas peak demand
potential. By 2020, natural gas seasonal peal
demand will reach 45 billion m3, rising to
76 billion m3 in 2030. In addition, as gas heating
and electricity proportions increase, daily peaks
and hourly peaks, among a wide range of prob-
lems, will also appear, and must be comprehen-
sively resolved.
10.2.2 Gas Reserve Peak Shaving
Capabilities Insufficient
1. Great advances in gas reserve facility
construction
Reserve natural gas peak shaving facilities are
an important component part of natural gas














Circum-Bohai 630 31 195 1102 31 342
North-east 280 31 87 522 31 162
North-west 245 31 76 348 31 108
Yangtze River
Delta
595 4 24 928 4 37
South-east coast 595 4 24 870 4 35
South China 385 4 15 870 4 35
South-west 455 4 18 638 4 26
Mid-west 315 4 13 522 4 21
Total 3500 452 5800 764
Data source 2020 data from CNPC Planning Institute, 2030 data from study group arrangements
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transmission system projects. They not only
ensure stable pipeline supply but are also integral
to strategic reserves and commercial cycles. They
are important measures to ensuring the secure
and stable supply of natural gas.
China’s large-scale gas storage construction
began in 1999 with the commencement of the
Shaanxi-Beijing Pipeline, in order to resolve
imbalances in Beijing’s seasonal gas usage and
to relieve peak demand, with subsequent large
power gas reserve groups and northern China gas
reserve groups. Later, along with the construc-
tion of the West-East Pipeline, construction of
the Jinyun and Liuzhuang storage facilities also
began, so that West-East Pipeline market users
could use gas as expected. From 2013, China’s
gas reserve construction saw major progress, and
existing gas reserve working gas volume capa-
bility is 17.3 billion m3, approaching 10% of
natural gas consumption volume. As far as gas
reserve capabilities are concerned, there is still a
gap to the global average of 11.3%.
According to the national Natural Gas
Development 12th Five-Year Plan, in the next
5–10 years China will continue to heavily pro-
mote underground gas reserve construction:
“accompanying construction of gas reserve peak
shaving facilities are required along long-
distance pipelines according to local require-
ments, with reasonable deployments and clear
points of focus, implementing staged construc-
tion”. It is likely that by about 2020, China’s gas
reserve total working gas capabilities will exceed
30 billion m3 (Table 10.2).
LNG commercial reserve capabilities have
begun to take shape. As a large quantity of LNG
receiving capability comes online, LNG com-
mercial storage in the receiving station, transfer
state commercial storage and urban peak shaving
LNG storage is receiving increasing attention.
Currently, China has yet to have a guiding
strategy for LNG reserves, and the country’s
various large first-stage LNG receiving station
designs likewise lack commercial storage beyond
ensuring basic load supply. However, they can
absorb spot LNG at low prices and release at
high prices, while at the same time ensuring that
supply security in commercial reserves remains a
major point of further development. This is
especially true for small and medium-sized LNG
receiving and transfer centres, which have rela-
tively small annual transfer capabilities, and
approval procedures that are relatively simple. If
projects and existing large LNG receiving sta-
tions could interconnect, this would not involve
LNG import approvals, and would be somewhat
simpler, and thus it is currently a focus in the
industry. Prior to 2013, China only had two
projects in operation, Shanghai Wuhaogou and
Dongguan Jiufeng, with annual receiving capa-
bilities of 1.5 million tons in total. China now
has more than 10 in-construction, reported or
planned LNG receiving and transfer centre pro-
jects, and there has been active enthusiasm for
investment and construction from local energy
companies and private corporations.
In addition to LNG receiving station accom-
panying construction of reserve facilities, urban
fuel is also gradually becoming a major force in
LNG reserves. China currently has a certain
amount of LNG volume in reserve stations in
Beijing, Shanghai, Changsha, Wuhan, Xi’an and
Chengdu, ranging from several hundred to over
100,000 m3.
China’s commercial reserves are in their
infancy, but strategic gas reserves have just
begun to build, with only Xinjiang Hutubi rep-
resenting a functioning large-scale underground
strategic gas reserve.
2. Gas usage load region peak shaving
capabilities are insufficient
Even though there has been some progress in
gas reserve facility construction, nonetheless
current peak capabilities are still markedly
insufficient. Because large-capacity reserves such
as Hutubi, Xiangguosi, Suqiao and Jinyun have
only been built in the past two years and are still
in the gas injection stage, peak shaving capabili-
ties are as yet insufficient, and designed working
gas volume is hard-pressed to come into full play.
Currently, winter peak shaving primarily relies
upon gas reserves, LNG, gas fields and pressure
reduction market gas volumes among other joint
peak shaving approaches. Gas field adjustments
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and pressure reduction markets are still the two
major modes of peak shaving. For example, in
2012 with its total peak shaving volume of
12.8 billion m3, gas reserve contributions accoun-
ted for 16%, LNG for 24%, gas field peak shavings
28% and pressure reduction markets 31%.
Regions with the largest variance between gas
usage peaks and troughs have the most marked
shortfalls in peak shaving. The region surround-
ing the Bohai Sea is the region with China’s
largest gap between peak and trough, and peak
shaving demand is significant. According to
forecasts, even if currently constructed and
under-construction gas reserves were all suc-
cessfully established, in 2015 there would still be
a shortfall in peak demand of 3.1 billion m3,
which will grow to 4.3 billion m3 by 2020. There
are relatively many oil and gas fields around the
Bohai region, and there are good conditions for
selection of reserve sites. However, there are not
many high-quality gas reserve site locations, and
the decision can be difficult and the investment
requirements high. If the issue of gas peak
shaving cannot be resolved, winter peak shaving
gas collection capabilities will fall short and
major problems could arise.
3. Pronounced problems with gas reserve
prices and operation mechanisms
Gas reserve facilities are unable to unilaterally
create prices, and newly constructed gas reserve
facilities are restricted in their development.
Currently, China’s gas reserves have been sup-
plemented by pipeline facilities and lack inde-
pendent pricing. Gas reserve stage investments
and costs are all linked to pipeline economic
efficiency calculations, and corresponding trans-
fer fees are incorporated into pipeline transmis-
sion fees, collected together with pipeline
transmission fees, and there is no natural gas
pricing system to independently establish an item
for “gas reserve fees”. For example, in 2003 the
NDRC announced that the average shipping
price (including gas reserve fees) for West-East
Pipeline line-wide pipelines was 0.79 CNY/m3.
Prior to the 12th Five-Year Plan, underground
gas reserve investments were generally
incorporated and collected through pipeline
investments as pipeline transmission fees, and gas
reserve construction and investment did not have
accompanying peak shaving gas prices and
transfer fee policies. The nation invested in natural
gas commercial reserve facilities, with construc-
tion investments (including baseline gas) and 30%
working gas procurement expenses in the formof a
rebated income tax that was paid for by the nation,
with assets belonging to the group or company and
gas reserve and shipping fees assumed by the
enterprise. In its guiding opinions regarding
acceleration of gas reserve facility construction,
the NDRC noted that a reserve price must be
established for independently operated gas reserve
facilities, but the policy was not implemented.
Gas reserve facility and long-distance pipeline
bundled operation affect long-term development.
China’s natural gas industry is still in the oper-
ational mode of having a unified upstream,
midstream and downstream. Production, ship-
ping, storage and sale of natural gas is primarily
operated and managed by CNPC, Sinopec and
other large oil companies. Gas reserves are sim-
ilar to the early stage of operations in the United
States and Europe, and with pipeline auxiliary
facilities bundled along with pipelines, there is
no independent stage for the natural gas industry
chain development. Even though after 2010 there
were national investments into construction of
gas reserves, nonetheless gas reserve operational
models have not undergone fundamental chan-
ges. Currently, China’s gas reserves are primarily
used to co-ordinate supply and demand and peak
shavings, as well as for optimisation of produc-
tion and pipeline network operations, including
emergency response and strategic reserves.
4. Peak shaving and emergency response
assurance mechanisms await
improvements
Responsibilities for gas reserve peak shaving
are unclear. Currently, China’s accountability for
natural gas industry chain peak shaving at each
stage is unclear, and this causes a divesting of
responsibility in emergency natural gas peak
shaving within the natural gas industry chain.
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Currently, upstream enterprise peak shaving
tasks are excessively challenging, as they not
only assume responsibility for regional and sea-
sonal adjustments to gas supply, but also for
daily adjustments in key regions. At the same
time, China’s natural gas emergency response
reserve construction investment mechanisms
need to be optimised, as they lack the necessary
pricing mechanisms and incentive policies. This
has led to lack of enthusiasm in the natural gas
industry chain upstream, midstream and down-
stream, causing severe limitations to winter sea-
son natural gas peak shaving abilities.
An effective natural gas warning mechanism
and emergency response mechanism have yet to
be established. Warning forecasts and emergency
response mechanisms are important measures for
short-term halts of energy supply. Currently,
China has yet to optimise mature operating
mechanisms in this regard.
In addition, China also lacked progress in
matters such as participation in international
energy security co-operative frameworks. China
has co-operative relationships with essentially all
global and regional energy organisations, but not
much substantive co-operation, which is not
helpful when it comes to using international
efforts to co-ordinate dealing with energy secu-
rity risks. Overseas oil and gas resource
co-operations lack effective emergency response
mechanisms for sudden incidents, and robust
political, foreign relation, economic and even
military means are lacking to tackle anti-terrorist
emergency response systems and many other
plans. As soon as an incident occurs, the nation





Comprehensively implement overall national
security requirements, making natural gas supply
security an important component part of national
security while accelerating deployment of robust
and reasonable reserve systems appropriate to the
size of the market. As soon as possible, build
prompt and flexible warning systems for emer-
gency response, constantly improving China’s
natural gas supply assurance capabilities, risk
avoidance and handling abilities.
10.3.2 Major Objectives
Based on the scale of China’s future natural gas
consumption, current natural gas reserve peak
shaving capabilities, underground gas reserve
resource conditions and progress in the con-
struction of LNG receiving stations, and with
reference to overseas major natural
gas-consuming nation experience, this research
proposes some 2020 and 2030 objectives for the
natural gas commercial and strategic reserve
sector in China, as well as emergency response
system construction objectives.
In 2020, establish underground gas reserves
and LNG reserve integrated peak shaving systems
with underground reserves of approximately
50 billion, and LNG reserves of 5–10 billion for a
total gas facility working volume of 35–40 bil-
lion. This will account for up to 10–11% of total
natural gas consumption volume, changing the
current peak shaving method, which is primarily
focused on pressure to force reduction of user
demand. At the same time, establish an emer-
gency response mechanism for China’s natural
gas as soon as possible, optimising special project
emergency response preparation plans, establish-
ing warning systems for emergency response and
ensuring key region gas supply security.
In 2030, further expand the scale and capa-
bilities of the reserve peak shaving system, with
gas facility working volume to reach 65 billion
and account for 12% of natural gas consumption
volume at that time, reaching global levels. With
regard to 2030 natural gas import scale, strategic
reserves should reach approximately 5% of
import volume. In keeping with large-scale and
full coverage for national natural gas market
demands, form effective emergency response
reserve systems for fluctuations in natural gas
supply and demand.
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10.4 Recommendations
for Developing Natural
Reserves for Peak Shaving
10.4.1 Accelerate the Formulation
of Natural Gas Peak
Shaving Emergency
Response Plans
In recent years, some regions in China have
encountered frequent gas shortages during the
winter season, clearly exposing China’s lack of
development in natural gas peak shaving reserve
facilities, compared to the rapid development of
the natural gas market as a whole. In order to
guarantee natural gas supply security and the
secure operation of the economy, accelerated
construction should be pursued by the nation and
provincial and municipal governments as well as
enterprises to jointly participate in the construc-
tion of a top-down natural gas peak shaving
emergency reserve system and management
system and mechanisms.
It is recommended that national natural gas
authorities accelerate the drafting of natural gas
peak shaving emergency response reserve plans,
making good use of local and enterprise enthu-
siasm for involvement, ensuring the scale of
reserve objectives, the number of emergency
reserve days, and deployment and location
selection while also incorporating the mid- to
long-term natural gas planning of the national
and provincial 13th Five-Year Plan. Some
underground gas reserve and LNG reserve con-
struction projects meeting certain conditions
should be incorporated into the overall frame-
work for national natural gas reserves.




Optimise as quickly as possible the nation’s
corresponding policies and legislation, ensuring
that natural gas reserves have good external
policy environments from a systemic perspective
so as to encourage enterprises to construct
reserve facilities, and carry out research on
innovative mechanisms for the reserve operation
model. Based on foreign experience, formulate
China’s natural gas reserve management statutes
and reserve laws, clarifying reserve organisation
and management institutions and their account-
abilities and obligations. For example, in the
United States’ Natural Gas Act (1983), it was
prescribed that the FPC regulates interstate nat-
ural gas pipelines, while each state government is
responsible for overseeing state natural gas
pipelines. China’s natural gas authorities should
oversee the formulation of plans and policies and
carry out regulation of gas reserve facility
third-party access, gas reserve prices, reserve
usage, emergency mobilisation and corporate
operational actions. Enterprise operations and
user consumption should be lawfully operated
within reasonable frameworks of law and regu-
lation, avoiding abuse of market strengths and
promoting effective competition within the
market.
Use national laws to clarify the requirements
for each level of government, upstream enter-
prise and fuel enterprise and their responsibilities
and obligations in the natural gas reserve system.
Implement stepped reserve management systems.
The nation is responsible for the strategic
reserves of natural gas. Natural gas upstream
enterprises assume responsibilities and obliga-
tions for seasonable peak shaving and emergency
response reserves. Reserve facilities are invested,
built and operated by those enterprises, and each
province and city’s gas enterprises assume daily
and hourly peak responsibilities and obligations,
with the necessary peak shaving gas reserves
being invested in, constructed and operated by
those enterprises.




The first task is to accelerate construction of
large-scale gas reserves and LNG storage tanks
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that can satisfy seasonal peak shaving demands.
In northern China, the north-east and the
north-west, seasonal peaks and troughs are sig-
nificant, and there are ample gas reserve loca-
tions for resources. First, underground gas
reserves should be established, supplemented by
LNG, small and medium liquefaction facilities
and LNG receiving stations for seasonal peak
shaving systems. In central China and the
south-west, among other regions with good
geographical conditions and nearby oil produc-
tion areas, use exhausted oil and gas deposits to
build underground gas reserves while at the same
time using upstream gas fields, with a supple-
ment from small and medium-sized liquefaction
facilities. In eastern China, southern China and
other locations with relatively poor environments
for underground reserves, construction of LNG
reserve storage should be a focus, supplemented
by underground gas reserves and small and
medium-sized storage for peak shaving systems.
The second focus is to construct small peak
shaving facilities that can satisfy daily peak
demand for gas. In central load gas-using cities,
give full play to city fuel companies, accelerating
construction of small LNG reserves, CNG tanks
and accessory gas reserve facilities to resolve city
daily peak shaving demands.
The third focus is to construct natural gas
emergency response reserve systems. Clarify
natural gas upstream production enterprise and
city fuel company emergency reserve responsi-
bilities. Rely upon and expand large reserves of
gas, LNG storage and small tank reserves among
other facility construction scope, accelerating the
establishment of natural gas commercial reserves
and satisfying issues of regional supply halt gas
demand.
The fourth issue to address is to study the
strategy for establishing suitably scaled natural
gas reserves. From a global perspective, natural
gas has not experienced a supply crisis on a
global scale such as the oil crisis, and natural gas
security issues are not yet pronounced. However,
compared to oil, natural gas has a high degree of
unification in the upstream, midstream and
downstream. As part of this, if any stage has
problems, it will affect the entire chain of natural
gas supply security, and there are major potential
risks. The 2009 dispute between Russia and
Ukraine is one such example of the danger.
Therefore, China should develop research into
natural gas strategic reserves as quickly as pos-
sible upon the basis of properly handling com-
mercial reserves, so as to determine the layout in
the mid- to long term for natural gas security
issues, making plans early and establishing nat-
ural gas strategic reserve scale and models suited
to China.
10.4.4 Formulate Proactive Tax
and Price Policies
Establish reasonable gas reserve pricing mecha-
nisms. The pricing stage in gas reserves must
ensure that gas reserve investment and operation
costs are recovered while guaranteeing that gas
reserve enterprises obtain a reasonable return. On
the other hand, standard service and fair com-
petition must be promoted among gas reserve
enterprises. The United States has developed
peak period/off-peak period or seasonal gas
reserve pricing based on service cost pricing
approaches that has to a certain degree reduced
the risk of imbalance in gas reserve services. In
order to promote gas reserve service competition,
the United States has also developed market
demand pricing approaches. These pricing
approaches have improved services to make
them more suited to gas reserves, ensuring that
gas reserve service providers obtain reasonable
economic rewards. China should formulate
pricing mechanisms suited to the current state of
development of the natural gas industry at the gas
reserve stage. Based on the operating costs for
gas reserves/storage facilities, and based on
government-determined internal rates of return
calculations, the government can determine price
levels and for each interval of time carry out an
assessment and adjustment on gas reserve prices.
Commence differential pricing based on peak
and off-peak periods, expressing natural gas
value during peak periods. It is recommended
that China implement differential pricing for
various users during peak and off-peak periods,
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thereby guiding reasonable consumption,
achieving a minimisation of peak and off-peak
limits and improving system operation efficiency.
The peak and off-peak pricing difference in the
United States and France is generally 1.2–1.5
fold, determining January–February and
November–December as the peak periods for gas
usage. By implementing peak gas usage prices,
price levels rise from base amounts.
Formulate discount policies and measures to
encourage enterprises to construct reserve facili-
ties. Because the construction expenditure for
emergency reserve facilities can be enormous,
along with major costs for the procurement of
reserves and daily operating expenses, and
because the main function is to satisfy seasonal
peak shaving supply demand, it is recommended
that the government put in place specific prefer-
ential policies for construction expenses related
to facilities for peak shaving reserves. This could,
for example, be similar to the approach taken
with commercial product oil reserves, with
upstream suppliers enabled to use 30% of LNG
reserve costs to construct LNG peak shaving
emergency response equipment as a rebate in
payable income taxes. This is aimed at encour-
aging upstream suppliers to construct suitable
amounts of LNG reserves so as to deal with
temporary supply cuts or extra volume during
peak demand periods.
10.4.5 Accelerate Gas Reserve
Management System
Reforms
System reforms include business unbundling,
independent settlement and promotion of
state-owned oil company gas reserve model
reforms. Currently, the United States and Euro-
pean nation gas reserve operations have devel-
oped into entirely free-market independent
business models, but the model must be within a
competitive market environment, including for
natural gas supply, shipment and storage stages,
which must have many market participants who
respect market rules and form a market envi-
ronment with fair competition.
Considering the current circumstances of
China’s natural gas industry, future gas reserve
operations could first employ a business model
without full market liberalisation by establishing
a gas reserve operating company within CNPC
that is financially independent from the pipeline
transmission business, thereby becoming an
independent stage of the industry chain. As an
independent profit-making entity, the gas
reserves company can help facilitate the profes-
sionalisation of the gas reserve business and
liberalise the market, while also helping to
facilitate individual pricing at the gas reserve
stage. As China’s gas reserve business rapidly
grows, it will be partitioned from the pipeline
transmission business to become a stage of the
industry chain that operates and develops
independently.
Gas reserve peak shaving facility construction
and operation diversification should be encour-
aged. Establish a diverse portfolio of entities as
part of a gas reserve system, including
state-owned oil companies, urban fuel companies
and independently operated gas reserve compa-
nies. This will be beneficial in ensuring that
natural gas supply security and gas reserve
capabilities can rapidly grow. Looking at the
American experience, this achieved natural gas
reserve peak shaving commercialisation to a very
high degree, with management and operation
entities including interstate and intrastate pipeline
companies, local distribution companies and
independent gas reserve service providers. In
order to encourage private enterprise and other
social capital to enter gas reserve facility con-
struction and operation, it is necessary to inno-
vate in a commercial model, forming reasonable
price mechanisms that achieve gas reserve facil-
ity third-party access and other measures for joint
realisation.
10.4.6 Establish Prompt and Flexible
Warning Systems
for Emergency Response
Prompt and flexible warning systems for emer-
gency response means active precautions and
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effective measures to relieve natural gas security
risks. The aim is gradually to establish and
optimise precautionary emergency response legal
systems, organisational institutions and strategic
mechanisms, information collection analysis and
distribution systems, and various types and levels
of emergency preparation and international
assistance and co-operation agreement for natural
gas emergency response systems.
1. Establish a natural gas forecast warning
system
Use research to find favourable opportunities
to build an indicator system for energy con-
sumption, monitoring systems and evaluation
systems to further standardise natural gas statis-
tical systems. Establish statistical data as quickly
as possible to monitor and assess as well as to
distribute information, wholly integrating energy
information channels to continually optimise
energy statistics and information collection sys-
tems. Enhance forecasting and warning method
research and develop forecast warning models
suited to China’s energy circumstances. Organise
a professional team with strong capabilities to
establish a timely and flexible forecast warning
platform.
2. Establish an emergency response system
covering natural gas production,
transmission, sales and all other stages
Based on gas industry and regional charac-
teristics, determine various levels of emergency
response preparation. Establish emergency
warning systems in the upstream and midstream
focused on the central government and central
government enterprises, and downstream plans
focused on local governments and local fuel
companies. Make full use of the co-ordinating
role of the National Energy Council to establish
handling for major energy incidents, to provide
feedback and for information release review
regimes as well as strategy mechanisms, ensuring
that emergency response is prompt, strict and
authoritative.
3. Promote communication and co-operation
China’s natural gas forecast warning system
construction should likewise be a broad interna-
tional co-operation. First, strengthen government
interdepartmental communication and contact.
Strengthen the dialogue and co-operation
between the National Energy Administration,
National Bureau of Statistics, NDRC Operations
Bureau and other relevant departments in the
realms of mobilisation, data sharing, forecasting
and warning, and other matters so as to establish
a unified and well-prepared natural gas forecast
warning and emergency response system.
At the same time, in terms of reserve project
construction deployment, the National Energy
Administration and other local governments
should take a scientific approach to planning,
with full proofs provided. For approved and
authorised project construction sites, various
levels of government should offer support to
enterprises. In terms of peak shaving emergency
response interregional deployment, the National
Energy Administration and provincial energy
bureaux as well as relevant enterprises should
co-ordinate efforts.
Also, strengthen international dialogue and
communication relating to energy. In terms of data
and information, continue to strengthen
data-sharing mechanisms with institutions such as
the IEA. Promote dialogue with natural gas source
nations including Russia, central Asia, Australia
and Qatar, negotiating resolutions to major and
outstanding problems. In terms of management
experience, make full use of advanced interna-
tional experience, with management systems and
mechanisms to become more scientific in their
handling. In terms of research results, fully absorb
the research results from various nations and with
relation to international organisations, so as to
design forecast warning systems suited to China’s
specific circumstances.
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PART III
Creation of Natural Gas Market
Mechanisms and Reform of Natural Gas
Management Systems
The research in this chapter concentrates on the
current state of China’s natural gas market
mechanisms and regulatory systems, on the nat-
ure of established natural gas market mechanisms
in other countries and how they were created,
and on the direction, underlying thinking, aims,
main pathways, approaches and measures needed
to ensure the success of reforms. For the pur-
poses of this research, the natural gas industry is
divided into upstream, midstream and down-
stream sectors.
The problems in China’s current natural gas
industry mechanism and regulatory system
include: over-centralisation of mineral rights, a
major lack of investment in exploration; bund-
ling of infrastructure operation, with low usage
efficiency; inappropriate natural gas pricing
mechanisms which are detrimental to the devel-
opment of downstream markets and the con-
struction of associated natural gas storage
facilities; regional monopolies controlled by
downstream pipeline operators and
cross-subsidies between different types of users;
and incomplete supervisory systems.
It can be deduced from the experiences of
mature overseas natural gas markets that diver-
sification of the participants involved in the
market is a precondition to the creation of a
competitive natural gas market, while the open-
ing of the upstream sector is absolutely essential.
Implementation of reforms to pipeline access
policy must progress gradually, with third-party
access policies as the first step in infrastructure
reform. Market-based pricing is a very important
stage of the process of market liberalisation of
natural gas, as natural gas pricing mechanisms
are closely linked to the extent to which the
market is able to develop. The creation of
regional trading markets is essential for the
market to be able to develop to any degree, while
the creation of an independent, legally estab-
lished regulatory system is the final guarantee for
the effectiveness of natural gas market systems.
The basic concepts and overall aims of Chi-
na’s natural gas market liberalisation reforms
include:
• the creation of a diversified, competitive,
open, orderly modern natural gas market
system;
• the establishment of pricing mechanisms
that reflect factors such as scarcity of
resources, the market fundamentals of sup-
ply and demand, external environmental
pricing mechanisms and green taxation; and
• the creation of a legally established,
service-oriented natural gas administrative
system.
Based on the current level of development of
China’s natural gas market, proposals concerning
natural gas market liberalisation reforms involve
three stages:
• By 2020, a preliminary mineral rights pri-
mary market should be created in the
upstream sector, in addition to the first steps
being taken towards the creation of a sec-
ondary market. This will establish a primary
market for preliminary midstream pipeline
capacity trading and storage trading,
including LNG facilities. Downstream, the
natural gas terminal prices should be
deregulated, to that they will then be based
on market competition.
• By 2025, an upstream mineral rights pri-
mary and secondary market should be more
or less complete. In the midstream, a pipe-
line capacity trading and storage trading
primary market should be more or less
complete, and this should be accompanied
by the preliminary creation of a pipeline
capacity trading and storage trading sec-
ondary market. A natural gas sales market
system based on a spot-trading market
consisting of manufacturers, independent
traders, major users, local distribution
companies and end users should be estab-
lished downstream.
• By 2030, an upstream mineral rights pri-
mary market and secondary market should
have been established, as well as midstream
pipeline capacity trading and a storage
trading primary market and secondary
market. Downstream, a natural gas sales
market system based on a combination of
spot-trading and futures should have been
established.
The main measures necessary to establish a
natural gas regulatory system and to reform
regulatory structures in China are:
• establishment of a market system: set up
the Sichuan-Chongqing natural gas market
liberalisation reform trial region;
• completion of natural gas pricing mech-
anisms: staged introduction of reforms to
natural gas pricing, acceleration of the cre-
ation of a natural gas futures market;
• clearing out pipeline transport bottle-
necks: extensive reform to the operation
and regulation of natural gas infrastructure
such as pipeline networks, clearly estab-
lishing functional roles, to ensure that
pipeline transport services and sales ser-
vices become separate from upstream and
downstream activities and that third-party
access occurs;
• carrying out regulatory reform: staged
creation of a comprehensive, centralised,
vertically unified, integrated, independent,
specialised regulatory system;
• stimulation of activity among market
participants: make reforms to state-owned
oil companies more extensive;
• setting up and broadening of the scope of
the natural gas industry-related service
market: development of the market for
natural gas will help broaden and deepen
the ancillary gas-related services industry.
Finally, a comprehensive legislative system
will need to be established as part of the reforms
to China’s natural gas institutions. The adminis-
tration needs greater reform, and there should be
financial and tax incentives to encourage the
development and usage of non-conventional
natural gas. A variety of measures can be
employed to back up these goals, such as
encouraging technical innovation, coordinated
planning and greater international cooperation
with commercial entities.
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11China’s Current Natural Gas MarketMechanisms and Regulatory System
11.1 Current State of Natural Gas
Market Mechanisms
11.1.1 Natural Gas Upstream Market
In 1998, as part of the separation of government
functions from enterprise management, the for-
mer China Petroleum and Natural Gas Company
and the China Petrochemical Corporation were
restructured according to principles of fair allo-
cation, interaction, preservation of advantages
and orderly competition, resulting in the creation
of the China National Petroleum Corporation and
the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec).
In February 2000, Star Petroleum, which had
originally come under the auspices of the Min-
istry of Geology and Mining, was completely
absorbed into the China Petrochemical Corpora-
tion. China National Petroleum Corporation,
China Petrochemical Corporation and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation all became
independent operations, responsible for their own
profitability, each an amalgamated organisation
that competed both upstream and downstream.
According to the regulations, these three main oil
companies were allowed to apply for oil and
natural gas exploration plots extending
throughout the whole country. Even though
China National Petroleum Corporation and
China Petrochemical Corporation were allowed
to carry out marine exploration and China
National Offshore Oil Corporation could also
carry out land-based exploration, other compa-
nies were still not permitted to enter to the fields
of conventional gas exploration and develop-
ment. When it came to non-conventional natural
gas, the Coal Industry Ministry issued the Coal-
bed Methane Exploration and Extraction
Administration Temporary Regulations in 1994,
then in 2012 the Ministry of Land and Resources
issued a notice encouraging shale natural gas
exploration and development monitoring and
regulation, which permits other market partici-
pants access to the coalbed methane and shale
natural gas exploration and development field.
However, the proportion of total natural gas
output that this accounts for is minimal.
Currently, the majority (97% or more) of oil
and gas exploration rights and mineral rights are
concentrated in the hands of the three large oil
corporations. Based on Ministry of Land and
Resources data, there were 1023 oil and gas
exploration rights registered in China in 2012,
covering 4,009,340 km2, of which 942 belonged
to the three main oil corporations, accounting for
3,906,848 km2, or 97.44% of the total. There
were also 671 oil and gas extraction rights reg-
istered, covering a total registered area of
118,949 km2, of which 655 belonged to the three
main oil corporations, covering 117,685 km2, or
98.93% of the total (see Table 11.1 and
Fig. 11.1).
* This chapter was overseen by Xiaoming Wang from
the Development Research Center of the State Council
and Mallika Ishwaran from Shell International. It was
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Because the three main oil companies own the
vast majority of natural gas exploration and
mineral rights, in addition to owning all natural
gas importing pipelines, LNG receiving stations
and other infrastructure, the three main oil com-
panies completely dominate natural gas supplies.
In 2014, natural gas consumption was
183 billion m3, domestic natural gas output was
125.6 billion m3, and coal-based gas output was
1 billion m3. Imported natural gas accounted for
59 billion m3, around one third of natural gas
consumption. China National Petroleum
Corporation was responsible for 95.5 billion m3
of domestic gas output, 31 billion m3 of impor-
ted pipeline gas and around 5 million tonnes of
LNG (approximately 6.5 billion m3), making up
72% of China’s total natural gas consumption.
China Petrochemical Corporation’s domestic
natural gas output was 20.2 billion m3, with
100,000 tonnes of imported LNG (130 million
m3), accounting for 11% of China’s total natural
gas consumption. China National Offshore Oil
Corporation’s domestic natural gas output was
12.4 billion m3, with 14.11 million tonnes of
Table 11.1 Oil and gas exploration rights and extraction rights registrations in 2012
Exploration rights Extraction rights
Number Area (km2) Number Area (km2)
China National Petroleum Corporation 415 1,608,291 396 91,578
China Petrochemical Corporation 284 908,211 194 20,420
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 243 1,390,346 65 5687
Yanchang Oilfield 24 75,958 5 444
China United Coalbed Methane Corporation 24 18,019 2 193
Others 33 8515 9 627
Total 1023 4,009,340 671 118,949
Exploration Rights 
China National Petroleum Corporation 
China Petrochemical Corporation 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
Extraction Rights 
Yanchang  Oilfieald 
China United Coalbed Methane Corporation  
Others 
Fig. 11.1 Oil and gas exploration rights and mineral rights registered areas in 2012
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imported LNG (18.8 billion m3), accounting for
17% of China’s total natural gas consumption.
Overall, China National Petroleum Corpora-
tion had a three-quarter share of China’s natural
gas market, with China Petrochemical Corpora-
tion and China National Offshore Oil Corpora-
tion having somewhat smaller shares. In terms of
regional markets, each of the three major oil
companies have very high shares of the market in
the regions that each supplies, in some cases
reaching 100%. For instance, even though Bei-
jing has seen diversification of gas sources,—
with the natural gas being used including
“Western gas going East”, Central Asian gas,
Inner Mongolian coal-based gas, imported LNG
and Shaanxi-Beijing pipeline gas, this gas is
provided by only one entity—China National
Petroleum Corporation. However, as the Beijing
Gas Group pointed out, China National
Petroleum Corporation was not actively seeking
a monopoly in the Beijing market; the situation
was brought about by Beijing’s desire for China
National Petroleum Corporation to act as the sole
gas supplier, making it responsible for gas supply
security. On the other hand, in south eastern
coastal regions such as Guangdong and Fujian, it
is China National Offshore Oil Corporation that
has a relatively high market share.
11.1.2 Natural Gas Midstream Market
The natural gas midstream market encompasses
natural gas transport and storage services, with
the extent of development of the market being
indicated by the scope of infrastructure present,
including natural gas pipelines, LNG receiving
stations and subterranean storage (see Fig. 11.2).
Completed pipeline 
Pipeline under construction 
Completed LNG  
receiving station 
LNG receiving station  
under construction 
Completed gas storage facility 
Central






Fig. 11.2 China’s natural gas infrastructure. Source China National Petroleum Corporation Economics and
Technology Institute, 2014 Domestic and Overseas Oil and Gas Industry Development Report
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1. Long-distance natural gas pipelines
The data and statistics for the current state of
construction of China’s natural gas pipelines are
incomplete. By the end of 2014, the main natural
gas backbone pipelines and branch pipelines
covered around 63,000 km, of which around
46,000 km was owned by China National Pet-
roleum Corporation, 73% of the total in China.
Aside from the natural gas backbone pipelines
owned by the three main oil companies, since
2003, as the natural gas market began to develop,
local pipeline companies have begun to crop up,
mainly owning provincial-level branch pipelines,
and transporting natural gas from the backbone
pipelines to municipal gate stations. In Zhejiang
and Guangdong provinces there is a “complete
province single network” policy, and here
monopolistic provincial pipeline companies were
created. In other provinces, where there were no
provincial level-pipeline network companies,
there are usually a number of pipeline compa-
nies; Shanxi province, for instance, has three
main pipeline companies, while Henan province
has almost 20. In general terms, the distances
covered by local pipeline company pipelines are
not great, for instance the length of pipelines
completed by the Zhejiang provincial pipeline
company is less than 1000 km. Details of the
main natural gas pipelines in China built after
1996 can be found in Table 11.2.
2. LNG receiving stations
By the end of 2014, 11 LNG receiving sta-
tions had already been completed and brought
online in China, with a combined receiving
capacity of 40.8 million tonnes/year (see
Table 11.3). Apart from this, there are 12 more
LNG gas receiving stations under construction or
planned for construction, with completion due in
2017, which will further increase China’s
receiving capacity of 42.4 million tonnes/year,
after which the combined receiving capacity will
be 83.2 million tonnes/year (see Table 11.4).
The completed LNG receiving stations already
online are all controlled by the three main oil
companies. Of the 11 completed LNG gas
receiving stations, China National Offshore Oil
Corporation owns 7, China National Petroleum
Corporation owns 3 and China Petrochemicals
Corporation owns 1. However, as the state
encourages access by private enterprise to the gas
and oil infrastructure industry, diversification of
LNG receiving station investors is gradually
taking place, and both private capital and non-oil
and gas companies are competing to build LNG
shore-based discharging-receiving stations.
The ENN Zhoushan LNG receiving station pro-
ject is already under construction, while Xinjiang
Guanghui Industry Investment (Group) Com-
pany Limited, China Huadian Corporation,
Hanas Group and Beijing Jingneng Power
Company Limited are all actively involved in the
LNG receiving station development sector.
3. Subterranean storage facilities
A gas shortage occurred on a national scale in
the winter of 2009, exposing the severe lack of
natural gas storage facilities. As a result, the
natural gas administration proposed a series of
measures to accelerate the construction of natural
gas storage facilities. During the 12th Five-Year
Plan, China National Petroleum Corporation
planned to build 13 oil and gas storage banks,
with a total storage capacity of 453  108 m3,
the designed working gas capacity of which was
184  108 m3, while it was expected that a total
working gas capacity of 170  108 m3 would
have been created by 2015, equivalent to 10% of
China National Petroleum Corporation’s sales,
which should be enough to satisfy downstream
peak regulation requirements. Based on the
“Sichuan gas going East” and Yuji pipeline
projects, China Petrochemical Corporation is
conducting a comprehensive selection of gas
storage sites in relation to central and eastern
region oil and gas fields and the western Sichuan
gas region, and, based on this, construction of
key gas storage facilities is planned during the
12th Five-Year Plan at Zhongyuan Wen 96,
Zhongyuan Wen 23, Jintan in Jiangsu and
Huangchang in Jianghan etc. Apart from China
National Petroleum Corporation and China
Petrochemical Corporation using depleted oil and
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gas reserves to create subterranean storage
facilities, China Petrochemical Corporation is
working together with China National Salt
Industry Corporation to construct gas storage
facilities in subterranean salt caverns in the Jintan
district of Jiangsu, while the first gas storage
facility constructed with investment from a
municipal gas company—Ganghua Jintan Gas
Storage Facility—is already under construction.
By 2013, the designed working capacity of gas
storage facilities that had been completed or that
were under construction had already reached
300 billion m3, but due to the need to extend
subterranean storage facilities gradually, the
actual completed working gas capacity is only
28.6  108 m3, which is only 1.7% of the cur-
rent annual national gas consumption (see
Table 11.5).
11.1.3 Natural Gas Downstream
Market
The natural gas downstream market has a com-
plex structure, and market participants are
somewhat dispersed. Downstream users can be
divided by gas supply method into users that are
supplied directly and urban gas enterprises.
Directly supplied users are those who purchase
natural gas directly from upstream suppliers for
the purposes of manufacturing or their own
consumption, and that do not resell gas; urban
gas enterprises buy gas from upstream suppliers,
then resell gas to end users via their urban gas
distribution networks. Direct users are generally
industrial users that use large quantities of gas,
but not all large industrial gas consumers are
directly supplied customers. Due to the
cross-subsidising that exists between residential
users and commercial users in the pricing of gas
supplied by urban gas enterprises, large-volume
industrial users where the cost of supplying gas is
relatively low are a major source of profit for
urban gas enterprises. As a result, urban gas
enterprises are violently opposed to upstream
suppliers selling gas directly to industrial cus-
tomers that fall within the geographical area to
which their trading licences apply. Based on
research by the China Oil Economy Institute of
Technology, the quantity of gas sold by urban
gas enterprises in 2013 was around 90 billion
m3, which accounts for 56% of China’s natural
gas consumption for that year.
In December 2002, the Ministry of Con-
struction issued Suggestions Concerning Accel-
erating the Rate of Marketisation of Urban
Utilities, which was followed by the publication
of the localised legislation and policy-related
Provincial and Urban Gas Administrative Regu-
lations in various locations. This adopted the
principle that “the party investing should make
decisions on policy, the party benefiting should
take on risks”; this was designed to actively
attract state, private and overseas investment in
urban gas infrastructure and management. Cur-
rently, China’s urban gas industry has begun to
convert from its previously ring-fenced situation,
towards one with a new “four-pronged approach”
consisting of centralised corporations, local
state-owned enterprises, overseas investment and
private enterprises, with over 800 gas companies
throughout China in addition to the formation of
five major transregional gas groups, including
Towngas, China Resources Gas, PetroChina
Kunlun Gas Company Limited, China Gas
Holdings and ENN. In addition, there are rela-
tively large local gas groups such as the Beijing
Gas Group, Shanghai Gas (Group) Company
Limited and Shenzhen Gas (Table 11.6).





1. Upstream natural gas administrative
policy and legislation
When compared to the midstream and
downstream sectors, market regulation and leg-
islation in China’s upstream market is relatively
complete; a preliminary core Mineral and
Resources Rights Law has already been drafted,
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and the natural gas upstream policy and legisla-
tion is based mainly on State Council regulations
and rules implemented by the industrial
administration.
In terms of oil and gas mineral rights man-
agement, the main legislation applicable is the
Mineral and Resources Law (1996), the Rules for
Implementation of Mineral and Resources Law
(1994), the Mineral and Resources Exploration
Plots Registration Administrative Measures, the
Mineral and Resources Extraction Registration
Administrative Measures and the Exploration
Rights and Mineral Rights Transfer Administra-
tive Measures. Regarding overseas co-operation,
the main legislation applicable is the Regulations
for Overseas Co-operation in the Terrestrial
Extraction of Oil Resources and the Regulations
for Overseas Co-operation in the Marine
Extraction of Oil Resources. Regarding taxation
and price regulation, apart from the general legal
provisions in Enterprise Income Tax Law and the
VAT Temporary Regulations, the main source of
legislation is the Temporary Regulations For
Resources Taxation, the Administrative Regula-
tion for the Collection of Mineral Resources
Compensation and the Exploration and Mineral
Rights Usage Fees and Remuneration Adminis-
trative Rules, in addition to notices issued by the
National Development and Reform Commission
relating to adjustment of gas prices.
The sets of mineral administrative measures
that apply to coalbed methane and shale natural
gas differ from those that apply to conventional
natural gas, and mainly consist of policy-type
documents issued by the administration,
including:
• Certain Suggestions in Relation to Acceler-
ating Coalbed Methane (Coal-mine Gas)
Extraction and Usage (2006) and Suggestions
in Relation to Further Accelerating Coalbed
Methane (Coal-mine Gas) Extraction and
Usage, issued by the General Office of the
State Council;
• Temporary Administrative Regulations for
the Exploration and Extraction of Coalbed
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• Notification Concerning Enhancing Admin-
istration of Overall Exploration and Extrac-
tion of Coal and Coalbed Methane and
Notification Concerning Enhancing Supervi-
sory and Administrative Work Relating to
Shale Gas Resources Exploration and
Extraction, issued by the Ministry of Land
and Resources;
• Shale Gas Development Planning (2011–
2015), Notification Concerning Various
Issues in Relation to Standardisation of
Approaches to the Development of the Coal
Gasification Industry, issued by the National
Development and Reform Commission;
• Notification in Relation to Subsidy Provision
Policies Relating to Development and Usage
of Shale Gas, issued by the Ministry of
Finance; and
• Coalbed Methane Industry Policy, issued by
the National Energy Administration.
2. Natural gas upstream administrative
bodies
A multi-departmental shared administrative
regime is employed. Apart from the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and the State Admin-
istration of Work Safety, which are responsible
for technical supervision of environmental pro-
tection and production safety, the main upstream
administrative departments are the National
Development and Reform Commission, the
National Energy Administration, the Ministry of
Land and Resources and the Ministry of Com-
merce, while the Ministry of Finance works
together with the industrial administration to
provide financial and taxation policy that pro-
motes the development of the industry.
The National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) is responsible for carrying
out research into economic and social
Table 11.6 Main provincial capital and urban gas enterprises in 2012
No. Provincial
capital/city
Gas enterprise No. Provincial
capital/city
Gas enterprise
1 Beijing Beijing Gas Group 17 Shijiazhuang ENN
2 Shanghai Shanghai Gas (Group)
Company Ltd.
18 Jinan Towngas, China Resources Gas
3 Tianjin Jinran Huarun 19 Nanjing Towngas, China Resources Gas,
China Gas Holdings
4 Chongqing Chongqing Gas 20 Zhengzhou China Resources Gas
5 Guangzhou Guangzhou Gas 21 Wuhan Towngas, China Resources Gas,
China Gas Holdings
6 Shenyang Shenyang Gas 22 Changsha ENN
7 Taiyuan Taiyuan Coalgas 23 Fuzhou China Resources Gas
8 Hangzhou Hangzhou Gas 24 Nanning China Gas Holdings
9 Hefei Hefei Gas 25 Hohhot China Gas Holdings
10 Nanchang Nanchang Gas 26 Xi-An Towngas
11 Haikou Minsheng Gas 27 Harbin Kunlun Gas
12 Guizhou Guizhou Gas 28 Kunming Kunlun Gas
13 Yinchuan Hanas 29 Lanzhou Kunlun Gas
14 Urumqi Xinjiang Gas 30 Xining China City Natural Gas
Investment Co. Ltd.
15 Changchun Changchun Gas 31 Lhasa Kunlun Energy Co. Ltd.
16 Chengdu Chengdu Gas
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development policy on behalf of the State
Council and is involved in maintaining a balance
while carrying out macroscopic adjustments
through reforms to the overall economic system.
When it comes to drafting policy in relation to
the natural gas industry and industry regulation,
it mainly plays a role through:
• drawing up and organising strategy in relation
to the national economy and social develop-
ment, mid- to long-term planning and annual
planning;
• prediction, forewarning and guidance infor-
mation, making suggestions in terms of
macroscopic policy, co-ordinating solutions
for important issues affecting the progress of
the economy, regulating economic activity,
emergency interventions and transport-related
co-ordination;
• involvement in establishing fiscal policy,
currency policy and land policy, drawing up
and organising the implementation of pricing
strategy and the supervision and monitoring
of pricing strategy implementation;
• organisation of drafting of comprehensive
schemes relating to economic reforms,
co-ordinating specific reforms to the eco-
nomic systems, providing leadership in eco-
nomic reform trials and in reform trial
regional work; and
• authorisation, approval and auditing of major
construction projects, projects with major
foreign investment, major overseas resource
development investment projects and projects
requiring investment of large quantities of
foreign currency.
The main duties of the National Energy
Administration in terms of drawing up natural
gas industrial policy and industrial supervision
include:
• drafting of relevant supervisory and admin-
istrative legislation and its delivery for ratifi-
cation and passing into law; drawing up and
organising implementation of natural gas
development strategy, planning and policy;
advancing institutional reforms; drafting
relevant reform schemes; co-ordination in
areas of development and reform where seri-
ous issues exist;
• organising and establishing natural gas
industrial policy and related standards;
approvals; checking and auditing of invest-
ment in fixed-asset investment projects;
• forecasts and warnings; dissemination of data
relating to natural gas; involvement in oper-
ational adjustments and emergency measures
in the natural gas industry;
• drafting of national natural gas planning and
policy and management of its implementa-
tion; monitoring of changes in supply and
demand in both domestic and international
markets; proposals concerning ordering nat-
ural gas storage equipment and suggestions
concerning rotation and usage in addition to
organising the implementation of such activ-
ities; approval or auditing of natural gas
storage equipment and installations and
monitoring and regulation of commercial
natural gas storage facilities;
• supervision of fair access to natural gas
pipeline network installations;
• organisation and encouragement of interna-
tional co-operation relating to natural gas;
co-ordinating overseas resources develop-
ment and exploitation; approval or auditing of
major overseas investment projects;
• involvement in establishing policy relating to
resources, finance and taxation; environmen-
tal protection and responses to climate
change; proposals concerning pricing adjust-
ments and suggestions concerning total
import and export quantities.
The Ministry of Land and Resources is a
major upstream administration for the natural gas
industry, and its main responsibilities in relation
to natural gas industrial policy and industrial
regulation are:
• organisation of drafting of development
planning and strategy;
• drafting of legislation, establishing regula-
tions, policy, technical procedures and
standards;
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• leading local government law enforcement
and investigation and handling serious
contraventions;
• organisation, drafting and implementation of
schemes relating to the application of mineral
rights; handling rights applications; issuing
exploration and development permits; audit-
ing and authorisation of rights transfers;
organisation and mediation in major rights
disputes;
• standardisation and regulation of the rights
market; investigation of rights holders; mon-
itoring and supervision of extraction
operations;
• regulation of the geological exploration
industry and reserves of mineral resources;
control over geological exploration accredi-
tation; geological data; geological exploration
results (it is legally entitled to gain from
resources financially);
• authorisation of plots for foreign
co-operation; supervision of foreign involve-
ment in exploration and extraction activities.
The main role of the Ministry of Commerce in
the regulation of the upstream natural gas
industry is the drawing up of natural gas import
policy, in the course of which they co-ordinate
with other administrative departments regarding
natural gas imports.
3. Main legislative regime applying to
upstream natural gas regulation
(I) Rights management
Grade I national supervision applies to the
exploration and extraction of conventional natu-
ral gas and shale natural gas, with unified plan-
ning applicable to the exploration and extraction
of coalbed methane and administration at various
levels, while there are differences in terms of
admittance to the industry.
Applications for exploration or extraction of
conventional natural gas are handled according
to the Mineral and Resources Law and the min-
eral and resources exploration and extraction
registration administrative measures, and require
submission of State Council documents approv-
ing the creation of an oil company or their
approval for oil or natural gas exploration or
extraction, in addition to submission of evidence
of the identity of the legal representative of the
exploration company. Exploration permits and
extraction permits can only be issued after
checking, after approval by an organisation
stipulated by the State Council (the National
Development and Reform Commission or the
National Energy Administration) and after reg-
istration with the Ministry of Land and Resour-
ces. The threshold for admission to the
conventional natural gas upstream field is there-
fore set very high, and requires “the approval or
permission of the State Council”.
While Grade I national supervision also
applies to shale natural gas exploration and
extraction, a notice issued by the Ministry of
Land and Resources about the encouragement of
shale natural gas exploration and development
monitoring and regulation outlines a procedure
for the sale of exploration rights based mainly on
tendering and other such competitive approaches,
with the aim of encouraging a variety of invest-
ment entities to enter the shale natural gas
exploration and extraction field. In 1994, the
Coal Industry Ministry issued the Coalbed
Methane Exploration and Extraction Adminis-
tration Temporary Regulations, and this had no
specific accreditation requirements for companies
involved in the development of coalbed methane,
while also promoting the use of foreign capital
and the adoption of advanced foreign technology
for exploration and development of coalbed
methane.
(II) Pricing regulation
Due to the monopolistic characteristics of the
upstream natural gas market, the upstream natu-
ral gas price has been subject to long-term gov-
ernment control. In June 2013, the National
Development and Reform Commission issued a
notice relating to the adjustment of natural gas
pricing. This notice mainly dealt with converting
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natural gas price regulation from an
ex-factory-based approach to a gate station
approach, with the introduction of gate station
pricing regulation. The original “cost plus”
approach to pricing was converted to a “market
netback” approach.
Gate prices are government-guided prices,
with a regulated maximum price, allowing sup-
pliers and consumers to negotiate prices within a
range beneath the maximum price.
Government-guided pricing only applies to
state-produced terrestrial natural gas and impor-
ted pipeline gas, while the prices of shale natural
gas, coalbed methane, coal-based gas and LNG
have been deregulated, now being determined
purely by negotiation between suppliers and
consumers. The natural gas gate price is pegged
against the price of alternative energy sources.
The alternative energy sources adopted for this
purpose are fuel oil and LPG, with weighting of
60 and 40% respectively. Distinctions are made
between stock gas and incremental gas, with an
approach of “old approaches apply to old gas,
new approaches apply to new gas”, and the
incremental gas gate price is no longer based on
category of use. According to a notice issued by
the National Development and Reform Com-
mission, since the April 1, 2015, the pricing of
stock gas and incremental gas has been com-
bined, with one approach to pricing being
applied, and with deregulation trials adopting a
directly supplied gas-user gas-use gate price.
(III) Fiscal and taxation regimes
There are four categories of fiscal policy that
apply to the upstream natural gas sector:
• taxation and administrative fees in relation to
the extraction of natural gas resources—these
are mainly a resource tax, a mineral resource
compensation fee, a mineral rights usage fee,
a mineral rights cost and plot use fee etc.;
• taxation and administrative charges in relation
to imported natural gas—a VAT tax rate of
13% is applied to import, while some VAT
refunds are available at import in relation to
“state-approved natural gas projects”;
• the general tax applicable to all companies,
such as company income tax and VAT etc.;
• the fiscal subsidies provided by the state in
relation to the development and usage of
non-conventional natural gas resources; cur-
rently the subsidy provided by central gov-
ernment is 0.2 CNY/m3 for coalbed methane
and 0.4 CNY/m3 for shale natural gas.
(IV) Overseas co-operation
Overseas co-operation is based on the Regu-
lations for Overseas Co-operation in the Terres-
trial Extraction of Oil Resources of the People’s
Republic of China and the Regulations for
Overseas Co-operation in the Marine Extraction
of Oil Resources of the People’s Republic of
China. China National Petroleum Corporation
and China Petrochemical Corporation are
responsible for overseas terrestrial co-operation,
while China National Offshore Oil Corporation is
responsible for overseas maritime co-operation.
Based on a notice jointly issued in December
2010 by four ministries including the Ministry of
Commerce and the National Development and
Reform Commission, China National Petroleum
Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation,
China United Coalbed Methane Corporation
Limited and Henan Coalbed Methane Develop-
ment Company Limited are allowed to develop




1. Midstream natural gas administrative
policy and legislation
Regulation of the midstream natural gas
market is divided into economic supervision and
technical supervision. Economic supervision
included pricing supervision and third-party
access etc.; technical supervision includes envi-
ronmental supervision and safety supervision. In
terms of supervisory policy and legal documents,
apart from the Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline
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Protection Law issued by the National People’s
Congress in 2010, the main measures and regu-
lations in force are:
• the Natural Gas Infrastructure Construction
and Operation Administrative Measures,
issued by the National Development and
Reform Commission in February 2014;
• the Oil and Gas Pipeline Network Installation
Fair Access Supervisory Measures (Trial
Implementation), issued by the National
Energy Administration;
• the Natural Gas Development Planning Under
the 12th Five-Year Plan, issued by the
National Development and Reform Commis-
sion; and
• Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for
Foreign Investment (revised 2015), issued by
the Ministry of Commerce.
The Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline Protection
Law’s aim is to protect oil and natural gas
pipelines, ensuring the security of oil and natural
gas pipeline transport, and this mainly provides a
legal framework for technical supervision. The
Natural Gas Infrastructure Construction and
Operation Administrative Measures provide
fairly wide-reaching legislation regarding super-
vision of the midstream natural gas industry, and
include natural gas infrastructure planning, con-
struction and operation. They also include leg-
islation covering natural gas market regulation
and emergency guarantees. The Oil and Gas
Pipeline Network Installation Fair Access
Supervisory Measures (Trial Implementation)
provide the legal framework in relation to the
requirement for fair access to natural gas infras-
tructure, and establish the supervisory structures,
supervisory duties and powers and modes of
supervision that apply to ensuring fair access to
natural gas infrastructure. In the Catalogue for
the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Invest-
ment revised by the Ministry of Commerce in
2015, gas transportation pipelines and gas stor-
age facilities are still listed as industries where
foreign investment is encouraged. The purpose of
this is to indicate openness to investment by
foreign businesses, but it does not relate to
construction project planning or approval, and
has even less weight when it comes to the
supervision of natural gas pipeline operation or
storage facilities. The Natural Gas Development
Planning Under the 12th Five-Year Plan pro-
posed certain infrastructure targets and guaran-
tees, and presented planning for a number of
pipelines and gas storage facilities and other such
major infrastructure construction projects, and
this is the main source of guidance in terms of
development of the natural gas midstream sector.
2. Natural gas midstream administrative
bodies
Based on integrated upstream and midstream
operational modes, oil companies both construct
pipelines and other such infrastructure and sell
and transport natural gas that they produce
themselves, so there is no conflict of interests
between the pipeline company and pipeline
users, and economic supervisory requirements
are low. As a result, there is no specialist regu-
latory body. From the point of view of natural
gas industry regulation, China adopts an
approach whereby governing and regulation are
combined, but there are a number of different
bodies involved. The midstream natural gas
administration includes the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission, the National
Energy Administration and natural gas adminis-
tration departments of People’s Governments at
the province, autonomous region and directly
governed city levels, and these also take
responsibility for economic supervision of the
midstream natural gas industry. Technical
supervision is carried out by geological, quality
monitoring, environmental protection and pro-
duction safety departments of local People’s
Governments.
The National Development and Reform
Commission and the National Energy Adminis-
tration are responsible for planning of national
natural gas infrastructure construction. The nat-
ural gas administration departments of province,
autonomous region and directly governed city
People’s Governments, on the other hand, act in
line with national planning in drawing up natural
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gas infrastructure development plans for their
administrative districts, submitting reports of
such activities to both the National Development
and Reform Commission and the National
Energy Administration. Planning departments
are responsible for approval, auditing and
recording of construction of natural gas infras-
tructure. Authorisation documents relating to
natural gas infrastructure projects authorised or
approved by province, autonomous region and
directly governed city People’s Governments are
submitted to the National Development and
Reform Commission. Where a natural monopoly
exists, natural gas infrastructure services are
subject to government pricing control, with the
National Development and Reform Commission
and pricing departments at province, city and
autonomous region level being responsible for
determining the natural gas infrastructure service
prices. The National Energy Administration and
bodies under its auspices are responsible for
supervisory work where it comes to fair access to
natural gas pipeline networks.
3 Midstream market supervision
Midstream market supervision mainly
involves establishing planning, project approval
(authorisation), pricing control and enforcing the
law etc.
The Natural Gas Development Planning
Under the 12th Five-Year Plan issued in 2012
was the first-ever natural gas-specific planning in
China. The main focus was to develop the natural
gas industry by proposing development targets,
policy assurance measures and major construc-
tion projects, and this provided guidance to lead
the way for business investors. Based on the
regulations, natural gas infrastructure construc-
tion projects required authorisation, approval or
filing by industrial administration departments; if
a project had not been authorised, approved or
filed, then that project could not commence
construction. Pricing for services in relation to
naturally monopolistic natural gas infrastructure
such as pipelines is controlled by the govern-
ment, with service charges being collected based
on prices set by government pricing departments.
Because “administrative measures” issued by the
National Development and Reform Commission
and the National Energy Administration fall into
the category of ministerial regulations, they do
not carry weight in terms of establishing
administrative penalties. The punitive measures
available to supervisory departments are there-
fore limited; apart from warnings and correction
orders, they mainly rely on pricing law,
anti-monopoly law and contract law to enforce
the legal responsibilities of the relevant
enterprises.
4. Midstream market regulation
In countries where reform of the natural gas
market is advanced, such as the UK and the US,
natural gas industry regulation mainly involves
midstream regulation. This results in “supervi-
sion of the middle with freedom at both ends”,
thus creating an “X + 1 + X” market structure.
In “X + 1 + X”, the first X is the upstream
supplier, the second X is the downstream user,
and the 1 in the middle is the midstream pipeline
network. “Supervision of the middle” refers to
implementing strict supervision of natural pipe-
line network monopolies, enforcing a regime of
third-party access and exerting control over
pricing. Due to the long-term application of
monopolistic operation to the upstream sector in
China’s natural gas industry and the unified
mode of operation encountered in the midstream
and upstream sector, a third-party access regime
has never been established, and the majority of
regulation relating to pipeline transportation pri-
ces stems from natural gas pricing requirements.
The first time that “fair access” was men-
tioned was in the Natural Gas Infrastructure
Construction and Operation Administrative
Measures, issued by the National Development
and Reform Commission in February 2014, and
the Oil and Gas Pipeline Network Installation
Fair Access Supervisory Measures (Trial Imple-
mentation), issued by the National Energy
Administration. The Natural Gas Infrastructure
Construction and Operation Administrative
Measures stipulate that natural gas infrastructure
operators:
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• should publicise information, including con-
ditions of service provision, the procedures
for obtaining such services and excess service
capacity, and provide fair and just pipeline
transport, gas storage, gasification, liquefac-
tion and compression services to all users;
• may not use infrastructure in a manner that
discriminates against other natural gas
enterprises;
• where there is sufficient capacity, may not
refuse to provide services to users who satisfy
the necessary conditions; and
• may not make unreasonable demands.
The Oil and Gas Pipeline Network Installation
Fair Access Supervisory Measures (Trial Imple-
mentation) defines the regulations relating to the
conditions and procedures for handling user
access applications and specific regulatory
methods in more detail.
11.2.3 Downstream Market
Administrative System
The downstream natural gas administrative sys-
tem includes supervisory bodies, policies and
legislation, in addition to main supervisory
regimes.
1. Supervisory bodies
There are users in the downstream natural gas
industry sector who are directly supplied by the
upstream sector. There are also residential and
commercial users, small industrial users, dis-
tributed power generation users and transport
users who are supplied with gas via urban dis-
tribution networks. Where directly supplied users
with larger gas consumption are concerned, such
as gas for power generation, industrial fuels, gas
for use in chemicals etc., the focus of govern-
ment economic supervision is mainly the price of
gas supplied and the fields in which gas is used.
Currently, the National Development and
Reform Commission is responsible for issuing
natural gas pricing and natural gas use policy.
From the point of view of users supplied via
the urban distribution networks, the main focus
of government economic supervision is industry
planning, control over admission to the gas
industry, project allocation, price regulation,
emergency assurance and so on, and the main
object of such supervision is the gas companies.
According to the regulations laid out in the
urban gas administrative regulations, the State
Council is responsible for the creation of
administrative departments with responsibility
for natural gas supervisory work at the national
level. According to the relevant laws and reg-
ulations, People’s Government gas administra-
tion departments at town level and above are
responsible for determining and adjusting pipe-
line gas sales pricing, safety monitoring, quality
inspections and provision of firefighting ser-
vices, while other departments are responsible
for specialist technical supervision.
2. Policy and law
Supervision of the downstream natural gas
industry includes technical supervision and eco-
nomic supervision. Technical supervision relates
to supervision of product quality, of standards
applied in engineering and construction and of
safety in production. Economic supervision
relates to supervision of admittance to the
industry, of natural gas sales prices, of gas use
sectors and of gas supply responsibilities. Gen-
erally, within policy or legislative documents,
there may be both technical supervisory content
and economic supervisory regulations. The
Urban Gas Supervisory Regulations issued in
2010 are one such example of generalised
administrative regulations, including both urban
gas development planning and emergency
assurances, and covering areas of economic
supervision such as urban gas business and ser-
vices, in addition to technical supervisory regu-
lations relating to gas use, protection of gas
installations, gas safety and prevention of acci-
dents and their handling.
Certain specialist policies and legislation do
exist in relation to downstream natural gas
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industry supervision. These mainly consist of
natural gas usage policy and pricing regulation
documents issued by the National Development
and Reform Commission, and national urban gas
development planning issued by the Ministry of
Housing and Urban Construction, as well as
urban gas supervisory regulations issued in 2010
by the State Council. Apart from this, contract
law, emergency response law, product quality
law, pricing law, fire prevention law, production
safety law, metering law, special equipment
safety inspection law, safe administration of
dangerous chemicals regulations, housing con-
struction and municipal infrastructure project
completion and inspection filing administrative
regulations and other such general law and reg-
ulations are also dealt with by downstream nat-
ural gas industry supervision.
3. Special business licence regime
In order to implement the reform demands
expressed at the Sixteenth National Congress
concerning “increasing reform to monopolistic
industries, actively introducing competition
mechanisms”, in December 2002 the former
Ministry of Construction issued Suggestions
Concerning Accelerating the Rate of Marketisa-
tion of Urban Utilities, which suggested
encouraging the involvement of social and
overseas capital in the form of sole ownership,
joint ventures and co-operation in the construc-
tion of municipal public utility infrastructure, to
construct commercially operated municipal pub-
lic utility facilities for water supply, gas supply,
heating supply, waste water processing and waste
treatment; tendering would allow selection of
investment entities and would allow
trans-regional and cross-industry involvement in
the operation of municipal utilities enterprises,
with special permits to be awarded by the gov-
ernment for such business operations. In 2004,
regulations in the Municipal Public Utilities
Business Licence Administrative Measures sta-
ted clearly that permitted municipal public utility
operators are investors or operators of municipal
public utilities that have been selected by the
government on the basis of relevant laws, statutes
and regulations according to a market competi-
tion regime, and clearly outlines a regime
whereby they may trade in certain public utility
products or provide such type of services within
a certain range and for a certain period of time.
The special permits regime gives priority to
appointments relating to specific business
schemes, via a tendering process that allows
selection of the best company, to which a special
operators permit is awarded.
According to the Municipal Public Utilities
Business Licence Administrative Measures,
entities taking part in tendering for special busi-
ness licences should:
• be a legally registered business entity;
• have corresponding registered capital, instal-
lations and equipment;
• have a good credit rating, be in good financial
condition and be capable of servicing any
outstanding debt;
• have experience in such operations and have
a good business record;
• have sufficient key technical, financial and
operational staff;
• present a realistic and feasible business plan;
• comply with any other conditions according
to local laws and regulations.
After authorisation by People’s Governments
at the directly governed city, city and town level,
government departments could then sign a busi-
ness licence agreement with the successful bidder
(the company that was awarded the special
operators permit), the content of which included:
the specifics of the permitted business operation,
its geographical extent, its scope and duration;
product and service standards; methods
and standards for determining prices and fees and
procedures for their adjustment; ownership and
disposal of facilities; facility maintenance, update
and conversion; safety management; perfor-
mance guarantees; termination or alteration of
terms of the permitted business operations;
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liability for breach and methods of resolving
disputes etc. Special business licence durations
depended upon such factors as the type of
industry, the scale of the operation and type of
business and did not exceed 30 years.
4. Gas business licences
In July 2004, after the Administrative
Licensing Law was issued, the original urban gas
company accreditation administrative regime
was rescinded, and the majority of provinces and
directly governed cities drew up or revised local
regulations and statutes to create a gas business
licence regime. Clause 15 of the Urban Gas
Supervisory Regulations of 2010 states that the
state has adopted a business licence regime for
gas businesses, and that companies involved in
conducting gas business activities should satisfy
the following conditions:
• they should satisfy the requirements of gas
development planning;
• they should possess fuel gas sources and gas
facilities that satisfy the national standards;
• they should have a fixed business address, a
complete safety management regime and a
complete business plan;
• the main person responsible for the business,
the production safety manager and opera-
tional, maintenance and emergency repair
staff should all have undergone professional
training and have been found satisfactory;
• other conditions applicable according to legal
and statutory regulations.
If these conditions are met, then the gas
departments (at town level) and People’s
Governments (for larger areas) may issue gas
business licences. It is clear from these regula-
tions that the standard for the award of a gas
business licence is “satisfactory” (satisfies the
conditions), and as such, those that satisfy such
conditions should all be awarded business
licences.
11.3 Challenges Faced
by the Current System
11.3.1 Over-Centralisation of Mineral
Rights and Lack
of Exploration
There are already oil and gas exploration rights
registered in relation to 4 million km2 across
China as a whole. Of these, 3.9 million km (over
97%) belong to the three main oil companies,
China National Petroleum Corporation, China
Petrochemical Corporation and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation. Oil and gas extraction
rights already registered cover an area of 118,000
and 117,000 km2 (99%) of these belong to the
three main oil companies. The monopolistic
position of the three main oil companies in terms
of upstream exploration is hardly the result of
free competition, but is rather due to legal
restrictions and administrative monopolies.
Based on the Mineral and Resources Law, the
regulations governing mineral and resources
exploration and the administrative measures
governing the registration of extraction plots,
applications to carry out exploration and extrac-
tion of oil and natural gas must be approved or
agreed to by the State Council, but in actual
practice only a very small number of companies
ever receive such authorisation or permission.
Even though the exploration and extraction of
shale natural gas, coalbed methane and other
non-conventional types of natural gas is now
open to other types of company, the number of
plots actually accessible is limited, and the three
main oil companies continue to dominate
non-conventional natural gas extraction. The
reason for this is that, in the majority of cir-
cumstances, non-conventional natural gas
(mainly shale natural gas) plots coincide to a
large degree with conventional natural gas plots.
Apart from the legal restrictions, there are issues
whereby it has not been possible to implement
total third-party access to infrastructure, resulting
in technical barriers arising in terms of extraction,
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and presenting difficulties for other companies
trying to enter the upstream sector of the natural
gas industry.
Due to the legal restrictions and the adminis-
trative protection of these monopolies, the three
main oil companies virtually dominate all avail-
able oil and gas exploration plots. However,
there is still a major lack of exploration.
According to the Mineral and Resources Explo-
ration Plots Registration Administrative Mea-
sures, owners of exploration rights should invest
not less than 2000 CNY/km2 in exploration
within one year of the date on which the explo-
ration permit was issued, rising to
5000 CNY/km2 in the second year and
10,000 CNY/km2 in the third. The Mineral and
Resources Exploration Plots Registration
Administrative Measures were issued in 1998
and were applied to all types of minerals, based
on today’s prices, and the level of investment that
would be required for exploration for oil or gas
(an annual exploration investment of
10,000 CNY/km2) is unquestionably far too low.
In November 2014, the Ministry of Land and
Resources subjected China Petrochemical Cor-
poration and Henan Coalbed Methane Develop-
ment Company Limited to fines of CNY
7,978,800 and CNY 6,035,500 respectively, and
ratified reduction of the extent of their explo-
ration plots. The reason for this was that these
two companies had not been able to carry out
exploration to the extent of their undertakings.
Even though China Petrochemical Corporation
and Henan Coalbed Methane Development
Company Limited had only completed 73 and
51% of their undertakings in relation to explo-
ration, their actual investment had already
reached a level equivalent to 11.6 times and
3.6 times the level of investment required by
law, respectively. According to China Petro-
chemical Corporation’s annual accounts, China
Petrochemical Corporation’s investment in
exploration in 2013 was only CNY 25.3 billion,
which would be the equivalent of exploration of
1,600,000 km2 of registered exploration rights,
and based on this their average exploration
expenditure was only 15,800 CNY/km2. In actual
fact, that CNY 25.3 billion also included the cost
of overseas exploration, therefore it should not
all be allocated to areas of domestic exploration.




From the point of view of developing the natural
gas market, building pipeline infrastructure is
enormously important. Construction of natural
gas pipelines and other infrastructure requires
massive investment, with investment in back-
bone pipelines often reaching between tens and
hundreds of billions of CNY, and branch
pipelines costing between billions and tens of
billions. The structure of every country’s natural
gas market is different, so variations in gas
industry development and the types of infras-
tructure investment entities will naturally differ.
In the early development stages of the US natural
gas market, the upstream was very dispersed, and
it was therefore often the downstream urban gas
companies that were responsible for extending
pipelines to oil and gas fields, where they bought
gas for transport to, and sale in, downstream
markets. In China, the development of the natural
gas industry has followed the exactly opposite
path; there is a relatively high level of monopoly
upstream, while downstream it is relatively dis-
persed, and generally it is the upstream compa-
nies that are responsible for construction of
pipelines and transport of natural gas for sale in
downstream markets. In both cases, the approach
adopted at the early stage involved bundling of
pipeline transport and natural gas sales, with
pipeline transport enterprises using their own
pipelines to transport and sell natural gas.
Natural gas pipeline natural monopolies and
bundling of business affects fair competition
between upstream enterprises. In the United
States in 1938, the Natural Gas Act introduced
control over wellhead prices that continued for
40 years. The initial aim was to prevent pipeline
transport companies from treating dispersed
upstream producers unfairly. As described else-
where, inappropriate wellhead price control
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eventually restricted the development of the
natural gas industry in the United States, result-
ing in the severe gas shortages that occurred in
the 1970s. In 1985 and 1992, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order
436 and Order 636, which introduced third-party
access (TPA) and division of business, providing
the basic conditions for the formation of a highly
effective competitive natural gas market, while
also acting as a stimulus for the shale natural gas
revolution that has occurred in the US.
In February 2014, the Natural Gas Infras-
tructure Construction and Operation Adminis-
trative Measures and the Oil and Gas Pipeline
Network Installation Fair Access Supervisory
Measures (Trial Implementation), issued by the
National Development and Reform Commission
and the National Energy Administration respec-
tively, stated that natural gas infrastructure
operators should provide fair and open access to
their services. However, without strict supervi-
sion, the “fair access” required by the Oil and
Gas Pipeline Network Installation Fair Access
Supervisory Measures (Trial Implementation) is
actually “negotiated access” rather than fair
third-party access. On top of this, neither of these
two measures actually require the division of
pipeline services from natural gas sales business.
Although there is currently no actual evidence
that bundled natural gas pipeline business oper-
ations act as an obstruction to entry to the
upstream fields of exploration and extraction, in
the second half of 2014, against the backdrop of
a major drop in international oil prices, bundled
operation of LNG receiving stations and
long-term agreements in relation to gas prices
were definitely responsible for obstructing the
import of low-priced LNG from the international
markets.
11.3.3 Irrational Pricing Mechanisms,
Which Dampen
Incentive to Build Gas
Storage
The pricing reforms in 2013 were a major step
forward in terms of liberalisation of the
mechanisms that go to shape natural gas prices.
However, prices are still not determined by the
market; the transition from “cost plus” to “market
netback” has only altered the method applied to
pricing, rather than changing the actual
price-determining mechanism. There are a lot of
artificial factors at play in the choice of alterna-
tive energy source type, and these may not
actually reflect the market value of natural gas.
Taking the United States as an example, between
2000 and 2008, the price of fuel oil continued to
rise while the price of natural gas virtually stayed
the same. In 2010, with the arrival of the shale
natural gas revolution, prices of fuel oil and
natural gas began to deviate, with fuel oil
increasing in price by one third, while the natural
gas price dropped by two thirds. Against the
backdrop of the widespread adoption of energy
saving, emissions reduction and pollution con-
trol, the demand for coal dropped, as did the
price, while the demand for gas continued to
grow, as did the price, their prices changing in
opposite directions. Therefore, adopting the price
of coal to determine the price of natural gas
makes no sense. Even if one tries adopting fuel
oil and LPG as references, the changes in their
prices still don’t fully reflect the changes in
supply and demand in the natural gas market, due
to the differences in their uses and the difficulties
in fuel conversion, and this may result in inves-
tors and natural gas users being exposed to
erroneous market signals.
According to the pricing reforms of 2013, the
natural gas gate station price was adjusted once a
year based on the alternative energy source prices
against which it is pegged, gradually transition-
ing to six-monthly and then quarterly adjustment.
Regardless of whether adjustments take place
once a year or at six-monthly or quarterly inter-
vals, this year’s natural gas price is still based on
last year’s alternative energy source prices. By
making an adjustment once each quarter, the
winter natural gas price is based on the autumn
alternative energy source price. Warmer tem-
peratures in autumn result in there being less
need for heating and a relatively low demand for
energy sources. Adopting the autumn alternative
energy source price when deciding the price of
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gas for the peak gas use winter season is coun-
terintuitive. So with a government-determined
price based on the “market netback” approach,
adjusted once a year or once each quarter, there is
limited scope for adjustment and no capacity to
reflect changes in supply and demand in the
natural gas market up to the actual moment when
the decision is made. Such an approach is not an
attractive proposition to natural gas companies,
given the massive levels of investment required
to construct natural gas storage facilities.
Unsurprisingly, gas storage facility working gas
capacity in the US is between 18 and 20%







Although the reform of public utilities that star-
ted in 2002 resulted in competition in terms of
market admission, it also had the effect of rein-
forcing monopolistic business operations. Com-
panies that were awarded special business
licences were allowed to carry out bundling of
natural gas sales and network distribution over a
period of time and within a certain range, thus
excluding the possibility of competition occur-
ring with other companies. Not only did these
other companies encounter problems supplying
gas to end users via urban gas networks, such
activities as construction of pipelines to supply
end users directly were also seen as an
infringement of the special business licences
awarded to urban gas companies. In addition to
various urban gas companies being awarded
special permits for supply of gas on the urban
level via the tendering process, some provinces
also set up provincial pipeline network compa-
nies, which then enjoyed provincial monopolies
in purchasing and sales of natural gas. As a
result, other companies were prevented from
investing in and constructing natural gas pipeli-
nes in those provinces.
• Due to the monopolistic nature of urban nat-
ural gas networks and the bundling of sales
and distribution, government-set pricing is
generally applied to natural gas sold by urban
gas companies. There are issues where pric-
ing of urban gas is concerned.
• The pricing mechanisms are inflexible—since
there is a mismatch between upstream and
downstream pricing, the downstream price
cannot immediately reflect changes in
upstream gas source prices.
• It is difficult to monitor gas supply costs, and
the pricing methods are somewhat opaque, so
urban gas pricing departments find it hard to
gain a clear understanding of the actual cost
of gas supplied to urban gas companies, and
there is no unified pricing method.
There is a mismatch between the natural gas
sales price and the cost of gas supplied, with
cross-subsidising occurring between different
users, as industrial and commercial users (who
have a low-cost of gas supply) pay a high price
for their natural gas and a low natural gas price is
applied to residential users (with a high-cost gas
supply). In view of the cross-subsidising that
exists between different users and the govern-
ment control over residential user gas prices, it
makes sense to some degree that urban gas
companies then prevent upstream enterprises





The laws that apply to natural gas are not com-
plete, and this is not only reflected in the rela-
tively few levels of legislation, with the majority
of regulatory documents being ministerial regu-
lations and there being no specific natural gas
law, but also the fact that in certain sectors there
are still no administrative regulations at all. The
Mineral and Resources Law only requires sub-
mission for “authorisation or approval by the
State Council”, but does not actually define
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clearly what kinds of company can actually
receive the “authorisation or approval” of the
State Council. Although there is a fairly high
hierarchical structure in Regulations for Overseas
Co-operation in the Terrestrial Extraction of Oil
Resources and Regulations for Overseas
Co-operation in the Marine Extraction of Oil
Resources, this is only applicable to foreign
co-operation in extraction. The Oil and Natural
Gas Pipeline Protection Law is the only
administrative-type document dealing with the
oil and natural gas industry at the legal level, but
it was enacted to protect oil and natural gas
pipelines and thereby ensure oil and natural gas
transport security, and thus it mainly covers the
legal issues of technical supervision. The Natural
Gas Infrastructure Construction and Operation
Administrative Measures provide a fairly com-
prehensive legal framework for supervision of
the midstream natural gas industry, but lack force
because they are merely ministerial regulations
issued by the National Development and Reform
Commission and thus lack hierarchical structure
and are not particularly binding. The Oil and Gas
Pipeline Network Installation Fair Access
Supervisory Measures (Trial Implementation)
provides the administrative framework to
implement fair access to natural gas infrastruc-
ture; however, there are drawbacks in terms of
the practicality of its application, with fair access
actually being “negotiated access”. In terms of
the natural gas industry downstream sector, there
are no legal documents providing an adminis-
trative framework, the legal document at the
highest hierarchical level being the Urban Gas
Administrative Regulations.
There is no specific natural gas industry reg-
ulator, and, apart from the areas of the environ-
ment, production safety and product quality
supervisory departments, industry regulation
adopts separate supervision of the upstream,
midstream and downstream sectors, with
co-operation and supervision divided between
different departments, relying on a combined
governmental supervisory approach. Under this
multifaceted approach to regulation, natural gas
supervisory functions are distributed between a
number of departments, and inevitably there is a
certain amount of duplication of roles as well as
areas that are not fully covered. For example, the
Ministry of Land and Resources, the National
Development and Reform Commission and the
National Energy Administration all have the
power to decide industrial development planning
and structure, to draft legislation and to establish
administrative policy, while to some extent there
are also jurisdictional conflicts between central
government departments and local government
departments.
With such a combined governmental super-
visory regulatory system, there is a serious lack
of supervisory input. For instance, the scheme
regulation drafting team in the oil and gas section
of the National Energy Administration whose
area of responsibility is the “three establish-
ments” (establishing functionality, establishing
structure and establishing draft regulations)
comprises less than 20 persons to cover the
whole of China’s oil and gas industry. Moreover,
they are responsible not only for determining
industrial development planning, drafting leg-
islative framework and determining departmental
procedures and industrial development strategy,
but also for such supervisory functions as
authorisation, surveying, co-ordination and
imposition of penalties on specific individual
projects, as well as the administration of work in
relation to national strategic oil and gas storage.
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12International Experienceof Liberalisation and Evolution
of Natural Gas Markets
During the liberalisation of their natural gas
markets, the United States and the United
Kingdom both underwent a reform process that
involved a transition from government supervi-
sion and gradual deregulation. This provides
valuable experience to draw on in various areas,
including natural gas exploration and develop-
ment, storage and transportation, pricing mech-
anisms, market trading and institutional
guarantees.
12.1 Incentivising New Entrants
and Establishing Competitive
Natural Gas Markets
From comparisons of the state of development of
the natural gas markets of six countries and
regions, it can be deduced that a competitive
natural gas market requires the involvement of
entities of a certain size (Table 12.1). The United
States and Britain are the most typical competi-
tive markets, and reflect the involvement of, and
high levels of competition between, a multitude
of different entities in many areas of the market,
including exploration and extraction, storage and
transportation, wholesale and retail, and trading
centres. By comparison, in China, Japan and
South Korea there is a lack of competition;
upstream and midstream business is mainly
monopolised by oligarchs and there has been no
division of production, storage, transportation or
sales operations.
A competitive, reactive and fluid natural gas
market should have the following characteristics:
• a greater number of entities, allowing com-
petition in the upstream and midstream mar-
ket sectors to provide diversified services to
consumers, for which funds can be raised
from investors;
• competitive prices at both the wholesale and
retail levels;
• non-discriminatory access to pipelines, gas
storage, LNG receiving stations and other
similar infrastructure.
12.2 Opening the Upstream Sector
to Competition
Availability of resources is a precondition of
natural gas usage, so, looking at the natural gas
industry as a whole, upstream production
departments have virtual control over the opera-
tion of the whole industrial chain and the distri-
bution of returns. As a result, opening up
upstream exploration and development to new
entrants is of major importance to the develop-
ment of the natural gas market.
* This chapter was overseen by Xiaoming Wang from
the Development Research Center of the State Council
and Mallika Ishwaran from Shell International. It was
jointly completed by Yusong Deng, Jiaofeng Guo,
Shouhai Chen from China University of Petroleum and
Qingle Wu from Shell China. Other members of the
topic group participated in discussions and revisions.
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In developed European countries and in the
United States, the natural gas exploration and
development field is for the most part a com-
petitive market, and this is closely related to the
system of access to mineral rights. For instance,
the privatisation of land ownership (and resour-
ces that lie beneath it) has been effective in
encouraging exploration and development of
natural gas, while also creating the conditions
necessary for the shale natural gas revolution.
The approach adopted in The Netherlands of
“50-50 state-private ownership” has acted as a
major stimulus in encouraging exploration for
natural gas resources. The government generally
implements a system of business licences,
including mineral rights release mechanisms, for
any companies that have been awarded mineral
rights, thus avoiding hoarding of rights and
delayed development. In the UK, for example,
companies involved in bidding for mineral rights
are expected to strictly abide by exploration and
development requirements, otherwise they are
likely to lose their licences. However, such a
system requires strict supervision by the regula-
tory body.
However, natural gas resources differ from the
average commodity in that not only do they have
a value as a raw material, but access to such
resources is also accompanied by massive profits
and, in addition, they have a strategic value that
derives from their relatively large influence on
the national economy as a whole. It is due to such
factors that in recent years, resource holders
such as Russia and Middle Eastern and South
American countries have been exerting ever-
tighter control over their oil and gas resources. In
light of this, the problem of how to increase
activity in the upstream exploration and devel-
opment field, while also ensuring that the
majority of profits remain within the country, in
addition to ensuring greater energy security for
China, deserves greater consideration.
Table 12.1 Main characteristics of natural gas markets of various countries and regions





689 269 38 3 0.5 115
Net imports 37 231 39 123 53 49
Consumption
(percentage of total by
sector %)
Power 40 30 30 65 50 15
Industry 20 20 10 5 20 45
Transport pipelines (km) 500 k 200 k 8 k 5 k 4 k 50 k







Open access Upstream ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Transportation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X X
Distribution Diversified Diversified ✓ X X X
Division of ownership of transportation
and sales
✓ Diversified ✓ X X X
Independent (federal) market rights ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X
Fluid market centre ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X
Note Data is for 2013 (except natural gas consumption levels for China, which are based on 2011 data from power
generation and industrial departments)
Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA, EIA, Chinese Government and ENTSOG data
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12.3 Orderly and Gradual
Implementation of Pipeline
Access Policies
Between the 1980s and the present day, policy
regarding the regulation of natural gas pipelines
has been reformed in both the United States and
the European Union, resulting in the creation of
an independent, open natural gas transportation
system. The increased level of supervision over
the operation of natural gas pipeline networks
(i.e. the aspects that usually attract natural
monopolies) has ensured pipeline and network
interconnectivity and access to services for third
parties. The process by which this was achieved
in general consisted of three stages.
In the first stage, pipelines were encouraged to
provide transportation services to third parties,
while government regulation was strengthened.
This stage may be seen as a period of preparatory
work for the encouragement of third-party access.
However, governments do not force oil compa-
nies to provide non-discriminatory services in
terms of access to their pipelines; incentives are
provided to companies that provide access, and at
the same time the gas end user is allowed to sign
contracts directly with producers. This procedure
allows feasibility to be examined and enables the
discovery of any problems that may exist in
implementing third-party access to pipelines. At
the same time, during this stage, the government
continues to enhance its supervisory capabilities,
with the gradual creation of an independent,
unified, impartial and effective natural gas
industry regulatory framework. This is in fact
preparatory work that will allow the reform of
supervisory capabilities and the formation of the
teams necessary to carry this out.
In the second stage, pipeline third-party access
is enforced. This effectively eliminates the bund-
ling of natural gas sales and pipeline transport. The
government issues the relevant regulations that
make it obligatory for natural gas infrastructure
operators to provide fair and just access to pipeline
transport, gas storage, gasification, liquefaction
and compression services to all users.
In the third stage, independence of pipeline
transportation services is encouraged. The natural
gas pipeline businesses of upstream/midstream/
downstream integrated companies are split from
them, creating a number of independent pipeline
companies, after which creation of the oil and
1985 Order 436 
Allowing users to sign contacts directly with
manufacturers, encouraging the provision 






to provide access to 
their transport services 
1992 Order 636 
Completely removed
the “bundling” of 
natural gas sales with
pipeline transport    
2000 Order 637 
Further removal of
“bundling” between
natural gas sales and
pipeline transport    
1998 
The first Gas Directive required non-discriminatory
access to 20% of the market in transport services,
introducing the concept of “unbundling” without
being obligatory    
2009 
The third Gas Directive was 
responsible for pipeline 
transport services becoming 
independent, giving customers 
the freedom to choose or
change supplier       
2003 
The second Gas Directive
made it obligatory to
“unbundle”, and launched
the proposal that households 
should be free to choose their
natural gas supplier       
Fig. 12.1 Timeline of development of pipeline regulatory policy in the United States and Europe
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natural gas pipeline supervisory system can be
completed (Fig. 12.1).
Analysis of experience in the United States
indicates that, from start to finish, reform of pipe-
line policy took more than 20 years, while in the
EUtheprocesshas taken10 years, soclearly this is
a fairly slow process and cannot be achieved
overnight. Moreover, pipeline reform in both the
US and the EU involved a process of encouraging
third-party access, followed by obligatory access,
which was then followed by the splitting up of
upstream/midstream businesses. This is the pat-
tern of reform best suited to the natural gas indus-
try, and deserves further study and emulation.
The development of US natural gas
pipeline regulatory policy
In terms of structure, the structure of the
early natural gas industry in the United
States was similar to that encountered today
in China: producers sold natural gas to
pipeline transportation companies, and
pipeline transportation companies then sold
the natural gas to local distribution com-
panies, with the natural gas being sold to the
end user by the local distribution company.
The natural gas sales price was controlled
by federal government, and the price of
natural gas sold to the end user by the local
distribution company was controlled by
local government institutions. The admin-
istration had virtual control over all parts of
the natural gas industry, and the state was
not only responsible for supervision of the
naturally monopolistic pipeline transporta-
tion sector, but also for the competitive
sectors of the natural gas industry (such as
production and wholesale supplies). The
strict regulation by the state resulted not
only in natural gas companies being placed
under a great deal of pressure, but also in
abnormal development in terms of natural
gas prices and consumption. The excessive
regulation of natural gas producers led to
the gas supply shortages encountered in the
United States in the 1970s.
In order to remove the monopolies that
had resulted from closed-type industrial
operations, and to encourage and
co-ordinate development in the natural gas
industry, the United States government
began to adjust its policies towards natural
gas industry regulation, and as a result nat-
ural gas pipeline regulatory policy under-
went four main rounds of revision. In 1978,
the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) intro-
duced a staggered process for relaxation of
natural gas wellhead pricing controls, at the
same time as encouraging pipelines to open
up access to their transport services. In
1985, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued Order 436,
which put pressure on pipeline transport
companies of different states to separate
sales and transport functions, while intro-
ducing competition mechanisms that gave
natural gas end users and manufacturers
more freedom of choice. In 1992, FERC
issued order 636, which required state
pipeline companies to separate natural gas
sales from pipeline transport and establish
separate companies to handle sales. By
adopting pipeline usage rights, this order
eliminated the widespread unfair competi-
tion largely associated with the supply of
natural gas by state pipeline companies. It
also introduced procedures whereby con-
tracted transport could be sold on, allowing
a “firm shipper” (any user of pipeline
transport) to buy transport capacity from
another firm shipper with excess transport
capacity. In 2000, FERC then issued order
637, which went further, completing the
unbundling of gas supplies and transport
services.
The development of European natural
gas pipeline regulatory policy
Europe is one of the three main global
natural gas-consuming regions, and in the
last 40 years, natural gas’s share of overall
energy consumption has continued to
grow. At the same time, the business
modes and regulatory systems applied to
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the natural gas industry in Europe have
undergone continual adjustment. The nat-
ural gas industry regulatory systems and
policies of each individual member coun-
try of the European Union are established
with reference to “directives” provided by
the European Union. If one looks at the
development of the European natural gas
industry over the last 10 years, the
European Union issued three main direc-
tives, and a major component of these
relates to encouraging the market liberal-
isation of natural gas pipelines.
In 1998, The EU issued the First Gas
Directive, providing the impetus for the
acceleration of the liberalisation of the
internal European natural gas market. This
directive proposed that in order to ensure
the establishment and efficient operation of
a European internal natural gas market,
each country within the EU had a duty to
ensure fair competition in terms of trans-
port, storage and distribution, while
requiring that all members should complete
revision of their legislationwithin twoyears
of the directive taking force. In terms of
pipeline policy, the directive recommended
the opening of a 20% non-discriminatory
market access, with the introduction of the
concept of “unbundling”, without it being
obligatory.
In 2003, the EU issued the Second Gas
Directive, which required that all member
states adhere to the regulations concerning
the single market and adjust their own
statutes, requiring that the natural gas
market be opened to the non-residential
users of all European countries before July
2004. Integrated companies had to com-
plete the legal dismantling of their pipeline
and marketing businesses, followed by the
opening of natural gas markets to all users
before July 2007, finally achieving the aim
of allowing the consumer freedom of
choice of gas supplier. Regarding pipeline
policy, the enforcement of regulations
relating to unbundling resulted in house-
holds being given the right to freely
choose their natural gas supplier.
In 2009, the EU issued the Third
Internal Energy Market Package (also
known as the Third Package), which
brought into force EU energy industry
reforms. Based on these new reforms,
large power and gas companies had to
select one of the following three reform
schemes:
• ownership unbundling, which requires
companies to sell their distribution net-
work, thus completing the separation of
the manufacturer from the network;
• unbundling of business operations,
which, while allowing retention of
ownership of distribution networks,
required the establishment of an inde-
pendent company (known as an “in-
dependent system operator”) who
would be responsible for the operation
of the gas distribution network;
• unbundling of managerial responsibil-
ity, allowing the ownership and man-
agement of gas distribution networks
but requiring a subsidiary to manage
the gas distribution network and
entailed ensuring managerial and
policy-making autonomy (known as an
“independent transmission operator”).
These reforms also required that each
country establish an independent regula-
tor, responsible for ensuring that large
energy companies actually implemented
this “division of production and supply”
and for ensuring that the rules that apply to
free competition in energy markets were
put into play.
12.4 Third-Party Access: The First
Step to Infrastructure Reform
In the natural gas industrial chain, upstream
production and downstream sales are both sec-
tors to which natural monopolies do not apply,
and as such, efficiency can be improved by the
introduction of market competition. Operation of
12.3 Orderly and Gradual Implementation of Pipeline Access Policies 291
midstream assets such as pipelines, on the other
hand, exhibits the characteristics of a natural
monopoly, with high fixed-cost investment and
relatively low operational and management
charges. There is thus a rationale for operation of
pipeline services by a single company being the
most effective approach to operation. This in turn
is effective in reducing the overall operational
cost to society. The special characteristics of
midstream asset natural monopolies are one of
the reasons that they are not exposed to the
pressures of market competition, and to some
extent they also dominate the markets. As a result
of this, we recommend that greater regulation of
midstream pipeline assets is required, to prevent
companies that occupy a position that can be
considered a “natural monopoly” from abusing
their power to influence markets and extract
ever-higher levels of monopolistic profits.
Generally, supervision of midstream assets
consists of a number of approaches: regulation of
fee standards applied to pipeline transportation
and other such infrastructure, implementation of
infrastructure third-party access and division of
ownership. In order to prevent monopolistic
enterprises extracting extremely high monopo-
listic fees for midstream services, the government
needs to investigate actual operating costs and
reasonable profit levels in order to establish
reasonable charging standards. Apart from this,
independent owners of midstream assets may
also take advantage of their market dominance to
increase pipeline transportation costs or restrict
natural gas transportation, and this in itself is also
responsible for reduced upstream and down-
stream competition, while also reducing pipeline
usage. To prevent owners with natural monopo-
lies over infrastructure taking advantage of their
market position, and to ensure that all other
parties have fair access to usage of pipelines and
other infrastructure, the government is generally
required to exert a supervisory influence, and this
is exactly what is being referred to as the
third-party access (TPA) regime.
International experience has demonstrated that
third-party access policies balance out the eco-
nomic interests of the owners of midstream
pipelines and upstream and downstream pro-
duction and consumption. This is not only ben-
eficial in that it allows full use to be made of the
potential of such infrastructure, but also in terms
of attracting capital investment into the infras-
tructure construction sector
Regulatory policy and its effects in the UK
provide excellent proof of this. Between the
1960s and the 1980s, when the North Sea oil
fields were being developed on a significant
scale, the production and transportation of British
gas was led by only a few major companies.
However, as the yield of these oil and gas fields
has dropped, large companies have begun to find
it hard to obtain satisfactory benefits, while
receiving stations and pipelines have redundant
capacity. At the same time, many small enter-
prises have entered the upstream field, develop-
ing small-scale oil and gas fields, using the
pipelines of the larger companies to transport
their oil and gas products. There is a lack of legal
framework, and thus the potential exists for dis-
putes to occur between the owners of infras-
tructure and the owners of oil and gas fields.
Indeed, throughout the 1990s there was a worry
that the cost of usage of infrastructure was
becoming too high in relation to the costs and
risks associated with the development of small
oil and gas fields.
In order to resolve this situation, between the
1990s and the early 21st century, the British
energy regulator (or the Department of Energy
and Climate Change as it is now known) estab-
lished a new access negotiation procedure,
accompanied by a raft of legal and regulatory
measures that reduced stakeholders’ uncertainties
at the same time as providing a regulatory
framework with a legal basis and arbitration
mechanisms that became a foundation via which
negotiations could be completed in a manner that
benefited both stakeholders. With the gradual
appearance and introduction of this legal and
regulatory framework, the natural gas markets
were able to develop further, which benefited all
the stakeholders concerned. This allowed smaller
enterprises to enter the larger oil and gas explo-
ration market, which in turn offered further
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benefits to the owners of infrastructure, reducing
the cost of redundant infrastructure, while the
government also benefited in terms of reduced
unemployment and an increase in tax revenues.
A well-designed third-party pipeline access
policy and regulatory framework should satisfy
the following conditions:
• the policy should be effective, with the reg-
ulator being responsible for drafting and
implementing policies relating to duties and
standards;
• appropriate pricing, with the regulator pro-
viding a framework, allowing investors and
users to reach agreement on pricing in terms
of TPA and appropriate returns mechanisms;
• risk avoidance, requiring the regulatory
framework to be stable and reliable, in a way
that reduces the risks to the investor and the
user to the minimum.
Third-party access policy frameworks will
affect different types of natural gas markets in
different ways. For instance, Japan is a typical
natural gas importer, being incapable of achiev-
ing competition between upstream manufactur-
ers, therefore TPA policy is limited. However,
where China with its continuously growing
markets is concerned, a regulatory framework
offers significant benefits, providing a stimulus
for investment in the midstream field.
12.5 Unbundling: An Important
Element of Liberalisation
of Natural Gas Markets
As mentioned previously, regulation that applies
to the midstream sector generally involves
approaches such as pricing standards applied
being to infrastructure such as transport pipeli-
nes, the implementation of third-party access to
such infrastructure and the unbundling or parti-
tioning of ownership. In practice, even when the
government establishes the principles of
third-party access, monopolistic companies still
have many methods of ostracising third parties,
for instance by a lack of transparency regarding
available pipeline transport capacity or pricing,
or by contractual obligations such as conducting
obligatory technical research etc. Strict applica-
tion of the principles of third-party access can
suppress these anti-competitive market forces to
some degree.
However, some experts are of the opinion that
unbundling is a more effective approach to
resolving such issues. Unbundling involves sep-
arating the factors that motivate operators at the
midstream stage from those that motivate oper-
ators at the upstream and downstream stages,
which reduces the likelihood of anti-competitive
activities. Unbundling is not the actual objective,
though; it is just an effective method of ensuring
the feasibility of third-party access. Whether or
not open access measures eventually result in an
efficient actively competitive natural gas market
is the final proof of whether mechanisms for
unbundling have been successful or not. For
instance, one of the benefits of unbundling is the
additional upstream activity resulting from
competition, encouraging greater manufacturing
efficiency and expansion.
Where nations that have a domestic production
capability are concerned, the earlier unbundling
takes place and the more completely it occurs, the
more effective it will be. Looking at the UK and
The Netherlands and their domestic North Sea
resources, and comparing them to nations such as
France and Germany that have only limited
domestic resources, unbundling occurred more
rapidly. In the case of Japan, which has only
minimal natural gas resources, only tentative
unbundling occurred. In juxtaposition to this is
the United States. The US has plentiful upstream
resources, with a wide distribution. In fact,
unbundling commenced in the US at a very early
stage; in 1992 the United States had already
required the introduction of legislation and other
structural unbundling measures. One has to be
cautious about making generalisations in the
analysis of the factors that motivated this, but
where nations that possess domestic resources
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were concerned, unbundling resulted in greater
economic benefits, and this in turn has led to such
nations being more willing to institute such
reforms.
The unbundling process is of great impor-
tance, and depending on the extent to which
unbundling takes place, it can be split into five
categories: service unbundling, financial
unbundling, legal unbundling, structural
unbundling and unbundling of owner-
ship. Unbundling at a higher level lays the
foundations for unbundling at a lower level,
lower-level unbundling being simply an exten-
sion of the unbundling occurring at higher levels.
A good example of this is that financial
unbundling must be implemented at the same
time as service unbundling, and so on; the most
thorough form of unbundling is ownership
unbundling (see Table 12.2).
Analysis of midstream asset unbundling case
histories from the United States and Europe indi-
cates that, if regulators are given sufficient powers
by the state, it is unnecessary to implement com-
plete ownership unbundling. Among the nations
analysed, only the UK and The Netherlands
instigated complete ownership unbundling, while
France and Germany carried out structural
unbundling and never attempted complete own-
ership unbundling. Experiences in the US also
demonstrated that, by applying a strict model to
the operations of natural gas transport companies,
it became unnecessary to apply ownership
unbundling in order to ensure effective competi-
tion in the natural gas market. To summarise, the
majority of the nations mentioned above insti-
gated structural unbundling, without the need to
carry out complete ownership unbundling. From
this one may conclude that simply carrying out
structural unbundling in conjunction with strict
regulation provided the best results.
In contrast to pipelines, implementation of
unbundling applied to infrastructure such as
LNG receiving stations and peak gas storage
installations has not been so strict. The reason for
this is that, generally speaking, there is a large
number of natural gas receiving stations and peak
gas storage installations, therefore there is more
opportunity for competition to arise; when com-
pared to LNG receiving stations and peak gas
storage installations, natural gas pipelines exhibit
more pronounced natural monopoly characteris-
tics. Where a pipeline network is connected to a
fairly well developed market, LNG receiving
stations take on the characteristics of supply
resources, competition occurring with other
receiving stations thus restricting market domi-
nance. In a similar manner, in a diversified
market with dense connections there will be
many storage providers, while pipeline storage
capacity, flexible natural gas production capacity
and dynamic increase and decrease in demand
can also be considered as providing storage ser-
vices. In light of this, unbundling and third-party
access policy should take this into account and
treat such installations with more leniency.
12.6 Natural Gas Pricing Reform
as Part of the Market
Liberalisation
and Development Process
Due to different natural gas markets having
developed to differing degrees, there are three
types of main pricing mechanism found in the
main global importers of natural gas: the first
type relies completely on market-driven prices,
such as is encountered in the US and the UK.
Here we have relatively mature natural gas
markets, and a completely unregulated natural
gas price, determined by market demand and
supply; however, third-party access to pipelines
is obligatory, resulting in a market where com-
petition occurs directly between different gas
companies. The NYMEX Henry Hub and the
UK’s NBP trading prices act as the reference
prices for North American and European trading.
The second category is reliance on the net-
back pricing method, such as is adopted in
European countries other than the UK. Market
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netback pricing is based on the market value of
energy sources which are an alternative fuel to
natural gas; this employs retrospective methods,
involving deduction of transport, storage, distri-
bution and other such costs to determine an
upstream price. When compared to the US and
UK markets, the European market is still in the
stage of transition to full market competition.
Natural gas consumption relies mainly on exter-
nal imports, and most natural gas is traded in
long-term contracts. The price is mainly pegged
against oil products, but there is a certain amount
of lag in the adjustment in contract prices.
The third type mainly relies on pegging
against the price of imported oil, examples of
which are Japan and South Korea. The devel-
opment of the natural gas markets in both Japan
and Korea have been somewhat delayed, with
reliance mainly being on imports. At the same
time, since there is a lack of a representative
trading centre, there is little choice but to peg
natural gas prices against crude oil. For instance,
Japan’s Chubu Electric Power agreed a pricing
formula with the Qatar Gas Transport Company
in 2001 which stated: P = 0.1485  JCC +
0.08675 + S. Here, S is an adjustment figure,
which was used to moderate the effects of the
violent fluctuation in the international oil price.
Prior to 2005, the international oil price was
relatively low, with the price of gas imported by
Japan and South Korea being more or less the
same as in Europe and the United States. In
recent years, with further fluctuations in the
international oil price, an “Asian Premium”
phenomenon has arisen, with a major increase in
the cost of gas use.
Reform of pricing mechanisms is a gradual
process, with the final objective being a pricing
mechanism which achieves completely
open-market competition between different gas
companies. If you take the historical situation in
the US, the government controlled natural gas
prices, applying a “cost plus” method to import
prices, with the federal government controlling
long-distance transport pipeline pricing and local
government organisations being responsible for
the price paid by the final user. Governmental
pricing regulation resulted in the price remaining
relatively low over a long period of time, which
led in turn to problems of supply being unable to
satisfy demand. Subsequently, the government
eased controls over the price of imported natural
gas, and the creation of a trading centre allowed
the gradual evolution of open-market pricing
regulation. Historically, the reform of pricing
mechanisms in the UK was similar to that of the
US, involving a transition from prices being set
by the government to prices being set by mar-
kets. Subsequently we find that the pricing reg-
ulation that was applied to these markets resulted
in trading centres adopting pricing based on a
reference market price model.
12.7 The Role of Natural Gas
Trading Markets
Currently, global gas trading relies mainly on
long-term contracts, and this plays a major role in
balancing upstream and downstream interests
and stabilising the relationship between supply
and demand. Long-term contracts allow natural
gas to be linked to the prices of alternative fuels,
market trading prices and many other indices,
thereby ensuring that upstream investors receive
a stable return over a number of decades and
protecting investment in exploration and pro-
duction. This is particularly beneficial for sta-
bilisation of upstream investment. Relative to
long-term contracts, spot trading is more flexible
and fluid and is taking on an ever-greater role in
natural gas trading. Taking shale natural gas in
the US as an example, due to uncertainties over
yields, shale natural gas developers are unable to
obtain long-term contracts on favourable terms
and therefore the development of shale natural
gas relies heavily on the spot trading market.
More important, though, is the fact that the
creation of spot trading markets has provided a
new pricing method for natural gas market lib-
eralisation, which has also accelerated the cre-
ation and growth of trading centres. Take, for
instance, US FERC order 636 in 1992, which
made it obligatory for pipeline companies to
provide access to their services, an event that
resulted in a substantial loosening of regulation
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over gas markets, and a market competition-
based pricing mechanism replacing the previous
pricing model, a government-driven pricing
mechanism. At the same time, FERC began to
promote the concept of natural gas market trad-
ing centres, adopting the stance that natural gas
market trading centres should be responsible for
providing natural gas supplies, transport, storage,
deployment, enhanced administration and other
such services or combinations of services to the
customers of pipeline transport operators. As a
result, 36 internal natural gas market trading
centres were created, covering all the US natural
gas pipeline networks between 1993 and 1998.
By 2003, 13 of these natural gas trading centres
were closed down, either due to their trading base
being insufficient, resulting in small trading
volumes, or because they lacked competitive-
ness. Currently, there are a total of 24 natural gas
trading centres, mostly in Texas and Louisiana,
which provide hub services to the natural gas
markets. The appearance of these natural gas
trading centres accelerated the formulation and
systematisation of open-market natural gas pric-
ing mechanisms, streamlining the allocation of
resources within the gas markets, increasing
market efficiency and enriching the choice of
investments available to those involved in these
markets. This evolution also helped the US to
establish itself as a leader in terms of energy
pricing, as well as ensuring US national energy
security.
Natural gas trading centres clearly offer both
benefits and drawbacks. They have two major
effects. The first is that there is a physical con-
nection between the buyer and the seller, the
second is that pricing is set based on market
competition. As a result of this, allowing markets
to provide pricing signals increases economic
efficiency in terms of trading and investment
decision-making, in addition to resulting in a
relative drop in trading costs, giving greater
returns to those investing in such markets. In
addition, natural gas trading centres are able to
balance problems in supply and demand due to
their pricing mechanisms, thereby ensuring the
security of natural gas supplies. A potential
drawback is their impact on current market
models. With pricing being determined by com-
petition between different parties, rather than by
the government or other leading influences within
the market, it is possible that they can cause
greater fluctuations in pricing in the short term.
From the global experience already gained by
the main countries operating natural gas hub
trading centres, we can conclude that, in light of
the different functioning of natural gas trading
centres, the success or otherwise of natural gas
trading centres depends on three preconditions
(see Table 12.3):




A complete and open natural
gas distribution network
Connections to both domestic and overseas gas-consuming




A large number of different
participants within the market
There must be sufficient numbers of entities within the
market, including both buyers and sellers
Relatively low level of market
concentration
There should not be dominant suppliers or consumers
Formalised trading activities Natural gas trading and pipeline transport prices should be
regulated by the government, with fair and reasonable
prices; traded gas quantities should be able to enter pipelines
freely; market prices should be made public and transparent
System
conditions
Market liberalisation of prices The wholesale trading price of gas along the supply chain
should be determined freely by the market
Stable regulatory framework The government must create a fair commercial environment
in order to allow competition policy and market models to
take effect
Source Vivid Economics
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• a natural gas transport network which is
completely open to access, which is available
for the use of market participants on a
non-discriminatory basis;
• large numbers of independent buyers and
sellers actively involved in arbitrage, none of
whom possess the capability to dominate the
market;
• government support for the opening of its
natural gas wholesale markets accompanied
by stable, transparent and reliable rules and
regulations.
Trading centres also require enterprises to
engage in trades based on arbitrage, which will
improve market operating efficiencies, and arbi-
trage activities rely on the accuracy and high
transparency of reports of natural gas prices.
By carrying out extensive natural gas sector
reforms, China will possess the conditions that
would allow it to become the premier natural gas
trading centre in Asia. Looking at China’s
advantages, its natural gas output, the extent of
development of its gas transportation pipelines,
the scale of its LNG imports and the significance
of its position in the Asian energy market are all
clear. However, China’s natural gas distribution
network is not well developed, the market is still
relatively concentrated, third-party access mech-
anisms are ineffective and pricing is still subject
to government control, all of which are factors
that are restricting the creation of a natural gas
trading centre in China.
Experience gained in the United States and
Europe since the 1990s in the creation and
development of natural gas trading markets pro-
vides a valuable reference for China. The first
thing to note is the extent to which the creation of
a natural gas market will have a major effect on
the development of trading centres. The devel-
opment of natural gas hubs in Europe only star-
ted in 2008, and for a period of time they were
not that successful, due to the slowness of market
liberalisation in the European natural gas
markets.
Second, government restrictions over trading
activities can also have a major influence on
trading centre development. Benefiting from the
enormous supplies of the Groningen gas field,
and recent increases in the number of LNG
receiving stations and increased storage facilities,
the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is widely
recognised as being the most successful Euro-
pean continental natural gas hub, and contract
volumes indicated that by 2013/2014 TTF had
already surpassed NBP to become the largest
European fluidity hub (Natural Gas Daily 2014).
Zeebrugge (Belgium), on the other hand, is
viewed as the least successful example, due to its
low level of trading activity, even to the extent
that it is no longer viewed as a hub. Zeebrugge
possesses suitable geographic conditions for it to
become a natural gas hub, but commercial
restrictions imposed by the local government
have restricted the number of participants
involved, reducing the trading platform’s rate of
growth.
Third, government impetus is capable of
having a substantial effect in the short term. In
the early 1990s, the United States had already
achieved market liberalisation of its natural gas
prices, but the link between natural gas prices of
different regions (eastern region and western
region) showed only a weak correlation. At the
end of the 1990s, as the United States govern-
ment promoted the adoption of the “law of one
price” across the whole of the US natural gas
market, after subtraction of transportation costs, a
single transregional price was applied, at which
stage price correlation had already developed to a
very high degree (Cuddington and Wang 2006;
Doane and Spulber 1994).
Fourth, formalised and orderly trading mech-
anisms also have a beneficial effect in encour-
aging the development of natural gas trading
centres. Taking the development of the NBP in
the UK as an example, the Uniform Network
Code has played a crucial role. The Uniform
Network Code provided the regulations and
procedures for supervision of third-party
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(TRA) use of the UK natural gas network. This
introduced a daily balance system and short-term
natural gas trading and one of the standardised
contracts (NBP97) became the cornerstone of the
UK direct trading contract.
Based on the experience gained in the devel-
opment of natural gas trading centres in the
United States and European Countries, and in
light of the specific characteristics of China’s
natural gas industry, development of China’s
natural gas trading centres requires a 5- to
10-year plan to be drawn up. Trial trading centres
should be established first. The government
could establish natural gas pipeline networks to
which third-party access applies in individual
regions such as Shanghai, with the introduction
of transparent natural gas pricing mechanisms.
This would create the conditions for competition
in natural gas demand and supply. Then, after
conditions have developed over a certain period
of time, a real-time gross settlement system
should be introduced to trial trading centres. On
the basis of this, the government can extend the
areas covered by trials further, or increase the
number of categories of buyers and sellers, at the
same time as making further enhancements to
market regulation. As the effects of these trials
become more noticeable, they will attract the
participation of greater numbers of producers and
consumers in market trading. Once the price of
natural gas in trading trials is less than the price
of natural gas for traditional contracts, the num-
ber of traditional contracts traded by consumers
will drop and further interest in purchasing nat-
ural gas from trial trading centres will
develop. On the other hand, when the price of
natural gas traded by trial trading centres is
higher than that of traditional natural gas con-
tracts, suppliers will be more willing to supply
gas to these trial centres, thus also reducing the
numbers of traditional contracts traded. As more
and more diverse participants become involved
in trading in these trial centres, the benefits of
trading will increase, due to the network effect
mentioned above. Hub-based pricing will be
applied on an increasing scale and over a greater
range, until partial market liberalisation is
achieved or geographical limits become a factor.
12.8 Establishment
of an Independent and Legally
Protected Regulatory System
Major state regulatory bodies generally include
an overall energy administration and an energy
regulator, with powers being divided between
these two bodies. The overall energy adminis-
tration is mainly responsible for establishing
energy strategy, planning and policy, playing a
role in the balancing of total energy resources,
with responsibility for energy security, modifi-
cation of energy structures, promotion of energy
saving and energy efficiency administration,
collation and analysis of data, scientific innova-
tion in relation to energy and international energy
co-operation. It is also responsible for harmon-
ising activities in conjunction with related
departments. The energy regulator, on the other
hand, is mainly responsible for ensuring order
within energy markets, while promoting market
competition within the industry and resolving
disputes. It is also responsible for regulation of
sectors in which natural monopolies exist, thus
protecting the overall interests of the market
participants. The overall energy administration is
responsible for establishing policy; the energy
regulator is responsible for implementing it (see
Table 12.4).
These two bodies may be partially indepen-
dent or completely separate from each other, and
from the point of view of energy management
they ideally act as a counterbalance to each other,
which satisfies the requirements of modern
administrative systems by separating the three
powers of regulation-making, implementation
and supervision. The regulator should be inde-
pendent in terms of powers and positioning, to
ensure that it is capable of reaching appropriate
decisions which treat all market participants
equally. Take the US Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) as an example. This is an
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independent administrative body which is sub-
ordinate to the US government. It is responsible
for the regulation of business activities involving
gas, electrical power, hydroelectric power and
oil, covering pipelines and distribution links; and
policy-making and the resolution of disputes
require a majority vote of the five committee
members. There are five committee members,
one of whom is the chair of the committee, and
the names of whom are suggested by the Presi-
dent and ratified by the Senate (though not more
than three fifths of the committee members may
come from one political party). Policy decisions
are issued by a court of law, and not by the
United States Congress, and when cases are
being heard, no private discussions are permitted.
The main regulatory role of FERC is to pre-
vent companies from taking advantage of their
monopolistic position, with the aims of the reg-
ulation including:
• prevention of discriminatory or preferential
treatment;
• prevention of inefficient manufacturing and
unfair pricing practices;
• ensuring excellence of service;
• prevention of infrastructure redundancy and
wastage;
• where competition does not exist or is not
able to exist, acting as an agent for the pro-
motion of competition;
• promotion of safe, high-quality, environ-
mentally friendly energy infrastructure via
implementation of consistent policies;
• where possible, encouraging overall market
competition in place of traditional regulation.
From the point of view of the natural gas
industry, the main function of the Commission
relates to pricing controls, interpretation of the
relevant legal statues and service regulation, and
the scope of regulation includes roughly 120
interstate gas pipelines. At the same time, the
Commission has the power to authorise the
construction and siting of gas delivery-related
infrastructure as well as being responsible for the
evaluation of the environmental impact that this
may cause.
12.9 A Roadmap for Natural Gas
Market Reform
Reform of market structures and the administra-
tive regime applied to natural gas is a gradual
process. Looking at the timeline of developments
in the US natural gas market, this process
involved a progression from complete govern-
ment regulation and the government setting of
prices to a situation where pricing controls were
gradually withdrawn and bundling of gas sales
was eliminated, followed by a fully developed
natural gas market with pricing determined by
the market itself (see Fig. 12.2).
The reform of the natural gas market is a
long-term and difficult process, requiring a par-
ticular political environment, relevant infras-
tructure and associated government policy.
Favourable political and market climates
encouraged the reform of both the British and
American natural gas markets. For instance,
looking at the period from the 1970s to the
1980s, the oil crisis resulted in massive pressure
being put on the government to introduce market
reforms, while the extensive pipeline network
infrastructure was also a driving force behind the
natural gas market reforms in the US. In the UK,
the Conservative party, which was in power at
that time, under the leadership of Margaret
Thatcher, was in the midst of carrying out pri-
vatisation of publicly owned industries, including
vertically integrated power and gas companies, in
order to relieve the financial problems faced by
the government at that time; this also created
political and market conditions favourable to
market reform. In contrast to this, if reforms do
not proceed effectively, there is also the possi-
bility that they will fail. In the last 20 years,
South Korea has encountered many difficulties in
the reform of its natural gas market, in particular
relating to the powerful unions of the publicly
owned, vertically integrated monopolistic
KOGAS, which objected to the surrender of
KOGAS’s global natural gas market purchasing
capabilities. It is easy to see from this that the
natural gas market reform process in all countries
in question has been both slow and tortuous, and
required tailoring to fit the current political and
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economic climate at the same time as imple-
mentation of the required policies and measures
took place. As such, establishing a roadmap for
reform and enforcing its implementation is cru-
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Fig. 12.2 Timeline in the reform of the US natural gas market
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13Regulatory System Reformto Support Natural Gas Market
Liberalisation
13.1 Direction of Reforms
Summarising international experience in relation
to natural gas market reform, while giving spe-
cial consideration to China’s specific situation,
the creation of a natural gas market system and
reform of administrative systems should embody
the principles described below.
The direction taken by reforms should be
identical to the direction taken in the creation of a
socialist market economic system. The creation
of a market economy with specific Chinese
socialist characteristics has been the overall
direction adopted in the reform of Chinese eco-
nomic systems. Statements issued during the
18th plenum of the People’s Congress also made
new proposals regarding the refinement of the
socialist market economy system. The reform of
the natural gas market must satisfy the require-
ments of a socialist market economy, ensuring
that the relationship between the government and
markets is dealt with effectively, in particular
requiring the transformation of governmental
functions. This applies particularly in the clari-
fying of the boundaries between the government
and its markets; this will provide oil and gas
companies with more opportunities to
develop. At the same time, in addition to pro-
viding the basic functions of a market system in
optimising and allocating resources, it must
improve the macroeconomic and market regula-
tory roles of the government, allowing imple-
mentation of effective regulation of naturally
monopolistic markets while encompassing the
important society-wide functions of safety,
energy efficiency and emissions reduction regu-
lation, in addition to evening out various flaws
within the market.
Reforms must be implemented according to
both long-term and short-term goals, taking place
gradually. Natural gas is a basic element of our
national economy; the reform of the natural gas
industry must take into consideration both the
positive and the negative impacts on socioeco-
nomics, and this requires us to keep our eyes on
the bigger picture, while establishing new system
mechanisms. At the same time as we seek to
implement these in the present, we also need to
be able to solve current problems as they appear.
This requires a unified design, which establishes
the direction and objectives of such reforms,
while allowing special emphasis to be placed
where necessary, dealing first with the easier
objectives and then the more difficult ones, first
building up experience from trials, followed by
gradual extension, followed by step-by-step
implementation.
Reforms must ensure that they are
all-encompassing and that the burden of them is
shared evenly. Sufficient consideration must be
given to the ability of different industrial sectors
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and Mallika Ishwaran from Shell International. It was
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to withstand adjustments in pricing, and to their
different requirements in terms of the adjustment
process. Special consideration must also be given
to the harmonising of international and domestic
market prices, and to the ability of both urban
and rural residents to withstand such changes.
The creation of new systems and procedures
should ensure that reform of the market, the
administrative system and pricing reform occur
in step with reforms to taxation, while making
active efforts to ensure the sustainable develop-
ment of the natural gas industry.
The objectives of reforms should be closely
linked to increasing industrial competitiveness.
As globalisation takes on even greater economic
significance, the rate at which China’s oil and gas
industries are becoming involved internationally,
in addition to inviting international involvement
in China, is increasing, and against this backdrop
increasing the competitiveness of our energy
industry is a matter of a major urgency. Reform
of the natural gas industry must be linked to the
creation of a more competitive industry. Whether
or not China’s oil and gas industries become
more competitive internationally is a major
benchmark against which we can measure the
success of market reforms. Allowing competition
to enter our markets will ensure that our oil and
gas industries become more efficient and scien-
tifically advanced, thus increasing the competi-
tiveness of our industry.
13.2 Key Pillars of Reform
Reforms must follow the proposals aired at the
18th plenum of the People’s Congress concerning
completion of a market economy with specific
Chinese socialist characteristics, which would
allow markets to play a definitive role in the allo-
cation of resources, accelerating the transforma-
tion of government functions, reducing
bureaucratic red tape and interference in microe-
conomic activities and establishing a
service-based natural gas administrative system.
Reforms should be sufficiently market-oriented,
while establishing pricing parity between natural
gas and alternative energy sources, in addition to
creating pricing systems that reflect the extent of
scarcity of resources, the market relationships of
supply and demand and environmental externality
in the creation of a green financial and taxation
system. This will introduce the diversity of com-
petition to the overall natural gas production chain,
increasing external access yet taking care to ensure
that the state retains control over the economy,
enhancing regulation in terms of fair extension of
access to services, while establishing a diversified,
competitive, open and orderly modern market
system. In overall terms, in order to guarantee that
the strategic objectives regarding the development
of natural gas inChina are achieved, the natural gas
market liberalisation reforms should accelerate the
establishment of three main pillars, as outlined
below.




The natural gas market liberalisation reforms
mainly cover three areas. The first is the breaking
up of monopolies, encouraging diversification
and competition among participants. The intro-
duction of private capital into the oil and gas
exploration field should be supported, allowing
its participation in conjunction with state oil and
gas companies in oil and gas exploration and
development. Reform of the current oil and gas
mineral rights allocation regime, gradually
allowing competitive tendering and bidding for
quotas, based on implementation of a licensing
regime, would then allow the structure of a
competitive oil and gas resource exploration and
development market to be established. Encour-
aging diversification of natural gas importers will
attract private capital for the construction of oil
and gas pipelines, which will then allow the
separation of natural gas transport and sales. At
the same time, it will make it possible to ensure
that access to the midstream and downstream
sectors is allowed on the basis of company
safety, energy efficiency, environmental, quality
and technical performance indices.
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The second area is the acceleration of the
creation of a natural gas trading market, involv-
ing training market intermediary organisations
and ensuring an improvement in service. The
construction of the Shanghai Oil and Natural Gas
Trading Centre should be accelerated. In addi-
tion, at an appropriate time, research should be
carried out regarding the creation of natural gas
trading platforms for Beijing, Tianjin, Guangz-
hou, Chengdu and other trading centres.
Encouragement should be given to energy effi-
ciency conversion, financial, insurance, IT, con-
sulting and other such participating professions,
in order to improve the professional standards of
all involved.
The third area is deepening the extent of
reform of state-owned enterprises, encouraging
the growth of modern energy companies. This
can be accomplished by:
• promoting reforms such as mixed ownership,
allowing private companies and overseas
investors to hold shares in state-owned energy
companies, as well as refining the process by
which state-owned energy companies may list
on the stock exchange, creating a diversified
ownership structure while maintaining a
state-owned controlling share over natural
monopolies;
• optimising corporate governance structures in
state-owned enterprises, introducing modern
business regimes, creating boards of directors
that are more than just symbolic and allowing
shareholder meetings and other similar busi-
ness administration and decision-making
structures;
• tightening up company budgetary and
expenditure management, ensuring
cost-effective accounting, while giving full
consideration to the social function of such
enterprises, historical problems and future
developmental requirements, increasing the
proportion of profits being passed on, and
ensuring that excess profits arising due to
monopolies revert to the public coffers and go
to benefit everyone.
13.2.2 Pillar II: Create a Pricing
System that Reflects
the Extent of Scarcity




Externality and a Green
Financial and Taxation
System
Natural gas pricing reform and financial and
taxation reform must be dealt with in five ways:
• ensure that there is a mechanism by which
competition in the natural gas industry results in
market adjustments, and that natural monopo-
listicmechanismsare subject to legal regulation;
• internalise the costs of externalities such as
environmental protection that required in the
course of exploitation of energy resources and
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, which
will go towards establishing energy pricing
parity;
• bring about gradual integration with interna-
tional natural gas markets;
• adopt natural gas as a clean and highly effi-
cient energy type, with major encouragement
being given to increased production capacity
and importing;
• eradicate cross-subsidisation, which will
ensure that “hidden subsidies” become
“known subsidies”.
In terms of pricing reform, it will be necessary to
improve the “market netback” laws. This will allow
regular dynamic adjustments correlating to energy
resources, including pricing, category selection and
weighting correlating to energy resource. Dynamic
upstream and downstream linkage systemsmust be
put in place, allowing for locally created price
transmission systems, in addition to refining
mechanisms via which low-income groups will
receive financial subsidies. Creation of the Shang-
hai Oil and Natural Gas Trading Centre should be
accelerated, while the scope of the trial should be
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extended. The introduction of differential pricing
policies should be brought forward, encouraging
the introduction of stepped prices and peak price
adjustment etc. Once themarket structure and other
conditions allow, competitive systems should be
introduced, allowing suppliers and users to deter-
mine prices freely. Once natural gas trading centres
have been established, this will act as the basis for
establishing and adjustingmarket prices and lead to
the creation of a gas storage market and a pipeline
market, allowing market forces to provide a solu-
tion to peak storage problems.
In terms of financial and taxation reform, it
will be possible to create a green energy taxation
system, which will act as a major financial
stimulus in the development of natural gas. Then,
at an appropriate point, carbon tax should be
introduced, with “emissions charges” being
converted to an “emissions tax” with the intro-
duction of collection of an ad valorem natural gas
resources tax, in conjunction with introduction of
an energy efficiency/emissions reduction quota
trading system. By increasing the financial sup-
port for infrastructure construction, scientific
innovation, energy efficiency and safety assur-
ances, it will be possible to accelerate reforms of
the pipeline and storage infrastructure financing
and investment systems. The duration of subsi-
dies for shale natural gas and other
non-conventional forms of natural gas should be
extended and tax breaks offered to interruptible
users, which in turn will increase research in
terms of energy efficiency and emissions reduc-
tion within the industry as a whole. Strategic
storage costs should be included in financial
budgeting in addition to establishing a system of
subsidies for low-income groups.




with a Legal Basis
The transformation of government functions
should be accelerated, reducing bureaucratic red
tape and interference in microeconomic
activities. Natural gas administrative bodies
should mainly be concerned with macroeco-
nomic administration relating to the field of
natural gas. The formulation and realisation of oil
and natural gas-related law and related policy
strengthening will establish a developmental
strategy that gives priority to energy efficiency,
providing the capacity to respond to climate
change and guide society as a whole in the
direction of reduction of emissions and sustain-
able development. This should also entail
enhanced macroscopic planning and industry
guidance while reducing regulatory control over
project approvals and pricing, thus reducing the
level of interference in terms of market opera-
tions, production and other business activities.
Enhanced demand-side management of
gas-using industries is necessary, with greater
attention being paid to long-term energy effi-
ciency and greenhouse gas emissions manage-
ment. At the same time, attention must be paid to
ensuring the security of natural gas supplies;
international co-operation should be encouraged,
combining increased “Chinese external involve-
ment” and “international involvement within
China”, improving reserve management capa-
bilities and ensuring effective resource alerts and
prediction.
Enhanced social oversight should be put in
place through the creation of a service-centred
natural gas administrative system. Natural gas
regulatory bodies should mainly be concerned
with market malfunction, with their main efforts
being concentrated on their regulatory role. They
must act appropriately in the regulation and
encouragement of fair competition and the pre-
vention of market monopolies. They need to
extend their regulatory functions to include nat-
ural gas pipeline development and other areas
where natural monopolies may exist, as well as
the regulation of market prices and other aspects.
In addition, they must be responsible for safety of
operations, pollutant discharge and emissions as
well as ensuring fairness of service and protect-
ing the rights of consumers. They should be
capable of ensuring compliance, strengthening
production safety and improving levels of energy
efficiency and environmental protection,
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ensuring that development is sustainable and
making the social accountability of businesses a
priority.
13.3 Reform Objectives
Full advantage should be taken of the strategic
possibilities for reform that present themselves at
this time of massive drops in international oil
prices. Any actions should be taken according to
the requirements of Chinese socialist market
economic development, taking advantage of the
definitive effect that markets play in the alloca-
tion of resources and making more effective use
of the role played by the government, in order to
support the establishment of “an effective gov-
ernment + an effective market”. This approach
will result in the creation of a mechanism for
natural gas pricing mainly determined by market
forces. The transformation of the government
approach to regulation will result in the creation
of a comprehensive oil and natural gas-related
system of legislation, the founding principles of
which are encouragement of independent control
of businesses over their operations, fair compe-
tition, freedom of choice for consumers allowing
them greater control over expenditure, free
movement of commercial factors and equality in
exchange. This will in turn ensure an effective,
competitive market structure and market system,
resulting in the overall advancement of reforms
in the field of natural gas while both promoting
and accelerating energy resource reforms in
China.
Establish a comprehensive system of natu-
ral gas related legislation and standards: A
“comprehensive legal system” means a national
legal system which is complete, standardised,
systematic, harmonised and unified. This should
embody the legal principles of socialism with
Chinese characteristics, providing a completely
standardised legal system, with an effective sys-
tem for the implementation of such laws. It
should also be a system capable of rigorous
monitoring of the law, which also consists of a
system of legal guarantees, whereby national
order is enforced according to the law, involving
both governing by law and the government act-
ing according to the law, in supporting the cre-
ation of a unified legal state, legal government
and legal society. This in turn ensures that laws
are scientifically established, strictly enforced,
formulated fairly and obeyed by society, in a
manner capable of modernising China’s gover-
nance systems and capabilities. Regarding natu-
ral gas, legislative revision should occur rapidly,
as there is a legal basis for the introduction of
major reforms, while policy should be closely
connected with such legislation. Moreover, there
should be increased governance according to
law, ensuring that industry administration occurs
on a legal basis, ensuring fair legal process,
enhancing the public’s faith in the judicial pro-
cess. Finally, increased work should occur in
relation to the creation of legal teams and
enforcing a restriction list, thereby ensuring that
“no actions should be taken without a legal basis,
while legal responsibilities must be fulfilled”.
Create a new kind of integrated, open,
competitive, orderly natural gas market sys-
tem: The modern market systems must be inte-
grated in nature, relying on the interaction and
interconnection of a number of submarkets
which are organically integrated. Integration,
openness, competition and order are all essential
characteristics of a market economy. Integration
is the foundation of economic development, with
products and factors able to flow between dif-
ferent industries, departments, regions, both
domestically and internationally. Openness is a
prerequisite in terms of economic vitality—in
terms of the international division of labour,
Chinese companies exhibit a major strength in
that they are responsible for making products
more competitive in the international production
chain, increasing the efficiency of allocation of
resources within specific sectors. Competition is
the foundation of all economic efficiency, and
fair competition with only the fittest surviving is
crucial to ensure improved economic quality and
efficiency. Order relates to maintaining economic
order, requiring the establishment of strict, fair,
open and transparent market regulations, which
then maintain effective order within markets.
Only by establishing an integrated, open,
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competitive and orderly market system is it
possible to ensure that market factors are able to
play a full role, which in turn will result in
resources being allocated in the most efficient
manner. This can be achieved via an overall
increase in the extent of reforms extending as far
as 2030, which will result in the creation of an
integrated, open, competitive, orderly and mod-
ern oil and natural gas market system formed of a
number of very large oil and gas companies in
conjunction with other oil and natural gas pro-
duction, transport and sales operators with dif-
ferent ownership structures and of differing size.
Creation of pricing systems and a financial
and taxation system that reflect the extent of
scarcity of resources, the market relationships
of supply and demand and environmental
externality: The system via which natural gas
prices are set should be transformed from being
government-dictated to being market-moderated,
and this in turn will ensure that prices fall in step
with those on the international natural gas mar-
kets. The pricing parity relationships between
natural gas and alternative energy sources must
be reorganised, and a financial and taxation
system that takes into account ecology and
environmental protection, reduction in green-
house gas emissions and other such externalities
must be established.
Encourage the creation of a modern natu-
ral gas market supervision system which is
all-encompassing, where rights and duties are
clearly delineated and which is both fair,
transparent, efficient and capable of effective
regulation: The manner in which the govern-
ment implements supervision over the natural
gas industry, which relied in the past mainly on
an application and approval system, should be
converted to one in which it has a strategic role in
planning and guidance. This will encourage the
creation and completion of a market regulatory
system, improving the social accountability of
government, the increased accountability
encouraging fairer competition, preventing mar-
ket monopolisation and protecting consumer
rights at the same time as ensuring the safety of
production operations; it will also provide
encouragement to reduce the levels of pollutant
emissions in addition to providing an impetus for
sustainable social and economic development.
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14Roadmap for Natural Gas MarketLiberalisation and Regulatory
Reform
14.1 Roadmap
At different stages of the development of the
natural gas industry, markets exhibit different
characteristics depending on the different levels
of competition and different problems encoun-
tered, and thus the focus of reforms should also
differ. In general, no stage in the reform process
can be left out, as each key issue must be dealt
with effectively to ensure that policy and adoption
of measures keep step. This approach should
achieve a balance between the three aspects of
timing, location and quantity. Attention should
also be paid to the special characteristics of the
natural gas industry sector and to the extent of the
effects of the reforms and the uncertainties relat-
ing, for instance, to market conditions. Taking all
these factors into account, the increase in the
extent of reform occurring in the natural gas
sector in China should take place at a gradual
pace and to a moderate degree, so that the reforms
are acceptable to society. Appropriate objectives
and measures should be determined based on the
stage of development reached by the natural gas
market and according to its specific characteris-
tics. For the purposes of this paper we envisage a
gradual roll-out involving three stages.
14.1.1 Upstream Sector Roadmap
Currently the vast majority of oil and gas mineral
rights are concentrated in the hands of four major
corporations: China National Petroleum Corpo-
ration, China National Offshore Oil Corporation,
China Petrochemical Corporation and Shaanxi
Yanchang Petroleum Group. Resolving this
problem of excessive centralisation of mineral
rights, resulting in control over land being
awarded but no exploration taking place, is key
to advancing reform in the upstream field. As a
result, reforms need to start by looking at current
legislative and administrative methods, concen-
trating on promoting diversification of investors,
encouragement of effective competition and
creation of a restriction list, in order to refine the
system of market access, ensuring that a system
for issuing tenders and bidding on quotas is
implemented for natural gas mineral rights; this
in turn will result in the orderly and effective
encouragement of the creation of primary and
secondary markets for exploration rights and
extraction rights, at the same time as ensuring
that basic data on natural gas resources is placed
in the public domain.
1. By 2020, the preliminary creation of a min-
eral rights primary and secondary market
should have taken place. This will involve the
creation and refinement of a legislative sys-
tem and framework with a “mineral resources
law” at its centre. Restriction list, industry
admission and competence baseline adminis-
trative systems will be established, allowing
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companies that are viewed as “competent” to
import gas independently (pipeline gas and
LNG) in addition to allowing freedom of
choice of importer. This will also include the
preliminary creation of a public-domain nat-
ural gas resources information management
system, which will also include newly dis-
covered Chinese gas hydrates mineral
resources, while also involving introduction
and refinement of a system for tendering and
bidding in relation to conventional natural
gas, shale natural gas, coalbed methane, gas
hydrates and other such mineral rights and the
preliminary creation of an exploration and
extraction rights secondary market system
and trading mechanism. The natural gas
wellhead (ex-works) price will be deregulated
and then decided by market competition,
while the natural gas pricing method will be
based solely on calorific value pricing.
Amalgamation and integration of the main
state oil companies will occur, according to
experience gained overseas in terms of bal-
ancing development upstream, midstream and
downstream, resulting in the creation of two
or three vertically integrated large interna-
tional oil companies, the upstream, midstream
and downstream operations of which are
equally balanced. This will allow the growth
of an effective, competitive market structure,
in addition to establishing and refining a
specialised independent regulator.
2. By 2025, establish the basic elements of a
primary and secondary mineral rights market.
Establish a legislative system with an “oil and
gas law” at its centre. Refine the restriction
list and industry admission regime. Create a
public-domain natural gas resources infor-
mation management system. Create a regime
for tendering and bidding on conventional
natural gas, shale natural gas, coal bed gas,
gas hydrates and other such mineral rights,
including the preliminary creation of an
exploration and extraction rights secondary
market system and trading mechanism.
Complete the honing and specialisation of the
independent regulator.
3. By 2030, primary and secondary mineral
rights markets should be fully established.
A comprehensive legislative system based on
an “oil and gas law” should have been
established. A highly effective administrative
implementation structure based on a restric-
tion list and industry admission regime should
have been created. A strict supervisory sys-
tem relying on an independent specialist
regulatory body should have been estab-
lished. An integrated, orderly but competitive,
legal, trustworthy, effectively regulated natu-
ral gas exploration and development market
system should have been established.
14.1.2 Midstream Roadmap
Currently, Chinese oil and natural gas
long-distance pipelines, branch pipelines and
provincial pipelines are mainly concentrated in
the hands of three major corporations (China
National Petroleum Corporation, China National
Offshore Oil Corporation and China Petrochem-
ical Corporation). How to resolve the issues of
the low numbers of participants involved in
pipeline construction and operation, the bundling
of transport and sales and a lack of third-party
access are all key issues encountered in relation
to overall reform of the midstream field. As a
result of this, it is necessary to commence work
regarding current legal and administrative sys-
tems, concentrating efforts in the areas of diver-
sification of market participants (this in turn will
encourage effective competition), creation of a
restrictions list and improve market admission
mechanisms. In this way, the complete separa-
tion of long-distance pipeline, branch pipeline
and provincial pipeline transport services and
sales operations will be ensured, so that the
reform objective of third-party access to pipeline
networks and open admittance to the industry can
be achieved. Admittance to sectors where natural
monopolies exist, such as the pipeline networks,
charging and cost supervision should also be
strengthened.
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1. By 2020, allow preliminary pipeline capacity
trading in a primary market, including the
trading of storage capacity such as that within
LNG installations. Ensure that reforms are
implemented that make natural gas pipeline
network finances independent, with the trial
introduction of independence of production
rights from the natural gas pipeline network.
Enforce third-party access and open industry
admittance. Completely separate long-
distance pipeline, branch pipeline and
provincial pipeline transport and sales ser-
vices. Establish and refine an independent
specialist regulator.
2. By 2025, the creation of a primary pipeline
capacity and storage trading market should be
basically complete, in conjunction with the
preliminary creation of a secondary pipeline
capacity and storage trading market. Ensure
that the independence of the natural gas pipe-
line network from production rights has been
accomplished and that the objectives of
third-party access and open industry admit-
tance have been achieved. In order to
encourage the construction of pipelines and
gas distribution networks and increase trans-
port capacity, permit long-term natural gas
supply and transport contracts (although
gradual pricing regulation of transport and
distribution networks would be necessary).
Implement policies giving pipeline investment
and construction projects that are of proven
benefit to society and that have a major social
influence immunity for limited periods (for
instance by not enforcing third-party access to
pipeline transport services for a specified per-
iod of time). Ensure that a specialised inde-
pendent regulator is fully in place and refined.
3. By 2030, ensure the formation of both pri-
mary and secondary pipeline capacity and
storage trading markets. Implement
third-party access to distribution services,
while allowing residential and commercial
clients to seek out alternative suppliers or
wholesalers other than their local distributor,
either via the introduction of trials or as part
of a compulsory process. Create a restriction
list and an industry admission administrative
regime which will act as the foundation of an
effectual administrative implementation sys-
tem. Create a strict supervisory system based
on a specialised independent regulator.
Ensure that this results in an integrated,
competitive, ordered, legal, trustworthy nat-
ural gas pipeline and storage market system
which is effectively regulated.
14.1.3 Downstream Roadmap
China has already begun to establish downstream
market structures, and in overall terms it is possible
to see the existence of market competition to dif-
fering degrees. However, there are still a lot of
problems, requiring solutions for issues such as
irregularities in market regulation, incomplete
pricing mechanisms, poorly developed market
structures and localised monopolies, all of which
are key areas of concern in ensuring thorough
reforms in the downstream sector. As a result,
work needs to begin on the existing legislative and
administrative systems, concentrating efforts in the
following areas: the formation of market systems;
encouraging effective competition; the creation of
a restrictions list and improving market admission
mechanisms; and the deregulation of natural gas
terminal pricing, with prices then being estab-
lished by market competition. This should finally
result in the formation at the national level of
around 10 regional oil and natural gas spot trading
markets, as well as establishing and refining a
natural gas futures trading market, ending in the
establishment of a fully featured, modern market
and associated regulatory structures.
1. By 2020, ensure the deregulation of natural
gas terminal pricing, which will subsequently
be determined according to market competi-
tion. Establish natural gas spot trading mar-
kets and wholesale markets at the main
natural gas trading centres and provincial
distribution hubs. Establish a natural gas
trading market within the Shanghai Futures
Exchange. Create and refine an independent
specialised regulator.
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2. By 2025, ensure the development of a natural
gas sales market system based on a combi-
nation of producers, independent traders,
large users, local distributors and end users
that rely on a spot trading market. Create and
refine an independent specialised regulator
(Fig. 14.1).
3. By 2030, a natural gas sales market system
based on a combination of producers, inde-
pendent traders, large users, local distributors
and end users that rely on a combined natural
gas market system consisting of a natural gas
spot trading market and a natural gas futures
market should have been established. Create a
specialised independent regulatory body as
part of a strict regulatory system. Ensure that
this results in an integrated, competitive,
ordered, legal, trustworthy natural gas sales
market system which is effectively regulated
(Fig. 14.2).
14.2 Key Measures
The basic direction of China’s natural gas policy
it that it “supports energy efficiency, strengthens
China’s position, encourages diversification, is
concerned about the environment, ensures thor-
ough reforms, encourages international
co-operation and improves the lives of every-
body”. This approach promotes transformation in
terms of energy resources and modes of pro-
duction and consumption, and forms the basis of
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Fig. 14.1 Diagrammatic representation of the natural gas markets after complete separation of sales and pipeline
transport. Source Xu (2015)
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Fig. 14.2 Diagrammatic representation of a spot trading market system. Source Xu (2015)
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a clean, efficient, safe and sustainable modern
industrial system, placing complete reliance on
the sustainable development of energy resources
to support the sustainable development of the
economy and society as a whole.
14.2.1 Creation of Market Systems
Efforts must be made to ensure that by 2020, an
integrated, open, competitive and orderly natural
gas combined production/transport/sales market
system which encompasses “one network, diver-
sifiedgas sources and10 regions”has beencreated.
A “one network” pipework transport system is
required in order to allow connection of gas
resources from different sources and regions to
the market, thus creating a national unified nat-
ural gas market system, which will encourage the
flow of resources between the markets of differ-
ent regions, and allowing effective competition,
helping to ensure the security of natural gas
supplies. To be specific, it will be necessary to
create a pipeline backbone by perfecting the
current “Western Gas Going East” system, the
new Guangdong-Zhejiang and Shaanxi-Beijing
systems, the “Sichuan Gas Going East” system
and the China-Burma pipeline networks,
while the Lanzhou-Yinchuan (Lan-Yin) line,
Lanzhou-Yinchuan-Ningxia (Lan-Yin-Xia) line,
Huaiyang-Wuhan (Huai-Wu) line, Zhongwei-
Guizhou (Zhong-Gui) line and the Ji-Ning line
act as connecting lines to create a “one network”
pipeline transport system.
1. “Diversified gas source” gas supply
framework
China’s main natural gas market resource is
state-produced gas from the Xinjiang, Sichuan-
Chongqing, Qinghai and Shaanxi-Gansu-
Ningxia regions as well as from maritime areas,
in addition to gas imported from Central Asia via
pipelines located in the west, gas imported via
the northern China-Russia pipeline and imported
LNG. Due to the need to concentrate on placing
reliance on nearby supplies, more consideration
needs to be given to a framework relying on
“piping of western gas east, delivery of gas from
the north to the south and bringing maritime gas
ashore”, ensuring that full use is made of a
variety of market resources to satisfy the gas
supply demands of various regions in order to
ensure security of supply.
2. “Top 10” regional markets
Due to the factors affecting the distribution of
natural gas resources, the layout of the pipeline
network and existing socioeconomic conditions,
the hope is to establish a seamless network in
China connecting imported pipeline gas to the
markets, connecting LNG receiving stations to
the markets, connecting producing regions to the
markets, connecting underground gas reserve
storage to the markets and connecting producing
regions with underground gas reserve storage.
By around 2020, 10 large regional markets
based on the Bohai Loop, Yangtze River Delta,
Pearl River Delta, Sichuan-Chongqing, Yunnan-
Guizhou-Guangxi, Central-Southern, Shandong-
Henan-Anhui, Central-Western, North-Western
and North-Eastern regions will be created,
including:
• a locally supplied market to feed local pro-
duction and consumption in Sichuan-
Chongqing and the North-Western region,
with Shanghai and Guangdong acting as
production-transportation-consumer centres
for the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River
Delta regional markets;
• Zhongwei in Ningxia, Wuhan in Hubei and
Yongqing in Hebei acting as logistical hubs
in the creation of Central-Western, Central-
Southern and Bohai Loop regional markets,
while gas from the China-Russia pipeline and
pipeline gas produced domestically will come
mainly from the gas source for a North-
Eastern regional market;
• gas from the China-Burma pipeline and
imported LNG acting as the gas source for the
Yunnan-Guangxi-Guizhou regional market,
with the underground gas storage groupings
of the Yellow River Plain and northern China
providing support to locally produced
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pipeline gas and imported LNG and gas from
other sources in the Shandong-Henan-Anhui
regional market.
These “Top 10” regional markets are not
completely independent but are interconnected
and influence each other. This is achieved via a
“single network” pipeline transport system con-
necting different pipelines and different entities in
addition to effective market regulation, encour-
aging effective competition, and ensuring that
market resources can spontaneously flow from
high-value areas to low-value areas, thereby
establishing a national pricing system based on
different regional prices and a flexible natural gas
market framework, in turn ensuring the opti-
mised allocation of resources.
The creation and developmental progression
of these “Top 10” regional markets should occur
sequentially, by policy-led trial introduction.
From the point of view of market creation and
developmental progression, the relatively mature
Sichuan-Chongqing, Yangtze River Delta and
Pearl River Delta regional markets should be
established within the time constraints of the
13th Five-Year Plan. When compared at the
national level to other regional markets, the
Sichuan-Chongqing region was the earliest
regional natural gas market established in China,
relying mainly on the Sichuan Basin, which is
rich in oil and natural gas resources as well as
having a relatively well established pipeline
transportation network; this would make it much
easier for a relatively mature market to become
established. In light of this, it is recommended
that a “Sichuan-Chongqing natural gas market
reform trial zone” be established as soon as
possible, with the results achieved in this trial
allowing the creation of a mature regulatory
system as far as market access and pricing
mechanisms are concerned, which should be
capable of overcoming inertia in the developing
market and obstacles to effective competition,
while allowing the market to play a definitive
role. This in turn will allow the creation of a
natural gas market with a 100 billion m3 annual
output capacity and a 70 billion m3 annual sales
volume.
Take full advantage of the economic advan-
tages of the production-transport-sales centres of
Shanghai and Guangdong and their ability to
sustain prices and other such market advantages,
which should allow for the rapid development
and operation of a Shanghai oil and natural gas
trading exchange. This will allow Shanghai and
Guangzhou to act as pricing centres, making the
creation of relatively mature regional markets in
the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta
districts possible within the time frame of the
13th Five-Year Plan. At the same time, by rely-
ing on the Ningxia Zhongwei, Hubei Wuhan and
Hebei Yongqing natural gas distribution hubs
and making full use of the advantages offered by
distribution network nodes, it will be possible to
gradually develop logistical systems so that they
radiate out into surrounding areas, establishing
these as oil and natural gas circulation and
logistical centres, and allowing the formation by
2020 of relatively mature Central-Western,
Central-Southern and Bohai Loop regional mar-
kets. Using this as the foundation, construction
of the Yunnan-Guangxi-Guizhou, Shandong-
Henan-Anhui, North-Western and North-
Eastern regional markets will then be possible.
This activity should take place in conjunction
with the construction of the “Top Six” subter-
ranean gas storage groups. These rely on depleted
oil and gas reserves, and depend on suitable stor-
age conditions existing within the oil or gas
deposits and create value from waste resources.
The Central Plain, northern China, the North-East,
Changqing, the North-West and the South-West
oil- and gas-producing regions will form six major
subterranean gas storage groups. These groups
will gradually create and optimise a natural gas
reserve peak adjustment system, which will be a
major factor in the creation of China’s “single
network, with diversified sources and 10 regions”.
By harmonising planning, construction and
usage of natural gas markets, resources and
infrastructure, it will be possible to create an
integrated national upstream-midstream-
downstream combined production-transport-
sales market system, ensuring that development
of the natural gas industrial chain occurs evenly
at all levels.
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14.2.2 Completion of a Natural Gas
Pricing Mechanisms
1. Staged introduction of reforms to natural
gas pricing
Currently, preliminaryworkhas been carried out
regarding the introduction of a dynamicmechanism
for pegging natural gas prices against alternative
energy sources. Considering the special circum-
stances of the natural gas industry, the widespread
implications of reforms and the uncertainties con-
cerning market conditions, it is recommended that,
depending on the stage of development encoun-
tered in the natural gas market, reforms to natural
gas pricing should advance steadily.
In the first stage, between 2015 and 2017, the
emphasis should be on the creation of a pricing
system. Application of the netback method
should be introduced as soon as possible (in-
cluding adjustment of the pricing coefficient K
from 0.85 to 0.70–0.75). Determine the costs and
pricing of long-distance pipeline, branch pipe-
line, provincial pipeline, urban pipeline and dis-
tribution network pipework transport in a
scientific and acceptable manner. Establish resi-
dential gas pricing in the light of basic economic
factors. Refine implementation methods to allow
for seasonal price variations, peak and trough
price variations, interruptible supply pricing and
gas storage pricing. Revise measurement stan-
dards and valuation methods (conversion from a
flow rate or mass valuation method to a calorific
valuation method), and increase administrative
and technical monitoring of illegal valuation
activities. Bring an end to the charging irregu-
larities occurring at local government levels
(such as the current natural gas pricing adjust-
ment fund, with local governments exacting this
at rates that vary between 0.3 CNY and 1.0 CNY
per cubic metre, which results in additional
burdens being placed on the consumer).
In the second stage, between 2018 and 2020,
remove all regulation of gas source pricing,
including all provincial gate station pricing.
Enhance regulation over residential use gas pri-
ces. Enhance the regulation of charging for use of
such infrastructure as gas transport pipelines and
gas storage, ensuring that there is effective reg-
ulation in relation to sector admission.
In the third stage, between 2021 and 2023,
charging for all gas transport pipelines except gas
distribution networks and for gas storage should
be completely determined by the market. Com-
plete introduction of supervisory and adminis-
trative systems with regard to pipeline networks
and other infrastructure, ensuring that the objec-
tives of allowing open, fair, orderly competition
with regard to natural gas prices are achieved. In
addition, policy should be formulated concerning
the introduction of a financial and taxation sys-
tem relating to resource tax, environmental tax
and carbon tax. This will ensure that a suitable
scientific financial taxation system and pricing
mechanism is put in place, which will reflect the
growing scarcity of resources, the relationships
of market supply and demand and the costs of
external environmental impact.
2. Accelerated creation of regional trading
centres
In the short term, the Shanghai and Guangdong
natural gas trading centres could be established. In
the mid to long term, new regional trading centres
could be established in Beijing, Sichuan, Hubei,
Ningxia and Xinjiang. Efforts must be made to
ensure that the Shanghai natural gas trading centre
becomes both an Asian and international natural
gas trading centre, resulting in the Shanghai trad-
ing centre system eventually becoming the centre
for trading of both internationally priced and
regionally priced gas, thus effectively creating a
link between domestic and international supply
and demand. The creation of natural gas trading
centres should commence with spot trading, then
the range and quantity of trading should be
expanded, finally developing into futures trading,
increasing the depth of the market.
14.2.3 Removal of Pipeline Transport
Bottlenecks
The supervision of the operation of natural gas
infrastructure such as pipeline networks should
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be extended, clearly establishing functional roles,
to ensure that pipeline transport services and
sales services are completely separate and that
third-party access is facilitated.
The emphasis should be on reform to the
natural gas pipeline network construction and
operational systems, establishing functional roles
within pipeline networks, and gradually resulting
in a natural gas pipeline network to which fair
access is provided, driven by supply and demand
and which is both reliable and flexible. The for-
mulation of policy in relation to market admit-
tance in terms of pipeline network operation and
services should be accelerated; this should
involve the introduction of an admittance system
of operator accreditation, ensuring the suitability
of operators to undertake certain functions and
duties. The basic requirements for operators will
be the existence of an independent legal body
corporate, and implementation of independent
financial accounting systems. In light of the
actual circumstances of China’s natural gas
industry, the separation of provision of infras-
tructure services could commence first with the
relatively easily reformed long-distance pipeline
network and LNG receiving stations. As for how
to approach separation, this could begin with
financial and legal separation. Then, as the extent
to which reforms are adopted increases, it would
be possible to institute trials in the eastern
regions, where there is a greater diversity of gas
sources, where competitive market structures are
more or less already in place and where there is a
relatively high density in terms of gas transport
pipeline networks. This would be followed by a
nationwide expansion. In addition to all this, an
exploratory separation of the financial systems
and legal status of gas storage services from gas
distribution networks should be carried out. Such
a change would encourage varied investment in
the construction of gas storage capacity, allowing
independent storage operators to participate in
the natural gas market and profit from market
peak and trough pricing differences.
Implementation of pipeline network inter-
connectedness allowing connection of third-party
services should occur rapidly, and more effort
must be put into the regulation of connection
contracts, service pricing and quality of service
—this will encourage the creation of the condi-
tions necessary for market competition.
In the gas transportation and LNG receiving
station sector, the scope of long-distance pipeline
and LNG receiving station third-party access
should be gradually expanded. Also, a permit
administration system should be introduced,
allowing any accredited operator of natural gas
services to sign transport or storage contracts
with pipeline networks and LNG receiving sta-
tions. Under such circumstances, when excess
capacity in the distribution network systems
arises, operators of pipeline networks and LNG
receiving stations must offer this to any natural
gas supplier or user who has need of such ser-
vices, thus providing a non-discriminatory ser-
vice based on fair pricing. Within the main
pipeline backbone, all gas source input nodes and
market terminals should be interconnected,
removing any obstruction to the circulation of
natural gas products. In terms of application,
depending on the extent to which infrastructure
has been developed and the degree of separation
that has occurred between services and sales, it
would then be possible to gradually introduce
negotiable and subsequently obligatory third-
party access. At this point, it would be essential
to promote gradual deregulation (in terms of
annual natural gas consumption), allowing large
users to choose their natural gas suppliers
directly (“large users” being urban gas compa-
nies, 200,000 kW power stations, combined
cooling, heating and power generation stations,
large-scale industrial companies (including for
use as fuel and as a raw material) and LNG/CNG
fuel suppliers, among others).
Regarding storage and urban gas distribution,
third-party access mechanisms should be gradu-
ally introduced to users at different scales of
consumption. Start with non-residential cus-
tomers with fairly high annual consumption; this
should result in a timetable and establish annual
consumption scales. Then introduce freedom of
choice of gas supplier to non-residential users
according to different annual consumption levels
while adhering to this timetable and depending
on the extent of overall implementation of the
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previous measures. Alternatively, it would be
possible to completely avoid urban pipeline dis-
tribution networks, or such urban networks
would only be allowed to provide gas distribu-
tion services according to government regulated
prices.
14.2.4 Further Regulatory Reform
Gradually set up a comprehensive, centralised,
vertically unified, integrated, independent, spe-
cialised regulatory system, with fully established
regulatory functions, and put more effort into
establishing regulatory powers.
At different stages in their energy develop-
ment, the United States and European nations
each introduced an independent regulatory
body. The US established both an energy
administration and an energy regulator. The
energy administration mainly has responsibility
for fundamental policies relating to the devel-
opment of energy resources and safety and for
related policy research. The energy regulator
mainly has responsibility for formulation and
implementation of specific regulatory policy. In
terms of its market regulation, this includes a
staged upstream-midstream-downstream regula-
tory process. Although there is no regulatory
committee for the upstream field, the federal
government’s Department of the Interior is
responsible for regulation relating to production
and use of energy sources, while individual
states carry out the regulation of certain types of
permit in upstream manufacturing. There are,
however, independent regulators at both the
midstream and downstream levels, with FERC
being responsible for the regulation of
state-level pipeline transport and sales regula-
tion, while state public utility regulatory com-
mittees carry out regulation of downstream
energy structures. These legally established
regulatory bodies have adjudicative powers and
are independent of the government, making
them a more effective guarantee of the imple-
mentation of government policy regarding
energy resources. Their open, fair, transparent,
legal principles make them more accessible to
public scrutiny.
Establish independent regulatory bodies and
clarify their regulatory responsibilities. Fully
extend their regulatory functions, providing
greater regulatory functionality. The energy-
related regulatory system should be established
as soon as possible. Enhance energy-related
regulation. Create and complete the structure of
regulatory organisations and related legislation,
involving regulatory innovation, thus allowing
improved regulation efficiency and ensuring the
fairness and stability of the markets. This will
help to create a healthy environment within
which to develop the energy industry.
2015–2017: Complete and perfect harmoni-
sation of the regulatory system. After establish-
ing the relevant regulatory legislation, statutes
and standards in conjunction with state energy
development planning and strategy and energy
industry policies, the different departments con-
cerned should enhance communication in
order to harmonise their work and co-operation.
During the course of the implementation of
the regulatory system, all departments should
ensure enhanced sharing of information and
co-operation. At the same time, it will be nec-
essary to establish the functions and duties of
each regulatory department in relation to central
government and local organisations.
2018–2020: The State Council will deputise
an energy regulation leadership group, which
will be responsible for harmonising work
between different departments and gradually
establishing a relatively centralised regulation
department. Each department will retain its
original regulatory legislation, standards and
functions, while the main burden of regulatory
implementation will gradually be transferred to
one organisation, which will then provide a rel-
atively centralised regulatory service. At the local
level, government will only establish a regulatory
organisation consisting of a single level of
administration, which will then dispatch spe-
cialist regulatory teams to various locations. In
addition, the central regulatory department will
be responsible for monitoring and supervision of
local regulatory organisations.
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2021–2023: Complete and refine the functions
of a unified regulatory organisation. Apart from
its role of regulation of the environment and
national resources, this will gradually be
endowed with full regulatory responsibility for
the economic and social aspects of the entire
energy industry chain. At this point a system of
interaction between different departments will be
clarified and their individual duties established
and an independent, unified regulator will grad-
ually be created. Finally, establish a system with
an independent, unified, specialised regulator and
vertical regulatory administrative organisations at
different levels.
Enhance reforms in terms of social account-
ability and monitoring, with enhanced monitor-
ing of present and future development and
promotion of a system of market supervision
based on standardised and procedural regulatory
measures. Impose a system of unified market
supervision, eliminating and discarding all reg-
ulations and practices that obstruct the creation of
a national unified market and fair competition.
Make better use of the government, in order to
ensure that legal concepts and methods are
applied to the adoption of market regulatory
functions, with enhanced monitoring of present
and future development and promotion of a
system of market supervision based on stan-
dardised and procedural regulatory measures.
1. Enhance the role of government regulation
Completion and optimisation of standards and
norms is vital. Accelerate the pace of work on the
formulation and actualisation of regulatory leg-
islation and technical standards and norms
relating to all aspects of natural gas development,
transport, storage and distribution. Complete and
refine an environmental impact evaluation sys-
tem, including evaluation of strategic environ-
mental impact, evaluation of environmental
planning impact and dynamic evaluation of the
impact of construction projects related to devel-
opment, transport, storage and distribution of oil
and natural gas.
Enhance the overall regulation of the com-
plete oil and natural gas development process,
involving strict regulation in the pre-
development stage, during development and in
the post-development stage. Pre-development
regulation should include planning and prepara-
tory work in relation to oil and natural gas
development, ensuring that all safety and envi-
ronmental hazards are rooted out. At the stage
when companies or contractors draft oil and
natural gas development projects, they should
also draft an oil and natural gas environmental
impact report, which should make proposals
relating to implementing measures to avoid or
reduce all types of pollution. At the same time,
companies undertaking development projects
should be required to establish baselines in terms
of the main environmental indicators (such as
subterranean water quality, surface water quality,
air quality and so on) prior to commencing work,
and continuous monitoring should be carried out
during the course of development. Well locations
must be based on detailed geographical surveys,
avoiding where possible densely populated areas,
areas where environmental protection orders
apply and so on, all the while reducing damage to
the local land and using land more effectively.
Where possible, pre-existing infrastructure should
be relied on, thus reducing the need for the
construction of new roads and infrastructure.
Regulation during development mainly relates
to the drilling of oil and natural gas wells, their
completion, gas extraction and normal operation.
Contractors should be required to satisfy safety
and environmental regulation standards and
norms at all times and in all aspects of their work,
adopting efficient, green, recyclable technology,
all the while ensuring environmental protection
and safety. At the same time, they should ensure
that contractors are capable of responding effec-
tively to prevent environmental pollution, that
they have emergency protocols and that they
provide anti-pollution equipment.
Post-development regulation mainly relates to
the evaluation of the long-term risks resulting
from the development of oil and natural gas. In
the course of development of oil and natural gas
it is possible that environmental factors which
were not easily perceived pre-development and
during development may arise. In the
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post-production phases it is necessary to carry
out analysis of subterranean water, surface water,
soil and air and other such aspects of the envi-
ronment. These samples should be compared
with pre-development baseline levels, allowing
an appraisal of the environmental impact of oil
and gas development. Post-development regula-
tion must be strictly enforced, and companies
that do not satisfy standards should be punished
accordingly.
Special consideration should be given to
safety and environmental protection as regards
midstream pipelines:
• During pipeline construction, it is necessary to
audit the legality and qualifications of
prospective designers, suppliers and contrac-
tors. During the pipeline design, supply and
construction process, there should be close
monitoring for adherence to state safe pro-
duction legislation and technical standards.
Pipes and safety infrastructure should be sci-
entifically selected and constructed, in order to
root out any safety flaws that may exist in
pipework. Companies responsible for distri-
bution and delivery of oil and gas should have
a safety executive in place, and ensure that
suitable personnel and equipment is provided,
ensuring the step-by-step creation and opti-
misation of a safe pipeline network and allo-
cation of production safety responsibilities.
• Oil and gas pipeline safety work should be
included within the scope of day-to-day
government administration, establishing a
comprehensive, scientific and sensible regu-
latory system, further enforcing specific
responsibility for safety management in rela-
tion to pipeline installations. This should
implement a system whereby responsibility
for this lies with local leadership, thus
establishing effective and enforceable proce-
dures in relation to public safety. A system
harmonising the work of various departments,
the government and pipeline companies needs
to be established, such as a system of joint
progress consultations. The next level of
government above will be responsible for
harmonising response in terms of
cross-boundary safety issues, and this will
include establishing a system of responsibil-
ities for all related government departments
and pipeline companies, fully implementing a
safety information sharing system and rapid
safety event response system.
• Those responsible for illegal appropriation
and excavation and other actions that repre-
sent a serious threat to the safety of oil and
gas pipelines will be held accountable, and
any organisations or persons found responsi-
ble will be dealt with.
2. Enhanced enforcement of the safety
and environmental responsibilities
of enterprises
Establish a comprehensive safe production
supervisory and administrative body and regime.
Enterprises must set up safe production com-
mittees and safety management departments,
which should be staffed with appropriate man-
agerial staff. In addition, enterprises must
establish a comprehensive production safety
management system, including a system of pro-
duction safety duties, a system of safety
instruction, a safety meeting system and a safety
equipment management system, including a
safety incentive and penalty system and emer-
gency response system.
Clarify production safety duties, providing a
comprehensive production safety duty regime.
Enterprises must establish a comprehensive pro-
duction safety duty system, based mainly on job
responsibilities, with the person with overall
responsibility at its centre, which establishes who
has overall responsibility for production safety and
consists of a system of production safety duties
applicable to staff involved in all departments and
activities, thus forming part of the overall pro-
duction safety monitoring and duty system.
Strengthen safety management in relation to
specialist technology. Strengthen safety man-
agement in relation to specialist technology on
the basis of production safety legislation, stan-
dards and norms.
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Institute a safety troubleshooting regime,
thereby enhancing preparation for emergencies.
Enterprises must carry out intermittent potential
accident troubleshooting on the main aspects of
the production process, the main points of
activity and main items of equipment used.
Where any potential accident areas are found,
these should be subjected to specialist evaluation,
categorisation and pre-emptive restrictions and
special precautions. It is necessary to establish a
strict potential accident reporting regime, stan-
dardising potential accident control work. Where
accidents occur, it is necessary to have an
effective emergency response organisation and
specifically formulated responses, which should
be practised in the course of day-to-day
operations.
Introduce a health, safety and environment
(HSE) management system and a pipeline
integrity management system. HSE management
is particularly concerned with the safety of
operative activities, safeguards and operational
safety, while pipeline integrity management
systems are specifically concerned with equip-
ment and technical management and preventative
maintenance in order to ensure the safe and
reliable operation of equipment. By effectively
integrating the functions of these two roles,
allowing them to complement each other, it is
possible to create a new pipeline management
system. This not only enhances HSE manage-
ment systems, but also increases the level of
safety management, supervision and the profes-
sional skills of auditing personnel and is an
extremely effective approach to safety.
3. Increased openness of information and
public scrutiny
Openness of information and public scrutiny
should be standard throughout the entire process
of oil and natural gas production, transportation
and usage. Government departments should
provide effective guidance and carry out effective
supervision of work on the openness of company
data and public scrutiny. This work should con-
centrate on providing open, honest descriptions
of any environmental, safety or health issues
related with production, transport and usage
processes, and the response of the company
concerned to such risks. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment should rapidly publish safety and envi-
ronmental testing data, and should make
communication with local residents a part of all
stages of the development process, ensuring that
residents are fully aware of any challenges, risks
or benefits that may arise as a result.
NGOs and other civil society organisations
should be active in carrying out public scrutiny,
to establish whether or not the companies con-
cerned respect environmental standards, while
also holding regulatory bodies accountable. The
public should be aware of environmental issues,
and have a full appreciation of the safety issues
and environmental risks associated with oil and
natural gas production, transportation and usage,
thus allowing them to play a role in the public
scrutiny of oil and natural gas production,
transport and usage. The media should play a
role in the dissemination of environmental
knowledge and the exposure of illegal activities.
Where media reports are critical, they should
require companies to carry out investigations into
the veracity of the claims and resolve the issues
in question. In addition, companies should then
provide reports within two weeks to the relevant
departments and news organisations regarding
the results of rectification work they have
undertaken or the progress of their investigations.
14.2.5 Further Reform
of the State-Owned Oil
and Gas Companies
State-owned oil and gas companies played a
dominant role in The Netherlands before reform,
making the situation very similar to that
encountered in China. Despite having created a
unified energy market according to EU require-
ments, due to path dependence, The Netherlands
adopted a different development approach. This
approach involved the retention of a number of
major state-controlled upstream, midstream and
downstream enterprises, while EBN, a com-
pletely state-owned company with special
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characteristics, stepped in and took control over
operation of the oil and natural gas markets, a
step which proved to be an effective measure.
The evidence proves that the presence of
state-owned enterprises does not necessarily
mean the presence of a monopoly or low effi-
ciency. However, there does need to be spe-
cialised supervision and management in order to
improve operational efficiency, which under fair
market conditions will effectively promote the
entry of social capital. The background of Chi-
na’s development from a planned economy to a
market economy as well as features such as the
strategic position of gas resources and their
exploration and development, the high-risk nat-
ure of pipeline transport and delayed returns on
investment have determined that in order to
ensure the security and supply of oil and gas,
involvement and investment by state-owned
enterprises is, at present, essential. Especially
from the point of view of natural monopolies and
important public goods and service sectors,
dominance by state-owned enterprises should
continue for a certain period of time. However, at
the same time it is important to encourage
effective competition through diversification of
investment and improvements in tendering and
bidding structures.
There is a need to optimise the allocation of
resources afresh, while remodelling the core
competitiveness of the enterprises concerned, in
order to create oil companies that satisfy basic
rules of structural proportions in terms of the
upstream and downstream sectors that apply
throughout the global oil and gas industry. This
will result in the creation of international oil and
gas companies that are more competitive inter-
nationally, which will in turn improve the
standing of China’s oil and natural gas industry,
as well as providing greater national energy
security. Between two and three international oil
and gas super-companies which have balanced
development in terms of the upstream, mid-
stream and downstream sectors should be
established. At the same time, in order to ensure
that suitable conditions exist for effective market
competition to occur, after merging, such unified
international super-companies should then hive
off part of their midstream and downstream
businesses.
Simultaneously with this restructuring, if
state-owned oil and gas companies are to con-
verted into satisfactory market participants, then
there will need to be a deepening of reforms.
This process would mainly require the comple-
tion and refinement of state-owned asset super-
vision and administration systems and
operational systems, so that government’s vari-
ous functions can be separated: social and eco-
nomic, asset ownership management, state-
owned asset management and state-owned asset
operation. This would achieve separation
between government and business enterprises
and between government and assets, resulting in
the creation of efficient operational mechanisms
and governance structures, which would
encourage the management of state-owned
enterprises to conduct managerial activities and
operations based on market forces, thus encour-
aging greater activity by state-owned enterprises.
14.2.6 Establish and Improve
the Services Market
The experience of the United States in its suc-
cessful development of shale natural gas shows
that multiple investors and combined develop-
ment systems for specialised services can mobi-
lise the positive aspects of venture capital,
technology research and development, upstream
extraction, infrastructure, market development
and end applications, as well as put in place a
system for the implementation and improvement
of the regulatory system to ensure the rapid and
orderly development of the shale natural gas
industry. In an open and competitive environ-
ment, there are advantages that may be exploited,
such as increased specialisation and access to
technology within the technological services
industry, providing horizontal drilling, well
completion and cementing and multi-stage
hydraulic fracturing services to rights owners
etc., as well as professional and technical ser-
vices for engineering, logging and experimental
testing. After a company completes a service in
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relation to a specific aspect, it can then be
replaced by another company that specialises in
the next aspect. A high degree of division of
labour allows for splitting of shale natural gas
extraction operations into individual aspects,
requiring less investment, with shorter operating
cycles and a faster recovery of funds, attracting a
large amount of venture capital and private cap-
ital into the shale natural gas field.
Market mechanisms must therefore be
allowed to play a complete role. This will pro-
vide a strong impetus for the development of oil
and natural gas-related professional services and
technology companies, in line with the principles
of “production requirements, advanced technol-
ogy and a good reputation”. Market mechanisms
and qualifying constraints can be used to regulate
service enterprises and their activities, organising
specialist construction teams, while establishing
new systems founded on “exploration,
production, site operations, costing, safety and
the environment”. All the while, procedural
regulation of production processes and stan-
dardised operations will ensure effective and
orderly exploration and extraction.
At the same time, the training of professional
personnel needs strengthening. Sustainable
development depends on the personnel of the oil
and gas industry, so competition between enter-
prises is ultimately competition using human
resources. It is therefore necessary to establish
professional resources for China’s oil and gas
market—and, indeed, for the international mar-
ket. Not only is there a need for experts with a
great deal of management and technical exper-
tise, they also need to be encouraged to expand
their proficiency to legal matters and interna-
tional trade, resulting in a relatively stable human
resource system which encompasses all the pro-
fessions required.
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15Policy Measures and Safeguardsto Support Natural Gas Market
Liberalisation and Regulatory
Reform
To promote the rapid and healthy development of
the natural gas industry, completion and refine-
ment of policy safeguards must take place as
soon as possible.
15.1 Create and Complete a Natural
Gas Legislative Framework
The fourth plenary session of the Communist
Party Central Committee proposed the creation
and completion of a legislative system, consti-
tuting a historical move towards the creation of
the conditions necessary for legislative reform,
laying the foundation for future legislative
work. Thus legislative work should take a
leading role in promoting economic and social
development, which will involve a transition
from “policy-guided action” to “legally guided
action”, ensuring that reform and legislation
keep step, and that reforms occur according to
the law. Only by ensuring that development of
the natural gas industry is realised according to
the law, and by increasingly establishing sci-
entific and democratic legislation for the natural
gas industry, can good legislation and gover-
nance be achieved, and a basic system for the
legal regulation of the natural gas industry put
in place.
Although the initial framework for a legislative
and regulatory systemwithin the natural gas sector
in China is already in place, the existing legal
system lacks co-ordination, consistency and sys-
tematisation. For example, China still lacks a
specialist and comprehensive “oil and natural
gas law” that completely covers the entire
upstream-midstream-downstream production
chain. In terms of exploration and development of
natural gas, the existing mineral resources legis-
lation is based on solid minerals, and deals with
problems that are common to the rights issues
encountered with mineral resources, making it
unsuitable for resolving the specialised problems
arising in relation to natural gas, a gaseous min-
eral. Moreover, most of the existing legislation
was created for a planned economy and restricts
the rules of acquisition and transfer of mineral
rights and is unable to fulfil the particular needs of
natural gas and market liberalisation reform. In
terms of natural gas pipeline networks, the end
consumer sector and environmental protection,
the current regulatory legislation is incomplete,
while the responsibilities and obligations of local
governments and related businesses are not suffi-
ciently clear in terms of transportation, gas storage
and gas distribution. The technical specifications
and standards of the modern gas industry are still
not sufficiently normalised and complete.
The law is the most important tool for gov-
erning a country, and good laws are a prerequi-
site of good governance. To form a complete
system of legal standards, first, key areas of
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legislation must be strengthened, the systematic
nature of laws and regulations must be enhanced
and weaknesses in the legal system causing the
laws to contradict each other in terms of logic
and value must be eliminated. Therefore, the
legal framework of the natural gas industry
should be improved as soon as possible. There
should be a comprehensive and effective natural
gas legal framework that consists of legislation
specific to the natural gas industry, with an “oil
and natural gas law” at the core.
Improving the application of such legislation
will make it better suited to the characteristics of
natural gas exploration, production, transporta-
tion, storage, distribution and usage. Completion
of improvements to relevant implementation rules
and supporting regulations should come first.
Gas-specific legislation should be established as
soon as possible, consisting of the formulation or
revision of the “oil and gas mining rights regu-
lations”, “natural gas midstream and downstream
administrative regulations”, “gas extraction
environmental protection regulations”, “offshore
oil and gas pipeline protection regulations”,
“natural gas reserves regulations” and other
administrative regulations. Improvements to leg-
islation in relation to resource rights, exploration
and development contracts, infrastructure and
operational management, storage, sales and
usage, safety alerts and emergency response,
production safety and compensation for envi-
ronmental impact, cross-border investment and
import and export trade are all vital as well.
Administrative regulations for natural gas
midstream and downstream should be researched
and drafted. The regulations should include, at the
very least: supervisory participants and duties at
different levels of government; the organisation,
position, powers, duties, regulatory principles and
operating mechanisms of a natural gas regulatory
body; natural gas transportation administration
modes and operational mechanisms; the rights,
obligations and responsibilities of businesses in
relation to natural gas; the principles and mech-
anisms which will determine the prices and dis-
tribution charging rates for natural gas; pipeline
construction and authorisation; maintenance,
security and open access to pipelines; and reso-
lution of disputes.
Environmental protection regulations for gas
extraction should be researched and formulated.
Special provisions must be made for the fol-
lowing aspects of natural gas exploitation: pol-
lution prevention planning; environmental
impact assessments; pollution permits; drilling
fluids and exhaust gases; the recycling or pro-
cessing of waste water and toxic gas; noise
control; management of radioactive sources;
environmental monitoring; excessive pollution;
and emergency response to pollution incidents.
Areas of conflict between the oil and gas
pipeline protection law and other laws should be
dealt with through by legal interpretation. There
are various urgent needs: co-ordinating pipeline
development planning and other specific plan-
ning; dealing with the convergence between
pipeline construction planning and urban and
rural planning; legal determination of under-
ground pipeline passage rights; restrictions on
land use in relation to pipeline safety; and con-
flicts between pipeline safety and road and rail
safety requirements.
15.2 Deepen Reform of Oil and Gas
Regulations
The existing energy administration systems must
be rationalised, and this will involve a gradual
transition to a high-level, centralised energy
administration. Industry administration should be
enhanced by placing general industry-focused
planning, market access approval and legislative
functions under the control of one overall
department. More emphasis should be placed on
strategic planning in relation to energy develop-
ment, implementing comprehensive planning,
policies and standards in the administration of
the industry. Increasing the rate at which related
governance is simplified and deregulation occurs,
further removing and deputising various admin-
istrative duties and application approval
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functions, and making a clearer distinction
between the role of government and the role of
business, will reduce the extent of government
interference in microeconomic affairs. The sep-
aration of government and business functions
should be promoted further by separating natu-
rally monopolistic businesses from competitive
businesses, and opening up specific areas to
competition, encouraging orderly access for all
types of investor to all areas of the energy
industry, to allow fair access and encourage
effective competition.
Admission management should be imple-
mented using a restriction list. A “restriction list”
is a government-compiled list offields, businesses
etc. to which prohibition or restrictions apply.
Access to fields that are not included on the list is
completely open, as a principle of “permissible
unless prohibited” applies. Give full play to the
market’s decisive role in resource allocation, and
ensure that where control is released this occurs
effectively and reduces admission thresholds. If
not prohibited by law, activities should be open to
market participants. If not authorised by law,
government activity in activities is not permitted.
This will provide greater space for the market to
play a determining role. A unified market
admission system should be implemented, foun-
ded on a restriction list regime, encouraging and
guiding the access of various types of market
entity to participate in fields other than those lis-
ted in the “restriction list” in accordance with the
law. This will promote diversification of investors
in the energy sector.
However, in addition to relaxing market
admission, there should also be certain large,
significant changes involving deregulation of
both large and small enterprises. For example, in
the oil and natural gas development and infras-
tructure fields, where problems related to
administrative monopolies are particularly pro-
nounced, allowing access to one or two major
competitors will result in more effective compe-
tition. Consideration could be given to tendering
and bidding for conventional oil and gas mineral
rights for the Sichuan Basin pilot scheme, to the
release to competition of construction and oper-
ation of the provincial pipelines and to the
complete deregulation of the oil and gas markets
for Sichuan, Chongqing and other cities. Dereg-
ulation of oil and gas importing would open up
both domestic and foreign markets and allow
private enterprises to grow in influence.
15.3 Deepen Reform of the Fiscal
and Tax Systems
1. Further improve fiscal policy
Action should be taken to take advantage of
market effects so as to expand funding for geo-
logical exploration, with a focus on supporting
and promoting unconventional and deep water
natural gas resource development and interna-
tional co-operation. Government support mecha-
nisms for fundamental, strategic and cutting-edge
scientific research and research into generic
technology and mechanisms for funding major
equipment should be improved. The peak regu-
lation, frequency modulation back-up and com-
pensation policies should be refined.
The manner in which taxes are divided
between central government and local govern-
ment needs adjusting. When compared to thermal
power generation and other such traditional
energy sources, the financial discounts applied to
natural gas and other clean energy sources offer
few benefits in terms of local fiscal income, and
as a result there is little stimulus for activity in
this area in local government. On the other hand,
when compared to central taxes, the sources of
local taxes are fairly dispersed, while collection
and administration presents greater difficulties,
with unstable income affecting funding for the
development of natural gas by local govern-
ments. We suggest an appropriate adjustment of
the proportions of VAT, company income tax
and other taxes allocated from the natural gas
sector, increasing local government fiscal
income, which will act as an encouragement to
local government to develop natural gas.
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2. Extension of financial subsidies for shale
natural gas
Efforts to provide policy support for coalbed
methane as soon as possible should be intensi-
fied. Financial subsidies to coalbed methane
development companies should be increased to
0.60 CNY/m3. The corporation tax exemption
policy should be extended to 2020, and there
should be strict implementation of the VAT
refund policy or implementation of an “imme-
diate refund” policy.
Between 2012 and 2015, China’s central
government gave a standard subsidy of 0.4
CNY/m3 to shale natural gas businesses who
satisfied the relevant conditions. The period to
which the 13th Five-Year Plan applies will be
critical for the launch, development and growth
of China’s shale natural gas industry. Encour-
agement of exploration and development of shale
natural gas will continue, despite the sharp drop
in international oil prices and the likelihood that
these will remain at between 60 and 80 $/barrel
for the next 3–5 years and the associated reduc-
tion in global investment in shale natural gas. In
light of this, the continuance and implementation
of further shale natural gas exploration subsidies
is of major importance if shale natural gas is to
continue to be developed on a large scale in
China. The standard subsidy for 2016–2018 is
currently 0.3 CNY/m3; the standard subsidy for
2019–2020 is 0.2 CNY/m3.
3. Accelerate resource tax reform
The objective of resource tax reform should
be the promotion of the rational development and
utilisation of natural resources, the promotion of
ecological and environmental protection and the
acceleration of transformation of development
modes. It should be introduced in three stages
and cover three areas. In 2015–2016, preliminary
completion of a resource tax system; in 2017–
2018 the resource tax system should be more or
less completed; and in 2019–2020 the objective
of the resource tax reforms should have been
fundamentally achieved, leading to an emphasis
on establishing the application of resource tax,
determining appropriate taxation levels and
extending the scope of tax collection, improving
calculation and collection methods, and refining
a system of resource commodity pricing, this
being achieved via integrated measures.
Research should be carried out on adjusting
petroleum product consumer taxation systems
and tax rates, promoting petroleum product
consumer tax reform using multifaceted taxation
schemes. On the basis of improving the existing
tax system, multifaceted collection schemes are
recommended, promoting petroleum product
consumer taxation reform. First, strict accredita-
tion of wholesale businesses should be applied,
through channels such as media monitoring and
public oversight, to ensure that access is provided
openly, fairly and justly to approved wholesalers.
Second, tax departments should focus on a new
tax collection scheme, adjusting the regulatory
focus to ensure that the transition between the old
tax system and the new one is smooth and suc-
cessfully implemented. Third, the proportion of
oil consumption tax to be shared between local
and central government should be determined in
a scientific manner, encouraging the active
involvement of local government in collection
and administration. Fourth, thorough monitoring
and improvement systems should be put in place
in order to deal with new problems and situations
which arise with the new tax system.
4. Establish and improve environmental tax
and carbon trading policy systems
Environmental taxes are taxes levied for
environmental purposes and include special taxes
imposed or levies imposed as a form of pre-
venting pollution or damage to the environment.
The scope of such taxes ensures that they are
levied against and specifically target behaviour
harmful to the environment. This form of taxa-
tion (also known as “independent environmental
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taxation”) is thus intimately connected with
environmental protection, and generally includes
pollutant emission taxes, contaminant taxes and
carbon taxes. Pollution emission taxes are envi-
ronmental taxes levied against pollutant emis-
sions (such as waste gas, contaminated water and
solid waste). Contaminant taxes are environ-
mental taxes levied against potentially contami-
nating products (such as energy fuels, motor
vehicles, ozone-depleting substances, fertilisers,
pesticides, detergents containing phosphorous,
mercury-cadmium batteries). Carbon taxes are
environmental taxes levied against carbon
dioxide-generating fossil fuels such as coal, oil
and natural gas.
During the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan,
encouragement was given in particular to the
breakthrough in carbon trading which encouraged
pilot schemes to realise a move from “voluntary
trading” to “mandatory trading”. In the long term,
the aim is to establish a comprehensive primary
and secondary market which covers the entire
economy and which integrates international mar-
kets, with market mechanisms playing a decisive
role in the optimised allocation of all kinds of
energy efficiency and emissions reduction
resources, in order to achievemaximum emissions
reduction for minimum cost. Regarding carbon
tax, carbon tax legislation should be accelerated,
making it possible to think about ways in which
carbon trading can be used in conjunction with
carbon taxes, thus allowing implementation of a
variety of policies. At the same time, enterprises
which actively use emissions reduction and car-
bon dioxide recovery technology and which reach
certain standards should be given tax breaks.
Legislative work in relation to the transfor-
mation from an environmental charge to an
environmental tax system and the introduction of
pollutant emissions taxes should be accelerated.
The objects of existing charges levied on pollu-
tant emissions should all be included in the scope
of the pollutant emission taxation, and compre-
hensive reform of the pollution charging system
should be implemented. Further refinement of
energy efficiency and emissions reduction taxa-
tion policy is required, as is the creation and
refinement of an environmental compensation
mechanism, while the possibility of implement-
ing a green tax system should be explored.
15.4 Establish and Complete
a Natural Gas Data
Management System
Refinement of a unified information management
system should occur as soon as possible. Sub-
mission of oil and gas data should be linked
directly with mineral rights administration,
allowing comprehensive integration and data
sharing in the mineral rights administrative pro-
cesses. Accelerate the establishment of a national
database. The main areas covered by this should
be the results of domestic oil and gas geo-
graphical surveys and data relating to exploration
and development, covering both domestic and
foreign oil and gas resource data. Establish a
national public information network for oil and
gas resources, implementing concentrated and
dynamic, publicly accessible data, mineral rights
administration and raw data in an integrated oil
and gas data management, publication and shar-
ing service platform, in order to effectively pro-
mote an open-door policy on mineral rights, with
truly equitable access, thus encouraging effective
competition.
15.4.1 Data Submission
Various types of data related to the exploration
and development of conventional natural gas,
shale natural gas and coalbed methane, including
original geological data, outcome data and rele-
vant geophysical information from geological
work, should be submitted to the departments
responsible for management of state-owned land
resources, which will then be filed with the nat-
ural gas mineral rights administration. Original
15.3 Deepen Reform of the Fiscal and Tax Systems 327
geological data and results data to be submitted
should include specialised information of aspects
such as field geology, geophysics, geochemistry,
geological remote sensing, experimental testing,
engineering geology, drilling engineering and
information technology. The complete dataset for
the previous year should be submitted by the
second quarter for the previous year.
15.4.2 Standardised Data
Management
To strictly regulate the resource-based integrated
data management of conventional natural gas,
shale natural gas and coalbed methane, submis-
sion of natural gas resource raw data will be
linked with gas mineral rights administration.
This will establish mechanisms for natural gas
resource data acquisition, processing, manage-
ment and storage, promote the digitisation of
natural gas resource raw data and establish and
improve new mechanisms for natural gas resource
raw data management and services, creating an
integrated management and shared services plat-




Resource information covering domestic con-
ventional natural gas, shale natural gas and
coalbed methane should be set up, adopting
China’s natural gas resource survey and explo-
ration and development data as the basis of the
main content of a national gas resource database.
Implement comprehensive integration and data
sharing in relation to the natural gas mineral
rights administrative processes. Create a national
public information network for oil and gas
resources, implementing unified natural gas
resources information management of concen-
trated and dynamic data, public data, mineral
rights administration and raw data.
15.5 Increase Reform and Technical
Innovation in the Natural Gas
Sector
State investment in gas development and utili-
sation technology should be increased. The focus
should be on key technological breakthroughs,
increasing investment in the areas of key tech-
nology common to unconventional gas explo-
ration, deep water gas development and LNG
storage and transportation. Strategic planning
and expansion of research and development
should be instituted in the following eight key
technology areas: shale natural gas exploration,
deep water gas development, coalbed methane
extraction, gas hydrates extraction, coal-based
methane, gas-powered vehicle (and ship) engine
manufacturing, combined cycle gas turbine gen-
erators and carbon capture and storage, with a
focus on achieving key technological break-
throughs and early deployment of fundamental
research in the relevant fields.
The administrative system in relation to
existing technological investment needs to be
reformed. The national energy departments
should organise and co-ordinate scientific, terri-
torial resource, industry and information, finance,
environmental protection and standardisation
departments, defining the tasks and responsibili-
ties of each different department with respect to
support for natural gas technology innovation.
With leadership from the State Council, uniform
supportive policies should be developed accord-
ing to the shared features of technology. Rec-
ommendations for improving the support system
for natural gas technology innovation include:
• Establish a national major technology labo-
ratory for unconventional gas, providing
manpower, resources and finance for research
breakthroughs relating to key technology,
should be established.
• Support business innovation and enhancing
industrial technological capabilities.
• Support businesses to transform themselves
and upgrade to clean, gas-based energy.
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• Improve production efficiency through tech-
nological innovation and investment.
• Assist backbone enterprises in adopting core
technology, thus enhancing their technical
capabilities and establishing their core
competitiveness.
• Strengthen the links between producers and
academic research.
• Support research into shared technology and
develop and implement independent projects
promoting autonomous, localised projects
relying on clean gas based energy equipment.
• Encourage localised manufacturing of clean,
gas-based energy technology.
• Intensify efforts to train personnel, supporting
the establishment of corporate research and
development centres and post-doctorate
research centres.
• Strengthen shale natural gas geological
research, and accelerate the development and
application of “factorisation” and “complete
sets” in the adoption and development of
technology.
• Explore the formative process involved in the
development of advanced practical shale
natural gas exploration and development
technologies and business models.
• Foster in-house innovation and equipment
manufacturing capacities.
• Encourage joint scientific advances and
international co-operation, ensuring the
introduction, digestion, absorption and inno-
vation of advanced technology.
• Adopt shale natural gas exploration, devel-
opment and production technology suited to
China’s surface and subsurface geology.
• Accelerate the formation of environmentally
friendly and cost-effective key technology
and equipment systems specific to China and
implement these in order achieve widespread
adoption.
In terms of equipment, the first step should be
to increase the power rating of technology,
reducing the number of devices necessary and
reducing the footprint of well-sites, making them
more suitable for mountainous settings. Next, the
aim should be to bring about equipment modu-
larisation, miniaturisation and portability so as to
facilitate work in complex surface configurations.
To achieve cost reductions, design process opti-
misation and research into low-cost hydraulic
fracturing options should be actively pursued. As
regards environmental issues, environmental
protection and the safety of additives should be
ensured, as should co-ordinated resource devel-
opment and environmental protection. Over the
next 3–5 years, at the same time as digestion,
absorption and innovation technologies are
introduced, key shale natural gas engineering
technology installations systems with Chinese
characteristics should be adopted on a wider
scale, and these should be environmentally
friendly, economical and effective. After 2020,
efforts should be made to ensure that localised
and mature proprietary shale natural gas tech-
nology and equipment is available.
Large-scale coal gasification and methanation
equipment, energy efficiency cascade technology
improvements, microalgal biodiesel technology
as well as key sewage treatment technologies
should be given priority and included in key
national basic research projects, while there
should be increased investment in the develop-
ment of technology and applications. Relying on
existing model coal methane projects, further
innovation and research should take place con-
cerning the suitability of coal types and
high-pressure gasification, increasing production
capacity, improving gasification, reducing water
consumption, promoting environmentally friend-
lier new-generation coal gasification techniques
and key equipment and other such breakthroughs
in proprietary innovations. In addition, research
and development of high-temperature methana-
tion synthesis and reactor technology and equip-
ment should take place, gradually resulting in the
creation of core production technology and
automated integrated systems suited to the char-
acteristics of Chinese coal.
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Research efforts into gas hydrates exploration
and development technology should be ramped
up, enhancing the research and development
capabilities in relation to core technology,
thereby encouraging the development of core
technology intellectual property.
• Investigation and evaluation of gas hydrates
will provide a basis on which the orderly
development of gas hydrates can take place.
Further improvements in resource surveying,
exploration and evaluation techniques should
be applied to gas hydrates, prioritising
prospecting criteria and methods, allowing
the distribution of China’s maritime and
tundra gas hydrates resources to be plotted—
this will establish which gas hydrate land
areas are commercially viable.
• Strengthening scientific and technological
research into extraction technology will pro-
mote a process by which gas hydrates could
be developed in China. This should mainly
include:
– research into methods that result in rapid
and efficient decomposition of gas
hydrates, such as depressurisation, heat-
ing, chemical inhibition and carbon diox-
ide substitution;
– research into key technology such as
drilling, completion, cementing, horizon-
tal wells and fracturing and improved gas
collection, storage and transportation
technology, which will establish a rela-
tively complete gas hydrates extraction
technological system;
– research and development into extraction
equipment and other key equipment,
encouraging the introduction of locally
manufactured gas hydrates extraction
equipment, enhancing the technical level
of China’s gas hydrates extraction equip-
ment, strengthening the integration of
extraction techniques and methods, opti-
mising extraction schemes and equipment
portfolios, and formulating practical gas
hydrates development technological
systems.
• Strengthening research into extraction safety
and environmental assessment, in order to
establish the likely impact of gas hydrates
extraction on global climate change, seabed
geological disasters and deep-sea ecosystems
as soon as possible, will allow the introduc-
tion of appropriate dynamic monitoring, dis-
aster warning and control systems.
15.6 Expand International Energy
Co-operation
Co-ordinate the use of domestic and international
resources and markets. Particular attention
should be paid to ensuring that investment and
trade go hand in hand, while making use of both
land-based and maritime channels, in addition to
accelerating the development and implementa-
tion of mid-term to long-term planning in relation
to overseas energy resources, focusing on
expanding import channels, building the Silk
Road Economic Zone, the 21st Century Marine
Silk Road, the BCIM Economic Corridor and the
Pakistan Economic Corridor, and actively sup-
porting energy technology, equipment and engi-
neering teams to “look outside”.
Strengthen the construction of the five key
energy co-operation regions of Russia and Cen-
tral Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas
and Asia-Pacific, and deepen bilateral and mul-
tilateral international energy co-operation to
establish regional energy markets. Actively par-
ticipate in global energy governance. Strengthen
co-ordination and encouragement of enterprises
to “look outside” and to acquire or obtain shares
in foreign companies dealing with advanced
shale natural gas and other unconventional gas
development technologies in a systematic and
targeted manner, allowing China to accumulate
technological experience relating to unconven-
tional gas development.
• Further optimise the authorisation process to
improve authorisation efficiency. Competition
for international oil and gas resources in the
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mergers and acquisitions market has been
relatively intense. Good projects often receive
a lot of attention, while requirements relating
to deadlines have become stricter. In light of
this, it is recommended that the relevant
departments tighten up their overseas invest-
ment authorisation procedures, reducing risks
where possible and increasing authorisation
efficiency in order to shorten the time
required for authorisation to be granted.
• Take effective measures to solve the problem
of the shortage of investment and financing
for overseas corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions. First, policy banks can give the neces-
sary support to enterprises for acquisition
financing. Second, China Investment Corpo-
ration may be able to act as an investor for
certain projects. Third, some China-Africa
development funding and other such equity
investments can play a role in overseas
investment.
• From the long-term perspective, it is neces-
sary to build a policy system which will
encourage oil companies to “look outside”.
First, co-ordinate the development of national
oil security strategy and energy diplomacy
policy, creating an international environment
which is conducive to overseas investment in
oil and gas, such as signing of investment
protection agreements, securing relatively
reasonable fiscal terms on resources in
regions like Latin America and Central Asia
and refinement of the government’s mecha-
nism for rapid response to overseas emer-
gencies. This will minimise the political,
security and policy risks faced by oil com-
panies due to overseas investment. Second,
establish overseas venture exploration funds
for projects approved by the state for which
oil companies can apply; after high-risk
exploration pays off, a share of the proceeds
is returned, or partly written off in the case of
failure.
At the same time, the oil and gas futures
market being created in China must take into
consideration the status and trends of the distri-
bution of global resources, production develop-
ment, trade flow and increasing consumption.
A perfect, modern, international oil and natural
gas market system with foundation like these will
help China attain a relatively favourable position
in the process of using global oil and natural gas
resources to develop its economy. Therefore, on
the one hand China should respond to the
developments and trends in the market while
improving the domestic oil circulation system
and price formation mechanisms, in order to
establish an oil and natural gas industrial system
based on diversified natural gas resources,
diversified participants and open-market prices.
On the other hand, though satisfactory market
admission, foreign currency and customs policies
must be put in place, in order to attract a large
number of international investors to participate in
building a global international oil and natural gas
futures market.
The establishment of the China (Shanghai)
free trade test area (the FTA) provides the con-
ditions necessary to develop a Chinese oil and
natural gas futures market. Organisations such as
the People’s Bank of China have issued policies
such as Suggestions on the Financial Support of
the Shanghai FTA, under the principles of “first
release, then regulate” and “controllable risk,
steady progress”. Capital account convertibility,
CNY cross-border use and interest rate market
liberalisation have already been achieved in the
FTA, indicating that China has entered a new
stage of financial innovation and that the estab-
lishment of an offshore financial market has
already begun. Moreover, the Shanghai interna-
tional energy trading centre will be specifically
responsible for the construction of an interna-
tional oil and natural gas futures platform, con-
tract design and supporting mechanisms (such as
foreign investor participation in transactions and
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bonded delivery), thus establishing a market
trading system based on three main principles:
value-changing mechanisms, fair trading rules
and good credit systems. Solid progress on this
work indicates that China expects to launch
international oil and natural gas futures trading in
the near future, an event which will attract the
participation of large numbers of international
investors, which will allow us to take better
advantage of both domestic and international
resources and markets. This will in turn help to
improve the international competitiveness of
Chinese oil and gas companies on the open
market, promoting the establishment of a Chi-
nese oil and natural gas market system that is
able to meet the ever-growing economic and
social development needs for energy while
ensuring national energy security.
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PART IV
International Experience from the
Development of Gas Markets Globally
Looking at the global energy system, natural gas
consumption is, on average, growing as a share
of the energy mix. This growth is driven by gas
market liberalisation, a switch from other fuel
sources and improved access to unconventional
natural gas reserves. At the same time, the world
is increasingly being divided into regions that
consume natural gas and regions that supply it.
The imbalance in natural gas supply and demand
has in part driven the sharp increase in trade in
liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the past decade.
In this context, as an important part player in the
global energy markets, China’s policy frame-
work has a major influence on global natural gas
markets.
Global natural gas pricing is in the process of
evolution, with oil-indexed long-term contracts
increasingly being replaced by market-based
pricing. For example, the US Henry Hub price
reflects current supply and demand conditions,
seasonal variations, the impact of major disrup-
tions, as well as long-term trends. In markets
with oil-indexed gas pricing, prices are less
sensitive to and reflective of market conditions.
Historical links between natural gas and oil pri-
ces are no longer relevant in many regions, and
as the fundamentals of natural gas and oil mar-
kets have diverged, so have natural gas prices in
regions with competitive pricing compared to
regions continuing with oil indexation. The
objective of market-based pricing, such as
through natural gas hubs, is to create a liquid
market where natural gas is competitively priced.
A competitive natural gas market is key for
achieving a more affordable, secure and envi-
ronmentally sustainable energy system. In turn,
this requires five core elements of a liberalised
market: creating institutions, ensuring open
access to infrastructure, deregulating prices for
the competitive segments of the value chain,
setting standards and ensuring market trans-
parency and protecting end users.
The natural gas value chain can be broadly
divided into three segments: upstream markets,
midstream infrastructure and downstream mar-
kets. The upstream segment primarily refers to
domestic exploration and production of natural
gas, where licensing regimes and fiscal policies
are important for incentivising and supporting
production. The midstream segment refers to
infrastructure for the transport of natural gas—
domestic and imported—through natural gas
transmission networks and local distribution
companies. The downstream segment refers to
wholesale and retail markets, including natural
gas trading hubs. A liberalised natural gas market
requires deregulation of the upstream and
downstream segments, and third-party access to
midstream infrastructure.
As natural gas demand rises globally, security
of supply is becoming an increasingly important
issue. Key elements of natural gas security
include: diversity of natural gas supply sources
and availability of alternatives, sufficient quantity
of good quality supply and transmission infras-
tructure such as storage facilities, pipelines and
LNG terminals, and institutions and policies to
support the development of natural gas sources
and infrastructure.
The energy system has implications for
environmental pollution—for example, reduc-
ing local air quality, which in turn produces
negative health outcomes and lowers the pro-
ductivity of the economy. Substituting natural
gas for other fossil fuels in industrial applica-
tions and residential heating can reduce local
air pollution and provide significant benefits for
the economy.
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Throughout the world, natural gas is gaining
prominence in national energy systems. In many
economies its share of the energy mix is grow-
ing. Major factors behind this global growth
include market liberalisation, a switch from other
fuel sources and improved access to unconven-
tional natural gas reserves. Environmental and
energy security considerations have added
impetus to the trend.
In this chapter, we examine developments in
natural gas supply and demand globally. We look
at developments and trends in international nat-
ural gas markets in terms of supply, demand and
prices. We also consider the experiences of many
developed economies of liberalising the natural
gas value chain. Given the increasing importance
of natural gas as an energy source, we examine
the effect of natural gas on national energy
security. Finally, we consider the environmental
benefits of a shift to natural gas, in terms of
boosting local air quality, improving health out-
comes and increasing the overall productivity of
the economy.
16.1 Global Natural Gas Markets
As global energy demand has grown, so has the
importance of natural gas in the energy system,
both in absolute terms and as a share of the
global energy mix. In 1980, natural gas accoun-
ted for 19% of global energy consumption, and
by 2010 that figure had risen to 23%. During
these two decades, natural gas consumption rose
on average by 2.6% per year, compared to 2%
for overall energy consumption, and is expected
to sustain a 2% annual increase until 2030. While
much of the current demand for natural gas
comes from developed markets, demand in
coming years is expected to be driven by
increased consumption in emerging markets,
particularly for power generation. Indeed, the
bulk of this new demand is expected to come
from Asia, and particularly China.
Demand for natural gas is driven primarily by
switching from other fuel sources, such as oil and
coal. In addition, increased economic intensity—
which is pushing demand for all fuels—is con-
tributing to growing consumption of natural gas.
Reduced energy intensity (the amount of energy
needed for a given output) is mitigating these
growth pressures slightly. Perhaps surprisingly,
our research finds that price differentials between
natural gas and other fuels have a relatively small
effect on fuel switching and demand growth.
The development of unconventional natural
gas has further stimulated natural gas demand
growth. In the wake of recent success in the
United States in exploiting shale natural gas, a
larger portion of the world’s natural gas supply is
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expected to come from unconventional natural
gas reserves. In 2030, shale natural gas and
coalbed methane are expected to account for
more than half of North America’s natural gas
production. Further, the US Department of
Energy has estimated that China holds the
world’s largest reserves of technically recover-
able shale natural gas, almost twice as much as
found in the United States. However, cost, the
geographic distribution of the natural gas fields,
and the need for the appropriate capabilities
could be obstacles to exploiting these reserves.
The global natural gas trade, and especially
the flourishing LNG trade, has supported the
continued growth in natural gas demand. Global
trade in LNG doubled between 2003 and 2013.
The increase in global LNG trade is expected to
continue, leading to an increasingly linked and
integrated global natural gas market. Partly as a
result of the increased production of unconven-
tional reserves in the United States and else-
where, countries exporting LNG are likely to
become more diversified in coming years, cre-
ating a supply network with links to a broader
range of demand centres. LNG shipping is also
more flexible, adding further momentum to glo-
bal LNG trade. Because they do not rely on
immovable pipeline networks, uncommitted
LNG shipments can respond to price and be
quickly directed to the best markets, based on
price. Energy security advantages and arbitrage
opportunities also help LNG shipments to
compete with natural gas delivered over
pipelines.
Pricing systems for natural gas are gradually
shifting away from oil-indexed contracts, espe-
cially outside Asia. While natural gas contracts
have traditionally been linked to the price of oil,
the underlying economic fundamentals for these
two fuels have diverged. Oil-based fuels are
primarily used for transportation, with power and
heat generation becoming a much smaller con-
tributor to demand, while the use of natural gas
in power and heat generation is increasing. In
addition, the creation of natural gas hubs—no-
tably in Europe and the United States—has
enabled natural gas contracts to be linked to
transparent and readily available natural gas price
benchmarks, such as Henry Hub in the US and
the British National Balancing Point (NBP).
As part of this study, we examined the impact
of different Chinese natural gas demand scenar-
ios on global energy markets. The analysis sug-
gests that an increase in China’s natural gas
demand is not likely to have a significant impact
on global natural gas prices, as global supply is
able to respond to increased Chinese demand.
However, Chinese coal demand displaced by the
increase in natural gas demand is likely to have a
significant impact on global coal prices. China
currently accounts for a large share of global coal
demand, and the decline in demand, combined
with global coal supply being slow to respond to
the new market conditions, is likely to depress
global coal prices. In the absence of any policies
to restrict coal use, regional economies such as
India and Indonesia are likely to be the main
beneficiaries of lower coal prices.
16.2 International Experiences
of Liberalising the Natural Gas
Value Chain
As part of our study, we examined the liberali-
sation experience of natural gas systems in five
markets that have witnessed significant increases
in consumption in recent years. In all of these
markets—the United States, the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea—
market liberalisation and increased competition
played a significant role in increasing domestic
demand for natural gas. The market development
in each of these cases was unique, but there are
nonetheless positive and negative lessons that
China can learn from.
When it comes to increasing the share of
natural gas in the energy mix, three key
energy-related concerns for policy-makers are:
• providing affordable natural gas for business,
residential and industrial end users;
• enhancing national energy security by diver-
sifying supply networks and improving the
country’s negotiating position in international
natural gas markets; and
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• delivering ancillary benefits, such as
improving air quality or supplying energy to
poor households and regions.
Liberalising the natural gas value chain can
help to balance and support these objectives. For
example, increased competition in the extraction
and sale of natural gas can drive down costs, and
therefore reduce the price paid by consumers and
end users. It can also help to diversify sources of
supply, increasing energy security.
The countries we studied followed similar
paths to liberalisation, although they differed in
the details and the level of success. The process
of liberalisation helps to deliver competitive
market outcomes—to provide end users with the
greatest choice at the lowest price. This can be
achieved by opening markets to competition or
through regulatory measures to limit or cap pri-
ces where natural monopolies exist.
The natural gas value chain can be divided
into three segments: the upstream exploration
and production segment; midstream infrastruc-
ture, including transmission and distribution
pipelines and LNG terminals; and the down-
stream wholesale and retail markets for natural
gas that bring the fuel to consumers and end
users. Competitive markets can exist at many
points in this value chain.
Competition in the upstream segment can drive
greater efficiency and innovation in the exploration
and production of natural gas, as a way to drive
down costs and develop greater volumes of
domestic supply. For example, before the liberal-
isation of natural gas markets in the European
Union, state-owned, vertically integrated natural
gas companies had little incentive to improve the
efficiency of their operations, leading to increases
in the price of natural gas. Similarly, greater com-
petition in the downstream segment can increase
choice and reduce the price paid by the end users of
natural gas, for example by increasing competition
in the shipping and sale of natural gas. These seg-
ments can be opened to competition, within a
regulatory oversight framework that ensures and
supports competitivemarkets andwithout the need
for further regulatory interventions.
However, opening the midstream segment to
market competition is typically not desirable, and
is likely to fail. Midstream infrastructure, such as
pipelines, is highly capital-intensive. For exam-
ple, in 2013, onshore oil and natural gas pipeline
construction in the United States cost $4.1 million
per mile, while offshore pipelines cost $7.6 mil-
lion per mile. High fixed costs and relatively low
operation and maintenance costs point to large
economies of scale: the costs of delivery decline
rapidly with volume. This fits the definition of a
natural monopoly, where the lowest long-run
average costs are realised when production and
ownership are concentrated in a single firm.
Countries have dealt with the natural monopoly
characteristics of midstream infrastructure in a
number of ways: by mandating third-party access
to pipeline infrastructure; by regulating the tariffs
that pipeline infrastructure owners can charge for
access; and/or by separating transport services
from upstream and downstream businesses (a
process known as unbundling).
To be more specific, countries that have suc-
cessfully liberalised the natural gas value chain
began by creating the necessary institutions, par-
ticularly a strong and independent natural gas
regulator. They then moved to ensure open access
to the natural gas network by, for instance,
requiring large integrated companies to unbundle
their holdings, regulating network charges and
overseeing third-party access to transmission and
distribution networks. These countries also
deregulated prices where appropriate, especially
in the upstream and downstream segments of the
value chain. They set market standards and man-
dated transparency, for example by standardising
trading agreements and supporting the develop-
ment of natural gas hubs. And finally, they strived
to protect end users by overseeing competition
and managing adverse market impact.
16.3 Liberalisation of Different
Segments of the Natural Gas
Value Chain
In addition to examining the evolution of natural
gas systems in selected markets, our study also
looks at international experiences of liberalising
specific parts of the natural gas value chain.
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In the upstream segment, liberalisation has
focused on encouraging new entrants and
increasing competition through appropriate fiscal
and licensing regimes. International experience
suggests that these measures are necessary to
meet national objectives, as well as to ensure the
quality and quantity of natural gas production.
In the midstream segment, the natural mono-
poly characteristics of natural gas transmission
and distribution infrastructure have meant that
liberalisation efforts have focused on providing
third-party access and unbundling. In setting the
framework and terms for third-party access,
governments need to balance the need for fair
and open access with incentives for further
investment in midstream infrastructure. This
balance varies by country and circumstance. For
example, regulators in Japan have favoured
midstream investment over access. Thus, while
provisions for third-party access exist in law,
enforcement has tended to be lax.
In addition to third-party access, unbundling
is an important consideration with regard to
midstream assets. Often, as a country begins the
process of liberalisation, the national market is
dominated by one or a few companies that own
assets throughout the value chain. These com-
panies have a strong incentive to restrict access to
midstream infrastructure in order to benefit their
own upstream or downstream businesses.
Because of this natural tendency, countries
seeking to liberalise their natural gas markets
often require these vertically integrated compa-
nies to separate—or unbundle—midstream assets
into autonomous businesses. Unbundling has
taken various forms. While countries like the
United Kingdom and The Netherlands have
achieved full ownership unbundling, others like
the United States, Germany and France have
chosen to stop one step short, at structural
unbundling. The experience of these latter
countries indicates that full ownership unbund-
ling is not required, and that structural unbund-
ling under a strong regulator can capture many of
the benefits of full ownership unbundling.
Finally, with respect to the downstream seg-
ment, our study examines the development of
competitive natural gas wholesale markets and
the establishment of natural gas hubs. Wholesale
markets connect upstream sellers and retail
buyers and establish a basic price point for nat-
ural gas in a country or region. Regulatory efforts
here have often strived to encourage the devel-
opment of natural gas hubs, national or regional
centres that ease transactions between buyers and
sellers. Hubs can push natural gas pricing away
from oil-indexed contracts, creating a more
competitive pricing mechanism that is based on
the value of natural gas and is more responsive to
changes in market conditions.
Successful hubs enable competitive pricing of
natural gas, more efficient market co-ordination
and increased market transparency, with con-
sumers and end users benefiting from the more
efficient pricing of gas. By reflecting the true cost
and value of natural gas in the economy, hub
pricing also ensures that trade and investment
decisions are made on the basis of economic
benefits and efficiency. Hubs also create power-
ful and self-reinforcing network effects, which
help to lower transaction costs and increase
competition in wholesale gas markets. Finally, a
hub also supports energy security objectives by
supporting the diversification of sources of sup-
ply. Diversified and liquid hubs are better able to
respond to changes in demand compared to the
inflexibility of long-term contracts, for example
by procuring LNG cargoes on the spot market
during peak demand periods.
16.4 Natural Gas Energy Security
and Social Influence
As global energy demand has grown, so has
policy-maker interest in the security of energy
supply. Until recently, concerns about energy
security centred mostly on safeguarding oil sup-
plies, but as the global energy mix has diversi-
fied, the scope of energy security has broadened
as well. Our study finds that while there are a
wide range of approaches that a country can use
to achieve energy security, they can be distilled
down to three critical aspects of the supply chain:
sources, infrastructure and institutions. Combin-
ing imports, domestic supplies and access to
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alternative fuels results in a diversified supply
with readily available fuel substitutes. Ensuring
the quantity and quality of physical assets such as
storage facilities, pipelines and LNG terminals
means that sources of supply can be accessed
reliably. Finally, proper market and political
organisations, as well as underlying incentives,
are necessary along the supply chain in order to
develop these sources and infrastructure.
Assessing China against this framework, our
study finds that the country is in a good position
with respect to natural gas energy security. In
terms of sources, rising LNG trade, future pipe-
line imports and significant availability of alter-
native fuels provide a diversified source of
supply compared to other large natural
gas-consuming countries and regions such as
Japan, South Korea and the European Union.
Rapid infrastructure development has meant that
China has capacity (especially storage) to match
the levels of other major gas-consuming
countries.
Since China became a net importer of natural
gas in 2007, import sources have rapidly diver-
sified. Figure 16.1 shows, compared to the EU,
Japan, and Korea, China’s rapid increase in the
diversification of its natural gas imports, thereby
increasing its energy security. In 2007, China’s
only import source was Turkmenistan. The
Herfindahl Index was 1. Following the develop-
ment of LNG trade, China’s import sources have
diversified rapidly, and its Herfindahl Index has
correspondingly dropped. Today, China’s natural
gas import diversification is comparable to that of
the EU. In 2010, it was even comparable to
nations with the most diversified sources of nat-
ural gas—Japan and Korea.
Compared to nations with high natural gas
energy ratios that rely more on natural gas
imports, China’s imports are more diversified.
China, the EU, Japan, Korea, and Turkey are the
top five importers of natural gas. These five
nations have very diversified sources for their
imports, and their Herfindahl Indexes are all very
low. However, as shown in Fig. 16.2, compared
to other countries, China’s natural gas energy
ratio is lower, and its reliance on natural gas
imports is lower. In fact, other nations do not
have the import diversification that China enjoys,
and their reliance on imports and on natural gas
is significant. However, these nations rarely face
major natural gas security issues, which indicates
that China could safely raise the proportion of
natural gas in its energy mix as well as its pro-
portion of natural gas imports.
LNG enables not only China but also the
entire world to achieve greater supply diversifi-
cation. From 2003 to 2013, global LNG trade
doubled, with a huge influx of new buyers and
sellers. Figure 16.3 shows Japan’s LNG trade
network. Japan’s LNG sources are in the inner
circle, while the outer circle shows other coun-
tries that Japan’s import sources supply. The
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a net importer of
natural gas
Fig. 16.1 China’s natural gas import diversification. Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA data
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arrows indicate how reliant each exporting nation
is on Japan. Red arrows show relatively high
reliance on Japan and yellow arrows show low
reliance. In 2003, there were relatively few
nations supplying LNG to Japan, and Japan was
one of the few consuming nations. By 2013,
Japan had added more nations from which it
imported LNG, diversifying its import sources.
Moreover, these exporting nations had grown
their client base since 2003, though many still
relied heavily on Japan for their LNG sales.
Figure 16.4 shows China’s natural gas trading
network in 2013. In addition to LNG trade during
this period, there was also one Turkmenistan
natural gas pipeline. Compared to other nations,
China’s imports of LNG were more diversified.
However, compared to Japan in 2013, there is a
marked difference. For exporting nations, Japan
is a more important export destination.
In the future, new pipeline natural gas will
improve the security of natural gas for China.
Figure 16.4 shows that currently China’s pipe-
line trading has negotiating power. Turkmenistan
has only Kazakhstan and Iran as its other export
options. China, on the other hand, also plans to
engage in pipeline trade with Uzbekistan, Kaza-
khstan and Myanmar (the options for these
countries are limited as regards pipeline desti-
nations) as well as Russia (East-West Siberian oil
and gas field natural gas export destinations are
limited). Therefore, even though Japan’s LNG
supply is more diversified, China (leaving LNG
to one side) still has the option to use pipeline
natural gas and can also engage in domestic
production. This means that China does not need
to have a strong relationship with natural
gas-exporting nations as Japan does, but can
instead use natural gas hubs to make exporting
nations compete with one another.
Domestic natural gas production can greatly
improve China’s natural gas security. Domestic
production is a reliable option to replace imports,
and can improve negotiating power. China’s
domestic production has great potential, and
features some of the world’s major unconven-
tional natural gas reserves. However, current
production levels are low, and future production
remains uncertain. This uncertainty is a key
factor in China’s natural gas security, since
international experience shows that natural gas
security of producing nations is entirely different.
There is a close relationship between natural
gas market liberalisation and whether a nation
has domestic production. Nations without
0.0
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Fig. 16.2 China’s import security as compared to major nations. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA and EIA
data; natural gas proportions are from 2011, with remaining data from 2013













































Fig. 16.3 Japan’s LNG supply sources are diversified. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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domestic production such as Japan and Germany
and nations with large volumes of domestic
production such as the United Kingdom and
United Sates prove this point. For example,
Japan’s market is more co-ordinated and there
are large companies with bargaining power with
exporting nations. However, the United States
and United Kingdom have more open markets
and their competitive pressures stimulate more
domestic production. Another factor is that
domestic production improves bargaining power
with exporting nations, since when import supply
is cut off, the nation has a reliable substitute
source. Figure 16.5 illustrates the consistent
relationship between domestic production and
market liberalisation.
Currently, China’s natural gas market is a
co-ordinated one. However, there is still major
potential to develop domestic production.
International experience has shown that further
deepening of market liberalisation will increase
domestic production, which then improves nat-
ural gas supply security. This would compensate
for any reduction in bargaining power that might
arise from moving away from the current
co-ordinated market system. Therefore, out of
consideration for energy security, China could
strive to increase domestic production, and
market liberalisation is one means to stimulate
domestic production.
China has another abundant substitute for
natural gas that can further improve source
security. Natural gas can be used for power
generation and supply of heating—and these are
energy services that China’s abundant coal or
renewable energies can provide. To a lesser
extent, natural gas is also used for transport,















































Fig. 16.4 Sources of China’s natural gas. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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if the natural gas supply were disrupted,
switching over to other fuels could limit the
negative repercussions. However, using other
fuels requires a variety of technologies, not all of
which are available to consumers, such as being
able to switch smoothly from natural gas to fuel
oil or other sources for heating. Moreover, using
coal and petroleum as substitutes will have a
greater impact on the environment and climate.




























Breaking down the degree of marketisation of the levels represented


















































Prior to the large increase
in geological reserves in 2014, 
China’s reserves were always low
The IEA estimates that China
plans to have an additional  50 billion
cubic metres of geological reserves by 2020, 
with LNG reserves of 4.2 billion cubic metres  
Fig. 16.6 Gas reserve volume as a proportion of consumption, showing planned increase for China. Note 2013 China
data includes the 10.7 billion m3 of China National Petroleum Corporation Hutubi. Source Vivid Economics, based on
IEA data
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improve energy security through domestic pro-
duction and diversification of imports.
China has the world’s sixth-largest natural gas
import capacity, and through the West-East pipe-
line it also has major pipeline import capabilities.
This infrastructure was developed after 2005, and
China is continuing to develop its infrastructure,
with plans for major expansions in the future.
Current plans indicate that by 2020, China will
have increased its pipeline import capacity by
114 billion m3 over 2012, with 40 billion m3 of
LNG import capacity, which is forecast to satisfy
planned natural gas import demand.
In terms of reserves, China’s reserve volume
is on par with other major natural gas-consuming
nations. For example, in 2014 storage facility
construction brought consumption reserve
volume on a par with Japan, as shown in
Fig. 16.6. In 2020 it is planned that reserve
capacity will increase, even if demand grows as
expected, to the highest level worldwide, the
level currently held by Europe.
Based on international experience, a lack
of infrastructure, maintenance and prompt
post-incident repairs are the main reasons for
natural gas supply cut-offs. Moreover, in
many nations, these problems are often
overlooked, viewed as operational issues
rather than policy issues. As China’s natural
gas industry develops, continued investment
in infrastructure and the establishment of
sufficient and reliable accompanying tech-
nologies and incentive measures will be
especially important.
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17The Global Natural Gas Market
Global natural gas consumption, both in absolute
terms and as a share of the energy usage mix, is
continuing to grow. This growth has been driven
primarily by changes in patterns of economic
activity, energy intensity and energy substitution.
Of these, the primary driver has been the switch
to natural gas from other sources, primarily oil.
Natural gas prices have consistently remained
high in recent years, but despite this and the fact
that gas has not been given any major preferen-
tial advantage compared to other energies, there
has been no marked dampening of demand.
As global consumption volumes grow, the
divisions between regions that consume natural
gas and regions that supply natural gas will
become more marked. The Asian OECD member
nations1 and Europe have become the major
natural gas importers, with the former Soviet
Union states, the Middle East and North Africa
dominating natural gas exports. The growth of
the gap between natural gas production and
consumption is continuing to widen, and greater
volumes of trade are necessary to balance supply
and demand.
As natural gas supply hubs rise in promi-
nence, natural gas prices are gradually breaking
free from their link to oil prices. In the United
States and Europe, because the natural gas mar-
ket has matured, supply hubs have sufficient
liquidity for competitive trading, and natural gas
is priced for its own value rather than being
linked to oil prices. However, an Asian natural
gas trading hub is unlikely to develop soon, as
this region’s markets are still controlled by a
small number of larger buyers and sellers, and
market liquidity is low. Given the imbalances in
regional supply and demand, shipping costs and
trade restrictions, natural gas prices are likely to
continue to vary by region rather than to con-
verge on global unified price levels.
17.1 An Overview of the Global
Energy Market
Natural gas is a growing player in the global
energy mix (Fig. 17.1). In 1980, natural gas
provided 57 EJ or 19% of the global total primary
energy consumption volume of 300 EJ. In 2010,
natural gas provided 124 EJ, representing 23% of
the 525 EJ global total. Natural gas grew its
proportion of primary total energy at a time when
global energy consumption was itself rising
rapidly. So natural gas demand grew at a faster
rate than total energy demand—since 1980,
average annual growth rate for natural gas has
been 2.6%, compared to 2.0% for total energy.
Natural gas is increasing its share in global and
regional energy mixes by displacing oil products
* This chapter was overseen by Jigang Wei from the
Development Research Center of the State Council and
Taoliang Lee from Shell Eastern Trading Corporation. It
was jointly completed by Yaodong Shi, Zifeng Song,
Ren Miao from the Energy Research Institute of the
National Development and Reform Commission and
Cindy Wang from Shell China. Other members of the
topic group participated in discussions and revisions.
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Fig. 17.2 Changes in share in the energy mix between oil, gas and coal. Note Data is share of fossil fuel energy; each
country’s coloured trail along the matrix gets thicker over time; movement toward the apex illustrates increased share of
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Fig. 17.1 Natural gas’s share of global energy consumption. Note Data is global total primary energy consumption.
Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA data
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and, sometimes, coal (Fig. 17.2). Each region
uses differing amounts of oil products, natural gas
and coal to supply its primary fossil fuel energy
needs each year, and the balance of these energy
sources changes over time. In the Middle East and
North Africa and countries of the former Soviet
Union, for example, natural gas has tended to
supplant oil, while in North America and Europe
it has taken some of coal’s share. In general, the
global trend has been toward natural gas con-
sumption in lieu of oil use, with a parallel
movement toward coal as well in some regions.
Looking to the future, global energy demand
will continue to grow, and demand for natural
gas is expected to increase faster than demand for
other fossil fuels, continuing the trend of recent
years. The IEA has noted that rapid population
growth, increasing prosperity and improved
access to reliable electricity are driving this trend.
Average annual growth rate for natural gas is
generally forecast to be 2% from 2012 to 2040.
The growth in natural gas demand in the
period to 2040 is expected to be widely dispersed
geographically, with Asia and the Americas
playing an important role (Fig. 17.3). Asia is
expected to account for the largest proportion of
global natural gas demand growth during this
period (as well as production). In particular,
natural gas demand in China is expected to grow
by 5.2% a year, accounting for 56% of Asia’s
natural gas consumption growth. Natural gas
demand is expected to grow steadily in other
emerging economies as well, with India rising
4.6% a year and Brazil 4.0%. However, OECD
member country growth should be slower, aver-
aging about 1% a year.
Power generation will play a significant role
in increasing natural gas consumption, account-
ing for 36% of total growth from 2012 to 2040
(Fig. 17.4). Driven by the petrochemical indus-
try, the industrial sector is also expected to
contribute strongly, with an annual growth rate
reaching 1.9%. Although natural gas use in
transportation is expected to grow strongly at
3.3% a year, this sector will still continue to
account for only a small share of total demand,
about 9% by 2040.
During the same period, unconventional nat-
ural gas (such as shale natural gas) will come to
account for an increased proportion of the overall
supply mix. Global natural gas resources are
widely dispersed geographically, and at the cur-
rent rate of production, there are 60 years of
proven reserves (Table 17.1). Even though US
shale natural gas development has seen strong
growth, there remain significant uncertainties
about the development of shale natural gas in
other regions. Currently, there are essentially no
other regions outside of the United States that
have successfully developed shale natural gas. In
Poland, Sweden and Ukraine, resource discov-
eries have been disappointing, while develop-
ments in Algeria, France, South Africa and other


































Fig. 17.3 Rising diversity in natural gas supply and demand up to 2040. Note bcm is billion m3. Source IEA
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17.2 Factors Driving Demand
Driven by a number of factors, global natural gas
demand has continually risen in recent years, and
is expected to maintain its upward momentum.
The three major drivers for this growth are eco-
nomic activity, energy intensity and switching to
natural gas, of which the last has played the
biggest role in most countries. On the supply
side, the availability of domestic natural gas
resources has played an important role. Consis-
tently high natural gas prices have not prevented
the fuel source from gaining substantial ground
in recent years, albeit from a low base.
17.2.1 The Main Factors Driving
Demand
Based on research analysing the natural gas mar-
kets in seven different countries (see Chap. 2), it is
apparent that economic activity, energy intensity,
switching to natural gas and the availability of
domestic natural gas resources are the four major
factors influencing natural gas demand.
As economic activity increases, so does energy
demand, and thus natural gas consumption
increases in line with its share of the overall
energy mix. From looking at the experiences of
various nations, it appears that residential users
and power utilities have seen the highest increases










Eastern Europe/Eurasia 143 11 15 20 46 189 73
Middle East 124 9 4 – 13 137 81
Asia-Pacific 43 21 53 21 95 138 19
Americas OECD member
countries
46 11 48 7 65 111 13
Africa 52 10 39 0 49 101 17
Latin America 31 15 40 – 55 86 8
Asian OECD member
countries
25 4 13 2 19 45 5
Global 465 81 211 50 342 806 216
Note Data is in trillions of cubic metres






Fig. 17.4 Sources of
demand for natural gas 2012
versus 2040. Source IEA
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in usage, probably because rising household
incomes allow people to spend more on heating
and power companies in turn increase their use of
natural gas to meet the greater general demand for
electricity. In addition, natural gas demand from
manufacturing industry has also increased, pri-
marily due to a rise in production volume and the
corresponding energy demand.
Under certain economic conditions, energy
demand will fall in response to a fall in overall
energy intensity of economic activity, and natural
gas demand will decrease in line with its share of
the overall energy mix. A drop in energy inten-
sity is closely related to structural adjustments to
industry. The experience of several major natural
gas-consuming nations shows that when the
service sector rises as a proportion of a nation’s
output or when a move from heavy industry to
light industry occurs, energy intensity will exhi-
bit a downward trend.
When a given industry chooses to replace oil
and coal with natural gas, its natural gas con-
sumption rises significantly. Global trend analysis
shows that using natural gas to replace oil or coal
is the major reason for the rise in natural gas
demand. In most markets studied, the change in
natural gas demand between 1982 and 2012
linked to switching fuel sources to natural gas was
equal to or greater than that attributed to increased
economic activity. Research into major natural
gas-consuming industries also shows that a large
proportion of consumption growth is accounted
for by switching from other fuels to natural gas.
As nations develop, the service industry
begins to play a larger role in the economy,
urbanisation increases, and controls on air pol-
lution become more stringent, leading to a
marked tendency towards replacing oil and coal
with natural gas. Australia, Europe and the Uni-
ted States have shifted a large portion of their
energy mix from coal to natural gas, and China is
currently considering similar measures. Many
other countries have switched from oil to natural
gas. These switches are significantly linked to the
proportion represented by the service industry in
each country’s economy, with growth in the
service industry directly affecting demand,
especially driven by the need for office heating.
Also, legislation aimed at greater urbanisation
and improvement of air quality leads to natural
gas (thanks to its cleanliness) often being first
choice as a substitute energy source.
Finally, the availability of domestic natural
gas resources is another factor that prompts
energy transition. Domestic reserves are gener-
ally the cheapest source of natural gas for a
country, and analysis has shown that, regardless
of how big the reserves are, they always have an
influence on the proportion of natural gas in the
country’s energy mix. This is partly because
nations without natural gas reserves generally
lack the infrastructure and systems to support
natural gas imports. In addition, countries with
domestic supplies and existing infrastructure and
institutions are also more open to trade in natural
gas, which may further increase the share of
natural gas in the energy mix.
China currently is in a period of rapid devel-
opment, becoming more urban, becoming more
concerned with air quality and developing
domestic natural gas reserves. These are all
characteristics of countries with a high propor-
tion of natural gas in the marketplace. However,
if China wishes to promote natural gas, it will
need to act to put measures in place that stimulate
the transition from coal to natural gas. The
experience of other nations suggests that this is
more difficult to achieve than a transition from oil
to natural gas, and currently only Europe has
accomplished it.
17.2.2 Natural Gas Price Elasticity
and China
International experience has shown that demand
for natural gas is not sensitive to price changes,
and that rises in natural gas prices do not nec-
essarily cause a reduction in levels of natural gas
consumption. From 1987 to 2000, global natural
gas prices remained stable at low levels and
natural gas demand in OECD countries grew
rapidly. Beginning in 2000, natural gas prices
began to rise, but demand did not react to the
price changes, remaining stable in the majority of
countries, and growing in others.
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China’s market performance is consistent with
international experience. Since the 1990s, Chi-
nese natural gas consumption has grown rapidly.
The rise in natural prices that began in 2000 has
not had a marked effect, and growth rates have
remained relatively subdued.
Price competition between fuels appears to
have only a modest effect on natural gas demand.
From 1987 to 2000, the natural gas price
remained a relatively constant fraction of the
electricity price and the coal price. During that
period, natural gas demand rose substantially.
After 2000, even though natural gas prices rose
substantially, there was no large decline global
natural gas demand. During the period 2000–
2012, OECD member country residential and
industrial natural gas demand only dropped by
8%, despite a 60% price increase in real terms.
The main reason that price competition
between fuels has only a minor effect on natural
gas demand is that natural gas commands loyalty
among its users. Once natural gas demand has
been established, it can adapt to a changing
economic environment, and this is especially true
in terms of residential usage. Once consumers
start to use natural gas, they tend not to switch
away, because of its quality. Natural gas is a
relatively clean source of controllable heat that is
easily delivered and easy to use. In comparison
with other fuels, such as coal, the characteristics
of natural gas may mean that once the infras-
tructure is in place, residential and industrial
users are less troubled by the price.
In summary, the non-price characteristics of
natural gas appear to be important drivers of
demand, so high natural gas prices in China may
not hold natural gas demand back. However,
China’s energy prices are controlled, whichmeans
that China’s situation could be different from other
nations. In the majority of cases, major natural
gas-consuming nations have already implemented
energy price market liberalisation, with prices
following changes in supply and demand. In
China, however, some energy prices are con-
trolled, a situation which lacks responsiveness to
changes in supply and demand. The synergy
between demand and price in other nations could
result in different scenarios in China.
17.3 Supply and Demand
Imbalances
Globally, natural gas-producing regions are
gradually diverging from demand centres. This
imbalance has triggered a boom in global natural
gas trade, with a proliferation of international
pipeline and LNG projects.
17.3.1 Summary of Global Resources
Unconventional natural gas resources are likely
to account for a larger share of total gas supply as
development continues. The IEA estimates that
global remaining conventional technical recov-
erable natural gas resources have reached 465
trillion m3 and unconventional resources, 342
trillion m3. Between 1994 and 2013, global
proved reserves increased by 56%, and available
resources are expected to continue to grow. Even
though unconventional gas production volumes
are expected to increase, the majority of natural
gas production is likely to continue to be from
conventional resources.
According to current estimates, global natural
gas remaining proven recoverable natural gas
reserves are approximately 186 trillion m3. Over
the past 30 years, proven recoverable natural gas
reserves have grown by 3–4 trillion m3 a year,
and the reserve-to-production ratio has stayed
steady at close to 60 years.
For the most part, these reserves are in three
countries: Iran (18%), Russia (17%) and Qatar
(13%). Turkmenistan also holds a significant
share of the world’s proven recoverable natural
gas reserve, with the other 11 countries among
the 15 with the largest reserves holding consid-
erably less (Fig. 17.5).
1. Centres of demand
In 2013, global natural gas consumption,
including LNG, rose by 1.1% from 2012. During
the same period, natural gas international trade
volume increased by 2.3%. Global international
trade in oil for the same period rose by only 1.7%.
The top 10 natural gas-consuming nations
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consumed a total of 2 trillion m3, accounting for
61% of total global consumption. These largest
consumers were: the United States (22%), Russia
(12%), Iran (5%), China (5%), Japan (4%),
Canada (3%), Saudi Arabia (3%), Germany (3%),
Mexico (3%) and the United Kingdom (2%).
The United States is the largest natural gas
consumer, and in 2013 consumed a total of 737
billion m3. The largest natural gas-consuming
industry was power generation, accounting for
33% (this proportion was 25% 10 years ago).
The second largest user was industry, accounting
for 31% of total volume in 2013 (its share fell
below that of power generation in 2008). Shares
taken by other uses in 2013 included residential
(21%) and commercial (14%). In the next
10 years, with the completion of various LNG
liquefaction projects, primarily around the Gulf
of Mexico, US natural gas production and the
country’s LNG exports to Europe and Asia are
expected to further increase.
In the United Kingdom, natural gas con-
sumption in the last decade has been more
volatile after a sustained period of growth, led
largely by increased residential and power gen-
eration use of gas. From 1990 to 2003, the share
of natural gas used for power generation in the
United Kingdom rose from less than 1 to 38%,
but this had dropped to 27% by 2013.
Prior to the 2011 Fukushima reactor incident,
Japan was already the world’s largest importer of
LNG. The Japanese government’s response to
the incident, especially its closure of all nuclear
power plants, pushed natural gas consumption in
the country even higher. When nuclear power,
which had previously accounted for 31% of
power generation, was entirely halted, Japan’s
LNG imports rose from 69 million tonnes to
82 million tonnes. Even though Japan’s nuclear
power plants are expected to resume operations,
continued domestic opposition and new stan-
dards make the timing for this uncertain.
Consumption in Russia, the world’s second-
largest natural gas market, has been volatile in
recent years. Use dropped sharply after the 2008


































































Fig. 17.5 The 15 countries with the largest proven recoverable natural gas reserves. Source BP Statistics 2014
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then softened again going into 2012 and 2013,
echoing the country’s lower economic growth. In
Europe, Germany’s 2012 and 2013 natural gas
consumption continued to grow despite a
reduction on average in EU member state con-
sumption. In the Middle East, Iran, another large
consumer, has seen natural gas consumption
growth moderate in recent years. Finally, China
has seen a brisk rapid growth in natural gas
consumption since 2000, placing it now among
the world’s 10 largest natural gas-consuming
countries.
While India is not yet among the world’s top
consumers of natural gas, policy initiatives—
especially in the power generation sector—have
led to remarkable increases in use. Domestic
consumption nearly doubled from 1995 to 2005,
reaching about 37 billion m3 or 1.3% of total
global consumption. However, price controls, a
drop in domestic production and issues sur-
rounding LNG infrastructure access have damp-
ened the natural gas market in recent years. As
these problems are resolved, India’s natural gas
consumption will likely resume growth.
2. Centres of production
World natural gas production was 3.4 trillion m3
in 2013, an increase of 1.1% from 2012. Between
1970 and 2013, global natural gas production
grew nearly 3.5 times. The largest natural
gas-producing countries and their proportions of
total global production volume were as follows:
United States (20%), Russia (18%), Iran (5%),
Qatar (5%), Canada (5%), China (5%), Norway
(3%), Saudi Arabia (3%), Algeria (3%), India
(2%) and Malaysia (2%). However, from the
perspective of export totals for natural gas pipe-
line and LNG, Russia was the largest exporter,
accounting for 22% of the global total, primarily
in pipeline natural gas. Ranking second was
Qatar (12%), primarily LNG, followed by Nor-
way (10%), primarily in pipeline natural gas.
The United States is already the world’s lar-
gest natural gas producer, and production is set to
increase significantly as several LNG projects
come online. The success of US shale natural gas
production will soon turn the country from a net
importer to a net exporter. LNG exports are
expected to start in 2016 as Cheneire’s Sabine
Pass facility begins operation. By 2020, the
United States is expected to have 40 million
tonnes in annual liquefaction capacity. There are
yet more LNG exports projects in planning, but
not all of them are expected to be completed.
The world’s second largest natural gas pro-
ducer, Russia, has been operating a large-scale
pipeline gas and LNG export business for a long
time. In 2013, Russia produced 605 billion m3 of
natural gas, and pipeline exports to Europe were
about 211 billion m3, with the main destinations
being Germany (40 billion m3), Turkey
(26 billion m3) and Italy (25 billion m3). Russia
also exported 14 million tonnes of LNG, pri-
marily to Japan. It is expected that as the natural
gas pipeline between China and Russia enters
operation, and with new LNG facility operation
commencement, Russia will see further growth
prior to 2020 in natural gas production volumes
and export volumes.
A significant amount of pipeline natural gas is
also exported from Norway, The Netherlands and
Algeria to European markets. Dutch gas produc-
tion is underpinned by production from the
Groningen Field, northwest Europe’s largest nat-
ural gas field and one of the largest in the world.
The Netherlands exported 53 billion m3 by pipe-
line in 2013, but in 2014 the government lowered
the production limit following an earthquake in
the region linked to natural gas extraction.
Qatar was the world’s largest LNG exporter in
2013, exporting over 78 million tonnes of LNG.
The world’s largest non-associated gas field
straddles the Qatar–Iran border, with some esti-
mates placing the recoverable reserves at 900
trillion cubic feet in the North Field (the Qatari
portion) and 500 trillion cubic feet in the South
Pars (the Iranian portion). Since production from
the North Field began in the early 1990s, Qatari
natural gas production has increased from 6.3
billion m3 in 1991 to 158 billion m3 in 2013,
with most destined for export. Qatar initially
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developed its LNG export capacity to supply
significant volumes to each major market—Asia,
Europe and North America—but the North
American shale natural gas boom and strong
LNG demand in Asia resulted in almost 70% of
its LNG going to Asia in 2013. Iranian gas
production also increased significantly over the
same period, but all of its natural gas is con-
sumed domestically.
Australia is expected to become an important
natural gas producer and exporter soon.
Although production volume in Australia was
1% lower in 2012 than in 2012, a series of LNG
liquefaction projects will become operational
over the next few years that will bring Australia’s
production capacity up to 88 million tonnes,
overtaking Qatar to become the world’s largest
LNG exporter. However, some of these facilities
will be the first in the world to use coalbed
methane to produce LNG, so some uncertainty
remains about these figures.
Even though 2013 production volume was not
significant, Papua New Guinea began natural gas
production in 2014 as the PNG LNG project
came online. This project’s annual production
capacity is 6.9 million tonnes of LNG, and pro-
duction capacity expansion plans are being
assessed.
Canada is already a major producer of natural
gas, and even although its exports are currently
limited to pipelines to the United States, the
country plans to export more widely. Canada’s
west coast has a significant number of LNG
projects in planning, hoping to take advantage of
the region’s abundant unconventional natural gas
and its access to large LNG importing countries
like Japan, South Korea and China.
Based on their abundant natural gas resources,
Tanzania and Mozambique are two more coun-
tries that could potentially become major LNG
exporters. For them, natural gas is a brand new
industry, and it is likely to take longer to begin
operations. For these—or indeed any—new nat-
ural gas projects to attract the necessary financ-
ing, they will need long-term commitments from
high-quality buyers at prices sufficient to provide
adequate returns to both the host country and the
developers.
17.3.2 Regional Imbalances
Globally, supply and demand is unevenly dis-
tributed between regions. The main producing
regions are countries of the former Soviet Union,
North America and the Middle East and North
Africa (Fig. 17.6). Countries of the former Soviet
Union and the Middle East and North Africa are
the world’s largest exporters of natural gas. The
Asian OECD countries, China and Europe are
the main importers. In other regions, production
and consumption are basically balanced, with the
exception of the rest of Africa, which is a rela-
tively small, but growing, exporter.
Because global natural gas consumption has
grown, and regional supply and demand are
unbalanced, import and export trade volumes are
also growing. From 1990 to 2013, global natural
gas consumption volumes grew by approximately
70%, but there were relatively large disparities in
each region’s supply and demand growth rates
(Fig. 17.7). Nations exporting natural gas
expanded exports, and importing nations likewise
increased imports. From 1990 to 2013, approxi-
mately 20% of the newly added consumer
demand was realised through inter-regional
import and export trade.
In recent years, production increases have
been supported by large discoveries of conven-
tional, and more recently unconventional, natural
gas. Since the late 1980s, there have also been
major discoveries of conventional natural gas,
especially in the Middle East and North Africa,
causing these regions rapidly to become major
producers of natural gas. At the same time, pro-
duction volumes even rose in regions where there
had been no major increases in reserves, indi-
cating a preference for domestic sources over
imports to meet demand.
While reserves of unconventional natural gas
reserves, including tight natural gas, shale natural
gas and coalbed methane, are largely uncon-
firmed, they are potentially huge. Their
exploitation in the United States since 2002 has
fundamentally changed the country’s natural gas
market, although unconventional production
remains minimal in all other regions. However,
the potential for unconventional natural gas to
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Fig. 17.6 The major natural gas producing and consuming regions. Note Data for 2013. Source Vivid Economics,
based on IEA data
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Fig. 17.7 Natural gas supply and demand growth rates of various regions, 1990–2013. Source Vivid Economics,
based on IEA data
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disrupt other regions is large. Unconventional
natural gas reserves are mostly distributed in
countries without major amounts of conventional
natural gas (Fig. 17.8), and if these reserves
could be commercially exploited, then the
inter-regional imbalance between natural gas
producers and consumers would probably be
reduced. Such a change would reduce demand
for natural gas from countries of the former
Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa.
As a result of the developments discussed
above, the world is increasingly becoming divi-
ded into regions that supply natural gas and
regions that consume it (Fig. 17.9). The natural
result of this situation has been an increase in
inter-regional trade.
17.3.3 Inter-regional Natural Gas
Trade
With the regional imbalances in natural gas
supply and demand, inter-regional trade,
especially LNG trade, has been increasing. From
1993 to 2013, natural gas trade over pipeline
almost doubled, while LNG trade—albeit from a
lower starting point—quadrupled (Fig. 17.10).
Natural gas trade over pipeline, however, still
dominates the market, accounting for about two
thirds of total trade.
1. Pipeline gas trading
Since 1993, the volume of natural gas traded
over inter-regional pipelines has almost doubled,
though the network has not significantly
increased its connectivity. In 1993, inter-regional
pipeline natural gas trade volume was 470 trillion
cubic feet, and 86% of this was exported by the
former Soviet Union, with 94% imported to
Europe. At the time, the natural gas pipeline
network was limited, with most natural gas
flowing from the former Soviet Union, the
Middle East and North Africa (Fig. 17.11). By
2013, 8.5 trillion cubic feet was being traded
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Fig. 17.8 Unconventional natural gas reserves by region. Note Data is for 2013; unconventional reserves include tight
natural gas, shale natural gas and coalbed methane. Source Vivid Economics, based on EIA and IEA data
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by countries of the former Soviet Union falling to
75%, and European imports to 65%. In the same
year, Chinese imports accounted for 11% of
pipeline natural gas, exclusively from countries
of the former Soviet Union. Even though there
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Fig. 17.9 The increasing polarisation of regions into suppliers and consumers of natural gas. Note Data is on a gross
calorific basis; each country’s coloured trail along the matrix gets thicker over time; the dotted midline represents
equilibrium between production and consumption, with greater production above the midline and greater consumption
below it. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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Fig. 17.10 Types of global
natural gas trade. Note Data is
a global aggregate of
international trade. Source
Vivid Economics, based on
IEA data

























Fig. 17.11 Global inter-regional pipeline natural gas trade. Note The thickness of the arrow represents the percentage
of global pipeline trade flowing between two regions. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
17.3 Supply and Demand Imbalances 357
2013, the inter-regional natural gas pipeline
network remained relatively limited, especially in
light of the global pattern of reserves, production
and demand.
2. LNG trading
The volume of natural gas traded through LNG
has more than tripled since 1993, and the net-
work has significantly increased its connectivity.
In 1993, inter-regional LNG trade volume
reached 2.7 trillion cubic feet, of which 64% was
exported from Asia, and 70% was imported
by Asian OECD member nations and 25% by
Europe. Though networks facilities were limited
in 1993, primarily concentrated on trade between
Asia and Japan and between Africa and Europe,
by 2013 they had expanded significantly
(Fig. 17.12). In 2013, inter-regional LNG trade
volume had reached 9.1 trillion cubic feet. Of
this, 57% was exported by the Middle East and
North Africa, while the major importers were
Asian OECD member nations (56%), Europe
(15%) and China (9%). LNG trade in Asia,
excluding China and OECD countries, has
become more complex, handling imports and
exports, and accounting for just 10% of net
inter-regional LNG trade volume, compared to
64% in 1993.
The degree of connectivity in LNG markets
has begun to form a global natural gas market.
By 2013, the network of LNG trade had become
much denser, with many regions connected to
each other. The flexibility of LNG delivery
means that LNG can be used to exploit arbitrage
opportunities across a range of regions, con-
necting markets together. However, LNG trade is
currently dominated by a small number of par-
ticipants in the Middle East and North Africa,
and trade volume on some routes are still low. In
addition, there are legal restrictions on exports,
such as in the United States, and limitations due
to infrastructure capacity. Furthermore, LNG
developments remain capital-intensive and risky,
and as a result interregional price differences
need to be wide to motivate trade. Faced with
such problems, even though regional markets are


























1993 LNG trade 2013 LNG trade
Fig. 17.12 Global LNG trade Note The thickness of the arrow represents the percentage of global pipeline trade
flowing between two regions Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
358 17 The Global Natural Gas Market
the degree of connectivity is still insufficient to
support the formation of a global market.
3. The problems facing LNG trading
LNG capacity has increased rapidly, and the
expansion is expected to continue. In 2013, LNG
liquefaction capacity, which is required for
export, was 2.25 times greater than in 2003,
while regasification capacity, an import require-
ment, was twice that in 2003. By 2023, lique-
faction capacity is expected to grow almost
threefold, while regasification capacity is expec-
ted to nearly double. This will bring global liq-
uefaction capacity to almost 40 trillion cubic
feet/year by 2023, and regasification capacity to
almost 60 trillion cubic feet/year. (Regasification
capacity is greater than liquefaction capacity
because regasification capacity is distributed
across more locations and countries build import
capacity to meet peak demand, whereas the flow
of exports tends to be smoother, requiring a
lower capacity for the same volume.)
However, LNG costs are volatile, and may not
fall significantly in the future. In general, the cost
of liquefaction plants has increased by 50% over
the last decade, and some projects, primarily in
Australia, have cost at least twice normal levels.
Costs have risen because of higher commodity
prices, such as steel, and, in Australia in particular,
higher labour costs. This pattern of high costs
could persist. Even if commodity prices fall, LNG
is likely to remain an expensive process, because
the scope for technological breakthroughs is lim-
ited, and the large amount of expensive capacity
recently added will lock in higher costs. Further-
more, LNG is only competitive with overland
pipelines over long distances, such as from the
Middle East to Japan (Fig. 17.13).
These issues suggest that LNG is economi-
cally limited. This fact could constrain invest-
ment, or may require long-term contracts to
manage risk. Moreover, it is likely to mean that
LNG remains an expensive fuel, serving as a
marginal source of supply in markets where
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Fig. 17.13 Comparison of competitiveness between pipeline natural gas and LNG. Source Vivid Economics based on
SBI Energy Institute (2014)
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17.3.4 Unconventional Natural Gas
Resources
Confirmed unconventional natural gas reserves
account for approximately three-quarters of glo-
bal technically minable reserves. In a 2012
report, the IEA estimated that global confirmed
technically minable natural gas reserves amoun-
ted to 420 trillion m3, with 331 trillion m3
recoverable with unconventional technology.
The unconventional resources were 208 trillion
m3 in shale natural gas, 76 trillion m3 in tight
natural gas and 47 trillion m3 of coalbed
methane. In a separate report, the EIA assessed
the world’s recoverable reserves of shale natural
gas at 7299 trillion cubic feet, of which China’s
share was the largest, followed by Argentina,
Algeria, the United States and Canada
(Table 17.2).
Unconventional natural gas has transformed
the natural gas market in North America. In the
United States alone, shale natural gas production
is expected grow from 9.7 trillion cubic feet in
2012 to 19.8 trillion cubic feet in 2040, bringing
its share of total US natural gas supply from 40 to
53%. This increase in natural gas supply is
expected to give US manufacturers an added
advantage over foreign competitors and has
already resulted in a significant number of pro-
jects that seek to liquefy natural gas for export.
North America’s success in exploiting
unconventional natural gas has inspired other
countries. According to IEA estimates, global
unconventional natural gas total production
volume will reach 928 billion m3 in 2020,
including 454 billion m3 of shale natural gas, 148
billion m3 of coalbed methane and 294 billion m3
of tight natural gas.
Despite the optimism, there nonetheless
remain significant uncertainties about how
quickly unconventional resources can be brought
online outside the US, especially in countries
where little or no production has been taken
place. Although China is estimated to have
unconventional resources totalling about
32 trillion m3, the government recently reduced
its near-term outlook for reaching these reserves.
Problems cited included that the resources were
spread across more than 500 basins and the
geography was difficult, as well as costs, inade-
quate infrastructure, water disposal concerns,
lack of channels for introduction of international
companies and a lack of innovation as a result of
the small number of participating companies.
In another example, Argentina, with about
23 trillion m3 in unconventional resources, has
Table 17.2 Top 10
countries with technically
minable reserves of shale
natural gas












Units trillion cubic feet
Source US Department of Energy
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solid pre-conditions in place, but is constrained
by funding and non-technical risks.
17.4 Pricing
Natural gas prices and price-setting mechanisms
have evolved over time. While long-term con-
tacts linked to oil prices were once dominant,
now price setting is taking different forms across
markets, and prices vary by region. A 2014
report from the International Gas Union
(IGU) found that 43% of global wholesale vol-
ume was based on competitive natural gas pric-
ing, also known as gas-on-gas pricing, and was
not indexed to oil prices,2 while 19% was
indexed to oil. The term of contracts is also
becoming more diverse, compared to oil-indexed
contracts, which tended to be long-term agree-
ments. Prices are being set more often based on
competition among natural gas suppliers, on
hubs or on spot markets (Fig. 17.14).
In China, where energy price controls are
relatively stringent, the mechanisms of natural
gas pricing differ greatly from the way they
function internationally, with different pricing
methods depending on gas source and on use.
However, China’s natural gas pricing is under-
going reform, and is gradually moving toward
national natural gas pricing rules.
Natural gas hubs are an important factor in
natural gas pricing mechanisms, given that their
core function is to provide a physical connection
within the natural gas system and to facilitate
competitive pricing. Natural gas hubs break the
link between the price of natural gas and oil
prices. The competitive pricing that the forma-
tion of hubs allows becomes a kind of substitute
plan for controlled prices linked to oil prices. In
addition, natural gas hubs also form an important
component of natural gas downstream markets.
See the special discussion in Chap.19 for the
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Gas in North America is almost 
entirely competitively priced
The world in aggregate, 
and particularly Europe, 
OECD Asia and the FSU 
are moving towards 
prices determined by 
competitive gas markets
Half of European gas
is now competitively priced
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Fig. 17.14 Changes in natural gas contract types. Note
Each country’s coloured trail along the matrix gets thicker
over time; movement toward the apex illustrates increased
share of natural gas at the expense of oil (lower left) or
coal (lower right). Source Vivid Economics, based on
IGU data
2Contracts connected to oil price can also be competitive,
but gas-on-gas pricing contracts are normally more
competitive, and are more reactive to changes in the
market fundamentals.
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Due to the great size and rapid development
trends of China’s natural gas market, as well as
previous experience of large-scale international
trade in other commodities, policy adjustments
for China’s natural gas market are likely to have
a major impact on global natural gas markets.
This study established a model to analyse
China’s natural gas demand growth in various
scenarios and its effects on global natural gas
markets, including price, energy mix, and other
aspects.
17.4.1 Current Pricing Regulations
The development of a global natural gas market
is limited by geography, with most international
trade being over natural gas pipelines or by LNG
shipping. Geographical limitations and high
shipping costs—the construction of international
long-distance pipelines, as well as the costs of
shipping and storing LNG—restrict trade
between different regions, causing the natural gas
market to develop distinct regional characteris-
tics, particularly regarding how prices are estab-
lished (Table 17.3).
Price levels across the regions have also var-
ied significantly, reflecting the changes to the
supply and demand for each market (Fig. 17.15).
In North America, the influential Henry Hub
price generally reflects the supply and demand
dynamics in the United States, for example by
reflecting seasonal variations, major incidents
(such as hurricanes Katrina or Rita) and
Table 17.3 Regional market pricing characteristics
Region Market description Method of price formation
North
America
Natural gas market with competition-based
natural gas pricing. Interconnected infrastructure
linking storage, supply and demand hubs
Multiple natural gas indices, with Henry Hub the
dominant openly-traded LNG index. Natural gas
index reflects North American natural gas supply
and demand
Europe Multiple natural gas markets with varying
degrees of competition-based pricing. Markets
operate and regulations are developed under a
framework established under the European
Union, but strong national interests remain.
Infrastructure is primarily interconnected, with
some bottlenecks
Long-term contracts connected to oil price or oil
product prices are being increasingly challenged
by competitive pricing, for example from NBP in





Markets primarily based on national monopolies
and supply in the region primarily under
long-term contracts, with some active spot LNG
buying to manage supply and demand or some
portfolio optimising. Customs data for LNG
imports publicly available and can be used to
determine the average import price
Strong oil indexation for long-term contracts to
the Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC), which is
generally defined within individual contracts and
lags current oil prices because they are typically
based on recent average prices of crude imports
into Japan. These are prevalent in Asia and may
include price review clauses. Spot cargoes are
primarily based on a fixed price, typically
negotiated bilaterally or based on tenders.
Surveys by various reporting agencies seek to
capture this through the Japan Korea Marker
(JKM). JKM is not a price for spot cargoes, but is
currently the best estimate in the industry
China Market dominated by state-owned enterprises.
Supply based on a mix of domestic production,
pipeline imports from central Asia, Myanmar
and, soon, Russia and LNG imports.
Infrastructure development continuing. Market
reforms ongoing
Natural gas market pricing reform ongoing.
Natural gas supplied under a mix of cost-plus for
domestically produced natural gas and
oil-indexed pricing, primarily for imports. LNG
price formation similar to Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan. Natural gas sold at regulated prices
set by a National Development and Reform
Commission formula linked to LPG and fuel oil
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longer-term trends (such as the shale natural gas
revolution). Indeed, there were periods when US
natural gas prices were higher than the average
LNG import price in Japan, for instance when the
market expected the United States to need sub-
stantial LNG imports.
In the past, the Henry Hub price was widely
seen as a benchmark for the US market, and
many natural gas liquefaction projects around the
world were begun targeting exports to the United
States based on these prices, relying on the
Henry Hub price for their export plan pricing,
along with the belief that the United States would
be a long-term LNG importer. A significant
number of regasification terminals in the United
States were also proposed (Fig. 17.16).
The United States was expected to be a














































S.Korea average import price
Fig. 17.15 Key price indices and Japan’s average import price. Source Platts, Energy Intelligence, Intercontinental
Exchange, and Heren
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willing to price their export plans based on the
Henry Hub largely because it was widely
accepted as reflecting US supply and demand
fundamentals. A significant number of regasifi-
cation terminals were also proposed in the United
States.
In markets in which pricing is predominantly
linked to oil indices, prices also respond to
changes in supply and demand, but not as effi-
ciently as in competition-based pricing. The
mechanism is also complicated by the supply and
demand of oil.
One example of this follows new LNG sales
and purchase agreements in Asia-Pacific, where
prices gradually diverged from oil until around
2005 and slowly retracted (Fig. 17.17). In the
early 2000s, project developers in the region had
to enter markets relatively new to LNG imports
and had the alternative of exporting to the United
States. Costs for building LNG projects were
lower than current levels, and their oil price
outlooks were anchored around historical levels,
which had generally been below $60 a barrel for
15 years. After 2005, higher project costs and
greater demand for natural gas led to higher
prices, in some cases reaching parity with crude
oil. The 2011 nuclear power plant accident in
Fukushima, Japan put additional upward pressure
on natural gas prices in Asia. More recently,
however, natural gas prices have begun to soften,
partly a result of lower oil prices, weaker global
economies, additional capacity (both completed
and proposed) and new projects, such as
US LNG exports to Asia.
Looking ahead, natural gas prices, especially
LNG exports to Asia-Pacific markets, could
become particularly volatile with the onset of
LNG exports for the United States, which are
primarily indexed to Henry Hub prices. Compa-
nies are hoping to capitalise on the US natural
gas boom by liquefying the fuel and trading it on
international markets. Many projects have been
Existing marine terminal
Proposed marine terminal
Fig. 17.16 Current and proposed LNG regasification terminals in North America, 2004. Information source EIA
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announced, but not all will be completed
(Fig. 17.18).
In general, pricing of American LNG exports
has two components: one linked to Henry Hub
prices representing the feed gas and fuel costs,
and an annual fixed component representing
investment in the liquefaction facility
(Fig. 17.19). Based on currently available pur-
chase and sale agreement terms, the “Henry
Hub” component is typically 115% of the Henry
Hub price, while the second component is based
on a fixed dollar amount, with about 15% of this
linked to US inflation rates.
Buyers gain supply diversity by procuring
US LNG exports, but they also acquire some
risk. Coupled with contracted destination diver-
sity, which allows shipments to be rerouted to the
most favourable markets, US LNG exports can
contribute to a beneficial diversified energy
supply network. However, US LNG supplies can
be less competitive than oil-indexed supplies,
depending, among other factors, on movements
of global oil prices and Henry Hub natural gas
prices (Fig. 17.20).
Compared to Asia, where natural gas contract
prices are linked to oil, US natural gas exports
have a different risk profile. Many US LNG
export sales and purchase agreements include a
tolling agreement section, which means that the
buyer is responsible for procuring the natural gas
to be liquefied, and lower plant utilisation rates
would lead to higher unit prices because the
buyer continues to pay the fixed component,
except in extreme cases. The buyer is responsible
for purchasing the natural gas to be liquefied,
with the unit price rising with lower liquefaction
facility usage rates, because the buyer continu-
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Fig. 17.17 Progressive divergence by different degrees from oil prices of Asian oil-linked natural gas prices. Source
Wood Mackenzie and public information
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exceptional cases. In recent periods, oil prices
have dropped, and long-term oil price trends are
uncertain, with recent Henry Hub prices seeing
multiple record lows, highlighting the relative
risk of US LNG supply and supplies whose pri-
ces are linked to oil.
Even though natural gas pricing mechanisms
are trending further toward competitive pricing,
the formation of a global unified price is still
impossible. However, the growth in
inter-regional natural gas trade volume, as well
as rises in trading hub or spot market natural gas
sales volumes, are prompting the formation of
regional markets based on the original national
foundations, for example in Europe.
Even if trade and competitive pricing were to
promote the formation of a globalised natural gas
market, regional prices are likely to continue to
exist, and inter-regional price variance could
even exceed shipping costs. The reason for this is
that natural gas regional demand and supply is
often imbalanced: large consumers are not large
producers, resulting in the signing of long-term
contracts to reduce energy security issues and the
potential concentration of market forces.
Likewise, formation of a global unified price is
not possible, since the flexibility of global trade
capabilities is likely to be insufficient, and will be
unable to satisfy trade demands that can change
at any time. Finally, the potential for economi-
cally recoverable unconventional natural gas
remains unknown, but if it were to be unlocked at
a low cost, as seen in the United States, the
volume generated would be more likely to
influence prices in the immediate region of the
supply rather than in other regions.
17.4.2 The Relationship Between
the Price of Natural Gas
and the Price of Oil
Natural gas, whether delivered over pipelines or
as LNG, has historically been priced based on
competing fuels in the receiving markets and
supplied under long-term agreements. Examples
include exports from the Groningen natural gas
field in The Netherlands, where pricing adjust-
ments are tied to the market price of three major






















1. Coos Bay, OR: 0.9 Bcfd (Jordan Cove Energy Project)
    (CP13-483)
2. Lake Charles, LA: 2.2 Bcfd (Southern Union - Trunkline LNG)
    (CP14-120)
3. Astoria, OR: 1.25 Bcfd (Oregon LNG) (CP09-6)
4. Lavaca Bay, TX: 1.38 Bcfd (Excelerate Liquefaction)
    (CP14-71 & 72)
5. Elba Island, GA: 0.35 Bcfd (Southern LNG Company)
    (CP14-103)
6. Sabine Pass, LA: 1.40 Bcfd (Sabine Pass Liquefaction)
    (CP13-552)
7. Lake Charles, LA: 1.07 Bcfd (Magnolia LNG) (CP14-347)
8. Plaquemines Parish, LA: 1.07 Bcfd (CE FLNG) (PF13-11)
9. Sabine Pass, TX: 2.1 Bcfd (ExxonMobil - Golden Pass)
    (CP14-517)
10. Pascagoula, MS: 1.5 Bcfd (Gulf LNG Liquefaction) (PF13-4)
11. Plaquemines Parish, LA: 0.30 Bcfd (I oulslana LNG)
    (PF14-17)
12. Robbinston, ME: 0.45 Bcfd (Kestrel Energy - Downeast LNG)
    (PF14-19)
13. Cameron Parish, LA: 1.34 Bcfd (Venture Global) (PF15-2)
14. Jacksonville, FL: 0.075 Bcfd (Eagle LNG Partners) (PF15-7) 
PROPOSED CANADIAN SITES IDENTIFIED BY PROJECT
SPONSORS
15. Kitimat, BC: 1.28 Bcfd (Apache Canada Ltd.)
16. Douglas Island, BC: 0.23 Bcfd (BC LNG Export Cooperative)
17. Kitimat, BC: 3.23 Bcfd (LNG Canada) 
Fig. 17.18 Proposed LNG export terminals in North America, February 2015. Source US Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
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priced based on Japan Crude Cocktail prices, an
amalgamation of oil prices that is generally
defined within individual contracts.
For many years, natural gas contracts have
been indexed to the oil price; when the oil price
changes, the price paid for natural gas changes as
well, using a preset formula. Until about 2008,
the link has led to a close correlation between
natural and oil two prices (Fig. 17.21). The link
loosened in periods when oil price showed high
volatility, such as the oil crises, and natural gas
contracts tended to be renegotiated. Anticipating
a need to rebalance the long-term agreements,
some natural gas contracts included clauses
allowing price formulas to be reviewed based on
an established set of factors.
The connection between oil and natural gas
prices started to loosen in 2008, typified by the
divergence of Henry Hub prices from oil prices.
The separation was partly a result of the US
recession and a boom in unconventional natural
gas supplies in the United States, which meant
LNG Sale and Purchase Agreements (SPAs)
Sabine Pass Liquefaction
~20 mtpa “take-or-pay” style commercial agreements
~$2.9B annual fixed fee revenue for 20 years
Annual Contract
Quantity (MMBtu) 286,500,000 182,500,000 182,500,000 182,500,000 91,250,000104,750,000
(1) (1)
Annual Fixed Fees ~$723 MM ~$454 MM ~$548 MM ~$548 MM ~$314 MM ~$274 MM
(3)(2)
Fixed Fees $ / MMBtu $2.25 - $3.00 $2.49 $3.00 $3.00 $3.00$3.00(2)
(4)
(5)
LNG Cost 115% of HH 115% of HH 115% of HH 115% of HH 115% of HH 115% of HH
Terms of Contract 20 years 20 years 20 years 20 years 20 years 20 years
Guarantor BG EnergyHoldings Ltd.
Gas Natural
SDG S.A N/A N/A Total S.A. N/A
Fee During Force
Majeure
Up to 24 months Up to 24 months N/A N/A N/A N/A
Contract Start Train 1 + additionalvolumes with Trains 2,3,4 Train 2 Train 3 Train 4 Train 5 Train 5
Corporate / Guarantor
Credit Rating A- / A2 / A- BBB / Baa2 / BBB+ A+ / A1 / AA- NR / Baa2 / BBB- AA- / Aa1 / AA A- / A3 / A-








& Power N.A Centric plc
(1) BG has agreed to purchase 182,500,000 MMBtu, 36,500,000 MMBtu, 34,000,000 MMBtu and 33,500,000 MMBtu of LNG
volumes annually upon the commencement of operations of Trains 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Total has agreed to purchase
91,250,000 MMBtu of LNG volumes annually plus 13,400,000 MMBtu of seasonal LNG volumes upon the commencement of
Train 5 operations.
(2) A portion of the fee is subject to inflation, approximately 15% for BG Group, 13.6% for Gas Natural Fenosa, 15% for KOGAS
and GAIL (India) Ltd and 11.5% for Total and Centrica.
(3) Following commercial in service date of Train 4. BG will provide annual fixed fees of approximately $520 million during 
Trains 1–2 operations and an additional $203 million once Trains 3–4 are operational.
(4) SPAs have a 20- year term with the right to extend up to an additional 10 years. Gas Natural Fenosa has an extension right
up to an additional 12 years in certain circumstances.
(5) Ratings are provided by S&P/Moody's/Fitch and subject to change, suspension or withdrawal at anytime and are not a 
recommendation to buy, hold or sell any security.
(6) Conditions precedent must be satisfied by June 30, 2015 or either party can terminate. CPs include financing, regulatory
approvals and positive final investment decision. 
(6)
(6)
Fig. 17.19 Sabine Pass LNG sale and purchase agreement structure. Source Cheniere Energy Inc
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that the country no longer needed significant
LNG imports. In Europe, an economic downturn
also triggered decreased natural gas demand,
leading to ample supplies, which were
increasingly purchased through the natural gas
hubs without any link to oil prices.
Recently, the possibility of Russian natural
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Decoupling of prices
as gas supply on spot
markets increases
Fig. 17.21 The relationship between natural gas price and oil prices. Note Data are indexes of global average prices.
Source Vivid Economics, based on World Bank data
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disrupted added market volatility, but prices
recovered even as the supply to Europe was
reduced. Interestingly, the supply reduction was
linked largely to LNG imports to Europe, rather
than Russian pipeline deliveries. Strong demand
for LNG in Asia-Pacific created arbitrage
opportunities, and LNG delivered to European
buyers was reloaded by the buyers for sale in
Asia-Pacific. Faced with low gas index prices,
low demand, or both, buyers in Europe chose to
profit by selling to Asia-Pacific buyers at higher
prices. The arbitrage opportunity disappeared as
oil prices and European natural gas hub prices
fell.
Historically, four rationales have supported
the need for linking natural gas contracts to the
price of oil:
• Benchmark price: Natural gas exploration,
production and transport are capital-intensive
and the industry often requires long-term
contracts. To share the risk between buyer
and seller, the contract prices generally vary
according to a benchmark, and the oil price
has provided a transparent and robust
benchmark. Also, many of the costs of natural
gas development—for example, drilling rigs
and skilled labour—are comparable in both
oil and natural gas production, and these costs
are affected by oil prices. However, in some
markets the fundamentals for pricing oil and
natural gas have diverged. For instance, in the
United States and parts of Europe, sufficiently
deep and liquid natural gas benchmarks have
become available.
• Co-production: Natural gas has been a
by-product of oil extraction and sold on
similar terms. Exclusive natural gas extrac-
tion, however, is becoming more common,
even though co-production remains impor-
tant. In the United States, for example, natural
gas is a by-product of shale oil production.
Low natural gas prices in the US market are
partially a result of high oil prices, which
have offered significant incentives to shale
projects. The low natural gas prices may not
be sustainable or easily replicated outside the
United States.
• Similar routes to market: Natural gas and
oil have similar transport infrastructure, and
the same companies have tended to deliver
both because of their expertise, market dom-
inance or both. However, natural gas infras-
tructure has increasingly become more
independent.
• Competition for customers: Natural gas and
oil products were used for power generation
and heating, and natural gas was often priced
just lower than oil to compete. However, oil
products are increasingly used only used for
transportation, with other fuels used for
power generation.
As markets have evolved, however, only one
of these reasons—the need for a transparent
benchmark—remains relevant, but even here in
some markets natural gas hubs are now more
able to provide a natural gas benchmark.
The fundamental economic rationale for the
link between natural gas and oil prices is whether
the economic drivers behind the value of oil are
similar to those behind the value of natural gas.
When oil and natural gas were substitutes—for
example when they were both used in power
generation—this was often true, and their value
would change at the same rate. Now, however,
oil is primarily used for transportation, and nat-
ural gas is not. The value the market puts on
these two fuels is often driven by different forces,
so the price of oil no longer reflects the value of
natural gas as accurately. Because the uses for
natural gas and oil and their production costs
have largely diverged, the fundamental economic
rationale for a price link is unlikely to be
re-established, especially in markets in which
natural gas benchmarks are emerging.
17.4.3 Chinese Pricing Mechanisms
China’s natural gas is derived from domestic
natural gas, imported LNG and imported pipeline
natural gas from countries of the former Soviet
Union. The different treatment of these resources
from different source results in a three-strand
pricing mechanism:
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• Domestic natural gas: Price is determined on
a cost-plus basis.
• Imported LNG: Contract prices and linked
to Japan Crude Cocktail prices, with an
S-curve-based ceiling mechanism that limits
exposure to oil price movements.
• Imported pipeline natural gas: In a pricing
mechanism that the IGU has called a “bilat-
eral monopoly”, price is based on intergov-
ernmental negotiations and entails significant
uncertainty.
The differences inherent in China’s pricing
structure have already caused a series of market
convergence problems, especially in periods
when oil prices are high.
Experience from North America and Europe
suggests that prices for imported natural gas or
LNG can be based on a natural gas index that
reflects the supply and demand of the recipient
region or country. A relevant natural gas index is
only possible, however, if the participants,
infrastructure and regulations are in place to form
a natural gas hub that is liquid, transparent and
widely used. The natural gas index must also be
acceptable to financial institutions, which supply
credit to developers and buyers. Once in place, a
Chinese natural gas index could provide the
necessary price signals to attract additional
imports as required. Although natural gas market
reforms in China continue to gather momentum,
international experience suggests that a natural
gas hub is not likely to develop soon and inter-
mediate measures may be needed in the interim.
As China continues to reform its natural gas
market, pricing mechanisms will need to be
allowed to evolve. As an interim measure, the
current practice of offering end users natural gas
at prices based on the prices of competing fuels
can continue. However, this approach exposes
importers, especially LNG importers, to risk.
LNG imports to China would continue to be
driven by global supply and demand factors, and
China would have to compete with other buyers
on the market. During this time, oil-indexed
contracts would continue, at the same time as
LNG deals linked to Henry Hub prices gain
momentum. If the market is allowed to open
further to competition, the mismatch between
imported natural gas prices and end-user prices
should narrow.
17.4.4 The Influence of Chinese
Demand on the World
Market
This section analyses the influence of China’s
natural gas consumption on global energy mar-
kets. We will explore three scenarios for Chinese
demand: the first where there are no new policies
to reduce consumption or stimulate natural gas
consumption, and then two scenarios that feature
increasing substitution of natural gas for coal,
both in the power sector and in the wider
economy.
The key findings from the modelling are:
• Natural gas prices: Flexible global natural
gas supply would dampen any increase in
domestic natural gas prices if higher natural
gas demand in China put upward pressure on
domestic prices.
• Coal consumption: Lower Chinese coal
consumption would be largely offset by
increased coal use in other countries, unless
those countries adopt similar policies.
• Domestic coal: Policies that encourage only
the power sector to reduce coal consumption
could result in lower coal prices and a switch
to coal from natural gas in industries not
covered by the low-carbon policies. Policies
aimed at reducing domestic coal production
should have broad applicability in order to
have the greatest impact.
1. The three policy scenarios
Three scenarios for China were developed to
illustrate the effects of a reduction in domestic
coal consumption—for power generation and for
industrial use more widely—and to analyse how
readily natural gas could be substituted for coal
and what impact these changes would have on
global energy markets. These three scenarios
(Baseline, Power Generation Sector and All
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Sectors) simulate the effects of varying degrees
of restriction on coal consumption in China.
Each scenario differs in the stringency of the
restriction, as well as the sectors that are targeted.
• Baseline scenario: China does not introduce
any new policy measures aimed at reducing
coal consumption or stimulating natural gas
consumption. Coal-fired generation capacity
in the power sector continues to grow at
historical rates for the duration of the 13th
Five-Year Plan, from 2016 to 2020. It con-
tinues to grow steadily, albeit at a slightly
slower rate, after that. This scenario is
broadly consistent with recent IEA and EIA
analysis. However, given the momentum for
change in China’s energy policy, it should be
viewed as a useful baseline against which to
compare the impact of the other two scenar-
ios, rather than a realistic future pathway. For
example, the scenario does not take into
account current commitments to LNG
projects.
• Power Generation Sector scenario: China
restricts coal consumption in the power sec-
tor, reducing investments in coal-fired gen-
eration capacity and increasing the effective
price of coal for power generation. This sce-
nario is very similar to current policy trends
in China, and thus is considered to be the
most realistic.
• All Sectors scenario: China restricts coal
consumption in the power sector, similar to
the Power Generation Sector scenario, but
extending the restrictions to other sectors of
the economy, reducing investment in all
coal-intensive capital stock and raising the
effective price of coal economy-wide.
2. The impact on Chinese energy supply
and demand
Restrictions on coal use would raise the effective
price of coal and reduce incentives for coal-
intensive investments. Coal consumption would
peak in 2020 under the Power Generation Sector
scenario and in 2018 under the All Sectors sce-
nario. The later peak in the Power Generation
Sector scenario reflects the leakage of coal use
from the power sector to other sectors of the
economy, most notably manufacturing, that
would result from restricting coal use only in the
power sector.
The decline in coal consumption would be
accompanied by an increase in the consumption
of natural gas and electricity. Under both the
Power Generation Sector and All Sectors sce-
narios, the share of natural gas in China’s energy
mix would rise by 2030—to 17% in the Power
Generation Sector scenario and to 21% in the All
Sectors scenario (Fig. 17.22). The share of nat-
ural gas in the power sector would rise to around
15% in both scenarios. Against a backdrop of
rising energy demand overall, this would trans-
late into a 70% increase in natural gas con-
sumption in the Power Generation Sector
scenario over the Baseline scenario and a 100%
increase in the All Sectors scenario.
China’s domestic natural gas production would
remain below consumption levels in both the
Power Generation Sector and All Sectors scenar-
ios, despite an assumed tripling in domestic pro-
duction by 2030. As a result, the share of natural
gas imports in total consumption is estimated to
rise to around 50% by 2025 in both scenarios.
Given current and planned future pipeline capac-
ity, the LNG share of natural gas imports is esti-
mated to rise to more than 50%. The consumption/
production gap would be larger in the All Sectors
scenario, where LNG imports are estimated to
account for 73% of total natural gas imports.
Restricting coal use only in the power sector
(as in the Power Generation Sector scenario)
would lead to a leakage of coal use to other
sectors, leading to natural gas-to-coal substitution
in these sectors. In turn, this would benefit other
coal-intensive sectors of the economy, such as
manufacturing, as lower coal demand in the
power sector would place downward pressure on
the price of coal paid by other sectors. On the
other hand, an increase in natural gas demand for
power generation would place upward pressure
on the domestic price of natural gas, putting other
gas-intensive sectors, such as residential heating,
at a disadvantage because their main substitutes
for natural gas are electricity and oil.
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3. The impact on the global energy market
The IEA estimates that emerging economies like
China will account for most of the growth in
global energy demand over the next two decades,
and changes to the energy policies and the energy
mix in these economies will have implications
for global energy markets. Overall, the modelling
indicates that while global coal consumption
remains relatively unchanged, natural gas con-
sumption would increase in the Power Genera-
tion Sector and All Sectors scenarios
(Fig. 17.23).
(I) Impact on coal consumption
In the Power Generation Sector and All Sectors
scenarios, decreased coal use in China depresses
the coal price enough to stimulate coal con-
sumption elsewhere, leaving total coal con-
sumption largely undiminished at the global
level. Both scenarios result in a decrease in
Chinese coal consumption, with a greater
reduction in the All Sectors scenario than in the
Power Generation Sector scenario. However,
total global coal consumption by 2030 remains
relatively undiminished and roughly the same in
both scenarios. This is because global coal sup-
ply is relatively price-inelastic, that is, supply is
relatively unresponsive to falling demand and
hence falling prices. While the reduction in
Chinese coal demand would put downward
pressure on the coal price, this would not lead to
a significant reduction in price. Cheaper coal
prices, on the other hand, would lead to increased
coal consumption in other countries without
similar restrictions on coal use.
Overall, in the Power Generation Sector sce-
nario 96% of the decrease in China’s coal con-
sumption is offset by an increase elsewhere, while
in the All Sectors scenario 89% of the decrease is
offset. One reason for the difference between the
two scenarios is the nature of trade flows in the
coal market in each scenario. In the Power Gen-
eration Sector scenario, some of the coal that
would have been imported by China compared to
the Baseline scenario would no longer be needed
and instead would be consumed closer to its
source. In the All Sectors scenario, however, both



































































Fig. 17.22 China’s 2030 energy mix, natural gas consumption and power generation energy mix, by scenario. Source
Aurora Energy Research, Global Energy Model
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be displaced, and China would become a net
exporter of coal by 2025. However, countries that
consume China’s surplus coal production would
incur transportation costs, leading to a smaller
share of China’s coal consumption leaking to
other countries.
The coal leakage effect would be driven
purely by the economics of lower coal prices—
neither the Power Generation Sector nor the All
Sectors scenario assumes comparable coal
reduction policies in other parts of the world.
This effect would be limited if comparable coal
restrictions were also in place in other Asian
countries. A key implication of this result is that,
given the interconnected nature of global energy
markets, a meaningful reduction in global coal
consumption can only be achieved through a
concerted international policy effort.
(II) Impact on natural gas consumption
In contrast to coal, natural gas supply is relatively
price-elastic, that is, global natural gas supply
increases in response to rising demand and rising
prices. The supply response mitigates some of
the increase in price, resulting in only a modest
increase in natural gas hub prices.
Restrictions on coal use in both the Power
Generation Sector and All Sectors scenarios
would drive substantial substitution away from
coal and towards natural gas in China. The
higher demand would be met by production from
many different geographical regions, including a
significant increase in domestic production
(Fig. 17.24). The rising share of LNG to meet
domestic consumption would push domestic
natural gas prices higher, nearing Japanese LNG
prices, which would stimulate domestic
production.
The modelling indicates that, while increasing
Chinese natural gas demand would put some
upward pressure on natural gas prices, natural
gas-intensive countries like the United States
would not decrease consumption substantially in
response. Thus global natural gas demand overall
would be higher under both the Power Genera-
tion Sector and All Sectors scenarios, and the
consumption decrease outside China would only
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Fig. 17.23 Global natural gas and coal demand, by region and scenario. Source Aurora Energy Research, Global
Energy Model
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(III) Impact on primary energy consumption
Both the Power Generation Sector and All Sec-
tors scenarios indicate a net increase in global
energy consumption (Fig. 17.25). The world’s
overall energy bundle would effectively become
cheaper as the coal price would drop by more
than the increase in the natural gas price. The
decline in coal consumption in China would be
offset by increased coal consumption elsewhere
and the increase in natural gas consumption in
China would not be offset. Moreover, in China,
higher total primary energy consumption would
be driven by substituting coal with electricity.
(IV) Changes in energy prices
Substituting natural gas for coal in China
would have a large effect on global coal prices
and a relatively small effect on global natural gas
prices. Global coal prices in 2030 would be
lower in both the Power Generation Sector and
the All Sectors scenarios compared to the Base-
line scenario. In the Power Generation Sector
scenario, the difference would be 15% or
$12/tonne and in the All Sectors scenario, 26%
or $20/tonne (Fig. 17.26). The main drivers for
the significant drop in global coal price would be
China’s exceptional position as the largest con-
sumer in the international coal market—China
currently consumes more than half of the world’s
coal—and the high degree of global integration
in the coal market.
Natural gas prices everywhere would increase
as a result of rising Chinese natural gas demand,
but this increase would be very modest at the
major international natural gas hubs: a 3% price
increase on average in 2030 across three major
natural gas hubs: the NBP in the United Kingdom,
the Henry Hub in the United States and the LNG
import price in Japan (Fig. 17.27). In all three
scenarios, there would be considerable conver-
gence between these hub prices, as global LNG
trade increases substantially and average LNG
transport costs fall. For instance, the difference
between Japanese LNG prices and the Henry Hub
price would fall from just more than $12/MMBtu
in 2015 to $7–8/MMBtu in 2030, as long-run East
Asian LNG prices become broadly equivalent to





































































Fig. 17.24 Trends in global natural gas production by region and scenario. Source Aurora Energy Research, Global
Energy Model
























































































































Gas & coal consumption in 2030
(   Mtoe, relative to baseline)
Fig. 17.26 Decline in China’s coal demand and leakage of capacity. Note Price references ARA 6000 kcal per kg coal.
From 2015 to 2018, displayed prices reference current futures prices. Source Aurora Energy Research, Global Energy
Model
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The increase in global natural gas prices
would be much smaller than the decrease in
global coal prices for several reasons:
• The increase in Chinese natural gas con-
sumption would be slightly less than the
decrease in Chinese coal consumption because
there would be some substitution from coal to
non-natural gas fuels in China.
• China is a larger player in global coal markets
than in natural gas markets, and its decisions
linked to coal would have greater implica-
tions for global markets.
• Global trade in natural gas is much smaller
than that in coal, partly because the rigidity of
pipeline supply and the high transport costs
for LNG restrict global trade flows.
• Global natural gas supply is more price-elastic
than global coal supply, and natural gas pro-
duction would increase to meet higher demand,
while coal production would not fall signifi-
cantly, creating excess supply and lower prices.
However, domestic natural gas price in China
would rise more substantially in both the Power
Generation Sector and All Sectors scenarios. By
2030, domestic prices would reach $12/MMBtu
in the Power Generation Sector scenario and
$13/MMBtu in the All Sectors scenario, com-
pared to between $8/MMBtu and $10/MMBtu in
the Baseline scenario. The reason for the dis-
proportionate effect on prices in China is that as
China starts substituting natural gas for coal, the
increase in natural gas consumption would be
made possible by increased natural gas imports,
LNG in particular. As a result, natural gas prices
in China would converge towards the East
Asian LNG price.
4. A description of the model
The simulations of three possible energy
scenarios for China were based on the Aurora
Energy Research global energy model, which is a
hybrid of the computable general equilibrium





























Fig. 17.27 Global natural gas hub price change trend forecasts. Notes (1) For 2014–2018, prices shown take into
account current futures prices (as of December 12, 2014, converted to real 2014 US$). (2) For China, this is a weighted
average producer gas price index (domestic, pipeline, LNG), which equates supply and demand in the AER-GLO
model. It includes regasification costs for LNG. Weightings are based on the standard Armington assumption governing
trade in CGE model. As a consequence, this figure will not necessarily match wholesale prices at any particular region
in the Chinese market. Source Aurora Energy Research, Global Energy Model
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model that the company had created to analyse
global energy markets.
The model drew from three key building
blocks: a global general equilibrium module to
represent energy demand and economic activity in
all countries, a number of dynamic resource
extraction modules to model the supply of oil,
natural gas and coal in a dynamic financial setting;
and an electricity dispatch module, which emu-
lates the Chinese power sector (Fig. 17.28). The
model lets all three modules solve iteratively in
each year until an internally consistent solution
across all three is found in every year. The hybrid
structure combined the benefits arising from the
robust structure of global general equilibrium
models with the added detail of partial-equilibrium
models of fuel extraction and electricity dispatch.
Both types of modelling approaches are essential
for understanding global energy markets.
The model was used to forecast the impact of
energy policy changes on the global economy,
as well as individual sectors. In addition, with
129 regions globally and 57 sectors within each
region, the model could produce outputs that
included country- and industry-specific forecasts
of demand and supply of all goods and services,
changes in imports and exports, gross regional
product, consumption, investments, returns to
capital and emissions of greenhouse natural
gases and particulate matters.
For this study, the model was calibrated
against recent economic and energy data, and
envisioned three illustrative energy policy sce-
narios, in which key Chinese policy parameters
relating to coal consumption were changed.
These scenarios simulate plausible changes in
China’s energy policy environment and the
effects these are likely to have on global coal and
natural gas markets.
A global general equilibrium structure was
necessary for modelling the global markets for
fuels because of the intimate linkage between
energy and future developments in modern
economies, the substitutability between different
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Aurora’s global energy model (AER-GLO)Modelling approach
1.     GGEM solves for prices given fossil fuel and
        electricity production
2.     Fossil fuel and electricity production are optimised
        at given prices
3.     Iterates until an internally consistent solution is found
4.     Moves on to next year
Fig. 17.28 Hybrid computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used by Aurora for global modelling. Source Aurora
Energy Research, Global Energy Model
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fuels in final energy use, and the uneven distri-
bution of resources across the world. As a result,
the impact of China’s energy policy on global
energy markets provided by the model were
driven to a large extent by the interaction of
different markets under equilibrium and the
resulting substitution between fuels in all geo-
graphical regions in the model.
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18An Overview of InternationalRegulatory Experience
As part of our study, we looked at the evolution of
natural gas markets in five selected countries that
experienced significant increases in gas demand
over the last few decades. In general, these five
markets liberalised their natural gas systems in
phases, allowing increased competition in the
upstream and downstream segments, ensuring fair
access to midstream infrastructure such as pipeli-
nes and LNG terminals, and striving to ensure that
market changes supported overarching energy
goals and benefited end users. To varying degrees,
the experience of the United States, the European
Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South
Korea shows that natural gas market liberalisation
plays a key role in developing and maintaining
well-functioning natural gas markets.
Three key factors that determine the devel-
opment and evolution of natural gas markets are:
fundamentals, market regulation and ancillary
policies:
• Market fundamentals: The fundamentals of
the natural gas market include demand for
natural gas in the economy, the availability of
sources of supply, and the extent to which
sources of supply compete.
• Energy market regulation: Natural gas
market regulation is a crucial factor in the
development and evolution of natural gas
markets. A clear and consistent regulatory
framework requires a strong and independent
market authority and includes key provisions
for the regulation of natural monopolies,
safety and environmental rules, particularly
for exploration and production, security of
supply and market transparency, where
competitive markets can exist.
• Ancillary policies: These include policies
and regulations that affect natural gas markets
indirectly, for example, air quality and cli-
mate change legislation that influences the
cost-competitiveness of substitute fuels for
power generation, policies to encourage and
support greater energy access for low-income
households, and subsidies for energy-related
research and development.
Market fundamentals, energy market regu-
lation and ancillary policies interact to deter-
mine market composition. In addition, the
entire energy system and even other sectors in
the national economy can influence natural gas
market regulation and ancillary policies. Like-
wise, the market fundamentals can be influ-
enced by technological development or by
geopolitical events that reduce the relative
costs of indigenous and foreign sources of
supply.
Turning for a moment to natural gas regula-
tions, these generally have three goals:
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• Affordable supply: Providing economical
natural gas to end users.
• Secure supply: Making gas delivery more
secure, especially in the segments of the
natural gas value chain where natural
monopolies exist.
• Secondary benefits: Formulating policies
that provide knock-on benefits for society as a
whole, for example, restricting air pollution
and carbon emissions, and providing energy
to poor families.
The market liberalisation of natural gas can
achieve these three goals. First, market liberali-
sation can provoke competition, which helps to
reduce consumption costs and thus provide
affordable energy to end users. Second, market
liberalisation opens the market to a more diverse
range of suppliers, which can improve security of
supply. Third, because market participants will
react promptly to any incentive measures con-
tained in secondary policies, the entire natural
gas value chain will be able to respond more
flexibly to fulfil these policy objectives.
However, market liberalisation also brings
greater risks to investment. For example, under
free market conditions, domestic natural gas
enterprise buying power could be reduced in
international markets. Market liberalisation will
also make it harder for poor families to obtain
energy. Case studies show that governments
often use targeted market liberalisation that is
restricted or controlled, so as to rein in these
adverse influences.
Natural gas market development does not
solely rely upon regulation, though. The funda-
mentals of a market, such as the ready avail-
ability of natural gas supplies and the level of
natural gas demand, are primary forces in natural
gas market outcomes. For example, regardless of
the regulatory regime, a country like Japan, with
negligible indigenous production, will always
have different natural gas market fundamentals
than the United States with its large indigenous
production. At the same time, competition
between natural gas and other fuels will also
influence development of natural gas markets, as
will a wide variety of other factors such as air
quality, climate change, energy sufficiency and
electricity market structure, all of which will
influence natural gas market development.
International experience suggests there is a
core set of actions required to deliver competitive
natural gas market outcomes, across a range of
different market fundamentals and ancillary pol-
icy priorities. The analysis of gas market evolu-
tion in different countries seeks to draw general
lessons for natural gas market liberalisation,
noting contrasts in each region that force differ-
ent regulatory approaches. The Chinese context
will be different again, but the common core of
actions across the case studies is likely to be
relevant to China, although modified for the
country’s unique characteristics. In short, inter-
national experience offers important guidance to
China as it designs the composition and opera-
tion of its natural gas market.
The political sequencing of regulatory reforms
is as important to successful market liberalisation
as correct implementation. Natural gas market
regulation impinges on a number of politically
important issues, in particular energy affordabil-
ity, the funding model for national infrastructure
and energy security. When political momentum is
supportive of liberalisation, regulatory reform has
delivered competitive markets within 10–15
years; for instance, in the United States starting in
the late 1970s or the United Kingdom starting in
the late 1980s. When political momentum is not
supportive, the process of regulatory develop-
ment could require decades.
In countries with significant domestic natu-
ral gas resources, such as Norway, The
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, market liberalisation has driven
increased competition and greater development
of these resources. At the same time, the
experience of these countries shows that the
course of market liberalisation requires
favourable upstream licensing, fiscal or envi-
ronmental policies. In the United States, private
ownership of land and the resources under-
neath it enabled rapid development of shale
natural gas exploration and production. Where
resources are owned by the government, such
as on the outer continental shelf of the North
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Sea in Norway, The Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, processes are in place to
enable effective and competitive leasing of
exploration and production rights.
Another lesson emerging from the case stud-
ies is that interactions between ancillary policies
are often unpredictable, such as environmental
and technology policies on the one hand and
liberalised gas markets on the other. Environ-
mental policies—relating to carbon emissions
and local air pollutants—can increase the costs of
emissions-intensive coal relative to natural gas.
While ambitious policies on climate change and
air quality favour natural gas over coal in elec-
tricity generation, the design of these policies
could produce some unintended consequences.
This has been the experience in the European
Union, where the interaction between the two has
undermined environmental objectives and led to
the coal-renewables “energy paradox”. Similarly,
the United States has supported energy-related
research and development programmes for dec-
ades, such as on unconventional natural gas and
microseismic fracture monitoring, which even-
tually proved instrumental in driving the US
shale natural gas boom of the last decade.
In summary, market fundamentals, energy
market regulation and ancillary policies interact,
and shape a country’s natural gas market over
time. International experience has shown that
technical developments and geopolitical events
can affect domestic and international supply
costs, and can influence the market fundamen-
tals. Likewise, the market fundamentals have an
influence on natural gas market regulation and
ancillary policies, and together they all form the
natural gas market. Natural gas market liberali-
sation is thus ultimately dependent on the history
of the natural gas market, geography and the
political environment, and these major influences
are pivotal in the formation of natural gas mar-
kets. For example, natural gas market regulation
and ancillary policies are determined by political
trends and events. This chapter will introduce
international experiences from natural gas market
regulation, market liberalisation and other per-
spectives, analysing case studies of foreign nat-
ural gas market liberalisation in depth in the hope
of providing a reference point for, and insight
into, China’s natural gas market liberalisation
reforms.
18.1 Regulatory Reform
18.1.1 The Reasons for Regulation
Policymakers regulate the natural gas value chain
in order to balance three major policy goals:
• Economic supply: Providing affordable
heating to households and competitive natural
gas prices for power generation and
energy-intensive industries.
• Security of supply: The maintenance of a
high-quality supply of natural gas to end
users. Policymakers also often consider nat-
ural gas supply infrastructure to be part of
critical national infrastructure required for the
functioning of the country and the delivery of
the essential services.
• Safe and clean supply: This objective pre-
supposes that natural gas supply should pose
minimum risk to public health and safety. It
also captures the notion that increased natural
gas supply can replace alternative fuels that
have a higher direct environmental impact
and higher greenhouse natural gas emissions.
These policy goals can conflict on multiple
levels, and are often referred to as the energy
policy “trilemma”. For example, within economic
supply, ensuring affordable natural gas prices for
end users has often led countries to subsidise
end-user prices, either through cross-subsidisation
of one class of users by another or directly from
the state budget. Further, delivering economic
supply may not always be compatible the with
goals of safe and clean supply.
Liberalising natural gas markets can help
deliver across the energy trilemma objectives,
but may need to be supplemented by a broader
policy framework to manage some of the
remaining trade-offs. For example, market liber-
alisation increases competition, which in turn
helps to drive down costs for consumers over the
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long term, delivering an economical supply. It
also opens the market to a diverse range of
suppliers, increasing security of supply. Finally,
policies to encourage natural gas use and
increase its share in the energy mix can reduce
the risk to public health and safety, for example
by reducing indoor and outdoor air pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions caused by coal use.
However, liberalisation can also make
investment riskier, and fragmented domestic
natural gas firms can face reduced buying power
on international markets. It can also raise costs in
the near term, reducing the ability of low-income
households to access energy, unless other poli-
cies are put in place to compensate. The five case
studies below demonstrate that gas market lib-
eralisation is often limited, or complemented by
other policies, in order to manage these impacts.
18.1.2 The Process of Market
Liberalisation Across
the Natural Gas Value
Chain
Liberalisation refers to the process by which
competitive market outcomes are delivered:
providing end users with the greatest choice at
the lowest price. This can be achieved either by
opening markets to competition or through reg-
ulatory measures to limit or cap prices where
natural monopolies exist. To achieve the goal of
natural gas market liberalisation, the structure
and economics of the natural gas value chain
need to be considered (Fig. 18.1). With the
exception of some segments where natural
monopolies exist, market competition exists
throughout the value chain.
The natural gas value chain can broadly be
divided into three segments—upstream markets,
midstream infrastructure and downstream mar-
kets. The upstream segment refers to domestic
exploration and production of natural gas. The
midstream segment refers to infrastructure for the
transport of natural gas—domestic and imported
—through transmission pipelines, LNG terminals

















Fig. 18.1 The natural gas value chain. Note Natural monopolies, where markets fail, are mainly in the midstream
segment
1For the purposes of this study, LNG terminals are
classified as midstream infrastructure rather than upstream
assets. Whether to treat LNG terminals as upstream assets
or midstream infrastructure depends largely on the nature
of competition in a market. In the United States, LNG
terminals compete with domestic production, and are
hence considered equivalent to domestic well heads and
classified as upstream assets. In Europe, most of the
competition is with imported natural gas, and hence LNG
terminals are considered part of the transmission network
and classified as midstream infrastructure. The appropri-
ate treatment of LNG terminals in China is not yet clear
382 18 An Overview of International Regulatory Experience
downstream segment refers to wholesale and
retail markets supplying gas to end users.
Competitive markets can exist at many places
across the natural gas value chain. Competition in
the upstream segment can drive greater efficiency
and innovation in exploration and production of
natural gas, as a way to drive down costs and
develop greater volumes and sources of domestic
supply. For example, before the liberalisation of
natural gas markets in the European Union, ver-
tically integrated and state-owned natural gas
companies had little incentive to improve the
efficiency of their operations, leading to increases
in natural gas prices. Similarly, greater competi-
tion in the downstream segment can increase
choice and reduce the price paid by the end users
of natural gas, for example by increasing com-
petition in the shipping and sales of natural gas.
These segments can be opened to competition,
within a regulatory oversight framework to ensure
and support competitive markets and without the
need for further regulatory interventions.
Opening markets to competition is typically
not desirable and can fail in the midstream seg-
ment. Midstream infrastructure, such as pipeli-
nes, are highly capital-intensive. For example, in
2013, onshore oil and natural gas pipeline con-
struction in the United States cost $4.1 million
per mile, while offshore pipelines cost $7.6 mil-
lion per mile. High fixed costs and relatively low
operation and maintenance costs point to large
economies of scale: the costs of delivery decline
rapidly with volume. This fits the definition of a
natural monopoly, where the lowest long-run
average costs are realised when production and
ownership are concentrated in a single firm.
However, enterprises in positions of natural
monopolies tend toward using their market
position to harm consumers and will collect pri-
ces higher than those formed by market compe-
tition. In addition, natural gas transmission
pipelines and other midstream infrastructure
owners are generally vertically integrated, and
they provide various services throughout the
value chain. Such enterprises will generally take
actions to restrict competition, for example col-
lecting excessively high fees from third-party
natural gas suppliers and shippers using the
infrastructure so as to maintain their leading
position in upstream sectors, or else raise their
profits in downstream sales business. This results
in US and European natural gas market regula-
tory bodies requiring transmission pipeline
owners to open their facilities to third parties, or
to regulate the fees collected from customers by
the pipeline infrastructure owners. They also
insist on the separation of transmission services
and upstream or downstream business—this
process is called deregulation.
Liberalisation of natural gas markets requires
identifying the competitive and natural mono-
poly segments of value chain, and applying
appropriate regulatory approaches. For example,
between 1954 and 1978, the United States in
effect treated the entire value chain as a natural
monopoly, with prices from the wellhead onward
fully regulated to protect consumers. As a con-
sequence, US natural gas investment failed to
respond adequately to the 1970s oil crisis. The
recognition in 1978 that only pipelines are nat-
ural monopolies, requiring regulation to ensure
open access, marked the start of a period of lib-
eralisation. The reforms unbundled the natural
gas industry, separating transportation and sales
businesses, and ensured open access to interstate
pipeline infrastructure for third parties. By 1992,
after 14 years, the fundamentals for a competi-
tive and efficient market had been established,
and they supported a 40% increase in natural gas
consumption from around 500 billion m3 in
1990 to 700 billion m3 by 2010.
A review of international case studies shows
that a competitive, responsive, liquid natural gas
market is characterised by:
• Critical mass: Many players that compete for
substantial upstream business and access to
midstream infrastructure, serving many buy-
ers with large volumes and financed by
responsive investors.
• Competitive pricing: Competitive price for-
mation at the wholesale and retail levels.
(Footnote 1 continued)
because a competitive natural gas market has yet to
develop.
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• Open access: Non-discriminatory open
access to natural monopolistic midstream
infrastructure, as well as regulated tariffs.
Overall, a competitive market can optimally
allocate resources in many stages of the value
chain, within an oversight framework to ensure
well-functioning competitive markets. However,
pipelines are natural monopolies and require
more direct regulation. Getting the right combi-
nation of competitive markets, regulatory over-
sight and direct market regulation is essential for




Market regulation is crucial to achieving and
securing the liberalisation of natural gas mar-
kets. A regulatory framework, codified in law,
defines the principles of regulation along the
natural gas value chain. It determines which
segments of the value chain should be opened
to competition and establishes the institutional
arrangements to ensure free and fair competi-
tion. It also determines which infrastructure is
to be treated as a natural monopoly and sets
the basis for access to the infrastructure, as
well as the level of unbundling for vertically
integrated players. The regulatory framework
also includes rules around safety, security of
supply and environmental standards, which
apply throughout the value chain. Implement-
ing the framework requires a strong, indepen-
dent regulatory authority.
The natural gas market liberalisation experi-
ence of the United States, the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea has
lessons that might be relevant to China. Each
country has different characteristics. For exam-
ple, the United States has by far the greatest
indigenous supply, while the European Union is
the biggest importer (Table 18.1). Understanding
Table 18.1 Market traits of five natural gas markets plus China
Natural gas
indicator





Indigenous 689 269 38 3 0.5 115
Net imports 37 231 39 123 53 49
Consumption (%
of total)
Power 40 30 30 65 50 15
Industry 20 20 10 5 20 45














Note Data for 2013, except China’s shares of power and industry in natural gas consumption for 2011. bcm is billion
cubic metres
Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA, EIA, Chinese government and ENTSOG data
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these differences can help identify experiences
that best fit China’s circumstances.
The case studies suggest five core actions for
liberalisation that can deliver a competitive out-
come in the natural gas market, as shown in
Fig. 18.2. Creating institutions allows for a fun-
damental natural gas legal framework and a
strong, independent regulatory agency. Enabling
open access focuses on assuring fair and rea-
sonable access to infrastructure owned by a nat-
ural monopoly. Deregulating prices enables
market forces to determine prices and provides
clearer signals about supply and demand. Setting
standards and ensuring transparency offers reg-
ulatory mechanisms to ensure fair market prac-
tices. And finally, protecting end users
safeguards the interests of commercial and resi-
dential natural gas users and seeks to manage any
negative consequences of market liberalisation.
These measures take into account the broader
context of natural gas market liberalisation: the
need to balance the positives and negatives of
liberalisation; interactions with fundamentals and
ancillary policies; the importance of natural
monopolies in the value chain; and the legacy of
state intervention in the natural gas market.
1. Creating institutions
Institutions, including a natural gas law and a
strong, independent regulator, form the funda-
mental building blocks of liberalised natural gas
markets. Regulators are most effective when they
have statutory independence from political,
government and industry influence to ensure
appropriate decision-making and equal treatment
of market participants, as well as to avoid a
myopic approach to long-term infrastructure
investment decisions. The regulator’s authority
and tasks should be laid down in a regulatory
framework codified in law.
The case studies below underscore the
importance of regulatory institutions being
independent of political influences and operating
transparently. They illustrate that decisions







n a clear gas law
n a strong, independent gas regulator
Ensure open access:
Deregulate prices (for competitive segments of the value chain)
Set standards and ensure transparency:
Protect end-users:
n regulated third-party access
n improve transparency in markets for network use
n standardise trading arrangements
n support market centre development
n competition authority to oversee competitive markets
n manage impacts on end users (consumers, power, industrials) with suitable support
n unbundle and release parts of dominant players’ business if necessary
n regulate network charges (and provide investment commitments)
Fig. 18.2 Five steps to successful natural gas market liberalisation. Source Vivid Economics
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manner by involving stakeholders, publishing
evidence and final decisions, and allowing appeal
in court. The regulator should have access to
adequate financial and human resources to carry
out its tasks satisfactorily.
The US Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) is a classic example of a natural gas
market system foundation operating well. FERC
was established in 1997 and is charged with
overseeing industries including electricity,
hydroelectricity, oil and natural gas. In all of
these industries, participants often hold signifi-
cant market power. FERC regulates the markets
to ensure that companies do not misuse their
monopoly positions, and its regulatory objectives
range from preventing discriminatory service and
unfair pricing to promoting environmentally
sound infrastructure. FERC’s main responsibili-
ties in the natural gas industry are regulating the
rates and services offered by interstate pipeline
companies, certifying and permitting new pipe-
line construction, enforcing competition and
preventing market manipulation where markets
exist, and handling related environmental issues.
2. Ensuring open access
Owners of natural monopoly infrastructure,
such as pipelines, have an incentive to misuse
their market power, particularly when they are
vertically integrated across the natural gas value
chain. Regulatory action is generally required in
five specific areas:
• Third-party access: This requires owners of
networks with natural monopoly characteris-
tics to grant access to their assets to interested
third parties. (A detailed review of third-party
access experience is presented in Sect. 19.2.)
• Regulating network charges: To prevent
monopolistic pricing of transportation ser-
vices, the tariffs that a network owner and
operator can charge for transportation should
be regulated. The allowable tariff should be
set at a level that encourages investment, but
does not price shippers out of the market.
• Unbundling ownership: A vertically inte-
grated company that has natural gas
extraction, sales and transportation businesses
has an incentive to engage in anti-competitive
behaviour, such as charging excessive rates
for transportation services, to prevent third
parties from competing with its upstream
extraction, downstream sales units or both. To
enable non-discriminatory open access to
networks, the interests of any extraction or
sales business should be separated from the
transportation services business. This is ide-
ally achieved by unbundling or separating
businesses operating in different segments of
the natural gas value chain. (A detailed
review of unbundling experience is presented
in Sect. 19.3.)
• Transparency on capacity availability and
the terms and conditions of infrastructure
use: Open access and unbundling alone are
not sufficient to deliver liberalised markets,
and provisions to ensure transparency around
midstream transport infrastructure use are
vital in enabling competition, both upstream
and downstream.
• Release parts of dominant players’ busi-
ness: Dominant players tend to have
long-term contracts with suppliers and cus-
tomers. The regulator should intervene to
break up these contracts so that sufficient
market volume is available for entrants.
Granting open access to networks is often
initially attempted through negotiated third-party
access or voluntary arrangements, leaving net-
work owners free to negotiate terms and condi-
tions for access. All five jurisdictions that were
reviewed adopted this approach at first. How-
ever, negotiated agreements consistently fall prey
to market power abuse by network owners that
are vertically integrated with interests throughout
the value chain, for example in production,
import capacity or local distribution. Such firms
have a clear incentive to use their power to pre-
vent entry of competitors.
Third-party access should be regulated care-
fully, with provisions for allowable network use
charges that provide incentives for investment,
terms and conditions of use, and transparency
around capacity availability, tariffs and terms of
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use. Even with regulated third-party access,
incumbent market supply dominance may need
to be proactively broken by the regulator. For
example, the United Kingdom regulator forced
British Gas, the dominant incumbent in the UK
natural gas market, to release parts of its
long-term supply contracts in the 1980s so that
new entrants could start to compete and serve the
market instead.
In terms of establishing fee rates, regulatory
bodies should satisfy the requirement to permit
open usage of gas transmission infrastructure
while also ensuring that gas transmission infras-
tructure is able to receive ample investments.
There are essentially two methods of establishing
fee rates: one is the sum of costs method, setting
total revenue as equivalent to investment and
operating costs plus a reasonable return. Another
approach is the incentive-managed pricing uti-
lised by the European Union and United States in
recent years, in which pipeline operator costs and
permitted revenue are separated and, based on
cost baselines or cost analysis models, a baseline
revenue is established, along with an additional
permitted revenue to incentivise supply quality
and other set goals. Together with these two
goals, the controlled rates of return always pro-
mote investment as an important factor, with set
levels both encouraging investment and also not
leading to excess investment or insufficient
investment. Sometimes, in order to encourage
investment, infrastructure need not be required to
provide open usage, for example with LNG ter-
minals in the United States and Britain.
Unbundling is a key element in ensuring
non-discriminatory access to infrastructure.
Owners of pipelines have an incentive to offer
favourable terms to their own upstream extrac-
tion and downstream sales businesses over other
third parties. Authorities observed this
anti-competitive behaviour by incumbent firms in
the United States in the 1930s and in the United
Kingdom in the 1980s. The response in both
countries was to require significant unbundling in
addition to open access, which facilitated the
entry of gas shippers and brokers into wholesale
and retail markets. The European Union allows
for different forms of unbundling. It allows
member states to keep networks under incumbent
vertically integrated ownership, with strict
arrangements to ensure independent
decision-making about transmission system
operations. This reflects the desire of EU member
states to retain control over who owns and
operates vital infrastructure and to maintain a
certain degree of buyer power with major import
sources. It also reflects the reality that some
member state markets may be too small to
achieve real competition, and the costs of liber-
alisation could outweigh the benefits.
Provisions to ensure transparency around
midstream transport infrastructure use are vital in
enabling competition. Open access and
unbundling, even when required by law, are not
in themselves sufficient to deliver liberalised
markets. In the 1980s, the liberalised United
Kingdom natural gas market was slow to attract
entrants and generate competition because mar-
ket participants were not able to acquire essential
information on capacity availability and the
terms and conditions of infrastructure use. Since
then, the United States and United Kingdom
have mandated that information about storage
availability and capacity and rates for pipeline
transport be published on bulletin boards.
Compliance is monitored and enforced by the
relevant market regulators and competition
authorities.
In Japan, open access to LNG terminals has
not yet resulted in third-party use, partly because
market participants do not have sufficient infor-
mation. Moreover, following the Fukushima
nuclear plant disaster, liberalisation lost
momentum in Japan as the country moved to
secure increased LNG imports. Japan now
encourages collective LNG purchasing by its
natural gas importers to protect the economy
against volatile LNG prices, although the debate
around further natural gas market liberalisation,
including third-party access to LNG terminals,
resumed in 2014. Similarly, in South Korea,
winter peak natural gas demand concerns and
volatile LNG prices have led to the protection of
its vertically integrated and publicly owned
monopoly supplier, Korea Gas (KOGAS), to
sustain its buying power on global markets.
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Finally, it is important to recognise and
address any existing long-term contracts held by
the incumbent that create barriers to entry by
limiting available capacity and restricting access
to midstream infrastructure. These legacy con-
tracts are generally long-standing, reducing
capacity available for third parties and therefore
preventing competitive forces from taking effect.
Regulators can intervene to break up long-term
contracts incumbents may have with suppliers
and end users, to reduce incumbents’ market
share, and to open the market for new entrants.
Breaking up existing long-term contracts was a
key step in liberalising markets in the United
States and United Kingdom: dominant market
players were forced to release capacity from
contracts to enable market entry and competition.
3. Deregulating prices
Prices should be deregulated where conditions
exist for the establishment of competitive mar-
kets, for example in upstream exploration and
production and in the downstream wholesale and
retail markets. Deregulating prices is necessary to
ensure that economic signals about supply and
demand fundamentals are transmitted between
market participants. Markets tend to fail when
they exhibit natural monopoly characteristics,
and in these stages of the value chain—namely
transmission and distribution—prices need to be
regulated. Elsewhere, however, participants are
able to allocate resources efficiently when prices
are left to respond freely to changes in supply
and demand fundamentals.
Wholesale prices are key transmitters of eco-
nomic signals because they form the link
between upstream exploration and production
and the rest of the value chain. Achieving a
competitive natural gas market involves a phased
liberalisation of wholesale prices. The United
States evolved from cost-plus wellhead prices,
using netback2 and oil-linked contracts, to a
system in which spot and futures contracts are
the dominant types, traded by a diverse set of
participants. The UK market evolved from a
price-setting single buyer—British Gas—linking
contracts to substitute fuels and inflation to reg-
ulated caps and, finally, to more competitive
hub-based trading. The end point of price
deregulation in these markets has been a liquid
and responsive wholesale market.
These market-based prices imply a move
away from long-term contracts, which tie the
price of natural gas to that of another commodity,
or regulated prices, which are set by the gov-
ernment. This has been changing as the volume
of natural gas traded, particularly LNG trade, has
expanded. In the United States, natural gas is
now almost entirely based on market prices,
whereas in the European Union it is split evenly
between market-based prices and long-term
oil-indexed contracts.
Long-term contracts linked to prices of sub-
stitute fuels, spot markets prices or other indices
offer a degree of certainty for investors to support
upstream development. For example, when com-
bined with netback pricing, a take-or-pay clause,
which provides a penalty payment if natural gas
deliveries are cancelled, can ensure a steady
income stream for decades and enable investment
in exploration and production. Such clauses are
common in the contracts for the Groningen nat-
ural gas in The Netherlands. However, long-term
contracts may lead to low spot market liquidity
and price uncertainty. Moreover, as discussed
previously, breaking up existing long-term con-
tracts is crucial to ensure open access, enabling
greater third-party access to midstream infras-
tructure and market entry and competition in the
upstream and downstream segments.
Reaching a stage of highly liquid wholesale
spot markets can also support upstream devel-
opment. For example, in the European Union,
once natural gas hubs gained sufficient liquidity,
contracts were increasingly linked to natural gas
spot markets rather than oil prices. In the United
States, shale development relied on the existence
of liquid spot markets. Developers of US shale
plays depended on spot markets because they
were unable to secure attractive long-term con-
tracts because of the high uncertainty around
field production.
2Cost back value pricing uses a price equation based on
the actual price collected from end users.
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4. Setting standards and ensuring
transparency
To enable new entrants to enter the market,
transparency around market rules is essential, as
is a regulator with appropriate legal authority and
independence from political parties, government
branches and industry in order to enforce trans-
parency requirements. This includes transparency
around the terms and conditions for third-party
access to networks and disclosure of available
capacity on networks. It may also include mea-
sures to enhance competition and increase market
liquidity in the upstream and downstream seg-
ments and, as a result, improve transmission of
economic signals between market participants.
For example, the regulator can increase upstream
competition through the design and implemen-
tation of licensing and fiscal regimes using
measures such as allowing trade in upstream
licences or setting beneficial fiscal terms for
exploration and production. The regulator can
also standardise trading arrangements in down-
stream wholesale markets, for example through a
network code or other guidelines that help build
trust among market participants, or by standard-
ising contracting arrangements to support the
creation and development of a natural gas hub.
The regulator can also promote the use of
market centres, such as in the case of Henry Hub
in the United States and the National Balancing
Point (NBP) in the United Kingdom. In the
United States, FERC has supported the devel-
opment of market centres by requiring market
players to provide certain services and by stan-
dardising trade arrangements. In the United
Kingdom, a virtual hub, the NBP, emerged as a
result of the Network Code in 1996, which
required a location where its balancing mecha-
nism could be implemented by the regulator. The
Code was complemented by a set of natural gas
trading arrangements that established contract
standards, allowing parties to trade natural gas
with confidence in contracts.
5. Protecting end users
To maintain a competitive natural gas market,
regulatory oversight needs to include a compe-
tition authority and provisions for managing
impacts on end users. A competition authority
would be responsible for ensuring
well-functioning markets that provide end users
with the greatest choice of suppliers at the lowest
price. It could also protect consumers, power
generators and industrial users that may be dis-
proportionally or inequitably affected by any
market reform or resulting market outcome.
Consumer and end-user protection requires
the appropriate legal, financial and political
support. In the United States, from the 1950s
until the late 1970s, consumer protection and, by
extension, welfare distribution influenced price
setting for natural gas. However, policies to
protect consumers and other end users should be
disconnected from the gas market liberalisation
process. In the long term, liberalised markets
generate competition that drives down costs for
consumers and delivers sustained low prices.
During the transition period, as natural gas
markets liberalise, social welfare and equity
considerations may result in additional support
being provided to the most exposed sections of
society and sectors of the economy. The most
economically efficient approach would be to
allow natural gas markets to liberalise, including
price deregulation, and to provide income or
other support separately to consumers and end
users, for example using social welfare payments
or lump sum subsidies. Such an approach would
not interfere with the efficient functioning of the
natural gas market, while ensuring that the most
vulnerable businesses and individuals are
protected.
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18.2.2 Political and Economic Factors
of Market Liberalisation
The sequencing and timing of liberalisation is
significant, and international experience suggests
a sequence of reforms that includes key mile-
stones and potential points of tension (Fig. 18.3).
Initially, vertically integrated incumbents tend
to supply all or most natural gas, acting as the
monopoly producer and supplier of natural gas.
Supply and demand are unresponsive as there is
no free price formation that enables transmission
of economic signals. The first step of the liber-
alisation process is to create a natural gas law and
establish a natural gas regulator to implement
market reforms, including open access to the
existing infrastructure and networks for third
parties.
Alongside measures to encourage new
entrants and facilitate greater competition in the
upstream and downstream markets, the liberali-
sation process requires that a start is made on
deregulating prices to that they reflect market
supply and demand conditions, for example
wholesale markets moving from simple cost-plus
pricing to more responsive approaches, such as
netback pricing. For midstream infrastructure,
network charges need to balance increased
third-party access with incentives to invest in
maintenance and new network capacity. In the
initial stages of liberalisation, incumbents tend to
battle to retain their market power, by putting up
barriers to entry, contesting regulatory interven-
tions and retaining their long-term contracts.
They may also withhold crucial information from
the market, such as the capacity available on their
networks and information on terms and condi-
tions of third-party access.
The next step in the liberalisation process is to
increase market transparency, for example by
requiring network owners to disclose network
capacity and the terms and conditions for access.
In addition, at this stage the regulator may
intervene to break up long-term contracts held by
incumbents with suppliers and customers. A ma-
ture market is one with a strong regulator that can
ensure and secure competitive market outcomes
and a diverse set of players across the value
chain. These players include some integrated
firms, but also new entrants, such as pure natural
gas shippers, marketers and brokers. If liberali-
sation is extended to cover distribution networks,
natural gas retailers may also emerge to compete
for smaller end users. Building on this, the next
step would be the establishment of standardised
trading arrangements, a balancing mechanism
and service requirements to support the devel-
opment of market centres or hubs as platforms to
Government Independent regulator Competitionauthority
create institutions
deregulate prices


















Fig. 18.3 The sequence of five regulatory reforms and potential market reactions. Source Vivid Economics
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trade short-term contracts. This allows market
liquidity to build and economic signals to be
transmitted between the demand and supply sides
of the market.
As the market matures, the emphasis of reg-
ulatory oversight shifts to end-user protection
and the competition authority takes on the role of
ensuring fair competition. The focus of policy
also shifts to mitigating undesirable impacts of
the reforms on end users.
However, a key observation from the case
studies is that the reform of natural gas markets is
a lengthy and difficult process and is likely to fail
if the political context, fundamentals and ancil-
lary policies are not aligned favourably. The
United States in the 1970s and 1980s exemplifies
a context conducive to natural gas market reform.
At the time, there were many upstream producers
and network infrastructure was well developed.
In addition, there was strong political pressure to
make the market more efficient, especially
downstream wholesale and retail markets, fol-
lowing the failure of natural gas supply to
respond during the 1970s oil crisis. Similarly, in
the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the political
and market context were conducive to reform.
The conservative government of Margaret
Thatcher strived to resolve poor government
finances by privatising publicly owned indus-
tries, including vertically integrated electricity
and natural gas companies. Further, the govern-
ment allowed natural gas to be used in power
generation, an opportunity for investors because
of the emergence of cost-effective combined-
cycle natural gas turbine technology.
On the other hand, liberalisation processes in
the European Union, Japan and South Korea
provide examples of protracted and incomplete
efforts to open up the natural gas value chain.
Even today, the European Union faces political
opposition in its attempt to liberalise continental
natural gas markets, a process that began in 1998.
Opposition focuses on concerns over supply
security as a result of greater import dependence,
as well as over ownership of infrastructure that is
in the national interest. Increased global tension
centred on Russia, Europe’s main natural gas
supplier, and the Ukraine illustrates the risk.
Recently announced proposals for a European
Energy Union seek to balance these concerns
while continuing to push for greater liberalisation
of natural gas markets.
Similarly, in Japan, energy security consider-
ations following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
disaster have caused a setback to the liberalisa-
tion process, driving towards more co-operation,
rather than competition, among the regional
monopoly suppliers in securing long-term LNG
contracts. However, in 2014, further liberalisa-
tion appears to have returned to the agenda.
South Korea has also faced difficulties over the
past two decades as it tried to liberalise its natural
gas markets, largely because of the power of the
KOGAS labour union and reluctance by KOGAS
to give up its buying power on world LNG
markets.
18.2.3 The Impact of Market
Liberalisation
on Domestic Mining
The experience of countries with significant
domestic natural gas resources, such as Norway,
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States, has been for market liberalisation
to drive greater development of these resources.
These countries have tended to liberalise earlier
and more comprehensively than countries with-
out significant domestic natural gas resources.
Before liberalisation, upstream exploration and
production tended to be dominated by
state-owned vertically integrated monopoly pro-
ducers. Opening the sector to competition helped
drive greater efficiency and innovation in explo-
ration and production of natural gas, reducing
costs and facilitating the development of greater
volumes and sources of domestic supply, as seen
in the European Union. In addition, access to
midstream infrastructure and competitive whole-
sale and retail markets have attracted new entrants
and fostered greater competition in upstream
exploration and production. With such access,
new upstream entrants can be confident of being
able to transport natural gas to wholesale and
retail suppliers, and eventually to end users.
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Liberalisation of the natural gas value chain
has also been supported by favourable upstream
licensing, fiscal or environmental policies in
these countries. In the United States, private
ownership of land and the resources underneath
it enabled rapid development of shale natural gas
exploration and production. Where resources are
owned by the government, such as on the outer
continental shelf of the North Sea in Norway,
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom, pro-
cesses are in place to enable effective and com-
petitive leasing of exploration and production
rights. For example, licensing arrangements in
the United Kingdom are designed to encourage
exploration and production and penalise hoard-
ing; UK licences can be taken away if companies
do not follow the work programme proposed in
their bid for exploration and production rights.
The Netherlands developed its large Groningen
natural gas field through a 50:50 public-private
partnership arrangement, which provides a
steady income stream to encourage new entrants
and greater investment in upstream exploration
and production, while also ensuring that the
investments were economic and competitive.
Specific fiscal incentives and other support poli-
cies are also provided, such as in the United
Kingdom, to incentivise exploration and pro-
duction in more-challenging areas.
18.2.4 Market Liberalisation
and Ancillary Policies
There are many interactions between liberalised
gas markets and ancillary policies. Ancillary
policies, relating to the environment or to tech-
nology development, affect the evolution of
natural gas markets. Analysis of the case studies
shows that while some of these interactions have
been anticipated, others have been unpredictable.
Environmental policies—such as the US
Clean Air Act Amendments in the 1990s, the
more recent US Environmental Protection
Agency carbon emission standards, the European
Union’s emission trading system to price in
carbon emissions, and the EU air quality direc-
tives and regulations—can increase the costs of
emissions-intensive coal relative to natural gas.
While ambitious policies on climate change and
air quality favour gas over coal in electricity
generation, the design of these policies could
produce some unintended consequences. This
has been the experience in the European Union,
where the interaction between climate policy and
energy markets has undermined environmental
objectives and led to the coal-renewables “energy
paradox”.
While the European Union has an overall
target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
20% by 2020 over the 1990 level, it also has a
separate target for a 20% share of renewables in
the energy mix by 2020. The separate renewables
target and the large subsidies provided to achieve
it have dampened wholesale energy prices
because of the low—and at times negative—
marginal cost of renewables. This has, in turn,
reduced incentives to invest in back-up fossil fuel
capacity, which is required to compensate for the
potential of intermittent supplies from renewable
sources. Moreover, flaws in the design and
implementation of the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme—the European Union’s primary mech-
anism for meeting its overall greenhouse gas
emissions target—combined with recent weak
economic conditions and the relatively low price
of coal, have shifted the energy mix towards coal
and renewables at the expense of natural gas.
These unintended consequences of energy and
climate policies have undermined the profitabil-
ity of power suppliers and destabilised their
business models. The problem is illustrated by
the challenges faced by companies like E.ON
and RWE in Germany, whose marginal cost
pricing-based business model has been put at risk
as subsidised and distributed sources of renew-
able energy of significant size enter the energy
mix. Going forward, Europe renewables are
likely to remain a significant part of the energy
mix to 2030 if Europe is to meet its climate
policy ambitions, and electricity market regula-
tion will need to evolve alongside climate poli-
cies. In turn, this will have knock-on impacts for
natural gas demand and markets.
The natural gas market has also benefited
from ancillary interventions, such as
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energy-related research and development support
and subsidies. This has been particularly signif-
icant in the context of US shale natural gas
development. Various research and development
programmes related to unconventional natural
gas were set up by the US Energy Research and
Development Administration in the 1970s and
continued by the Department of Energy. These
programmes, along with other research and
development programmes, such as those centred
on microseismic fracture monitoring, have
proved instrumental in driving the US shale
natural gas boom of the last decade.
18.3 Case Studies of Natural Gas
Market Liberalisation
Careful study of individual national natural gas
markets makes clear the precise nature of the
market liberalisation that has occurred as the
natural gas value chain has developed. Each
market’s liberalisation has its own characteris-
tics, but the ultimate goal is always to establish a
more vibrant natural gas system that supports the
nation’s strategic goals. Understanding the
development of these markets can provide valu-
able reference points as China formulates its
energy system objectives.
18.3.1 Case Study 1: United States
The development of a dynamic and competitive
natural gas market in the United States (Fig. 18.4)
reveals three main phases of regulation. These
phases are set against a backdrop of events, such
as the shale natural gas boom and key regulatory
changes, as well as varying levels of gas supply
and gas prices between 1960 and 2013.
The pre-liberalisation phase was marked by
gradually increasing levels of regulation over
Indigenous production Net pipeline imports































































































































Fig. 18.4 Phases, development and key regulations in the establishment of a liberalised natural gas market in the US,
1978–1992. Note Nominal natural gas prices paid at power plant, national currency converted to average GDP
purchasing power parity. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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15 years, which began as early as 1938 and
reached full wellhead price regulation in 1954.
These price controls were justified on the basis of
the perceived natural monopoly characteristics of
the natural gas value chain, warranting heavy
state intervention to protect consumers from
abuse of market power. These interventions
echoed earlier interventions in the oil value chain
to counteract the anti-competitive practices of
Standard Oil and other companies. The price
controls suppressed investment and led to sig-
nificant supply shortages, particularly during the
1970s oil crisis, which were only ameliorated by
the subsequent recession.
In response, a new market authority, FERC,
was established and several orders to reform the
market were enacted from 1978, marking the
start of a period of liberalisation. The reforms
unbundled the natural gas industry, separating
transportation and sales businesses, and ensured
open access to interstate pipeline infrastructure
for third parties. By 1992, after 14 years, the
liberalisation programme had largely been com-
pleted. The post-liberalisation phase saw the
enactment of various orders to refine the
unbundling and open access arrangements, but
the fundamentals for a competitive and efficient
market had been established and they supported a
40% increase in natural gas consumption from
around 500 billion m3 in 1990 to 700 billion m3
by 2010.
1. Before market liberalisation
The natural gas market in the United States
started in the early 1900s. Before then, natural
gas produced from coal was used locally. In the
early 1900s, the discovery of large natural gas
basins in the Southwest triggered the construc-
tion of large-scale natural gas transmission net-
works to reach the population and industrial
centres of the United States. Vertically integrated
companies started selling natural gas from basins
in the Southwest to end users on the East Coast,
the Mid-Atlantic Coast and the West Coast.
A 1935 Federal Trade Commission investi-
gation found high levels of market concentration
and abuse of market power by vertically
integrated companies in the exploration, pro-
duction and transportation of natural gas. In
response, the Gas Act of 1938 established the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate
interstate pipelines and ensure “just and reason-
able” wholesale prices. Regulation of intrastate
pipelines was left to state regulators. Any pur-
chase of natural gas for interstate transport and
sale to a local distributor now required a certifi-
cate from the FPC, which set a maximum price
for the natural gas. This price allowed pipeline
companies to recover some of the costs incurred
in pipeline construction and operation. The
exploration and production of natural gas
remained exempt from federal regulation: well-
head prices remained unregulated. The final sale
price to end users was also unregulated. The FPC
further gained authority to approve the con-
struction and operation of facilities and the pro-
vision of services used in interstate natural gas
transmission.
The industry defended deregulated wellhead
prices provided for under the 1938 Gas Act.
However, by the 1950s, consumer groups were
championing a system of regulated prices for
both producers and pipelines based on the per-
ceived natural monopoly characteristics of natu-
ral gas supply and fear of market power abuse
among vertically integrated companies. This
debate culminated in the Phillips Decision, which
established full wellhead price control by
extending the powers of the FPC to “the rates of
all wholesales of natural gas in interstate com-
merce, whether by a pipeline company or not and
whether occurring before, during, or after trans-
mission by an interstate pipeline company.”
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the FPC
struggled to find a satisfactory methodology for
setting wellhead rates. Following the Phillips
Decision, the FPC initially aimed to establish a
cost-of-service rate for wellhead natural gas for
each producer. It was administratively challeng-
ing and a large backlog developed, complicated
by the wide variety of producers, contract types
and cases. In 1960, the FPC adopted an averaged
approach based on a regional pricing strategy,
setting provisional price ceilings based on the
average costs of exploration and development in
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24 producing regions. There were many hurdles,
including a wide variety of production cost pro-
files within the established regions, and as a
result the process was protracted and it was not
until eight years later, in 1968, that the first
permanent price was established.
This approach to setting prices led to signifi-
cant natural gas shortages in the 1970s. Rising
energy prices, particularly during the oil crisis,
led to increased demand for comparatively
inexpensive natural gas. Unfortunately, as a
result of wellhead price regulation, there was no
incentive to invest in exploration and production
and, as a result, the supply response was very
limited. Significant shortages prevailed by the
mid-1970s, and often supply was curtailed for
some customers and new customers were refused
connections. The Southern states were the
exception to these shortages: consumers in these
natural gas-producing states remained able to
source the natural gas they wanted because these
intrastate markets were not subject to interstate
wellhead price controls.
2. Market liberalisation
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 sought to
improve the functioning of natural gas markets
by phasing out price controls and establishing a
new natural gas market regulator, FERC. The
United States had found itself vulnerable to the
oil crisis, partly because of the way it regulated
upstream wellhead and interstate pipeline prices
of natural gas. The new act sought to increase
security of supply by improving incentives to
invest in indigenous natural gas production. It
also aimed to establish a single national natural
gas market, with producers allowed to choose
their own wellhead prices. Producer market
power would be addressed through competition
within this new single market.
The act also established a complex transitional
system of escalating wellhead price ceilings
across more than 30 categories of “old” and
“new” natural gas. To encourage new supply, but
prevent producers of already-committed natural
gas from benefiting from increasing prices, the
act established higher initial price ceilings and an
accelerated schedule of wellhead price decontrol
for new contracted natural gas, which did not
apply to old natural gas supplies. The act
scheduled the full phase-out of all price controls
by the end of the century. But after just 10 years,
regulators reviewed the wisdom of market and
regulated prices coexisting for such a long per-
iod, and the Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
hastened the phase-out schedule, dictating that all
price ceilings were to be removed by January 1,
1993.
A single market required a single price, so the
differential inter- and intra-state pricing had to be
ended. The act replaced the FPC with FERC,
which was granted authority over interstate nat-
ural gas trade (see box “Overview of the US
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission”).
Overview of the United States Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
The US Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) was created under the
1977 Department of Energy Organization
Act as a government agency independent
from political party influence or affiliation,
other branches of government and industry
participants. It has a staff of about 1500
and an annual budget of $300 million. It is
governed by five commissioners, nomi-
nated by the president and confirmed by
the US Senate. Each commissioner serves
a five-year term, and no more than three
can come from the same political party.
The commission operates by majority rule.
In a testament to FERC’s independence,
the commission’s decisions are reviewed
by a court, rather than Congress or any
other branch of government, and private
discussions during case proceedings are
prohibited. In addition, there is a clear
distinction between FERC authority, com-
prising interstate business and infrastruc-
ture, and authority held by state
governments on intrastate business and
infrastructure.
FERC oversees electricity, hydro
power, oil and natural gas. Its activities
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centre on ensuring that companies with
natural monopolies do not misuse their
market positions, and its regulatory objec-
tives include:
• preventing discriminatory or preferen-
tial service;
• preventing inefficient investment and
unfair pricing;
• ensuring high-quality service;
• preventing wasteful duplication of
facilities;
• acting as a surrogate for competition
where competition does not or cannot
exist;
• promoting a secure, high-quality, envi-
ronmentally sound energy infrastruc-
ture through the use of consistent
policies;
• where possible, promoting the intro-
duction of well-functioning competitive
markets in place of traditional
regulation;
• protecting customers and market par-
ticipants through oversight of changing
energy markets, including mitigating
market power and ensuring fair and just
market outcomes for all participants.
The primary responsibilities of FERC in
the natural gas industry are regulating the
rates and services offered by interstate
pipeline companies, certifying and permit-
ting new pipeline construction and han-
dling some closely-related environmental
issues.
The 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act led to rising
prices, and an increase in long-term take-or-pay
contracts. This moved FERC to intervene in
1984 as market conditions drove natural gas
prices down, but left buyers paying high prices
under long-term contracts. Natural gas contracts
in the 1970s were typically multi-year purchas-
ing agreements with take-or-pay clauses obliging
buyers, including interstate pipelines and local
distribution companies, to pay for a contract
volume, whether or not they took the natural gas.
The contracted sales allowed upstream compa-
nies to recover their investments in exploration
and production and provided buyers with a hedge
against further expected price increases as a
result of shortages.
For a few years following passage of the act,
many contracts tied prices to the escalating reg-
ulated price ceilings. This became problematic in
the early 1980s, when natural gas demand and
petroleum market prices declined under prevail-
ing market conditions, diverging from the price
ceilings. As a result, some buyers were locked
into long-term contracts under which they were
paying prices far above spot market prices. In
1984, FERC Order 380 alleviated the burden of
take-or-pay contracts by eliminating minimum
bill obligations for local distribution companies.
The minimum bill represented the amount of
natural gas that had to be paid for whether or not
the natural gas itself was received. However,
although local distribution companies were
released from this requirement, pipeline compa-
nies remained locked into take-or-pay contracts
with natural gas producers.
In 1985, FERC moved to unbundle pipeline
and sales services with Order 436, introducing
voluntary third-party access to interstate pipe-
lines. This unbundling of transportation and sales
services enabled alternative sales arrangements to
the merchant package, or the sale of natural gas
plus its transportation, which had traditionally
been offered to local distribution companies. The
order provided incentives to interstate pipeline
companies to offer standalone transportation
services, in the form of blanket certificates that
allowed them to engage in new activities such as
opening new facilities without prior authorisation
from FERC. Third-party access to pipelines
remained voluntary and was to be offered on the
basis of negotiated rates. The order did not
address open access to other services, such as
storage facilities. The changes to voluntary
third-party access did not resolve the high cost of
take-or-pay contracts of the 1970s, which still
haunted pipeline companies. These were
addressed by FERC two years later, by Order
500, which allowed interstate pipeline companies
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to shift some of the take-or-pay liabilities to other
businesses in the value chain, leading to the
voluntary renegotiation of most remaining
liabilities.
FERC Order 636 of 1992, known as the
Restructuring Rule, marked the final stage of
natural gas market liberalisation, fully imple-
menting the third-party access regime. The order
required interstate pipeline companies to unbun-
dle their sales and transportation services,
ensuring that natural gas of other suppliers could
receive the same level of service as previously
enjoyed by the pipeline company’s own natural
gas sales. It diminished the market power of
pipeline companies and increased competition
among natural gas sellers.
The major provisions of Order 636 were:
• A requirement that interstate pipeline com-
panies provide open access to transportation
and storage services that are equal in quality,
regardless of whether the natural gas is pur-
chased from the pipeline company or else-
where. This included a provision for
companies to create an internal firewall to
prevent exchange of information between
marketing and transportation divisions. It also
included provisions for legal unbundling,
requiring companies operating pipelines,
storage and LNG facilities to restructure
production and marketing branches as
arm’s-length affiliates and cease all-merchant
services.
• Encouragement of market centres where
several pipeline systems interconnect,
including mileage-based rather than
fixed-tariff or “postage stamp” rate setting for
natural gas transportation.
• Establishment of a capacity release market in
transportation and storage, with a requirement
for pipeline companies to maintain electronic
bulletin boards to provide information about
availability of services on their systems.
• Redesign of regulated rates for pipeline
transportation, shifting all fixed-cost recovery
onto firm customers with a daily capacity
reservation and not onto interruptible cus-
tomers without a daily capacity reservation.
Variable costs were to be recovered through a
usage fee based on the natural gas trans-
ported. This was intended to eliminate any
distortions in purchasing behaviour in
response to the previous design, which allo-
cated certain fixed costs to the usage fee.
• Requirement for pipeline companies to offer
“no notice” firm transportation services to
local distribution companies, allowing cus-
tomers to receive natural gas on demand up to
their maximum contract level.
Order 636 represented a watershed moment in
US natural gas market development. It intro-
duced competition among natural gas suppliers
and greater efficiency in the use of natural gas
industry infrastructure. The industry restructuring
which began with voluntary third-party access
under Order 436 and led to mandatory unbund-
ling under Order 636 fundamentally changed
natural gas transportation rates and patterns.
According to the US EIA, the higher level of
flexibility and resulting increased competition
among natural gas suppliers “has contributed to
changes in regional production, transportation,
and consumption patterns, and to greater effi-
ciency in the use of the natural gas industry
infrastructure.”
As a result of the new regulatory regime,
entities purchasing at the wellhead can negotiate
for spot, short-term and long-term contracts at
various rates. The market can operate with firm
and interruptible delivery of spot natural gas on a
contract-by-contract basis rather on the previ-
ously prevailing long-term contract obligations.
The electronic bulletin boards facilitate offers and
bids for natural gas and for pipeline space.
Marketers and brokers trading on spot and
futures markets collectively clear the market,
with higher prices leading to increased wellhead
and pipeline capacity supply.
3. The impact of market liberalisation
Liberalisation of the US natural gas market
has created a system with unique characteristics.
In the upstream market, regulation of explo-
ration and production is mostly within the
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jurisdiction of states, and therefore highly
diverse. At the end of 2013, the United States
had 9.3 trillion m3 of proved natural gas
reserves, and a wide range of state regulatory
provisions covering licensing, ownership and
safety and the environment of exploration and
production across the country.
Key elements of upstream regulation in the
United States are:
• Ownership of resources resides with owner-
ship of land. In the United States, land is
mostly owned by private entities. Onshore
and offshore resources owned by the federal
government are governed by the Department
of the Interior and the EPA, which control
and administer leases, revenues, land use
planning and environmental standards.
• States generally have regulatory commissions
that deal with all aspects of the energy value
chain within the state. Development of pri-
vately owned and federal resources needs to
comply with state regulations on safety and
the environment to ensure that resource
development is safe and environmentally
responsible and therefore in the public
interest.
• Exploration and production rights for federal
resources are auctioned to private entities on
an open and competitive basis once land use
planning has been determined. Prospective
lease holders bid for exploration and pro-
duction rights. They pay an initial bonus, and
then rent for the right to develop the resour-
ces. Leases are valid for 10 years or as long
as there is at least one producing well.
In terms of regulation of midstream assets,
FERC has continued to refine the regulatory
framework since 1992 to promote market effi-
ciency and increased levels of competition.
Notable further improvements in setting rates and
regulating unbundling include:
• In 1999, FERC published a cost-of-service
manual, listing transparent guidelines for
FERC’s determination of allowable project
cost recovery by pipeline companies on the
basis of a reasonable rate of return, operating
and maintenance costs, depreciation charges
and tax recovery mechanisms. This rate of
return regulation is a general model for the
treatment of natural monopoly utilities,
including pipelines.
• The 2000 FERC Order 637 refined and
updated pipeline transport regulations relating
to rates, including the suspension of price
caps on capacity release sales of less than one
year, to achieve a greater transparency and
efficiency in the use of pipeline services.
• FERC’s Hackberry Decision of 2002 estab-
lished that LNG import terminals would be
exempt from open access requirements to
encourage more LNG site development. It
allowed the owner of the Hackberry LNG
terminal to agree to terms of use with its
affiliates rather than under regulated
cost-of-service rates. This effectively defined
LNG terminals as an upstream supply source,
part of the competitive sector, rather than part
of the natural monopoly transportation chain,
with individual project approval depending
on FERC assessment of the general need for
the project as well as its economic and envi-
ronmental impacts.
• The 2003 FERC Order 2004 introduced new
functional unbundling regimes applicable to
both electricity and natural gas industries,
requiring that marketing, transmission and
affiliated energy employees of electricity and
natural gas companies function indepen-
dently. The order established the Office for
Market Oversight and Investigations to
monitor the implementation of functional
unbundling, which has since been absorbed
into FERC’s Office of Enforcement.
• The 2008 FERC Order 717 further reinforced
functional unbundling. It included specific
provisions for the physical separation of
facilities and staff, for example the separation
of occupational functions, which meant that
employees can be responsible for work on
marketing or on transport, but not both.
Downstream policy is generally subject to
local regulations, and remains inconsistent across
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states. For example, intrastate natural gas com-
merce is subject to state regulation, and retail
unbundling is at the discretion of the state regu-
lator. Only four jurisdictions—New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Washington, DC—have
unbundled retail markets. Unbundling is deliv-
ered by means of natural gas residential choice
programmes in these four jurisdictions. The res-
idential choice programmes allow consumers to
purchase the components of natural gas supply
separately, rather than relying on the bundled
products offered by a single local distribution
company.
The regulatory framework has ensured that
pipeline companies transport natural gas, but no
longer buy and sell it, so they cannot abuse
market power based on the natural monopoly
characteristics of pipeline infrastructure. This has
enabled the construction of 305,000 miles of
transmission pipelines and the establishment of a
high number of competing market participants.
The US interstate and intrastate transmission
network comprised more than 210 separate
pipeline systems (Fig. 18.5). This system is
supported by ancillary infrastructure, including
1400 compressor stations, 24 hubs or market
centres, 400 underground storage facilities, 49
pipeline import and export locations, eight LNG
import facilities, and 100 LNG peaking facilities.
This has also enabled competitive markets in the
upstream and downstream segments. It has led to
6300 natural gas producers producing from more
than 480,000 wells, including 21 companies
considered major producers. There are 160 dif-
ferent pipeline companies, 123 storage operators
and 1200 local natural gas distribution
companies.
The liberalisation process, particularly the
1992 FERC Order 636, created the conditions for
the rapid growth of natural gas trade through
market centres such as Henry Hub as pipeline
infrastructure improved and competition
increased. Henry Hub, a physical trading hub in
south Louisiana, has emerged as the most
prominent market centre, with spot and future




Fig. 18.5 US natural gas transmission pipelines. Note Data for 2009. About two thirds of the length is interstate
transmission pipelines. Source US EIA
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pricing rather than oil indexing. It was estab-
lished by Sabine Pipe Line LLC, a subsidiary of
Chevron, in 1989. In 1990, the NYMEX selected
Henry Hub as the basis of its natural gas con-
tracts because of its central location and liquidity.
Henry Hub now sets the benchmark price for the
entire North American trading area. It has
emerged as the most liquid natural gas market in
the world, trading more than 100,000 natural gas
contracts a day, compared to 918 contracts on its
first trading day. The scope of NYMEX futures
contracts has extended from terms of up to three
years in 1997 to up to 10 years at present.
Other hubs have emerged since, such as Opal
in Wyoming, where price differentials compared
to Henry Hub are determined by regional dis-
parities in production and transport costs. The
arbitrage opportunities between regional hub
prices drive investment in pipeline capacity.
Notably, the recent shale natural gas boom has
led to trade volumes shifting to hubs that are
closer to shale natural gas fields, such as the
Dominion South hub, a key supply point in the
Marcellus shale in southwest Pennsylvania. This
could result in a fundamental shift of the main
price reference point in the United States away
from Henry Hub.
The liberalised regulatory framework has
enabled the market to transmit economic signals,
and encouraged the rapid expansion of shale
natural gas production once extraction technol-
ogy became competitive. On the supply side,
price signals led to a surge in shale natural gas
production since the mid-2000s. Once drilling
and hydraulic fracturing technologies were
cost-effective, many firms adopted the technol-
ogy and secured acreage. Economic growth and
price hikes of substitute fuels led to rising natural
gas prices in the 2000s and, in response, heavy
investment in shale natural gas drilling by
incumbents and new entrants alike. On the
demand side, market liberalisation coincided
with increasing levels of natural gas consumption
throughout the economy (Fig. 18.6). The
increase was greatest in electricity generation,
where natural gas competes directly with




















































































Fig. 18.6 US natural gas consumption before, during and after the period of market liberalisation. Note Excludes
transport, non-energy use, energy industry own use and losses; non-power transformation includes CHP and natural gas
to liquids plants; other includes the services, agriculture and fishing sectors. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA
data
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alternative fuel inputs, especially coal, but also
nuclear and renewables. Increased shale natural
gas supply and falling natural gas prices led to a
rapid increase in natural gas use for electricity in
the last decade.
4. Ancillary policies
The natural gas market has not only benefited
from the regulatory framework directly govern-
ing it, but also from ancillary intervention,
including research and development subsidies
and environmental policy.
On the supply side, various research and
development programmes related to unconven-
tional natural gas were set up by the US Energy
Research and Development Administration in the
1970s and continued by the Department of
Energy. These have been important for shale
natural gas development. Other research and
development programmes, such as those centred
on microseismic fracture monitoring, have also
contributed to shale natural gas development.
Fiscal incentives including tax credits for the
production of unconventional fuels under the
Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980
further enhanced the financial viability of shale
natural gas extraction.
On the demand side, the competitiveness of
natural gas compared to substitute fuels—mainly
coal—is a key driver. Emission standards, such
as those imposed under the Clean Air Act
Amendments (“CAAA”) of 1990, improved the
competitiveness of natural gas relative to coal.
With effect from 1995, 110 power plants were
required to surrender CAAA emissions allow-
ances. The programme was extended in 2000.
More recently, in June 2014, the EPA proposed a
new plan to cut carbon emissions from power
plants, which is likely to further improve the
competitiveness of gas.
18.3.2 Case Study 2: Europe
Liberalisation of the natural gas market in the
European Union began as part of the creation of
an internal energy market with the First Gas
Directive in 1998. Regulatory efforts in the
European Union have evolved over decades,
passing through various milestones (see
Fig. 18.7).
In 1988, the European Union articulated the
goal of creating an internal energy market. It then
took a decade for the European Commission
(EC) to draft legislation that was acceptable to
member states. The First Gas Directive passed by
the European Parliament in 1998 included
requirements for third-party access and unbund-
ling, although these provisions had been much
diluted in negotiations during the preceding
decade. The Second Gas Directive, adopted in
2003 and complemented by further regulation in
2005, focused on implementation of third-party
access and unbundling provisions introduced in
the First Gas Directive. This was achieved
through strengthening market oversight across all
member states, allowing market authorities to
establish cost-of-service tariffs for monopolistic
infrastructure, and other mandates. The Third
Gas Directive, commonly known as the Third
Package, was passed in 2009 and focused on
incentivising infrastructure development, pro-
viding for stricter unbundling, network planning
and supply security. Despite the provisions of the
Third Package, the European natural gas market
—apart from the United Kingdom market—is
not yet fully liberalised.
1. Before market liberalisation
Similar to the US experience, before liberali-
sation most EU member states had blanket reg-
ulatory regimes that treated the entire natural gas
value chain as a natural monopoly. The natural
gas industry structure in each country was similar
across the bloc, with the upstream segment of the
value chain often dominated by one or a few
state-owned, vertically integrated natural gas
companies engaged in exploration and produc-
tion as well as transportation and sales. The
downstream segment was dominated by local
distribution companies, which controlled distri-
bution and retail monopolies.
As state-owned enterprises, these vertically
integrated national natural gas companies had
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little incentive to improve the efficiency of their
operations, which led to increases in natural gas
prices. Natural gas markets were governed by
national law and were generally exempt from EU
competition law, which granted special status to
public natural gas companies on the basis that
application of competition rules might obstruct
the supply of natural gas. The national laws
governing public natural gas companies within
member states were generally based on similar
principles, including exclusive rights to build and
operate networks, prohibition of entry, vertically
integrated operations, compensation on the basis
of historical costs and a high degree of central
planning.
2. Establishing energy policy objectives
The EC established the creation of an internal
energy market as a policy goal in 1988. The
internal market is a foundational principle of the
EU, codified in the 1986 Single European Act,
and aims to facilitate the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital, with com-
petitive markets in all sectors. Although not
explicitly part of the Single European Act, a
competitive energy sector was deemed a pivotal
element in a well-functioning internal market: a
competitive energy sector, and the associated
energy cost reductions, contributes directly to
improved competitiveness of European



























































































































Fig. 18.7 Phases, development and key regulations in the establishment of a liberalised natural gas market in Europe,
1971–2013. Note Nominal natural gas prices paid at border, national currency converted to average GDP purchasing
power parity; the average German import price and United Kingdom NBP prices have followed similar paths, apart
from a more pronounced drop in the United Kingdom price as a result of the 2008–09 economic recession; TPA
Third-party access. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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industries. This position was elaborated in a 1988
EC green paper, The Internal Energy Market,
which set out procedures for the creation of an
internal energy market, including harmonisation
of rules and technical norms, the opening up of
public procurement markets and the removal of
fiscal barriers.
The EC then set out to develop several
directives3 targeting a common carrier system,
under which consumers could purchase natural
gas from any supplier, regardless of the owner-
ship of pipeline infrastructure. However, the
directives faced strong opposition in the Council
of Ministers, and the EC had to change its
approach to a more staged, bottom-up approach.
Complex negotiations ensued, and in 1993 the
European Parliament took an active role in
finding a compromise that was acceptable to both
the EC and the Council. The development of the
first Electricity Directive was given priority over
a directive covering natural gas. The Electricity
Directive was adopted in 1996, with provisions
for electricity market liberalisation.
3. The beginning of market liberalisation
The First Gas Directive was adopted in 1998.
It established a framework for liberalisation for
member states, with provisions for third-party
access and account unbundling. The directive
sought to create a single internal market for
natural gas in the European Union, but was a
significantly diluted version of the initial EC
proposals for a common carrier system. Member
states were left free to choose their preferred pace
and regulatory measures for natural gas market
liberalisation.
The directive required owners of natural
monopoly infrastructure, including transmission
networks, storage and LNG facilities, to provide
open access to third parties. However, member
states could still choose between negotiated and
regulated third-party access.4 Vertically inte-
grated companies were required to separate the
accounts of natural monopoly infrastructure and
sales businesses, but not necessarily to realise
full functional unbundling. The directive further
provided that power generators and end users
consuming more than 25 million m3 of natural
gas a year should be able to choose their
suppliers.
The concessions made for political reasons in
the First Gas Directive hindered the opening of
natural gas markets. The Madrid Forum, an
annual meeting of natural gas market stakehold-
ers, was established in 1999 with a remit to
identify further harmonisation needs. With 9 out
of 15 member states planning to open their nat-
ural gas markets fully by 2008, the EC moved to
adopt the Second Gas Directive in 2003 and
complementary regulations in 2005, establishing
requirements for cost-of-service calculations and
market oversight by regulatory authorities to
expedite the creation of an internal energy mar-
ket. This time, a new electricity sector directive
was adopted alongside the Gas Directive.
The main provisions of the Second Gas
Directive were:
• Stronger unbundling: Mandatory functional
and legal unbundling for the transportation
and distribution sectors and voluntary func-
tional and legal unbundling for storage and
LNG facilities, to address issues associated
with lenient account unbundling in the First
Gas Directive and sluggish development of
the third-party access regime.
• Stronger third-party access: A right of third
parties to non-discriminatory access to net-
works and LNG facilities, with the aim of
enabling new suppliers to enter the market
and providing consumers with a range of
suppliers to choose from.
3EU directives have to be transposed into national law
whereas EU regulations apply directly to market partic-
ipants. Both types of EU law—directives and regulations
—govern the natural gas market.
4Under negotiated access, network operators are free to
negotiate terms of network use in good faith with
prospective users. The main commercial conditions of
these agreements must be published ex-ante. In contrast,
under regulated access the commercial conditions of
access are determined by the regulator.
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• National regulatory authorities: Mandatory
establishment of regulatory authorities in all
member states, with responsibility for com-
pliance with non-discriminatory network
access principles, ensuring appropriate levels
of transparency and competition, setting tar-
iffs and the methodology for calculating them,
and settlement of disputes. Establishment of
the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy
Regulators, which co-ordinates the imple-
mentation of Gas Directive provisions by
national regulators.
• Principles of network tariff calculation:
The establishment of the principles of tariff
calculation for natural monopoly networks.
These principles should allow pipeline trans-
mission companies to recover costs and
receive a return on investments while at the
same time providing incentives to maintain
existing infrastructure and construct new
infrastructure.
• Exemptions for new infrastructure: An
exemption for interconnectors, LNG and
storage facilities from third-party access
requirements and cost regulation, subject to
various conditions, in order to reduce and
mitigate risks associated with new infras-
tructure build.
4. The Third Package
The 2009 Gas Directive, known as the Third
Package, further developed unbundling and
open-access arrangements. It sought to create a
competitive, secure and environmentally sus-
tainable market in natural gas. To achieve these
goals, the Third Package offered member states a
choice between ownership unbundling on the
one hand and setting up an independent system
operator (ISO) or becoming an independent
transmission operator (ITO) on the other.
The ISO and ITO models are essentially less
stringent forms of unbundling. Unlike ownership
unbundling, setting up an ISO or ITO would let
the transmission network remain under the
ownership of vertically integrated firms. Under
an ISO model, the transmission networks remain
under the ownership of vertically integrated
energy companies, but an ISO would be
responsible for operation and control of
day-to-day business. Investment decisions would
be jointly made by the ISO and the owner of the
infrastructure. Under an ITO model, vertically
integrated energy companies retain ownership of
their transmission networks. The ITO would be a
legally independent joint stock subsidiary oper-
ating under its own brand name, with strictly
autonomous management and under stringent
regulatory control. Investment decisions would
be made jointly by the parent company and the
regulatory authority.
The directive recommended ownership
unbundling as “the most effective tool by which
to promote investments in infrastructure in a
non-discriminatory way, fair access to the net-
work for new entrants, and transparency in the
market”. Nonetheless, it also stated that setting
up an ISO or ITO that is independent from
supply and production interests should enable a
vertically integrated company to maintain own-
ership of network assets while ensuring an
effective separation of interest. The Third Pack-
age thereby implied that there is more than one
way to achieve the necessary alignment of
incentives along the gas value chain to deliver
gas at least cost while still maintaining
investment.
In addition, the Third Package further
strengthened the independence of regulators from
private or public interests to achieve equally
effective regulatory supervision across member
states. It set out various roles and responsibilities
for regulatory authorities, including setting tar-
iffs, ensuring that tariffs are non-discriminatory
and cost-reflective, and issuing binding decisions
and penalties in relation to natural gas
undertakings.
Finally, the Third Package and complemen-
tary regulations focused on providing incentives
for investment in natural gas infrastructure and
ensuring security of supply. The Third Package
upheld the exemption from third-party access
requirements and cost regulation in the Second
Gas Directive for particularly risky new infras-
tructure, such as cross-border pipelines and LNG
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terminals. It also introduced new requirements
for long-term infrastructure planning, in terms of
10-year network development plans to be
developed by transmission network owners and
operators. These plans are to be developed at the
national as well as European level. National-level
plans are binding, and investments by indepen-
dent transmission operators over a three-year
horizon can be enforced by national regulators.
The package also allowed member states to
impose public service obligations on entities
operating in the natural gas sector, mainly in the
areas of security of supply, regularity and quality
of service, price, environmental protection and
energy efficiency. These entities can refuse
access to their systems if it compromises their
ability to meet these obligations.
In 2010, EU regulations further strengthened
security of supply considerations within the
context of the internal market. The aim of these
regulations was to ensure trade and supply even
under extreme and emergency conditions. The
regulations put emphasis on infrastructure
development to increase internal natural gas
flows and external LNG imports. They provided
for increased co-operation among member states,
introduced supply obligations for companies and
established minimum supply and infrastructure
standards.
The European Union gas directives weakened
state ownership rights in the natural gas value
chain, especially in terms of wholesale and retail,
as well as promoting transnational pipeline
development. Even though the European Union’s
natural gas is in the process of being liberalised,
and some countries such as The Netherlands and
the United Kingdom have already privatised the
natural gas wholesale business, nonetheless the
majority of infrastructure is still in the hands of
the state so as to ensure undifferentiated treat-
ment of third-party access. In contrast to this are
the independent company operations by natural
gas shippers in The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. In France and other countries, natural
gas transmission is operated by vertically unified
company subsidiaries, and natural gas transmis-
sion companies are very active among the
transnational pipelines.
The relationship between the distribution and
retail business is becoming increasingly slack.
With regard to transmission, the British distri-
bution network is operated by independent
companies, while France’s is operated by verti-
cally unified company subsidiaries. Vertically
unified companies were traditionally the compa-
nies building and controlling reserve capabilities,
but after market liberalisation took its first steps,
all private entities within Europe began devel-
oping underground reserve equipment. In addi-
tion, Europe’s various merchants have begun
developing LNG facilities.
At the same time, the European Union’s nat-
ural gas market liberalisation and natural gas
infrastructure planning has been extended,
resulting in higher natural gas prices and reduced
natural gas consumption volumes. Through
strong natural gas network development and the
expansion of transmission infrastructure mea-
sures and plans, the European Union has stimu-
lated increases in trade with neighbouring
regions, as well as the construction of transna-
tional pipelines and LNG terminals.
5. The impact of market liberalisation
Since the 1970s, the European Union’s natural
gas consumption volumes have grown fivefold.
However, in the first 10 years of the 21st century,
growth stagnated (Fig. 18.8). The recent drop-off
in gas consumption has been as a result of the
recession and subsequent low economic growth
rates, increasing competition from coal and
renewables in power generation, particularly
linked to EU climate policies, rising natural gas
prices since the onset of liberalisation, and
diversion of LNG shipments to Asia as demand
rose following the Fukushima disaster.
The European Union has a well-developed
natural gas network, with plans to expand the
transmission infrastructure to ease increased
trade with neighbouring regions, including
cross-border pipelines and LNG import terminals
(Fig. 18.8). The EC natural gas directives have
led to reduced public ownership within the nat-
ural gas value chain, particularly at the wholesale
and retail levels, and increased cross-border
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pipeline development. The European Union has
good natural gas networks, and plans to further
expand its gas transmission network to promote
natural gas trade development with regions sur-
rounding the European Union. This includes
cross-border pipelines and LNG import terminals
(see Fig. 18.9). The natural gas directives issued
by the European Union have reduced the pro-
portion of state-owned assets in the natural gas
industry, especially in the wholesale and retail
segments, which has greatly accelerated the
development speed of transnational pipelines.
As the European Union’s largest natural gas
producers, Norway and The Netherlands com-
plemented the liberalisation and increased access
to midstream infrastructure with upstream poli-
cies to increase competition. At the end of 2013,
Norway had confirmed natural gas reserves of
2 trillion m3, while The Netherlands had
900 billion m3.
Norway developed its reserves by mandating
a 50% stake for publicly owned Statoil in each
exploration and production licence. The part-
nership arrangement enabled Statoil to acquire
exploration and production capabilities to com-
plement its operational capabilities. Statoil was
partly privatised in 2001, and the partnerships
transferred to Norway through a new
state-owned company, Norway Oil and Gas
Revenue Management Company. In 2003, Nor-
way began a series of licensing rounds for new
producing areas and further exploration in mature
areas on its continental shelf. This has introduced
a new set of players to the upstream exploration
and production segment.
The Netherlands developed its large Gronin-
gen natural gas field through a 50:50
public-private partnership. The state expected this
ownership structure to lead to rapid development
of the reserves, while maximising the benefits to
society. The partnership was based on netback
pricing, with natural gas prices regulated at 65–
85% of the price of a basket of fuel oils. This
arrangement provided a steady income stream to
encourage new entrants and greater investment in
upstream exploration and production, while also
ensuring that the investments were competitive
compared to alternative fuel sources.
















































































































Fig. 18.8 European Union natural gas consumption volume and structure. Notes Excludes transport, non-energy use,
energy industry own use and losses; non-power transformation includes CHP and natural gas to liquids plants; other
includes the services, agriculture and fishing sectors. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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6. Ancillary policies
To achieve the energy trilemma goals of
energy affordability, security and sustainability at
the same time as employing liberalised energy
markets, Europe has a relatively well-developed
set of climate and environmental policies.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, in 1997 the Euro-
pean Union-155 committed to reducing green-
house gas emissions by 8% by 2008–2012 from
1990 levels. (Actual reductions were between 12
and 15%.) Since then, it has since adopted a 20%
reduction target by 2020 and a 40% target for
2030. In addition, wider environmental policies,
such as European clean air policies, have played
a significant role in shaping the energy mix in the
power sector. The recently proposed air policy
package sets ambitious air quality objectives for
2030.
However, the design and implementation of
climate policies interacts with electricity markets,
affecting the outlook for gas-powered generation.
While ambitious policies on climate change and
air quality favour gas over coal in electricity
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Fig. 18.9 European Union transnational pipelines and LNG terminal distribution. Source Euronatural gas
5In 2004, prior to the eastern expansion, the European
Union had 15 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
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generation, the design of these policies could
produce some unintended consequences. For
example, by setting a separate 2020 target for
renewable energy, the EU Renewable Energy
Directive has dampened wholesale energy prices,
since the marginal cost of renewables has been
low, and even negatives at times. This has, in
turn, reduced incentives to invest in back-up
fossil fuel capacity, which is needed to com-
pensate for the potential of intermittent supply
from renewable energy sources. Moreover, flaws
in the design and implementation of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme, the European
Union’s primary mechanism for meeting its
greenhouse gas emissions target, combined with
recent weak economic conditions and the rela-
tively low price of coal, has led to the “energy
paradox”: a shift of the energy mix towards coal
and renewables at the expense of natural gas.
These unintended interactions between energy
market and climate policies have undermined the
profitability of power suppliers and destabilised
their business models. The problem is illustrated
by the challenges faced by companies like E.ON
and RWE in Germany, whose marginal cost
pricing-based business model has been put at risk
as subsidised and distributed sources of renew-
able energy of significant size enter the energy
mix. Going forward, Europe renewables are
likely to remain a significant part of the energy
mix to 2030 if Europe is to meet its climate
policy ambitions, and electricity market regula-
tion will need to evolve alongside climate poli-
cies. In turn, this will have knock-on impacts for
natural gas demand and markets.
18.3.3 Case Study 3: United Kingdom
From 1986 to 2002, the United Kingdom
implemented natural gas market liberalisation,
contributing to the “dash for gas” in the power
sector in the 1990s. The process comprised three
distinct phases: pre-liberalisation, liberalisation
and post-liberalisation (Fig. 18.10).
The UK natural gas market took off in the late
1960s, when domestic coal gas started to be
replaced by natural gas from North Sea basins.
At that time, the newly formed Conservative
government had just come to power and was
facing a weakened economy in 1979. They for-
mulated policies to privatise state-owned indus-
tries, using this approach to promote investment
without requiring actual financial support from
the government. By selling assets, the revenues
could be used to prop up government finances, to
invigorate business and to weaken the influence
of unions.
In the 1980s during the asset sales, the first set
of sales included a vertically unified company—
British Gas. After the implementation of the Gas
Act 1986, British Gas began a process of pri-
vatisation, opening access to its pipelines for its
competitors, and establishing a natural gas reg-
ulator, Ofgas. With the new third-party access
agreements, the privatised British Gas was forced
to abandon a portion of the content of its existing
natural gas supply contracts, unbundling the
company’s business to independent subsidiaries
and providing space for entry into the market by
competitors. The Gas Act 1995 made further
progress by promoting retail competition. In
1996, the Network Code was implemented,
fine-tuning third-party access rules while build-
ing a system for managing daily settlements and
national balancing points. In 2002, the newly
established settlement mechanisms entered their
final stage. In that same year, British Gas sold its
transmission business to achieve complete own-
ership rights spinoff. As an independent British
transmission operator, Britain’s National Grid
established a national gas transmission network.
Following market liberalisation, because of
excessive exploration in the North Sea natural
gas fields, domestic natural gas production vol-
umes in Britain declined. Further changes after
market liberalisation primarily consisted of
alterations to the terms of third-party access,
improved settlement agreement efficiency and
improved supply security.
1. Before market liberalisation
In the 1970s, as natural gas supplies continued
to increase, the United Kingdom established a
state-owned natural gas company. In the late
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1960s, self-produced North Sea Basin natural gas
gradually replaced domestic coal gas, and the
United Kingdom’s natural gas market began to
flourish. The Gas Act of 1972 merged the 12
existing area natural gas boards and the Gas
Council to create the British Gas Corporation.
British Gas was the sole buyer of natural gas
produced in and around the United Kingdom. It
also held a statutory monopoly on the supply of
natural gas to end users. The company relied on
flexibility in its long-term natural gas purchasing
contracts to provide reliable balancing of input
and output volumes on its network. Natural gas
purchase prices varied greatly as British Gas
negotiated individual contracts with producers.
Downstream pricing was based on the weighted
average cost of these natural gas purchase prices,
a margin to cover transportation and distribution
costs, and a profit margin.
In the 1970s, in face of high inflation and
unemployment rates, the United Kingdom
applied for loan financing from the International
Monetary Fund. Poor labour relations and rising
oil prices led to the Winter of Discontent in
1978–79, a period of widespread strikes. Mar-
garet Thatcher was elected prime minister of a
new Conservative government in 1979. She
immediately faced difficulty funding the nation-
alised energy sectors, which needed to invest to
secure supply. The government developed plans
for the privatisation of the nationalised indus-
tries, to generate income and enable new
investment by the new private entities. At the
time, privatisation was not driven so much by a
desire to increase competition as by the imme-
diate challenge of government finances that
could not support the necessary investments in
energy infrastructure.
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Fig. 18.10 Phases, development and key regulations in the development of the British natural gas market. Note
Nominal natural gas prices paid at power plant, national currency converted to average GDP purchasing power parity.
Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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A first move towards privatisation of the
natural gas sector was made with the Oil and Gas
(Enterprise) Act of 1982, which removed British
Gas’s statutory right of first refusal on purchases
of upstream natural gas. This effectively opened
the market to third parties, although in reality it
remained challenging for new entrants to pur-
chase, transport and eventually sell natural gas.
2. Market liberalisation
The Gas Act 1986 introduced real competition
by sanctioning the privatisation of British Gas
and requiring third-party access to transmission
and distribution networks. The privatisation of
the British Gas Corporation led to the formation
of the similarly named British Gas Plc, and the
new entity lost its monopoly to supply the largest
customers: those using more than 25,000 therms
(around 730 MWh) of natural gas a year. The act
also obliged the newly incarnated British Gas to
grant third-party access to its pipeline infras-
tructure. Finally, the act established the first
natural gas regulator, the Office of Gas Supply or
Ofgas.
Competition was slow to develop under the
new arrangements. In 1988, a Monopolies and
Mergers Commission inquiry found that British
Gas’s practices were anti-competitive and that
price discrimination prevailed. This led to the
recommendation that company be barred from
purchasing more than 90% of new natural gas on
the market. The company was also instructed to
publish prices charged to industrial and com-
mercial customers. The government viewed the
initial stages of natural gas market liberalisation
to be a political success, and used it as a template
for the power sector privatisation that followed in
1989 and 1990.
Competition in the natural gas sector was
subject to close government scrutiny in subse-
quent years, leading to British Gas being asked in
1992 to further reduce its market share to 40% of
the natural gas market by 1995. The threshold for
British Gas’s large consumer supply monopoly
was further reduced to 2500 therms. British Gas
also undertook to release some of its natural gas
under existing contracts by selling it to other
suppliers. Further inquiry into the company by
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in
1993 resulted in the recommendation that British
Gas unbundle its divisions into separate sub-
sidiaries. This took place in 1994. It led to the
creation of Transco, which had responsibility for
transport and storage.
The Gas Act 1995 started a phased introduc-
tion of full competition in the natural gas market,
including retail competition, which established
complete supplier choice in the market. The act
established a new licensing system for desig-
nated pipeline operators, wholesale companies or
shippers, and retail companies. As a result, Bri-
tish Gas lost its majority market position. In
October 1990, British Gas controlled all of
small-firm supply and 93% of large-firm supply,
but by June 1996 these had shrunk to 43% of
small-firm supply and 19% of large-firm supply.
The 1996 Network Code established the rules
and procedures for third-party access to pipelines
and introduced a regime for daily balancing.
Transco gained responsibility for securing the
physical balance of the system, capacity plan-
ning, the forecasting of demand and distribution
arrangements, and the overall operation of the
system. The code also created the NBP as a
virtual location where the transmission system
operator could balance the system on a daily
basis. The NBP quickly became the United
Kingdom’s most liquid natural gas transmission
system, and was adopted by traders for nomi-
nating their buys and sells on a standardised
basis. This was followed by the introduction of
natural gas trading arrangements in 1996, which
simplified natural gas trading procedures. Further
significant reforms in 1999 introduced an
on-the-day commodity market to help with bal-
ancing and to incentivise to Transco to minimise
overall balancing costs. In 1998, an intercon-
nector pipeline between Belgium and the United
Kingdom was opened, for the first time allowing
natural gas to flow between grids in Britain and
continental Europe.
British Gas was restructured several times. In
2000, it broke up into two companies: BG
Group, holding upstream assets, and Centrica,
encompassing a mixture of upstream and
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downstream assets. Transco was sold to National
Grid in 2002. These combined businesses make
up the United Kingdom’s independent transmis-
sion system owner and operator for natural gas
and electricity markets (Fig. 18.11). In addition,
National Grid owns and operates four distribu-
tion networks, as well as the Grain LNG import
terminal and the Avonmouth LNG storage
facility.
3. After market liberalisation
The end of the liberalisation phase in 2002
was marked by full unbundling of the natural gas
business. It also signalled the successful transi-
tion to competitive and liquid wholesale markets:
daily balancing by shippers, with penalties for
out-of-balance portfolios, and a role for the
transmission system operator to maintain safe
balance in the transmission system. In 2005, the
Uniform Network Code replaced the Network
Code, adding clarity and detail to enable shippers
and the transmission system operator to balance
more effectively. This included identifying types
of capacity held along the natural gas value chain
and obliging owners of that capacity to provide
stock data to the transmission system operator.

























Fig. 18.11 National Grid completely owned and operated British transmission networks. Source National Grid
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updated and amended over time to improve
practices and ensure the safe and efficient func-
tioning of the United Kingdom’s natural gas
supply.
More recently, security of natural gas supply
has emerged as a key priority in the United
Kingdom. This is governed by several additional
codes, including:
• the Fuel Security Code (2007), which grants
the Department of Energy and Climate
Change the option to instruct power stations
to use alternative fuels;
• the National Emergency Plan for Gas and
Electricity, which sets out the response to
emergency situations—such as supply defi-
cits, storage safety breaches, transportation
constraints and the loss of supply to more
than 50,000 customers—and describes the
roles and responsibilities of market partici-
pants; and
• the Transmission Network Planning Code,
which is maintained by the National Grid and
identifies weaknesses in the UK natural gas
transportation system, based on long-term
demand and supply forecasts. The code
requires a security margin to cover uncer-
tainties in forecasts and a design margin for
maximum demand, subject to approval to the
regulator.
4. The impact of market liberalisation
The liberalisation of the UK natural gas
market triggered the “dash for gas” in power
generation during the 1990s (Fig. 18.12). The
power sector had access to new combined-cycle
natural gas turbine technology, which was rela-
tively quick to build. The liberalisation of the
natural gas and electricity sectors, along with
abundant supply and a lifting of the ban on use of
natural gas for power generation, drove a rapid
rise in gas consumption as the number of
combined-cycle turbines used by power genera-
tors increased. The decline in natural gas use in
power generation in recent years has been the
result market forces which have made natural gas
less competitive compared to coal.























































































Fig. 18.12 UK natural gas consumption by sector, 1960–2012. Note Excludes transport, non-energy use, energy
industry own use and losses; non-power transformation includes CHP and natural gas to liquids plants; other includes
the services, agriculture and fishing sectors. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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Upstream regulation in the United Kingdom is
based on principles of transparency and open
access. The United Kingdom had 200 billion m3
of proven natural gas reserves at the end of 2013.
The Petroleum Act of 1998 sets out the rules
around upstream natural gas exploration and
production. Natural gas resources are owned by
the state, and the Secretary of State of the
Department of Energy and Climate Change is
responsible for granting licences for exploration
and production rights.
As exploration and production efforts on the
United Kingdom’s continental shelf have
become increasingly difficult, licensing tenures
have lengthened. The Department of Energy and
Climate Change assesses bids, focusing on pol-
icy objectives including environmental risk and
infrastructure quality. If the winner of a licence
does not keep up with the agreed work pro-
gramme or does not meet safety and environ-
mental standards, the department may revoke the
licence.
18.3.4 Case Study 4: Japan
Vertically integrated businesses delivered all
aspects of Japanese natural gas supply until lib-
eralisation began in 1995. The development of
Japan’s natural gas market has gone through
three distinct phases, with liberalisation still
incomplete (Fig. 18.13).
From 1954 to 1995, prior to Japan’s natural
gas market being liberalised, it was managed
through the 1954 “Natural Gas Business Law”.






































































































































Fig. 18.13 Phases, development and key regulations in the development of the Japanese natural gas market. Note
Nominal LNG cost, insurance and freight (CIF) import prices converted to US$. Source Vivid Economics, based on
IEA data and BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013
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monopolised by vertically unified entities.
Beginning in 1995, Japan’s government began to
implement natural gas sector market liberalisa-
tion gradually. Powerful opening up of user
rights systems in natural gas transmission,
including functional spin-off and outside access
of controls, permitted large clients to choose
suppliers. LNG infrastructure incorporated
negotiated third-party access systems.
In 2011, the Fukushima nuclear disaster had a
massive impact on Japan’s energy systems,
causing the re-nationalisation of the nation’s
major LNG importer, Tokyo Electric Power, in
2012. This marked the end of the Japanese
government’s liberalisation plans for the energy
market. However, in public debate, natural gas
market reforms are continually a focus, and the
government has been forced by this pressure to
add energy sector competition. After the rise in
oil prices due to the Fukushima disaster, because
demand grew, and LNG price fluctuations were
significant, the Japanese government was forced
to change policy to weaken controls on long-term
contracts linked to oil. The government has also
taken other measures weakening the influence of
oil markets on natural gas, including proposing
the construction in 2015 of a LNG futures mar-
ket. The futures market would determine natural
gas prices based on domestic demand factors.
1. Before market liberalisation
Prior to liberalisation, Japan’s natural gas
market was governed by the 1954 Gas Utility
Act. Under this act, the natural gas industry was
regulated as a vertically integrated monopoly.
Companies wishing to enter the natural gas
market needed licences from the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry. The vertically
integrated natural gas companies were responsi-
ble for importing LNG, and the city natural gas
companies were responsible for distribution.
Tokyo Gas, Osaka Gas and Toho Gas were major
vertically unified natural gas companies respon-
sible for the import of natural gas, operation of
LNG terminals, the storage of LNG, operating
natural gas transmission distribution networks, as
well as retail business. The smaller-scale city
natural gas companies also provided distribution
and retail services, reselling natural gas pur-
chased from the vertically integrated companies.
Power generators were allowed to import LNG
for their own use, including large users such as
Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) and Kansai
Electric Power.
2. Market liberalisation
The Japanese government gradually intro-
duced liberalisation in transmission, distribution
and LNG facilities beginning in 1995. Natural
gas prices in Japan have long been higher than
the average in OECD countries, and the Japanese
government sought to reduce prices by intro-
ducing competition, with open access to infras-
tructure and unbundling. The first two phases of
liberalisation, in 1995 and 1999, focused on the
transportation and distribution sectors.
People believed that these two stages were not
successful. Since 2003, oil prices have remained
high and, compared to oil products, natural gas
has become more attractive, with subsequent
rises in natural gas demand. Therefore, beginning
in 2003, the government started to implement
more unbundling measures. Although there not a
complete opening of LNG infrastructure to
third-party access, nonetheless this stage began
to implement open access.
The Gas Utility Act of 1995 attempted to
introduce negotiated third-party access and
unbundling, but was unsuccessful. The act
introduced mandatory negotiated third-party
access, allowing large natural gas consumers
with an annual natural gas consumption of more
than 2 million m3 to buy natural gas from
non-incumbent natural gas suppliers. Tokyo Gas,
Osaka Gas and Toho Gas were required to
unbundle their services. However, almost a dec-
ade later these three companies still accounted
for more than 70% of domestic sales
(Fig. 18.14).
This regime was not considered successful in
opening the natural gas market as terms and con-
ditions for access were not sufficiently standard-
ised and transparent. The companies using
or seeking access to other companies’ pipeline
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complained of entry barriers and non-transparency
in the wheeling system which moves natural gas
from one system to another. Many of the com-
plaints related to the lack of information on the
available capacity of pipelines, non-transparent
standards and procedures for assessing fees, and
other compensation mechanisms.
The Gas Utility Act was revised in 1999 to
introduce regulated third-party access, expanding
from the three largest vertically integrated com-
panies to include a fourth, Saibu Gas. The
threshold for eligible consumers was reduced by
half, to 1 million m3 in natural gas consumption
a year. Natural gas companies were also required
to publish the terms and conditions for use of
their transportation and distribution pipelines.
When the first phase of liberalisation did not
achieve an effective open-access regime, further
unbundling and market transparency measures
were adopted from 2003 onwards. High oil pri-
ces provided added impetus, making natural gas
more attractive compared to oil products and
substantially raising demand. In 2003, account
and functional unbundling were introduced to
separate natural gas transportation businesses
from sales businesses by requiring separate fil-
ings of accounts and a separation of day-to-day
management. The reforms also sought to open
LNG terminals. The threshold for customers to
be eligible for third-party access was further
reduced to 500,000 m3 a year in 2003 and again
to 100,000 m3 in 2007 (Fig. 18.15). By 2007,
61% of the natural gas market by volume was
deregulated, and this was unchanged in 2013.
In addition, open access was extended to all
natural gas companies with eligible customers.
Natural gas companies were required to prepare
standardised third-party access contracts with
terms and conditions for transportation services
that were to be approved by the energy authority.
Japan does not have a well-developed
long-distance natural gas transportation net-
work. There are no cross-border natural gas
pipelines and the high-pressure transmission
natural gas pipeline length is only around
2500 km (Fig. 18.16), compared to 500,000 km
in the United States. Although there are around
43 main interconnection points between areas,
the trunk line networks are not necessarily con-
nected to each other as they have separately
developed around LNG terminals. The lack of
interconnection between regions may limit the
scope for competition through third-party access.
Starting in 2003, there were calls in Japan to
delay the development of national high-pressure
natural gas pipeline networks, on the grounds that
managed third-party access terms could reduce
the incentivising effect of natural gas infrastruc-
ture investment, and hinder energy security.
In 2003, there were natural gas legal reforms,
with LNG infrastructure sectors implementing













Fig. 18.14 Japan natural gas market sales volume, 2012. Source Osaka Gas (2012)
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The need for open access in LNG infrastruc-
ture was included in the 1999 US-Japan Third
Joint Status Report under the Enhanced Initiative
on Deregulation and Competition Policy, an
offshoot of economic co-operation efforts
between the two countries. The issue was par-
ticularly relevant as LNG terminals are the entry
points for imported natural gas, and without free
access to LNG terminals and storage facilities,
only a limited degree of competition, if any,
would be possible in Japan. In response, the
Japanese government amended the Gas Utility
Act in 2003 and introduced an open-access
scheme for LNG facilities. Under this scheme,
natural gas companies were to define precondi-
tions for negotiated access. Further transparency
requirements related to the capacity information
for LNG storage and facilities were also applied.
However, by 2012, no third-party access had
been effectively granted to any company at a
Japanese LNG terminal.
3. Prospects for continued liberalisation
post-Fukushima
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011,
the appetite for further liberalisation in natural
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Fig. 18.15 Japan’s natural gas market liberalisation progress. Source Osaka Gas
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renationalisation of TEPCO, a significant LNG
importer, in 2012 epitomised the change in
momentum regarding energy sector liberalisation
that followed the Fukushima disaster. However,
in 2013, a plan for reforms to deregulate the
electricity market was passed, signalling a
renewed interest in energy sector reform. The
electricity sector is particularly important to
Japan’s natural gas market because it accounts
for about two-thirds of the country’s total natural
gas consumption and that share has grown
rapidly since the Fukushima disaster
(Fig. 18.17).
Japan’s 10 regional electricity utilities have
sought to increase regulated electricity tariffs
paid by end users to help cover their costs. Since
2012, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry has approved tariff increases of between
7 and 11% for six utilities. In 2013, the first of
three electricity market reform packages was
passed, to reduce LNG procurement costs
through competition between electric utilities.
The measure established an Organization for
Cross-Regional Co-ordination of Transmission
Operators to promote the development of elec-
tricity transmission and distribution networks and
to enhance the nationwide function of adjusting
the supply-demand balance of electricity. The
second reform measure would fully liberalise
entry to the electricity retail business and the
third would require legal unbundling of the
transmission and distribution sector.
As Japan depends heavily on LNG imports to
meet its electricity generation needs, the gov-
ernment has sought to ensure diversified LNG
supply based on cost-efficiency and energy
security. The key elements of Japan’s overall
energy security policy are diversifying its
Existing pipelines
Pipelines under planning or construction
Pipelines under consideration
LNG terminals in operation
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Fig. 18.16 Japan LNG terminals and high-pressure pipelines. Source IEA (2013)
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long-term supply contract portfolio, ensuring
contractual flexibility to increase imports in an
emergency and using voluntary commercial
LNG stocks in industry. Japan’s largest natural
gas supplier, Australia, represented just 21% of
total imports of the country in 2013, illustrating
the diversity of Japan’s natural gas suppliers
(Fig. 18.18).
In recent years, Japan’s proportion of imports
from Malaysia and Indonesia has dropped, while
import proportions from Australia and Qatar
have increased.
4. Focus: Japanese natural gas pricing
Traditionally, Japan’s natural gas contracts
have been linked to oil prices, but the govern-
ment has already begun to weaken the influence
of crude oil prices. In the 1970s and 1980s,
long-term LNG import contracts were closely
linked to international crude oil prices. These
contracts are about to expire, and importers are
being forced to renegotiate contracts or else lock
into shorter-term supplies. Crude oil price
increases have led to dual increases in cost and
electricity prices in obtaining LNG.
Japan’s METT encourages electricity compa-
nies to negotiate in order to obtain LNG at prices
the same or lower than previous contracts, as a
prerequisite to collecting higher fuel fees from
electricity consumers. Japan’s natural gas and
electricity companies also carry out negotiations
for LNG contracts, and these contracts are not
restricted by crude oil prices that are lower than
natural gas market prices in the United States.
For example, Kansai Electric Power came to a
long-term agreement in 2012 with British Pet-
roleum, and this agreement was governed by the
US Henry Hub price. In 2012, Japan’s govern-
ment proposed establishing a LNG futures mar-
ket in March 2015, with the futures market
determining natural gas prices based on domestic
demand factors. Japan released its latest strategic
energy plans in April 2014, encouraging natural
gas and electricity companies to carry out tar-
geted loosening of LNG long-term contract
terms. Beginning in 2012, many companies were



















































































Power generation Non-power transformation Industry Residential Other
Start of liberalisation
Fig. 18.17 Major components of Japanese natural gas consumption. Note Excludes transport, non-energy use, energy
industry own use and losses; non-power transformation includes CHP and natural gas to liquids plants; other includes
the services, agriculture and fishing sectors. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data
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projects, and this will account for 20% of Japan’s
total natural gas demand.
Furthermore, Japan’s LNG importers have
formed partnership relationships with the
region’s other LNG purchasers in order to
increase negotiating power and reduce purchase
prices. For example, Tokyo Electric Power
formed a full alliance in October 2014, covering
the entire energy supply chain, with Chubu
Electric Power. Their co-operation incorporates a
wide arrange of activities, whether it be in
upstream investments and procurement of fuel
for power plants, or carrying out a series of joint
projects, including natural gas upstream invest-
ment on a global scale, construction of new
thermal power plants and procurement of LNG.
18.3.5 Case Study 5: South Korea
Since 1997, South Korea’s efforts to liberalise
the natural gas sector have led to partial
unbundling and open access, but progress has
been slow in the wake of political resistance that
began in the early 2000s (Fig. 18.19).
Prior to market liberalisation in 1997,
KOGAS (a state-owned corporation) was the
exclusive owner of LNG infrastructure and nat-
ural gas transmission facilities. In 1997, the
government attempted to break KOGAS’s import
monopoly. Even though some large-scale natural
gas users could directly import natural gas for
their own use, KOGAS still maintained its sub-
stantive monopoly in LNG, transmission and




















































Fig. 18.18 Four major country suppliers of LNG gas imports to Japan since 2000. Source Vivid Economics, based on
IEA data
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wholesale supply. In the first 10 years of the 21st
century, after the natural gas supply crisis, mar-
ket liberalisation progress halted. Moreover,
California’s major power cuts not only increased
worries about the compatibility of electricity
market liberalisation and energy security, but
also weakened political determination. Finally,
opposition from trade unions at KOGAS further
impeded the implementation of government
reform plans.
1. Before market liberalisation
Before liberalisation began in 1997, the
state-owned utility, KOGAS, was the sole owner
of LNG infrastructure and natural gas trans-
portation facilities. KOGAS is a vertically inte-
grated state-owned natural gas company formed
by the Korea Gas Corporation Act in 1982.
Similar to the vertically integrated regional
monopolies in Japan, KOGAS was primarily an
import-oriented company, given the lack of
indigenous natural gas production in South
Korea, and it controlled and operated LNG ter-
minals, storage and natural gas transportation
pipelines.
The City Gas Business Act of 1983 estab-
lished city natural gas companies and introduced
a regulatory framework comprising licensing
requirements for the supply of natural gas, the
construction of natural gas facilities and
the terms and conditions of natural gas supply.
The main business of the city natural gas com-
panies was to buy natural gas from KOGAS or
liquefied petroleum natural gas from oil compa-
nies and distribute it to customers. This local
distribution system has remained largely in place,
and there are 30 privately owned city natural gas
companies, each of which enjoys exclusive retail
sales rights within its areas.
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Fig. 18.19 Phases, development and key regulations in the establishment of a liberalised natural gas market in Korea.
Notes Index of wholesale prices is the natural gas sub-index of the producer price index; 2010 = 100. Source Vivid
Economics based on IEA data
420 18 An Overview of International Regulatory Experience
2. Market liberalisation
In response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis,
the South Korean government announced plans
to liberalise the natural gas sector by introducing
competition and privatising KOGAS. The 1997
National Energy Plan set the main framework for
natural gas liberalisation and privatisation, but
did not specify detailed regulatory changes. In
1999, the South Korean government developed
the Basic Plan for Restructuring the Gas Indus-
try. The assets and staff of KOGAS were to be
divided into two groups: infrastructure, including
receiving terminals, pipelines and storage
infrastructure; and import and wholesale func-
tions. KOGAS would retain ownership of the
infrastructure group, while the import and
wholesale divisions were to be further split into
three natural gas supply subsidiaries by the end
of 2001. Of these three trading entities, one
would remain a subsidiary of KOGAS and the
other two would be independent.
The government succeeded in partially pri-
vatising KOGAS, and 39% of the equity was
sold by the government by the end of 1999.
However, the plan to further privatise and
unbundle KOGAS was not completed because of
fierce opposition from the company’s labour
union. Additionally, the country faced a domestic
natural gas supply crisis at the time when
detailed privatisation plans were being discussed.
Natural gas demand from the residential, indus-
trial and power sectors rose sharply, raising
concerns over energy security (Fig. 18.20). The
electricity blackouts in California further fuelled
concerns about whether liberalisation and energy
security were compatible. These factors together
undermined the political appetite for electricity
and natural gas sector liberalisation.
Although the 1999 Restructuring Plan stalled,
a voluntary service unbundling initiative and a
negotiated third-party access regime were intro-
duced for KOGAS infrastructure. In 1999, the
City Gas Business Act abolished part of
KOGAS’s monopoly on importing LNG and
operating LNG infrastructure. The act set out a
regulated third-party access regime, but it lasted
only a short time before being suspended in 2000.
























































































Fig. 18.20 Korean natural gas consumption by sector. Note Excludes transport, non-energy use, energy industry own
use and losses; non-power transformation includes CHP and natural gas to liquids plants; other includes the services,
agriculture and fishing sectors. Source Vivid Economics based on IEA data
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Despite the reform efforts, third-party access
to LNG storage facilities, the transmission net-
work and LNG terminals owned by KOGAS has
been limited. In 2002, KOGAS remained the
dominant natural gas player, even while large
users like Pohang Iron and Steel Company
operated their own LNG import terminals and
imported LNG for their own use (Fig. 18.21).
Energy security concerns over LNG market
volatility and meeting peak winter demand have
hampered progress in natural gas market liber-
alisation. The importance of diversified LNG
supply sources, ensuring LNG supply on the
basis of long-term contracts, and expansion of
storage capacity to meet high seasonal demand
are perceived to outstrip the potential benefits of
liberalisation. The government promotes the
participation of KOGAS in upstream natural gas
production abroad and strives to preserve its
position on world LNG markets, where KOGAS
is the single largest buyer of LNG. For example,
the Tenth Long-Term Gas Supply and Demand
Plan, published in 2010, proposed that KOGAS
secure oil-indexed long-term contracts with
improved flexibility and conditions from 2015.
This makes it unlikely that plans to privatise
KOGAS will be revived soon, and the govern-
ment is likely to continue to exert a direct,
commanding influence on South Korea’s natural
gas sector.
KOGAS owns and operates Korea’s national
pipeline network and three quarters of the
country’s LNG terminals. Korea currently has no
transnational natural gas pipelines. Its national
transmission pipelines stretch for 3588 km
(Fig. 18.22). According to plans announced, this
will be extended to 4928 km by 2027.
The majority of Korea’s contracts are linked
to the price of crude oil. KNGC has signed
mid-term and long-term contracts linked to crude
oil for the import of 80–90% of its LNG, with the
remainder being through spot market purchases.
In 2012, Qatar was the largest supplier of natural
gas to Korea, followed by Indonesia, Oman,
Malaysia and Yemen (Fig. 18.23). Among the 10
long-term natural gas supply and demand
















Fig. 18.21 Korean natural gas industry structure. Source Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre


















































Planned LNG import facilities
Fig. 18.22 Korean LNG terminals and pipeline networks. Source IEA (2011)
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policies announced in 2010 was the proposal
that, beginning in 2015, KNGC should ensure
that oil-linked long-term contracts increase
their degree of flexibility and terms. Further
co-operation between Korea and its LNG
importing neighbours (such as Japan) could












Fig. 18.23 Major importers of natural gas to Korea, 2012. Source Vivid Economics, based on IEA data (2012)
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19A Close Look at the Natural GasIndustry Chain
The previous section set out international expe-
rience in the development and evolution of nat-
ural gas markets. A key insight from the five
country case studies is that liberalisation requires
different regulatory approaches for different parts
of the natural gas value chain.
This section draws from international experi-
ence and takes a closer look at regulatory efforts
at specific points of the value chain. In the
upstream segment, countries have encouraged
exploration and production by increasing com-
petition, including through fiscal and licensing
regimes, to encourage new entrants into the
industry. In the midstream segment, where nat-
ural monopolies exist, third-party access to
transmission and distribution infrastructure has
been crucial. In addition, some degree of
unbundling of companies integrated across the
value chain has been essential, both to reduce
anti-competitive behaviour with respect to mid-
stream infrastructure and to encourage competi-
tion across the natural gas value chain. In the
downstream segment, countries have encouraged
greater competition in the wholesale and retail
markets supplying end users. Countries with
significant domestic natural gas resources have
liberalised their wholesale markets by encour-
aging greater competition and the establishment
of natural gas hubs.
19.1 The Upstream Segment: Fiscal
Policies and Licensing Systems
In addition to furthering a government’s fiscal
objectives, these regimes have important impli-
cations for the development of a country’s oil and
natural gas resources, the natural gas regulatory
environment, the relationship between various
levels of government and various agencies, and the
overall nature of the oil and natural gas industry.
Upstream fiscal and licensing regimes play a
critical role in the development of a country’s oil
and natural gas resources. The two of themwork in
unison to offer benefits by incentivising invest-
ments and strengthening market competitiveness.
Through an analysis of the experiences of the
United States, Australia, Argentina and Mexico,
this section carries out an in-depth exploration of
natural gas upstream sector financing and taxes,
permit system arrangements, and co-ordination
and contact between various levels of government,
all of which can be useful as references as China
formulates similar policies.
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Development Research Center of the State Council and
Taoliang Lee from Shell Eastern Trading Corporation. It
was jointly completed by Yaodong Shi, Zifeng Song,
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Our analysis of international experience in fiscal
and licensing regimes to regulate the upstream
produced four overarching observations.
• Unconventional resources: International
experience in crafting fiscal and licensing
regimes shows that policy makers need to
consider the fundamental differences between
the exploration and development of conven-
tional natural gas reserves and that of
unconventional reserves. Unconventional
natural gas developments have an ongoing
need to explore, develop and produce on
order to find the most productive areas, the
so-called “sweet spots”. These are charac-
terised by shorter plateaus and more rapid
depletion of reserves than conventional nat-
ural gas wells. As a result, unconventional
operations require ongoing capital expendi-
tures, whereas the majority of capital costs for
conventional operations occur at the start of a
development. Moreover, unlike conventional
operations, unconventional natural gas
developments typically require significant
quantities of water, potentially affecting water
availability for other users in the area, as well
as water quality from the run-off and dis-
charge of water used in processes such as
hydraulic fracturing. This requires appropri-
ate policy frameworks and processes to
manage and minimise these impacts.
• Co-ordination across government tiers:
Fiscal and licensing regimes should also take
account of the interplay between national and
regional authorities. Each level of govern-
ment has an important role to play in the
development of a country’s energy resources,
in terms of taxation and wider policy devel-
opment. A review of experiences in the
United States, Australia and Argentina shows
that national and regional governments typi-
cally share the revenues generated, both
directly and indirectly. Co-ordination
between national and regional authorities is
also required in terms of regulatory policies.
For example, in the United States and Aus-
tralia, access to midstream infrastructure—
essential for encouraging competition in the
upstream and downstream segments—re-
quires policy co-ordination and alignment
between the national and state governments.
• Looking across the value chain: Fiscal and
licensing regimes have a direct impact on
promoting upstream developments, but they
are just one part of an overall energy
approach. Efforts to stimulate other parts of
the value chain, especially demand, can have
a profound influence on upstream activities.
In Australia, for example, regulatory support
for a switch to natural gas in power genera-
tion created momentum for greater domestic
exploration and production.
• Balancing the need for foreign investment
and expertise with domestic interests:
Investment in upstream exploration and pro-
duction is often supported by foreign direct
investment (FDI). However, at times,
increased FDI can also create tensions with
national oil companies or concerns that
national interests are being neglected. The
experience of Mexico and its Bid Round Zero
illustrates how countries can balance these
interests, providing opportunities and
safeguards for domestic companies while
bringing in foreign funding and capabilities.




Under the United States federal system, most
regulations for the oil and natural gas industry
are enacted and enforced by the individual states.
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The US upstream investment regime uniquely is
underpinned by ownership of mineral resources
by the owner of the land. This means that
onshore ownership of the resources is by private
individuals, and private leases can be negotiated
without a licensing authority. The exception to
this norm concerns federal and state land, where
the relevant government authority issues leases
through tenders. For federal land, the Bureau of
Land Management is responsible for issuing
leases (Fig. 19.1). For federal waters—typically
beyond three miles of the coastline—the Bureau
of Ocean Management is responsible for issuing
leases. Federal leases typically have a term of
5–10 years and can be renewed as long as pro-
duction attributable to the lease continues.
With regard to the mining of natural gas,
federal and state governments in the United States
primarily use a tax and royalty regime. Onshore
rates range from 12.5 to 30%, while the offshore
rate is 18.75%. Most states also charge a sever-
ance tax, with its structure and level varying by
state. For example, the Texas severance tax is
7.5% of the market value of the natural gas, while
in neighbouring Louisiana, the severance tax is
set each year based on NYMEX Henry Hub set-
tled prices and on spot prices in the state. In 2014,
this was 16.3 cents per thousand cubic feet.
The regime in the United States is also char-
acterised by significant information sharing
around the development of tight and shale natural
gas, often cited as a reason behind the country’s
successful development of unconventional oil
and natural gas resources. Data on permits, dril-
ling, testing and production is required to be
made available in a timely manner, although the
details vary from state to state. Interested parties
can obtain the information directly from the state
or from consulting companies that collect such
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Fig. 19.1 US federal public land surface and underground levels. Source US Bureau of Land Management
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companies also have incentives to disclose
information—occasionally including details on
individual wells—to support their share price and
their efforts to raise capital. Publicly traded
companies are also required to submit detailed
quarterly and annual reports to the federal gov-
ernment, which are publicly available. In addi-
tion, several federal government agencies,
including the US Geological Survey, the
Department of Energy and the Energy Informa-
tion Administration, monitor and publish key
statistics weekly, quarterly and annually. Adding
to the data flow, industry associations, technical
and business journals, investment reports and
conferences provide a platform for upstream
companies, investment banks, academics and
government to exchange information.




According to forecasts, in the near future Aus-
tralia will become the largest LNG exporter in the
world. It has liquefaction capacity of about
26 million metric tonnes a year in operation, and
is expected to add about 62 million metric tonnes
in additional capacity over the next several years.
The new projects include three projects in
Queensland, primarily using coalbed methane to
produce LNG. A diverse range of companies are
involved in onshore Queensland natural gas pro-
duction, including PetroChina, Sinopec and the
China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC).
Australia’s domestic natural gas system
comprises the East Coast market, covering
Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia,
the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, and
the Western Australian market, covering the rest
of the country. Australia does not have an
extensive pipeline network, especially compared
to Europe or the United States, because demand
is highly concentrated in the various state and
territory capitals and because supply has
historically come primarily from two basins,
Cooper and Gippsland (Fig. 19.2).
Alongside fiscal and licensing measures to
stimulate upstream exploration and production,
Australia also provided demand incentives to
increase the share of natural gas in the energy mix.
The Queensland Gas Scheme illustrates the suc-
cess of such measures in driving coalbed methane
production. Introduced by the Queensland gov-
ernment in 2005, the scheme required all electricity
retailers to acquire 15% of the power they sold
from natural gas-fired generation plants. Accred-
ited power producers generated Gas Electricity
Certificates (GEC) for each MWh of eligible nat-
ural gas-fired electricity they produced. These
GECs are then sold to the electricity retailers,
providing an alternative revenue source for power
producers to offset the higher cost of natural
gas-fired power generation compared to coal. The
scheme ended in 2013 when the state government
declared that its goals of promoting the state’s
natural gas industry and reducing greenhouse
natural gas emissions had been achieved. During
this time, natural gas-fired power generation had
gone from 5% of total power in 2005 to 20% in
2013, and the state’s unconventional natural gas
production had grown from 1 billion m3 in
2004–05 to 6 billion m3 in 2010–11 (Fig. 19.3).
Australia has three levels of government—
federal, state or territory, and local—and has a
concessionary fiscal regime. The federal govern-
ment and state and territory governments share
jurisdiction over petroleum resources, and there
are no private ownership petroleum resources.
State and territory governments manage the
licences for development onshore and within
3 miles of the coastline. They collect royalties of
between 10 and 12.5%, based on the wellhead
value of the petroleum resource. Licences in
Queensland are issued and managed by the
Department of Natural Resources and Mines, and
the published royalty rate is 10%.
The federal government manages licences for
offshore development beyond 3 miles of the
coastline. It levies a Petroleum Resource Rent
Tax of 40% for both onshore and offshore oil and



















































Moomba to Sydney Pipeline





Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline
QSN Link
South West Queensland Pipeline (Baliera to Walumbilla)
Roma to Brisbane Pipeline
Queensland Gas Pipeline (Wallumbilla to Gadstone/Rockhapton)
Amadeus Basin to Derwin Pipeline
Bonaparte Pipeline










































Fig. 19.3 Natural gas production in Queensland, Australia. Source Queensland Department of Natural Resources and
Mines
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natural gas, with state and territory royalties
deductible from the amount due.1 In addition, the
federal government levies a corporate tax of
30%. It also levies a value added tax, known as a
Goods and Services Tax, of 10% on most
transactions, with receipts redistributed to the
state and territory governments.
The three levels of government in Australia
co-ordinate to develop natural gas resources and
markets. The Council of Australian Governments
is the main intergovernmental forum that pro-
motes policy reforms with national relevance or
those that require co-ordinated action at all
levels. Members of the council are the prime
minister, the premiers or chief ministers of each
state or territory respectively, and the president of
the Australian Local Government Association. In
addition, the Standing Council on Energy
Resources (SCER) was founded in 2011 and
comprises federal, state and territory ministers
responsible for energy and resource matters. The
council’s responsibilities include oversight of the
natural gas and electricity markets, energy laws
and regulations, energy security and emergency
management, and promoting the economic
development of Australian resources.2
Companies developing new upstream infras-
tructure may be granted exemptions from
third-party access requirements if they satisfy
criteria outlined in the legislation.
Access to third-party infrastructure is estab-
lished under the federal Competition and Con-
sumer Act. The National Competition Council
(NCC) is established through consensus by the
SCER and is responsible for recommending reg-
ulations on third-party access to monopoly
infrastructure, including natural gas transmission
pipelines. Factors taken into consideration include
whether access would increase competition in a
market, the economics of developing competing
infrastructure, and whether the infrastructure is
already subject to an effective access regime.
For example, 15-year exemptions have been
granted to cover the pipelines being built to
transport natural gas from the three Queens-
land LNG projects to the liquefaction plants in
Gladstone. The NCC concluded that third-party
access “would not promote a material increase in
competition in any likely dependant market”.3
Even though the developers can obtain a waiver,
nonetheless the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (which also has jurisdiction
beyond energy) and the Australian Energy Regu-
lator (AER) both carry out significant oversight,
strictly executing energy market rules and pro-
viding protection for competition and consumers.




Argentina is a significant producer and consumer
of natural gas. According to data from the US
Energy Information Administration, the coun-
try’s technically recoverable shale natural gas
reserves are second only to those in China, and
its shale oil resources are the world’s fourth lar-
gest, after Russia, the United States and China.
According to forecasts, Argentina’s natural gas
demand will have been 44 billion m3 in 2015,
accounting for 45.7% of its energy structure.
Currently, the domestic shortfall is met by LNG
purchased primarily from the spot market and
imported through two floating regasification and
storage units. Natural gas prices are regulated
and subsidised below cost, but prices have begun
to be deregulated—mainly through bilateral
negotiations—to encourage upstream investment
and to raise revenues for the government.
Argentina’s concession-based licensing sys-
tem replaced a system based on risk service
contracts. State-controlled Energía Argentina
S.A. (ENARSA), which is 35% publicly owned,
owns all unlicensed federal offshore exploration
acreage more than 12 nautical miles from shore.
Any activity in these blocks must be done in
partnership with ENARSA. Provincial govern-
ments issue tenders for onshore projects.1Australian Taxation Office website.
2Jurisdictional scope of the Standing Council on Energy
and Resources. 3NCC website.
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All licences are subject to royalties, income
tax, provincial sales tax and other signature
bonuses and rentals, as well as possible export
duties on oil and natural gas. The Oil and Gas
Law, passed in 2014, centralises implementation
of the royalty system and licensing, but leaves
the administration to provincial regulators.
Before this law was enacted, provincial govern-
ments had jurisdiction on oil and natural gas
licensing and operations, and many provincial
governments took equity interests in licences.
From this it is clear that provincial-level gov-
ernments can become involved in relevant
licensing matters through their various oil and
natural gas departments (Figs. 19.4 and 19.5).
Due to growing energy needs, governments
have begun to focus on stimulating investment.
In October 2014, the Oil and Gas Law was
passed. This contained a series of measures
providing incentives for investment in uncon-
ventional oil and natural gas exploration and
production, including:
• distinguishing between conventional and
unconventional resources, for example by
providing unconventional assets with an
exploitation period of 35 years compared to
25 years for conventional resources (explo-
ration periods are 13 years);
• plans to allow higher prices for natural gas
produced using unconventional means;
• creating an unconventional production
licence, providing five years for a pilot pro-
ject to become commercially viable, with
royalties to be dropped by 25% for uncon-
ventional projects after the pilot phase is
completed; and
• allowing 20% of production to be exported.
However, obstacles remain to building an
unconventional natural gas industry in Argentina,
including a shortage of trained labour. The
opening of the Unconventional Fields Technol-
ogy Center in Neuquén Province is a step for-
ward, but more is needed to build capabilities in
shale natural gas technology. In addition, current
regulations do not address environmental con-
cerns adequately, which could become
problematic for unconventional developments
near population centres.
19.1.5 Case Study 4: Mexico—
Reopening the Market
and Round Zero Tender
Mexico’s oil industry is one of the world’s old-
est; oil was first discovered in Mexico in 1904.
By 1921, Mexico’s oil production had reached
530,000 bod, accounting for 25% of the world’s
oil production. Following labour disputes, inter-
national oil company assets in Mexico were
nationalised in 1938, which led to the creation of
the national oil company Petróleos Mexicanos
(Pemex). Pemex held exclusive rights to the
country’s oil and natural gas fields.
In the following decades, Pemex largely ran
its own oil and natural gas operations, aided by
international service companies. As a state
monopoly, its budget and financial management
were heavily controlled by the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit, leading in part to its
gradual stagnation. Its production volume con-
tinually dropped, beginning in 2004 (Fig. 19.6).
Its production volume peak was between 2004
and 2005, with approximately 2.6 million
barrels/day, as well as 3 billion ft3 of natural gas.
Rapid further decline is projected for the coming
years.
In an attempt to halt production declines, in
2013 the political party known as PRI began
implementing energy reforms after 71 years.
President Enrique Peña Nieto proposed an
Energy Reform Act in August 2013. The act was
eventually passed in December 2013, allowing
international oil companies and other investors to
invest once again in Mexican oil and natural gas
businesses through three possible legal arrange-
ments: service contracts, production- or
profit-sharing contracts, or licences.
To protect the national interest in Pemex, the
government ran a unique tender in 2014, Bid
Round Zero. Under the tender, Pemex had to
submit applications for which fields and blocks it
wanted to keep and relinquish the rest. The
submission had to demonstrate technical,
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financial and operational capabilities to operate
productive assets, and, for exploration acreage,
Pemex had to show it had either drilled explo-
ration wells, conducted sub-surface studies or
both. The Energy Secretary and the Comisión
Nacional de Hidrocarburos (National Hydrocar-
bons Commission) made the final decisions on
the applications.
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Fig. 19.4 Argentina’s primary basins and LNG receiving stations
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As a result of Bid Round Zero, Pemex
retained about 83% of proven and probable oil
and natural gas reserves (Fig. 19.7) and 21% of
the prospective resources, based on commission
estimates (Fig. 19.8). Pemex was also allowed to
invite foreign investors to join in the exploration,
development and production of assets it retained.
A measure like Bid Round Zero could be an
attractive option for China. Such a tender would
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Fig. 19.6 Oil and natural gas production in Mexico. Source Wood Mackenzie
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assets they would like to retain, freeing up
other assets for new entrants. The move could
attract greater energy investment and acceler-
ate the development of unconventional shale
natural gas production. Increased domestic
production would reduce the country’s depen-
dence on foreign natural gas, which rose from
zero in 2005 to 32% of domestic consumption
in 2013.
In late 2014, the National Hydrocarbons
Commission began Bid Round One, which will
be a staged tender and include shallow water
exploration, shallow water development, onshore
projects, enhanced production for the Chiconte-
pec field, unconventional oil and natural gas, and
deepwater projects (Fig. 19.9).
Without question, the most important factor in
these events has been the speed and determina-
tion of the Mexican government in taking clear
and transparent steps toward energy reform,
including the 20%+ of discovered oil/natural gas
fields provided to international oil companies
following the final Round Zero Tender. It is
worth considering which of these measures could
suit China’s situation, especially in the acceler-
ated exploration and development of unconven-
tional natural gas and shale natural gas, as well as
in attracting suitable international oil companies
and private investors to accelerate the trials in
this process. It is also worth considering whether
Mexico will continue on its path of open policies
after the six-year term of President Enrique Peña
Nieto.
19.2 The Midstream Segment:
Building Infrastructure
and Managing Access
Midstream assets—transmission pipelines, LNG
regasification terminals and storage facilities, and
distribution networks—are natural monopolies.
They have high fixed capital costs of investment
but low, and decreasing, marginal costs of
operation. As a result, it is economically more
efficient if fewer of these assets are built and fully
utilised, rather than assets being duplicated and
dividing volumes among them through
competition.
Natural gas pipelines—both transmission and
distribution—have more significant natural
monopoly characteristics than LNG terminals or
storage facilities. The economies of scale for
LNG terminals and storage facilities are not as
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Fig. 19.7 Pemex reserves analysis after bid round zero
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great as those for pipelines. Hence, for a given
market size, the optimal number of facilities
required will be greater compared to the number
of pipelines required to serve a market of similar
size. Moreover, LNG terminals and storage
facilities can compete with other similar assets
once they are connected through a pipeline
network.
In the United States, LNG receiving stations
are viewed as upstream assets, because they are
seen as extensions of upstream wells. However,
in Europe, LNG receiving stations are midstream
assets. The difference in perception depends on
the degree of competition in the market. In the
United States, LNG receiving stations compete
with domestic products, and thus they seen as
comparable to domestic wells. In Europe, the
majority of competition comes from imported
natural gas, and thus LNG receiving stations are
viewed as part of the transmission network.
If LNG receiving stations are seen as upstream
assets, then regulatory measures will be different,
and there will be fewer concerns about the
monopolistic nature of the receiving stations. In
China, there is uncertainty regarding the charac-
ter of LNG receiving stations, because develop-
ment is lacking in competitive natural gas
markets.
The natural monopoly characteristics of mid-
stream infrastructure mean that government
oversight and regulation is required to prevent
access being restricted and monopoly rents being
charged. A monopoly owner of midstream
infrastructure has an incentive to charge very
high prices to maximise its profits, reducing
pipeline utilisation in the process. It may there-
fore be necessary to unbundle midstream assets
from vertically unified companies. Examples of
the options for accomplishing this can be found
by looking at the international experiences seen
in the case studies.
Even if midstream assets do not belong to a
given vertically unified company, if no oversight
is implemented, there is still the possibility of
problems arising. On the one hand, independent
owners need upstream and midstream partici-
pants to use their midstream assets. On the other
hand, independent owners also have an incentive
to collect the highest price possible to maximise
their profits. Regulation is the solution, to ensure
that usage rights to midstream assets are avail-
able to all parties (in other words, third-party
access).
Regulatory institutions will often need to
unbundle and re-establish third-party access. In
practice, even if there are rules for third-party
access, there are still many means to exclude
third parties, such as lack of transparency over
pricing. Using regulatory institutions to imple-
ment strict regulation of third-party access can
prevent such anti-competitive behaviour. At the
same time, many regulatory institutions believe
that through unbundling such motivations can be
eliminated, which is an effective supplement to
third-party access rules.
In a growing market in need of investment,
such as China, regulatory frameworks should
ensure that investments can receive sufficient
profits, encouraging capital investment. Regula-
tion of the collection of usage right fees can help
asset owners to recover their capital. Regulation
of fee collection can employ either a “regulated
return” system or a “regulated tariff” system.
These two methods are very similar, but have
differing risk allocations in terms of midstream
asset users and owners. Under a “regulated
return” oversight approach, the owner of the
midstream is authorised to receive a high enough
rate of return to act as a motivation for future
pipeline construction. Under the “regulated tar-
iff” regime, such tariffs should likewise be suf-
ficiently high to provide an incentive for future
asset investments.
The challenge therefore faced by government
departments is to achieve a balance between
making usage rights available and encouraging
investment in midstream assets. This balance can
be achieved through a precisely designed regu-
latory framework, which will need to include the
following key factors: rules for liability and
standards, a consensual pricing framework for
third-party access and a mechanism to assure
returns for investors. In some frameworks, when
regulatory institutions solve downstream market
structure or legacy issues, these mechanisms can
be used to balance out two different goals.
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When a country’s regulatory mechanisms
reflect various domestic factors, such evolutions
and influences can be referenced by China. We
examine three case studies below: the third-party
access arrangements of the United Kingdom in
the North Sea; Singapore and Japan’s LNG
experience; and Shell’s IPO of its Shell Mid-
stream Partners enterprise in the United States.
These case studies yield five primary lessons:
• if it is to promote usage rights and invest-
ment, regulation must strike a balance
between the economic interests of midstream
asset users and owners;
• regulatory frameworks must be stable, reli-
able and clear, thereby facilitating general
risk minimisation and stimulation of
investment;
• mechanisms based on rules can provide a
means of resolution for this;
• at the same time as generating revenue, reg-
ulations such as mandatory third-party access
requirements can ensure that midstream assets
are used efficiently;
• even while balancing usage rights and
investment, regulatory institutions can also
consider market structure in addition to the
value chain. Current regulatory policy will
influence future economic opportunities.
19.2.1 Balancing Third-Party Access
and Investment
Incentives
Third-party access needs to be balanced against
incentives for further investment in midstream
infrastructure, especially in growing markets
such as China. While allowing for third-party
access, the regulatory framework also needs to
provide adequate incentives—and returns—on
future investment in the midstream. For example,
access charges can be regulated to enable asset
owners to recover fixed costs.
Regulated charging regimes can be of two
types: either regulating the rate of return
achieved by midstream infrastructure owners or
regulating the tariff charged for access to mid-
stream infrastructure. Under a regulated return
regime, the owner is granted a rate of return on
its midstream asset value that is high enough to
provide incentives for future investment in
maintaining and extending the infrastructure
network. Under a regulated tariff regime, the
tariff is set at a level that provides incentives for
future asset investment. Both approaches are
similar, but vary in the distribution of risk among
the users and the owners of midstream assets.
While an individual country’s regulatory
regime reflects a variety of domestic factors, a
review of the evolution and impact of these
regimes can offer insights for China in achieving
a balance between returns to investment and
access to midstream assets. The oversight of
natural gas infrastructure reflects a country’s
experience in the realm of natural gas market
liberalisation, as well as its systemisation and
government and policy priorities. There is no
single oversight system that can be transplanted
from one jurisdiction to another. In fact, if
residual issues, systems and political factors are
not taken into consideration, replicating another
country’s oversight structure will result in failure
(United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe 2012). However, it is possible to learn by
comparing existing oversight frameworks that
the key is to balance the attainment of public and
private goals.
Regulatory institutions often need to unbundle
third-party access. In reality, even if there are
third-party access rules, there are still many
means by which to exclude third parties—for
example, a lack of transparency over pricing of
capacity. Regulatory institutions can prevent
such anti-competitive behaviour by rigorous
oversight of third-party access rules, but many
regulatory institutions believe that unbundling is
an effective solution that eliminates the incentive
for anti-competitive behaviour.
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In growing markets in need of investment,
such as China, regulatory frameworks should
also allow for sufficient profits, thereby providing
momentum for future midstream investment.
Using a “regulated return” system, owners of
midstream assets are allowed sufficiently high
rates of return that there is an incentive for future
piping construction. Under a regime of “regu-
lated tariffs”, such tariffs should likewise be
sufficiently high to provide an incentive for
future asset investments.
The challenge for government departments is
therefore to achieve a balance between mid-
stream asset usage rights and investment, as
shown in Fig. 19.10. Within a carefully designed
regulatory framework, it is possible to achieve
this goal. Many countries have achieved such
success, and the regulatory mechanisms that may
be of interest to China as precedents include:
• Rules: Regulators establish and enforce rules
on liability and standards.
• Prices: Regulators provide a framework for
investors and users to agree on prices in both
third-party-access and regulated-return
regimes.
• Mechanisms to reduce risk: Regulators




The case studies provide five overarching
insights:
• Regulation balances the economic interests
of users and owners of midstream assets to
facilitate access and investment. Economic
opportunities drive demand for access to and
investment in infrastructure. However,
demand by itself is an insufficient condition
for access and investment, as users and
owners often cannot agree terms, often
because of the asset owner’s natural mono-
poly power. Thus, players require a strong
regulatory framework that grants access to the
midstream and provides incentives for
investment. For example, experience in Sin-
gapore and the United Kingdom in estab-
lishing third-party access shows that strong
regulation can assist users of assets in their
negotiations with midstream operators.
The experience of the United States and Japan
has shown that in terms of risk/reward for
investors, oversight is beneficial in creating










Fig. 19.10 The balance of factors needed in the regulatory framework
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more funds to be channelled to the construc-
tion of midstream infrastructure.
• Regulation can ensure that the midstream
asset is used efficiently. Regulation, such as
mandatory third-party access requirements,
can ensure that players upstream and down-
stream can access the pipeline and that the fees
charged and returns made by the owner of the
midstream asset are fair. Regulation can take
various forms, such as negotiated or regulated
access, but all forms of regulation are aimed at
increasing access while ensuring reasonable
returns to the asset owner and supporting suf-
ficient investment to maintain energy security.
Controls implemented according to specific
circumstances can utilise agreement negotia-
tions or controls to achieve third-party access.
The British North Sea owner and user nego-
tiations successfully implemented third-party
access, with new companies able to develop
small-scale gas fields without needing to
invest in the construction of new piping.
Midstream asset owners can obtain revenue
from amortised assets, and the government
can obtain relevant oil and natural gas pro-
duction taxes related to asset development.
However, in the rapidly growing market of
China, the experience from the North Sea is
of limited use. There is very little need for
new investment in piping in the North Sea,
and this made it easier for midstream facility
owners and users come to an agreement. This
is not the case in China, and the facility
owners tend to look to use their position to
collect monopolistic lease amounts. As a
result, China’s rapidly growing emerging
market should give greater consideration to
using mandatory third-party access systems to
stimulate investment in midstream facilities
by promoting recovery of capital and rea-
sonable risk returns.
• The regulatory framework should be
stable, credible and clear to minimise risk
and encourage investment. The success of
the master limited partnership in the United
States has been in large part the result of
government providing a statutory basis for
partnership treatment: federal rules on quali-
fying income and assets gave all parties the
necessary certainty to proceed. In the United
Kingdom, the combination of a statutory,
rules-based framework and the threat of
arbitration ensures that when negotiating
third-party access, parties have similar
expectations and incentives, with it being
very rare that events end in disagreement. The
regulatory layers collectively help to reduce
uncertainty for participants (see Fig. 19.11).
In contrast, the absence of enforcement has
meant that third-party access rules are not
credible, and midstream infrastructure is for
the most part not open to third parties.
• Regulators should take into account mar-
ket structures along the value chain when
balancing access and investment. The nat-
ure of competition along the entire value
chain influences regulatory choices. For
example, Japan has a fragmented market
where all natural gas is imported by LNG
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Fig. 19.11 The three layers of agreements supporting North Sea usage rights
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between regional markets. This means that
competition is hard to achieve and brings few
benefits, and as a result third-party access is
limited.
In the United Kingdom, the natural gas mar-
ket was originally created upstream, with
competitive downstream markets only start-
ing in the 1980s, and thus its regulatory
framework design focus is on the promotion
of midstream usage rights.
In Singapore, private funding for an
open-access LNG terminal fell through as a
result of sufficient pipeline gas supply to meet
demand and liberalised downstream markets,
which favoured cheaper pipeline gas over
more expensive LNG imports. The govern-
ment stepped into develop the LNG terminal
as a means of diversifying sources of supply
and enhancing energy security. Ownership is
deliberately separated from operation of the
multi-user LNG terminal, and the government
has developed a framework to open the ter-
minal to third-party access. At the same time,
the government has also sought to secure
downstream demand for LNG by restricting
new pipeline imports (Table 19.1).
• The regulatory framework a country pur-
sues affects the set of available policy
choices. The regulatory legacy can affect the
level of utilisation of infrastructure, the level
of activity by new entrants and the form of
private contracts. The private sector’s
capacity to identify and develop economic
opportunities is a function of how a country’s
regulatory regime and its infrastructure have
evolved.
In the first years of development of North Sea
gas, large companies obtained permits from
the government and independently invested
to develop the oil and gas fields. In the past
12 years, because of drops in yields, these oil
and gas fields have seen reduced rates of
return, and there is less interest from large
companies. However, the amortised assets
that they possess can be transferred to smaller
enterprises to develop small-scale oil fields
that pay the larger companies for usage of
their assets. Therefore, from the 1960s to the
1990s, the United Kingdom’s regulation
system has increased the opportunities today.
In Japan, even though on the surface LNG
receiving stations seem to be accessible,
regulators have chosen to use negotiated
approach a third-party access, rather than
making it mandatory. This approach gives
facility owners a powerful negotiating posi-
tion. Combined with a lack of competition
upstream and downstream, there is a push for
suppliers and upstream facility owners to sign
long-term supply agreements. Without reli-
able access systems, new entrants to the
market generally build new LNG receiving
stations in order to take advantage of down-
stream business opportunities.
Table 19.1 The influence of the nature of competition on midstream infrastructure regulation choices




Liberalised markets Ease of entry, but investment
costs high
Framework for asset owners






Lack of interconnection creates
concern over security of supply
Facilitate construction of new







Uncertainty that downstream can
be accessed given pipeline natural
gas supplies
Pipeline natural gas moratorium
and midstream third-party
access
440 19 A Close Look at the Natural Gas Industry Chain




The United Kingdom’s North Sea experience
illustrates one approach to arranging access to
midstream infrastructure. In particular, it focuses
on the government’s efforts to develop a regu-
latory framework that grants new entrants access
to the pipelines built by earlier North Sea field
developers.
Several key lessons emerge from this
experience:
• A liberalised market with clear rules
encourages new investment. Output from
the North Sea was declining and costs were
rising. However, new firms that specialise in
declining fields were able to enter the liber-
alised market, which has provided asset
owners with new business and the govern-
ment with greater tax revenue.
• Users of assets have been favoured over
owners to some extent. As midstream assets
were already in place as a legacy of past
exploration of the North Sea, and faced
declining utilisation, new users seeking
access had greater bargaining power as asset
owners had few alternative customers. In
addition, by encouraging access, the govern-
ment could benefit from greater hydrocarbon
production tax revenues associated with
resource development.
• Where interests between midstream asset
owners and users are broadly aligned, a
voluntary agreement on access provision
between the parties is feasible. The United
Kingdom had a layered regulatory framework
to access. Parties were encouraged to reach
voluntary agreements, with clear rules for
dispute resolution and, ultimately, a legal
framework if voluntary agreements could not
be reached. This system has worked well,
with many parties reaching voluntary agree-
ments, because interests are broadly aligned
and the rules are clear and credible.
China faces a different gas market context
than seen in the North Sea example. China’s
natural gas market is growing rapidly, whereas
output from the North Sea was declining. As a
result, the economic pressures felt by UK asset
owners that supported negotiated third-party
access—specifically, existing assets with declin-
ing utilisation—would not be as prevalent in
China, where limited midstream capacity gives
asset owners more bargaining power. Neverthe-
less, the North Sea experience demonstrates how
a credible regulatory framework can help achieve
agreement and avoid disputes.
1. Background
The regulatory regime for natural gas explo-
ration in the United Kingdom from the mid-1960s
through to the 1980s was characterised by liber-
alisation and increasingly competitive markets.
When the first licences were offered by govern-
ment, major companies chose to develop oil and
natural gas fields as stand-alone installations.
Upstream pipelines and offshore processing
facilities were usually built by field owners to
process and transport output from specific oil and
natural gas fields. However, since then, recovery
rates—and returns—from these fields have fallen,
and larger enterprises have been less interested in
developing the remaining resources.
As spare capacity became available in
pipelines and terminals, opportunities arose. The
existence of their depreciated pipeline assets has
allowed smaller players to enter the industry and
exploit smaller fields, paying larger companies to
use their assets to transport oil and natural gas to
the mainland. A liberalised downstream market
meant there was a ready market for small-field
developers if they could access midstream assets.
There were benefits to infrastructure owners, too,
in terms of additional revenue from granting
third-party access to new users and from defer-
ring the costs of decommissioning these assets.
The government saw opportunities in terms of
additional job creation, maximising recovery of
North Sea oil and gas resources, and continued
production tax revenues.
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The 1996 Network Code established the rules
and procedures for third-party access to pipelines
and introduced a regime for daily balancing,
while the Petroleum Act of 1998 set out the rules
around upstream exploration and production. By
the early 2000s, liberalisation of the sector was
complete, with the creation of the National Grid
as a fully unbundled, independent transmission
system owner and operator of the United King-
dom’s natural gas and electricity markets in
2002.
However, the legal framework by itself was
insufficient and left room for commercial dis-
putes between owners and users of the infras-
tructure. Through the 1990s, there were concerns
that the tariffs to access infrastructure were too
high compared to costs and risks of developing
small fields. This led to a new process for
negotiating access. The legislative and regulatory
changes provided a statutory basis for a
rules-based framework, including a process for
arbitration of disputes, which helped co-ordinate
activity and create common expectations.
2. The framework for negotiated third-party
access
Working with government, the natural gas
industry sought to develop voluntary frameworks
for third-party access. The first industry offshore
Code of Practice was introduced in 1996. It sought
to establish a timely process for seeking, offering
and negotiating third-party access to natural gas
infrastructure in the North Sea. It also sought to
ensure that access was easy and fair, with terms
offered on a negotiated, non-discriminatory basis.
In 2004, market participants agreed to a
strengthened code, the Infrastructure Code of
Practice. The code outlined best practice and
expected behaviour in conducting negotiations
for access to infrastructure. According to the
industry group Oil & Gas UK, the code was
intended “to facilitate the utilisation of infras-
tructure for the development of remaining UKCS
[United Kingdom continental shelf] reserves
through timely agreements for access on fair and
reasonable terms, where risks taken are reflected
by rewards”. Its main tenets are:
• Parties uphold infrastructure safety and
integrity and protect the environment.
• Parties follow the Commercial Code of
Practice.
• Parties provide meaningful information to
each other before and during negotiations.
• Parties support negotiated access in a timely
manner.
• Parties undertake to settle disputes if needed
through the Automatic Referral Notice pro-
cess which involves the UK minister
responsible for energy.
• Parties resolve conflicts of interest.
• Infrastructure owners provide transparent and
non-discriminatory access.
• Infrastructure owners provide tariffs and
terms for unbundled services, where reques-
ted and practicable.
• Parties seek to agree on fair and reasonable
tariffs and terms, where risks taken are
reflected by rewards.
• Parties publish key commercial provisions
from the agreements.
Companies seeking access to infrastructure
falling within the scope of the third-party access
provisions of the Energy Act 2011 must apply first
to the owners. However, the act also allows the
government minister responsible to take the ini-
tiative and set the terms in cases where there is no
realistic prospect of reaching an agreement. If the
parties are unable to agree to satisfactory terms and
conditions, the prospective user may apply to the
minister to resolve the dispute. The minister can
require access to pipelines, associated offshore
production facilities, and onshore natural gas
processing facilities, and dictate the appropriate
terms. In most cases, these terms will be in line
with those offered by infrastructure owners in
a competitive environment. In such cases, the
legislation stipulates that appropriate notices
be issues to the parties to implement the terms.
While a dispute resolution procedure exists and the
minister can intervene to adjudicate, the third-
party access framework is essentially self-
enforcing and has rarely resulted in dispute.
A crucial factor in the success of the frame-
work is that it reduces commercial risk by giving
442 19 A Close Look at the Natural Gas Industry Chain
stakeholders guidance on tariffs and a variety
of other terms. Terms of agreements tend to be
quite specific with regard to liability, trans-
parency and technical standards. Terms covered
often include:
• the basis for modification of infrastructure, if
necessary;
• the duration of service;
• identifying which party has ownership and
risk exposure to the natural gas while it is
within the infrastructure owner’s facility;
• capacity terms and the ability of the owner to
change them;
• charges for providing the service;
• rights of both parties to terminate the agree-
ment; and
• liabilities covering damage and loss relating
to people, property and pollution.
Within the regulatory framework, both owner
and user considerations are important in deter-
mining terms of access. Competition and other
market forces, the user’s ability to pay and con-
tract flexibility are all key considerations to be
taken into account when agreeing the terms of
access (Fig. 19.12).
Owners and users have flexibility when nego-
tiating access. For example, when agreeing to
provide access, the infrastructure owner reserves
capacity in its system for the shipper. The shipper
gains certainty that the required capacity will be
available, subject to normal operational avail-
ability, and the infrastructure owner will not
market reserved capacity to others. In turn, the
infrastructure owner will want to mitigate the risk
of the user booking more capacity than required,
such as through send-or-pay provisions, which
guarantee minimum payment regardless of the
extent to which the reserved capacity is used. In
declining fields, such as in the North Sea, terms of
access are often based on operating costs, plus a
risk premium. This contrasts with the approach for
newer fields, where the terms of access also tend to
include operating costs, as well as capital cost
recovery.
Owner considerations User considerations
The cost and risks of providing the service
User ability to pay
Whether they are competing against other owners
Whether an escalation formula can be
added for long-term contracts
Whether existing business will be affected by the
provision of a service
Whether the owner’s tariff is reasonable
relative to the user’s risk and reward
Whether there are competing owners
Flexibility required for long-term contracts
Regulatory framework
Legislative basis | Voluntary code | Arbitration process
Fig. 19.12 Analysis of regulatory frameworks
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Singapore and Japan have had entirely opposite
experiences in the development and control of
midstream infrastructure, especially in terms of
LNG regasification receiving stations (Table 19.2).
However, the experiences of the two countries
highlight that for a balance to be struck between
access to and investment in midstream infrastruc-
ture, both a streamlined industry chain and con-
sideration of the influence of the market structure
are necessary.
1. Singapore LNG: national power involved in
influencing construction of infrastructure
Singapore has no domestic natural gas
resources and is dependent on imports. Natural
gas consumption grew rapidly in the 2000s, from
1.3 billion m3 in 2000 to 8.7 billion m3 in 2010.
Into the early 2000s, the island-state’s natural
gas market was characterised by government
ownership along the value chain through Singa-
pore Power Group and SembCorp, limited or no
unbundling in commodity and transportation
activities, significant price controls on electricity,
and generally homogeneous supply through
pipelines deliveries from Malaysia and Indone-
sia. In 2004, the country began progressive
liberalisation, resulting in a competitive mid-
stream and downstream natural gas market,
including regulated open-access networks, a
significant number of primarily private market
participants, unbundled commodity and trans-
portation activities, and oversight entrusted to an
independent energy regulator, the Energy Market
Authority (Fig. 19.13). The government’s role is
limited to ensuring fair access to infrastructure.
In 2006, the government decided to develop an
LNG regasification terminal to enhance energy
security by diversifying sources of supply away
from existing pipeline gas. However, meeting the
policy objective on energy security was not con-
sistentwithSingapore’s liberalised and competitive
wholesale and retail markets. Singapore had a
well-functioning domestic natural gas market, with
sufficient supply frompipelines, and therewas little
market demand for an LNG regasification terminal,
despite the energy security benefits it offered.
The country originally granted a licence to a
private consortium of PowerGas and GDF Suez to
make the necessary investment, but this arrange-
ment collapsed in 2009 because of a funding
shortfall.While the problemwas linked to the 2008
global financial crisis, it also reflected the compet-
itive nature of the downstream market, which
dampened the commitment among potential cus-
tomers of the LNG facility. The benefits of diver-
sifying supply were outweighed by the risks of
being a first mover to a more expensive and
untested source, reducing the incentive for energy
companies and end users to switch supply sources.
Table 19.2 Differing LNG management systems resulting from different market traits in Singapore and Japan
Influencing factor Singapore Japan
Industry organisations Separation of midstream from
downstream assets
Vertically integrated supply chains
Downstream market Liberalised except for moratorium on
piped natural gas




Functional unbundling No mandatory functional unbundling
Midstream asset
ownership
Public utility (terminal) Private
Access mechanism Third-party access Bilateral access arrangements, but with no
credible enforcement
Support mechanisms Rules-based framework and arbitration Ease of regulation on construction of new
terminals
444 19 A Close Look at the Natural Gas Industry Chain
In 2009, the government announced it would
take over the development and ownership of the
LNG terminal. It established the Singapore LNG
Corp. to develop and operate the terminal.
The facility, which opened in 2013, was regu-
lated by the Energy Market Authority. It was
open access, with third-party access arrange-
ments underpinned by a rules-based regulatory
framework, including a dispute-resolution pro-
cess, and public ownership of the infrastructure















































Singapore Power Group (100%)
Pavillion
Energy













Fig. 19.13 Market diversification in Singapore, 2004 versus 2014
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The regulatory framework established by the
government and the Energy Market Authority
was designed to guarantee fair and transparent
access to midstream infrastructure while reducing
investor risk. It comprised three key elements:
• Aggregator: A private company, BG, was
appointed natural gas aggregator to secure
supplies. By pooling demand from large
users, Singapore maximised its negotiating
power on global markets and secured com-
petitively priced supply.
• Framework: Terminal access rules agreed
between BG and Singapore LNG provided a
commercial framework for other third parties
that sought access and enabled a greater
degree of forward planning by energy
companies.
• Support: The government offered a purchase
agreement with any power-generation com-
pany that committed to LNG supply and a
tariff structure that allowed companies to pass
through the cost of LNG.
The terminal had the capacity to handle three
times as much natural gas as the country con-
sumed. While it initially opened with a 3 mil-
lion tonnes per year capacity, the opening of its
third tank in 2014 doubled capacity to 6 mil-
lion tonnes. A fourth tank is expected to open by
2017, which would bring total capacity to
9 million tonnes. The terminal could eventually
accommodate seven tanks, for a total capacity of
15 million tonnes.
Because capacity was planned to exceed
domestic requirements, the government has also
sought to secure downstream demand for LNG.
To do this, the government introduced controls
on new pipeline imports in 2006. These controls
allow existing contracts to be honoured, but new
contracts were subject to approval from the
Energy Market Authority. The decision moved
Singapore away from its free market approach
and introduced a measure of uncertainty about
the evolution of Singapore’s natural gas markets.
While the moratorium on new pipeline imports is
likely to be lifted, it remains unclear whether the
government will continue to limit direct compe-
tition between pipeline natural gas and LNG.
Key lessons from Singapore’s experience of
developing and regulating its midstream LNG
infrastructure include:
• Markets can face challenges when invest-
ing to achieve policy objectives. Singapore
had a well-functioning domestic gas market,
with sufficient supply from pipelines. Given
this, there was little market demand for an
LNG terminal, despite the energy security
benefits it offered.
• Regulation is needed to deliver policy
objectives. As the market would not provide
the investment, the government had to step in
and invest in the LNG terminal itself. At the
same time, the government also sought to
secure downstream demand for LNG by
restricting new pipeline imports. However, in
recognition of the efficiency of market forces,
the government operated the terminal as a
multi-user access terminal to enable compe-
tition downstream between importers.
• Regulators have an important role in set-
ting up the commercial framework for
access. The terms of access were clear and
credible, allowing private companies to make
long-term plans despite the uncertainty that
comes from an open access terminal, such as
available docking times and capacity.
2. Japanese LNG: oligopoly restricting
third-party access
Japan imports most of its natural gas, and its
imports are exclusively LNG. The country has 30
operating LNG terminals, with a total capacity of
172 million tonnes a year, a level well above
domestic demand. However, Japan remains con-
strained by howmuch LNG it can receive, based on
berthing, ship size and other infrastructure limita-
tions. Five additional terminals are currently under
construction and expected to become operational by
2016, adding capacity of at least 7 million tonnes.
The majority of LNG terminals are near main
population centres and manufacturing hubs around
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Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya (Fig. 19.14). They are
owned by local power companies, either alone
or in partnership with natural gas companies, and
the same companies own much of Japan’s LNG
tanker fleet.
Japan has unique energy fundamentals that
make midstream assets particularly important.
Japan has no domestic production of natural gas
and few other domestic sources of energy.
The country also does not have a well-
developed or integrated domestic long-distance
natural gas transportation network, partly because
its mountainous geography limits the development
of a network. Instead, LNG regasification terminals
have proliferated along the coastline and take the
vital role of a transmission network. However, as a
result of these conditions, downstream markets are
fragmented and dominated by regional monopo-
lies. Domestic natural gas transport and distribu-
tion infrastructure, including LNG terminals, is
owned and operated by vertically integrated private
natural gas and power companies. The natural gas
market remains largely uncompetitive, with four
companies supplyingmore than 70% of natural gas
and almost all LNG terminals owned by a small
number of companies and no actual third-party
access.
Open access in LNG infrastructure was dis-
cussed in the US-Japan Third Joint Status Report
under the Enhanced Initiative in 1999, an eco-
nomic co-operation agreement between the two
countries. In response, the Japanese government
amended the Gas Utility Act in 2003 and intro-
duced an open-access scheme that obliged natu-
ral gas companies to define preconditions for
negotiated access. Further transparency require-
ments related to the capacity information for
LNG storage and facilities were also introduced.
The changes were intended to act as a guide for
infrastructure users, but did not go far enough:
Existing pipelines
Pipelines under planning or construction
Pipelines under consideration
LNG terminals in operation











































Fig. 19.14 Japanese LNG facilities and their proximity to large cities and manufacturing hubs. Note This document
and any map included here are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of
international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. Source IEA
19.2 The Midstream Segment: Building Infrastructure and Managing Access 447
third-party access to terminals was characterised
as “desirable” and LNG terminals were not
classified as “essential facilities”. As a result,
while a mechanism for access exists, the regu-
latory framework does not promote ease of
access. Users face a lengthy application process,
the timing, flexibility and tariffs are unclear, and
there is no arbitration or dispute resolution
process.
Since the changes were introduced, no com-
pany has effectively negotiated third-party
access. Incumbents have successfully argued
against third-party access, claiming that regulated
third-party access, such as in Singapore, may
create disincentives for investment in natural gas
infrastructure and hamper energy security. As a
result, regulators have tended to promote
investment over access. Lack of downstream
competition has also led to LNG shippers and
LNG terminal owners signing long-term supply
contracts, which make it more difficult for new-
comers to enter the market.
Natural gas market liberalisation in Japan has
been ineffective. The country has rules in place
for market liberalisation, such as retail price
liberalisation for the non-household sector and
third-party access rules. However, natural gas
market reform has been piecemeal. Third-party
access rules have not been complemented by
mandatory unbundling or by other measures to
increase competition in downstream retail mar-
kets. If the market were to be liberalised, reform
is needed on all fronts: while effective third-party
access facilitates competition, the lack of down-
stream competition has prevented third-party
access from being effective.
Energy security remains the primary policy
priority. Japan’s regulatory regime cannot focus
on minimising costs as vigorously as that of
countries with more favourable fundamentals,
such as China, which has greater energy security
and can build a national transmission network.
Key lessons from Japan’s experience of
developing and regulating its midstream LNG
infrastructure include:
• Japan has unique energy fundamentals
that make midstream assets very impor-
tant. The country had no domestic production
of gas and few other domestic sources of
energy, and its mountainous geography lim-
ited the development of a national transmis-
sion network. As a result, energy security was
a high priority, and LNG terminals played the
role of a transmission network by providing
access at points along the coastline.
• Japan has experienced large investments in
midstream assets. Japan has invested in a
large number of LNG terminals, which were
warranted from an energy security and
geography perspective. Incumbents have
successfully argued against third-party
access, claiming that regulated third-party
access, such as in Singapore, may create
disincentives for investment in natural gas
infrastructure and hamper energy security. As
a result, regulators have tended to promote
investment over access.
• Gas market liberalisation in Japan has
been ineffective. Japan had rules in place for
market liberalisation, such as retail price lib-
eralisation for the non-household sector and
third-party access rules. However, in practice
the market remained uncompetitive, with four
companies supplying more than 70% of nat-
ural gas and almost all LNG terminals owned
by a small number of companies with no
meaningful third-party access.
• The failure of liberalisation demonstrates
the importance of regulating across the
value chain. Gas market reform in Japan has
been piecemeal. Third-party access rules have
not been complemented by mandatory
unbundling or by other measures to increase
competition in downstream retail markets. If
the market were to be liberalised, reform is
needed on all fronts: while effective
third-party access facilitates competition, the
lack of downstream competition has pre-
vented third-party access from being
effective.
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19.2.5 Case Study 3: The United
States—Master Limited
Partnerships
In the United States, a unique corporate struc-
ture, master limited partnerships, enables own-
ership of midstream assets to be reallocated to
owners with appropriate risk profiles. The
structure facilitates the transfer of midstream
assets from organisations focused on high-risk,
high-return activities, such as oil and gas
exploration and development to organisations
seeking low-risk, low-return assets, such as
pension funds. While the case study focuses on
oil pipelines, it is applicable to midstream
infrastructure more generally.
Key lessons from the US experience with
master limited partnerships include:
• Midstream assets are low-risk, low-return
assets and can attract significant invest-
ment. Once constructed, midstream assets
such as pipelines have a relatively simple
business model, especially in markets with
high demand and regulated charges, such as
the United States. Such assets were attractive
to investors comfortable with low-risk hold-
ings and a regular return, such as pension
funds.
• Greater capital liquidity enables better
allocation of capital. Many midstream assets
were constructed by companies with a greater
appetite for risk and higher return expecta-
tions, such as domestic and international oil
companies with upstream assets, as a way of
transporting wellhead natural gas to con-
sumers. However, these companies spe-
cialised in higher-risk, higher-return
investments. Instruments such as master lim-
ited partnerships enabled these companies to
sell midstream assets to investors with more
appropriate risk profiles and recycle the pro-
ceeds into new investment more consistent
with their own risk-reward profile.
• Tax efficiency is important in attracting
investor interest. A master limited partner-
ship is a particular form of business entity that
is not liable for US federal income tax.
Allowing midstream assets to be structured
into a master limited partnership reduced tax
liability and improved the returns, therefore
increasing investor interest.
• Regulation gives clarity and certainty,
further enhancing capital liquidity. Beyond
the corporate structure, master limited
partnerships in the United States have ben-
efited from a clear, credible and stable
regulatory regime, which has created con-
fidence among investors less familiar with
the energy industry. Regulated access
charges, a history of long-term contracts,
and a stable regulatory and tax regime
helped lower the risk of an investment and
attract new capital.
1. Background
The United States is the world’s largest oil
consumer. The level of domestic crude oil pro-
duction has increased over the past few years,
reversing a decline that began in 1986. Accord-
ing to the IEA, crude oil production increased
from 5 million barrels a day in 2008 to just less
than 5.7 million barrels a day in 2011 and 6.5
million barrels a day in 2012. This increase in oil
production was largely brought about by new
seismic and horizontal drilling technology and
hydraulic fracturing, bringing domestic resources
that were previously considered non-viable into
production.
Pipelines are the common transport mode for
shipping crude oil and refined products. In total,
the country has more than 275,000 km of
crude-gathering and distribution pipelines, oper-
ated by 2338 companies. The top 10 operators
alone run almost 90,000 km of pipeline. In 2011,
this network delivered 514.3 million barrels a
day of crude oil between regions. The highest
concentration of pipelines is in the Gulf Coast,
which is also home to almost half the country’s
refining capacity.
Because of the capital-intensive nature of
pipeline operations, many companies have
sought to structure these units as master limited
partnerships, publicly traded businesses that are
taxed as partnerships. Unlike a corporation, a
19.2 The Midstream Segment: Building Infrastructure and Managing Access 449
partnership in the United States is classified as a
pass-through entity and is not liable for federal
income taxes. Instead, partners pay tax based on
their allocated share of the partnership. The
structure offers two significant advantages. First,
tax is levied only at a single level of federal
income tax, which is applied individually on the
total income of each member of the partner-
ship. The master limited partnerships do not pay
corporation tax. The other advantage is that
favourable tax treatment allows a master limited
partnership to access lower-cost capital than if it
were taxed as a corporation.
These advantages make the master limited
partnership approach an especially attractive
option for capital-intensive pipeline infrastruc-
ture transmission enterprises.
2. Benefits to infrastructure owners
One example of the structure was Shell Mid-
stream Partners, a master limited partnership that
held onshore and offshore oil infrastructure.
Three of the four pipelines in its portfolio served
the Gulf Coast, while the fourth reached into the
Northeast (Fig. 19.15).
For the infrastructure owner, a particular
advantage of this corporate structure is that the
business retains control of the pipelines. Unlike

















































Fig. 19.15 Shell midstream partners pipelines
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unitholders—investors holding shares of master
limited partnerships—are not entitled to elect the
general partner or any directors. Instead, they
benefit from a stream of income in accordance
with their ownership interest, while the partner-
ship itself is managed by a board of directors and
executive officers appointed by a general partner,
in this case Shell Pipeline Company LP, an
affiliate of Shell. The distribution of ownership
interests varied across the pipelines in the port-
folio (Table 19.3).
Launching an initial public offering for Shell
Midstream Partners allowed Shell to release
capital for investment elsewhere in its value
chain and optimise its risk profile. It also allowed
Shell to divest itself of low-return, non-core
assets and to improve its focus on other activities.
At the same time, investors in Midstream Part-
ners, such as pension funds, were attracted by its
lower risk-return profile.
3. Importance of the regulatory framework
The regulatory framework provided certainty
for investment by detailing eligible assets and
activities. Master limited partnerships were only
possible as a result of the regulatory authorities
providing rules for partnership treatment: federal
rules on qualifying income and assets gave Shell
the necessary certainty to proceed. It also enabled
Shell to offer stable and predictable cash flows to
investors. Rules on access meant that Midstream
Partners’ assets generated stable revenue under
FERC-based tariffs and long-term transportation
agreements. In addition, ship-or-pay contracts
mitigated volatility in cash flows by limiting
exposure to changing market dynamics that
could reduce production and affect shipper
demand. Finally, life-of-lease agreements, some
of which have a guaranteed return, reduced cash
flow exposure to volume reductions.
19.3 Unbundling Midstream
Infrastructure
Midstream infrastructure unbundling is a critical
step in natural gas market liberalisation progress
and in the promotion of natural gas market
competition. This section analyses the effects of
unbundling with the background of natural gas
market liberalisation as well as related goals of
unbundling. In addition, a comparison of five
partition models is carried out using case studies
from the United Kingdom, the European Union
and Japan. These case studies offer experience
and a reference point to China in its future
unbundling work.
Natural gas markets have historically been
dominated by large vertically integrated compa-
nies operating across the various segments of the
value chain. Vertically integrated pipeline own-
ers face particularly strong incentives to engage
in anti-competitive behaviour, charging exces-
sive rates to third-party natural gas shippers for
access to midstream infrastructure to protect
profits in their own production or retail
businesses.
Unbundling seeks to separate the incentives
facing midstream operations from those of
upstream and downstream operations and to
reduce the opportunity and incentives for
Table 19.3 Shell Midstream Partners ownership rights allocation
Entity Shell Midstream Partners
(%)








43.0 57.0 563 375
Mars 28.6 42.9 262 400
Bengal 49.0 1.0 254 515
Colonial 1.6 14.5 8851 2500
Notes SPLC is Shell Pipeline Company Limited Partners; kbpd is thousand barrels per day; ownership interests may not
add to 100%
19.2 The Midstream Segment: Building Infrastructure and Managing Access 451
anti-competitive behaviour. Without this, owners
of midstream assets will retain an incentive to
operate in a way that favours their upstream or
downstream businesses. Unbundling focuses on
the midstream segment because of its natural
monopolies and the potential for misusing mar-
ket power (Fig. 19.16).
Full ownership unbundling is the most com-
plete form of unbundling, although some models
of unbundling seek to change these incentives
without separation of ownership. For example, if
a single vertically integrated firm participates in
the upstream segment, transportation and retail
sales, but regulation effectively prevents it from
operating its midstream assets to the advantage
its upstream or downstream businesses, vertical
integration does not threaten efficient market
operations.
Unbundling is a key step in natural gas market
liberalisation, as part of a broader effort to create
open access to midstream infrastructure, partic-
ularly to pipelines which have stronger charac-
teristics of natural monopolies. Unbundling is
required in addition to third-party-access
regimes. Third-party access requirements
address the incentive of a natural monopoly
owner to charge very high prices to maximise its
profits, reducing pipeline utilisation in the pro-
cess. Unbundling requirements, on the other
hand, address the incentive for vertically inte-
grated owners to make monopoly profits by
favouring their vertically integrated partners and
excluding third parties.
Vertically integrated companies can misuse
their market power even if third-party access to
midstream assets is allowed, for example through
a lack of transparency over available capacity
and prices or through onerous contracting or
technical studies requirements for third parties.
Such anti-competitive behaviour can be remedied
by strict policing of third-party access rules, but
removing the incentive for this behaviour
through unbundling has been seen by many
regulators as a part of the solution. Unbundling is
not itself the goal, but rather a means to ensure
that third-party access is effective. The success of
an unbundling regime should be measured by the















There are degrees of
unbundling, so the midstream
may remain connected in some
way to the original company
Fig. 19.16 Unbundling is the separation of midstream business from that of upstream and downstream business
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package in supporting an efficient and competi-
tive gas market.
19.3.1 Models of Unbundling
Five unbundling models are defined and exam-
ined using case studies from the United King-
dom, the European Union and Japan. They are:
• Service unbundling: Businesses must offer
use of their midstream assets as a distinct
service separate from the wholesale supply of
natural gas.
• Account unbundling: Midstream businesses
must maintain separate accounts from
upstream and downstream businesses to pre-
vent cross-subsidisation and distorting
behaviour.
• Legal unbundling: Midstream assets are
placed into a separate legal entity, such as a
wholly-owned subsidiary, to reinforce the
operational separation of these assets from
other assets within a vertically integrated
entity.
• Structural unbundling: Strict regulatory
requirements are placed on how a midstream
business is operated to ensure that it supports
the efficient operation of the natural gas
market, rather than to the benefit of related
upstream or downstream interests.
• Ownership unbundling: The legal entity that
owns midstream assets does not have com-
mon ownership with upstream or downstream
interests, fully separating their economic
incentives.
Each of these models builds sequentially on
each other, alongside an overarching process
known as functional unbundling, which can
reinforce each of these models. Functional
unbundling restrictions can vary from being
fairly mild to quite onerous. They could include,
for instance, requiring separate management,
locations, support units and logos, prohibiting the
sharing of information, and imposing additional
compliance and reporting requirements. Func-
tional unbundling is a critical element of any
unbundling process. To illustrate, a legally
unbundled midstream business that shared man-
agement or offices with a related upstream or
downstream business could be less effective than,
say, a midstream business that legally remained
part of a vertically integrated entity, but had more
rigorous separation of staff and management.
Each of the five models of unbundling serves
different purposes and follows sequential chan-
ges in moving from service unbundling to own-
ership unbundling (Table 19.4).
19.3.2 Key Insights from the Case
Studies
Our review of international experience in
unbundling midstream assets from upstream and
downstream businesses produced three general
insights that might be valuable to China’s policy
discussions.
• Complete ownership unbundling is not
necessary under a strong regulator. The
case studies indicated that there are viable
models that don’t require full ownership
unbundling. In particular, structural unbund-
ling under a strong regulator could capture
many of the benefits of full ownership
unbundling. Of the country case studies, only
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands
pursued full ownership unbundling. France
and Germany argued for structural unbund-
ling that fell short of full ownership unbund-
ling, and the latest EU Gas Directive included
this option along with strong regulatory
measures to enforce a well-developed struc-
tural unbundling model. Experience in the
United States also suggested that a competi-
tive natural gas market can be supported
without mandatory ownership unbundling,
provided the operations of transmission
companies are tightly prescribed. Each of
these cases followed a unique path to
unbundling (Fig. 19.17).
In general, structural unbundling can be
effective if the regulator is strong. However,
anything less than structural unbundling is
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likely to be inadequate in delivering liber-
alised natural gas markets. The experience of
the United Kingdom and Japan indicated that
service unbundling alone offered few benefits
and that service and account unbundling,
combined with meaningful functional
unbundling, was the minimum viable
unbundling models. However, this combina-
tion of unbundling models should be seen as
a stepping stone to deeper unbundling, rather
than an end point. The European experience
also indicated that legal unbundling offered
little without moving to deeper structural
unbundling, complemented with functional
unbundling.
These observations suggest a streamlined
unbundling process consisting of three steps
(Fig. 19.18). Functional unbundling supports
this process at key junctions, principally in
the account, legal and structural unbundling
phases.
• Domestic production can increase the
benefits of unbundling. A key benefit of
unbundling was to open upstream activities to
Table 19.4 Operational changes resulting from five types of unbundling
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Note Structural unbundling encompasses the independent transmission operator model within the EU’s Third Gas
Package
Source Vivid Economics, based on Gao
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competition and efficient production. In mar-
kets that had few indigenous natural gas
resources and were heavily reliant on imports,
unbundling and other open-access measures
promoted the efficient delivery of natural gas
to market, but had only a limited impact on
upstream activity. In contrast, in countries





























































Fig. 19.18 Streamlined unbundling process (three steps only)
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unbundling and other open-access measures
could promote domestic production by
enhancing access to downstream wholesale
and retail markets. Indeed, countries with
more domestic production have tended to
unbundle earlier and more comprehensively
(Fig. 19.19).
The Netherlands and United Kingdom, with
their indigenous North Sea resources, pursued
unbundling more rapidly than nations such as
France and Germany with limited domestic
reserves. The United States, with its sub-
stantial and geographically diverse upstream
resources, was the world leader in unbundling
efforts, requiring legal and other structural
unbundling measures as early as 1992. Japan,
with its negligible domestic natural gas
resources, pursued unbundling only tenta-
tively. This suggests that countries with sig-
nificant domestic resources perceive higher
economic benefits from unbundling—in
terms of promoting a dynamic and competi-
tive upstream sector and unlocking the eco-
nomic and energy security benefits of
domestic production—and are more willing
to pursue these reforms.
• LNG and storage facilities tend to face less
strict unbundling regimes than pipelines.
Unbundling requirements for LNG terminals
and storage facilities were generally less
stringent than for pipelines, reflecting the
greater potential for competitive pressure on
these facilities, as well as the relatively new
development of this type of infrastructure. The
potential for LNG regasification terminals or
storage facilities to exercise excessive market
power depends on the number of alternative
providers of similar services. In a physically
well-connected market, LNG terminals are























































Fig. 19.19 Correlation of domestic natural gas production volumes and levels of and timing of unbundling. Note
Characterising 1992 reforms in the United States as structural unbundling is based on the strong non-discrimination,
transparency and capacity release requirements of FERC Order 636, reinforced with extensive functional unbundling
measures. Source Vivid Economics, based on Gao and IEA
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many others and have limited market power.
Similarly, a diversified and well-connected
market may have multiple storage providers,
as well as other options such as pipeline
linepack (in which natural gas is stored in the
pipeline), flexible production capacity and
demand curtailment. Other than in very small
or fragmented markets, the potential for LNG
terminals and storage facilities to exercise
market power is likely to be limited. As a
result, both unbundling and third-party access
requirements tended to be more lenient for
these facilities.
19.3.3 Case Study 1: The UK—The
Long and Difficult Road
to Spinoff
Despite the United Kingdom’s position today as
an exemplary case of full natural gas supply
chain unbundling, the process has been far from
smooth. Regulatory arrangements were reviewed
and amended on numerous occasions before the
present market structure was largely reached in
2000. Unbundling was not always synchronised
with liberalisation, and with measures to intro-
duce competition in the broader gas market. Full
ownership unbundling was only achieved in
2000 when the then British Gas Plc separated its
Transco subsidiary into the separately owned
Lattice Group Plc, well after the emergence of
substantial gas market competition through the
early and mid-1990s.
By that time, substantial competition had
already emerged in large parts of the UK natural
gas market. British Gas had already lost signifi-
cant market share before major reforms under the
Gas Act of 1995 were implemented. The Gas
Release Scheme, for instance, had forced British
Gas to release natural gas contracts to competing
suppliers. A compounding factor was that many
of British Gas’s legacy North Sea natural gas
contracts were priced higher than prevailing
market prices, pressuring the company’s market
position.
The first phase of reform was marked by the
Gas Act of 1986. The act privatised the
state-owned British Gas Corp. as British Gas Plc
and provided a limited form of service unbund-
ling of the company’s pipeline operations. The
act allowed larger natural gas customers to
source natural gas from any authorised supplier
and required British Gas to allow these suppliers
to use its pipelines. In effect, British Gas was told
to offer a standalone pipeline service to com-
petitors seeking to supply large customers.
However, this service unbundling was not sup-
ported by account or functional unbundling and
proved to be largely ineffective. The Monopolies
and Mergers Commission found in 1988 that
British Gas had been abusing its market position
by engaging in price discrimination and sought to
address this by requiring the company to publish
common carriage terms to support pipeline
access. The change, however, was still largely
ineffective.
Subsequent reviews by the Office of Fair
Trading in 1991 and the Monopolies and Merg-
ers Commission in 1993 suggested that further
unbundling was necessary to promote competi-
tion. The Office of Fair Trading review addressed
a range of other structural elements of the natural
gas market other than unbundling. It led to Bri-
tish Gas undertaking to make supply available to
competitors under the Gas Release Strategy,
which triggered a substantial reduction in its
market share with large industrial customers
between 1991 and 1993. It was these provisions,
rather than its unbundling recommendations, that
were instrumental in driving a decline in British
Gas’s market share.
In response to the critical 1993 Monopolies
and Mergers Commission review, British Gas
bypassed the account unbundling phase and
voluntarily moved directly to legal unbundling in
1994. A transportation and storage subsidiary,
Transco, was created and separated from British
Gas’s trading and sales activities. Despite the
commission’s recommendation for full owner-
ship unbundling, in response to regulatory and
commercial pressures, the unbundling of British
Gas progressed in two further phases.
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The Gas Act of 1995 required Transco to
establish a Network Code to govern the national
transmission system, which effectively consti-
tuted structural unbundling of the network busi-
ness. The code was published in 1996,
establishing the rules and procedures for
third-party access to pipelines and introducing a
regime for daily balancing. The code strength-
ened access to the pipeline system for natural gas
market players, supporting competition even
though Transco remained a British Gas
subsidiary.
However, this business structure did not last,
as competitive pressures built around British
Gas. The 1995 Gas Act extended the scope of
competition to include the smallest, residential
customers, and full retail competition was
implemented across the United Kingdom by
1997. As competition in both large and small
user markets deepened, the relatively high price
of British Gas’s legacy upstream contracts for
North Sea gas weighed on its business. The
pressure prompted British Gas to voluntarily
divest its trading and sales businesses. British
Gas was unbundled into two entities: Centrica
plc, which held sales and retail units, as well as
upstream assets in Morecombe Bay, and BG plc,
which retained Transco, the midstream unit, as
well as domestic and global upstream assets.
This structural unbundling model appears to
have been effective, even though Transco
remained a subsidiary of BG, a major upstream
player. Transco held some ownership of
upstream assets, and its separation from BG was
maintained by the Network Code.
The final step in full ownership unbundling
came in 2000, when BG split into the BG Group
and the Lattice Group, which took ownership of
Transco. The split meant that Transco was
entirely separated from all upstream and down-
stream assets. Further ownership changes saw the
Lattice Group merge with the operator of the
United Kingdom’s electricity grid, National Grid,
in 2002 and sell off some local distribution net-
works in 2005. While Transco initially included
storage assets, these were spun off into a storage
subsidiary, which was privatised in 2001 and
purchased by Centrica in 2002.





The EU regulatory regime has evolved towards
greater unbundling over the course of three major
regulatory packages since 1998. These stages
broadly comprise account and functional
unbundling in 1998, legal unbundling from 2003
and more detailed structural and ownership
bundling approaches since 2009. Some member
states have moved to comply with EU directives
more swiftly than others, and several have gone
beyond the minimum requirements of EU
regulation.
Differences on the merits of unbundling have
led to a diversity of approaches among EU
member states and an EU regulatory approach
that offers a menu of unbundling options rather
than a single prescriptive model. Development of
the Third Gas Directive was contentious and
ultimately led to a political and regulatory com-
promise that offered two main unbundling mod-
els: structural unbundling and ownership
unbundling.
The characteristics of the member states that
took different positions within this debate illu-
minate the motivations and concerns of those
arguing for and against ownership unbundling
models. For example, countries with domestic
natural gas resources, such as the United King-
dom and The Netherlands, appear to be more
enthusiastic proponents of unbundling. The
benefits of unbundling are greater in such coun-
tries, promoting competition among natural gas
producers. Conversely, in countries like Ger-
many, where there are limited domestic natural
gas resources and the primary physical assets
held by natural gas businesses are pipelines,
unbundling was more hesitant. These funda-
mental differences could, in part, explain varying
regulatory attitudes toward unbundling.
The First Gas Directive successfully achieved
account unbundling, but does not appear to have
had substantial effects on gas market competi-
tion. The directive required separate accounts for
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transmission, distribution and storage activities to
support transparency and competition in these
activities. A 2003 benchmarking report by the
European Commission found that all member
states had complied with minimum account
unbundling requirements and several had gone
further to legal or ownership unbundling. How-
ever, the same report noted that prospects for
competition in the natural gas market were lag-
ging significantly behind those for electricity in
many member states, citing Germany in partic-
ular. Around 2001, the European Commission
itself began arguing that the first package of
measures had been ineffective and that further
reforms were needed.
One weakness of the First Gas Directive may
have been limited functional unbundling in sup-
port of the core model of account unbundling.
While the directive included some broad provi-
sions against discriminatory behaviour and a
general requirement for transmission providers
not to abuse commercially sensitive information
obtained from third parties, it did not include
detailed and enforceable provisions to separate
information and management systems between
transmission and other business units. Some
member states, including The Netherlands and
Ireland, voluntarily adopted functional unbund-
ling measures to separate management of trans-
portation businesses. Others, such as Austria,
Belgium, Denmark and Italy, went further,
adopting legal unbundling. Meanwhile, Spain
and the United Kingdom moved to ownership
unbundling. However, some major member
states, notably France and Germany, only
implemented the directive’s minimum require-
ment of account unbundling and appear to have
been slower in progressing natural gas market
competition during this period.
The Second Gas Directive, adopted in 2003,
mandated the legal separation of transmission
businesses, reinforced with functional unbund-
ling measures. The directive required transmis-
sion system operators to be “independent at least
in terms of legal form, organisation, and
decision-making from other activities not relating
to transmission”. Specific functional unbundling
measures required entirely separate management,
effective independent decision-making rights and
a compliance programme to maintain indepen-
dence. Member states adopted elements of the
Second Gas Directive at different speeds and to
differing degrees. By 2005, for example, The
Netherlands had established full ownership
unbundling, while Germany had only imple-
mented minimum regulatory requirements for a
legal unbundling regime.
Policy-makers and market observers quickly
concluded the Second Gas Directive was also
ineffective in promoting competition and argued
for further reform. A 2007 European Commis-
sion report found that “wholesale gas trade has
been slow to develop, and the incumbents remain
dominant in their traditional markets”. It con-
cluded that the level of unbundling in place was
inadequate to “resolve the systemic conflict of
interest inherent in the vertical integration of
supply and network activities”. In the same year,
an IEA review of German energy policies con-
cluded that legal unbundling was ineffective and
that the involvement of traders in pipeline busi-
nesses had limited the liquidity of wholesale
markets. A similar 2009 IEA review of French
energy policies identified the dominance of
GDF-Suez, especially in the bilateral trade of
wholesale natural gas, as constraining the ability
of other market players to supply the French
market.
Earlier reform efforts had targeted mandatory
ownership unbundling. For example, the Euro-
pean Commission argued in 2007 that “full
ownership unbundling is the most effective means
to ensure choice for energy users and encourage
investment.” However, nine member states—in-
cluding France and Germany—opposed full
ownership unbundling, saying that it would not
improve competition or reduce prices. They
argued that breaking up large, vertically integrated
energy companies would weaken their negotiating
power in international markets—for example with
powerful external suppliers such as Russia’s
Gazprom—with no benefit to consumers.
The adoption of the Third Gas Directive was
contentious, with several large member states
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arguing against mandatory ownership unbund-
ling. The compromise captured in the Third
Directive presented ownership unbundling as the
ideal model, but allowed member states to
choose from two alternative structural unbund-
ling models. The directive recommended full
ownership unbundling as “the most effective tool
by which to promote investments in infrastruc-
ture in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to
the network for new entrants, and transparency
for the market”. It also argued that the two
alternative models, the independent transmission
operator (ITO) model and the independent sys-
tem operator (ISO) model, “should enable a
vertically integrated undertaking to maintain
ownership of network assets while ensuring an
effective separation of interests, provided that…
extensive regulatory control mechanisms are put
in place”.
The ISO and ITO models were essentially less
stringent forms of unbundling. Unlike ownership
unbundling, setting up an ISO or ITO would let
transmission networks remain under the owner-
ship of vertically integrated firms.
EU member states have adopted either full
ownership unbundling or the ITO model. The
United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and
Spain have ownership unbundling models,
though these regimes were in place before the
Third Gas Directive was adopted. Elsewhere, the
ITO model has been adopted, complemented by
a range of strong functional unbundling
requirements. By mid-2014, 21 natural gas
transmission operators had been certified.
No country had pursued the ISO model by
mid-2014. The core element of the ISO model
was that network ownership remains with a sub-
sidiary of the vertically integrated entity, but
system operation and investment decisions are
made by a legally separate entity with separate
ownership. Vertically integrated companies
seemed unconvinced by an approach that would
require them to fund investments made by entirely
separate entities, while the ITO model allowed
investment decisions to be made jointly by the
parent company and the regulatory authority.
The choice between the full unbundling and
the ITO model may reflect different evolutionary
stages in the development of natural gas markets.
Countries that embraced full ownership
unbundling started their reform processes earlier
and progressed more rapidly along the spectrum
of unbundling models. The progress made in
markets such as the United Kingdom and The
Netherlands may reflect the maturity of their
unbundling efforts, rather than the advantage of
ownership unbundling over alternative models.
Indeed, an effective and mature structural
unbundling model may be sufficient to support
and enable competition in the upstream and
downstream segments of the natural gas value
chain.
19.3.5 Case Study 3: Japan—Market
Characteristics
Restricting Unbundling
Japan’s two tentative attempts at unbundling
appear to have had only a modest effect on its
natural gas market, although the lack of compe-
tition may also reflect the fundamentals of the
Japanese markets as much as the merits of its
regulatory efforts. One of the benefits of
unbundling appears to be a dynamic upstream
market, but since Japan has no domestic natural
gas resources, this incentive is less compelling.
Minimal pipeline interconnectivity further limits
the potential for regulation to unlock competi-
tion. In general, the limitations of Japan’s
unbundling efforts since 1995 may be both a
symptom and a cause of the lack of competition.
Japan began its unbundling measures in 1995
with a service unbundling regime. The 1995
reform required Japan’s three largest natural gas
companies to offer pipeline services to competi-
tors seeking to supply large consumers, under-
pinning the emerging third-party access regime.
These requirements were extended to additional
customers in 1999. They were reinforced in 2000
with functional unbundling requirements that
directed companies to separate the transportation
function from other elements of their business.
However, the measures were lenient and did not
materially change the behaviour of incumbent
natural gas suppliers. A second wave of reform in
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2003 and 2004 introduced account unbundling
supported by new and more stringent functional
unbundling requirements. The functional
unbundling measures required separate physical
office locations, staff functions, and decision-
making and prohibited information sharing.
Compliance improved, but was not uniform.
The overall reform programme has been only
modestly successful, with markets remaining
highly concentrated. As of 2012, three large,
vertically integrated players together supplied
around 70% of the market. Companies wanting
to use pipelines owned by other companies have
complained of entry barriers and opaque access
requirements. In particular, many complained
of insufficient information on the available
capacity of pipelines and on standards and pro-
cedures for assessing fees and other compensa-
tion mechanisms.
The Japanese experience suggests that
account and functional unbundling can deliver
benefits, but its value may have been limited by
the fundamentals of the Japanese natural gas
market. Service and account unbundling, com-
bined with meaningful functional unbundling,
appears to be the minimum viable unbundling
model, acting as a stepping stone to more
advanced unbundling model.
19.3.6 Unbundling LNG Terminals
and Gas Storage
Facilities
Unbundling requirements for LNG terminals and
storage facilities are generally less stringent than
for pipelines, reflecting the greater potential for
competitive pressure on these facilities, as well as
the relatively new development of this type of
infrastructure. The potential for LNG regasifica-
tion terminals or storage facilities to exercise
market power depends on the number of alter-
native providers of similar services and the
degree of interconnection between them. In most
markets, there are likely to be a larger number of
LNG terminals and storage sites than pipeline
routes because of the smaller economies of scale.
Moreover, in a physically well-connected
market, LNG terminals will compete with each
other and with other sources of supply, limiting
their market power. Similarly, a diversified and
well-connected market may have multiple stor-
age providers, alongside storage services pro-
vided by pipeline linepack, flexible production
capacity and demand curtailment.
Except in very small or fragmented markets,
the potential for LNG terminals and storage
facilities to exercise market power is likely to be
limited, and regulations mandating unbundling
and third-party access requirements will not tend
to be as stringent as for pipelines. For example,
Japan requires only account unbundling for LNG
facilities and places no requirements on storage
facilities. Unbundling requirements in the Euro-
pean Union are stronger than those in Japan for
both LNG regasification terminals and storage
facilities, with both types of facilities required to
have unbundled accounts. In addition, storage
operators cannot participate in company struc-
tures of vertically integrated natural gas compa-
nies, imposing an additional functional
unbundling requirement.
A range of European LNG and storage facil-
ities have gone beyond the minimum regulatory
requirements for account unbundling, adopting
either legal or ownership unbundling. In some
cases, particularly for LNG terminals, legal
unbundling has been adopted for practical rea-
sons associated with forming joint ventures.
Ownership unbundling has been adopted in
instances when transportation assets face
unbundling requirements, and since storage
facilities or LNG terminals are held by trans-
portation owners, they become unbundled from
upstream and downstream interests by default. In
other cases, legal unbundling through
wholly-owned subsidiaries has occurred on a
voluntary basis, possibly pre-empting regulatory
requirements to unbundle or other regulations
limiting the benefits of vertical integration.
Finally, new LNG terminals can receive an
exemption from third-party requirements if,
among other things, they are unbundled.
Examples of LNG facilities and storage
facilities and their prevailing level of unbundling
show a wide range of approaches (Table 19.5).
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Overall, the range of experience suggests that
access to LNG or storage terminals is not a key
regulatory concern in the European market and
that legal unbundling of these facilities is not an
imposition on normal commercial behaviour.
19.4 The Downstream Segment:
Natural Gas Trading Hubs
and the Liberalisation
of Wholesale Natural Gas
Markets
The downstream segment of the natural gas value
chain includes wholesale and retail markets
supplying gas to end users. Greater competition
in the downstream segment can increase choice
and reduce the price paid by the end users of
natural gas, for example by establishing natural
gas hubs and increasing competition in wholesale
markets. Competitive wholesale markets, in turn,
are important for ensuring effective retail com-
petition and delivering benefits for consumers
and end users. Whether focused on a physical
location, such as Henry Hub in the United States,
or a virtual platform, such as Britain’s NBP,
activity on wholesale markets is the dominant
factor in pricing and delivering natural gas to
retailers and, eventually, end users.
This section analyses the experience of the
United States, the United Kingdom and conti-
nental Europe in constructing natural gas trading


















































































Legal GDF-Suez Storengy (gas
reserve subsidiary)
Note Gate LNG could be characterised primarily as ownership unbundling as 95% of the company is held by parties
with no upstream or downstream interests, and, formally, the 5% ownership held by terminal users could justify its
classification as legally unbundled
462 19 A Close Look at the Natural Gas Industry Chain
hubs, providing a reference point to China in
promoting its own natural gas downstream mar-
ket liberalisation.
19.4.1 Pros and Cons of Natural Gas
Hubs
There are two basic types of natural gas hub:
physical hubs, such Henry Hub in the United
States, and virtual hubs, such as the NBP in the
United Kingdom. The IEA defines a physical hub
as a geographical point in the network where the
price is set for natural gas delivered to that
specific location. A virtual hub, on the other
hand, sets the price for natural gas across a wider
geographic area. Unlike a physical hub, the NBP
price reflects the price in the entire area without
geographic differentials linked to transport costs.
In general, a natural gas hub cannot be both
physical and virtual, but it can evolve over time,
for instance, starting as a physical hub and then
expanding to become a wider virtual hub.
A natural gas hub has two core functions. The
first is to physically connect buyers and sellers in
a natural gas system. Before the creation of a
hub, a gas system may already have many or all
of the individual elements required for a hub, and
some of them may already be connected. A hub
strengthens these connections by linking physical
flows between buyers and sellers across the
entire system (Fig. 19.20). The second is to
competitively determination natural gas prices.
A gas hub provides a point or area in the gas
network where demand and supply are balanced
by a price. This balancing price is determined
through competition between many buyers and
sellers in the marketplace. In this way, hub prices
reflect the fundamental market conditions for
natural gas rather than prices tied to other com-
modities such as oil-indexed prices or regulated
prices set by the government.
Natural gas hubs also provide a set of insti-
tutional rules, standardised contracts and price
benchmarks. Hub prices serve as a focal point for
market participants, ensuring that natural gas
market conditions are widely known. In this way,
hubs increase market transparency and lower
transaction costs. Hub prices can also be used as
references in contracts without delivery through
the hub itself.
The creation of a natural gas hub comes with a
variety of benefits, but also has potential draw-
backs. The benefits include:
• Market-based price signals raise the eco-
nomic efficiency of trade and investment
decisions. The competitive trading of natural
gas sets a price that reflects the true cost and
value of gas in the economy. These compet-
itive prices direct natural gas to where it is























Fig. 19.20 The position of natural gas hubs in connecting buyers and sellers
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cheaply. Trade takes place only when it is
economically efficient, maximising the over-
all gains from trade. Such co-ordination is
difficult to achieve other than through market
mechanisms, especially in large and complex
gas systems. In the longer term, the signals
from competitive prices raise the quality of
capital allocation as they drive natural gas
market players to make investments only
when they can create real economic value.
• Hubs benefit from powerful and often
self-reinforcing network effects. Better
market co-ordination, contact standardisation
and greater transparency facilitate trading by
reducing the costs of transactions. A hub
lowers market participants’ costs in searching
for trading partners, who can now be easily
found at exchanges or over the counter at the
hub. A hub also reduces bargaining over the
terms of the trade: a reference price and
standardised contracts avoid wasted time and
resources in negotiation over the terms of
bespoke bilateral contracts. By reducing
transaction costs, a hub makes it easier for
new players to enter the natural gas market,
widening market participation and increasing
competition.
• A natural gas hub can improve a country’s
security of energy supply. Hubs help to
diversify sources of supply; for example, by
connecting regions within a country. More-
over, efficient price signals mean that, when
markets are tight, additional supply is
encouraged to come to market while also
inducing reductions in gas demand. This
helps to reduce the likelihood of unantici-
pated natural gas shortages.
However, natural gas trading hubs also have
some potential drawbacks:
• Hubs can disrupt pre-existing arrange-
ments in a country’s natural gas industry.
In particular, hub prices are determined by
competitive forces, not by the government or
a dominant incumbent. A transition to hub
pricing puts pressure on incumbent players
and leads to a shift in the structure of natural
gas markets. Hub pricing also puts pressure
on regulated prices, as well as any remaining
oil-indexed contracts. For example, the
international trend since 2005 towards hub
pricing, most notably in Europe, has reduced
the role of long-term, oil-linked contracts.
Natural gas in North America is almost
entirely priced on hubs, while half of Euro-
pean natural gas is priced on hubs, rather than
through oil-indexed contracts.
• There is no guarantee that prices will
decline with the emergence of hub pricing.
At any particular time, hub prices may be
higher or lower than oil-indexed contract
prices. However, there appears to be a ten-
dency for hub prices to be lower. For exam-
ple, NBP prices were below European
oil-indexed prices 77% of the time between
2000 and 2014. An increase in prices may
have adverse impacts on broader state
development objectives, especially in poorer
regions, for example putting upward price
pressure on domestic heating. However, hubs
tend to develop when the oil-indexed contract
price fails to clear the market, that is, when
supply is available in excess of contracted
volumes and demand for this extra supply
exists at prices below oil-indexed contract
prices. As a result, the hub price paid for
non-contracted volumes will be below the
oil-indexed contract price, and the potential
savings between oil-indexed prices and hub
prices encourage buyers to switch from
oil-indexed contracts to hubs.
• Hub prices have tended to be more volatile
than oil-indexed contract prices. Because of
averaging and time lags, oil-indexed contracts
tend to be less volatile than hub prices. The
volatility of hub prices may be perceived as
costly by natural gas buyers, although expe-
rience suggests that such price risks can be
managed, especially in well-developed hub
markets with a wide array of financial con-
tracts for natural gas.
A China natural gas hub is likely to create
long-lasting benefits, while its drawbacks are
likely to be temporary. China’s large and
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complex domestic gas market could benefit from
value-based pricing, market co-ordination and
lower transaction costs. China’s market size
means that valuable network effects could also
operate more strongly. A natural gas hub could
further encourage local gas production, including
from shale natural gas, and improve energy
import diversity and responsiveness. Consumer
gas prices could fall following the establishment
of hub pricing, although they could rise again
later.
19.4.2 The Important Inspiration of
International Experience
in the Development
of Natural Gas Trading
Hubs
A successful natural gas hub can only develop
and be successful under a clear set of physical,
market, and institutional conditions (Table 19.6).
These conditions follow from the functions that a
natural gas hub performs, informed by the
experience from countries that have developed
hubs.
Since the 1990s, the world has accumulated
considerable experience in creating and devel-
oping natural gas hubs. This experience centres
on US and European markets. The US natural
gas market was restructured in the 1980s and
1990s, and its Henry Hub price has become the
world’s leading natural gas price indicator.
A similar process of liberalisation began in the
United Kingdom in the 1990s, leading to creation
of the NBP, the leading hub in Europe. In con-
tinental Europe, market liberalisation began later
and has proceeded more slowly as part of
European Commission’s plans for an Internal
Energy Market.
Insights from the experience of the United
States, continental Europe and the United King-
dom could benefit China. Indeed, China shares
some structural features with the United States—
in particular, both are geographically vast, with
domestic production far removed from centres of
demand. These characteristics suggest that, like
the US Henry Hub, China may need a physical
hub to accommodate significant differences in
transmission costs to various dispersed destina-
tions. Essentially, a physical hub prices natural
gas at a single physical point of the network,
after which transmission costs are added. This
contrasts with a virtual hub, such as the NBP,
which sets the price for natural gas within a
region and imposes a fixed transmission cost for
natural gas delivered within that region. A virtual
hub is appropriate for a market with a relatively
small delivery region and fixed transmission
costs. The situation in China may be best served
by multiple hubs that follow the pricing of a main
hub, a structure similar to that seen in the United
States.
The process of building a hub in Europe also
has relevance for China. Hub development in
Table 19.6 Necessary preconditions in three areas for the successful development of a natural gas hub
Area Precondition Description
Physical Well-developed natural gas
transmission network
Connection of domestic and foreign natural gas supply to demand
Open-access to pipeline network by suppliers
Market Large numbers of participants Sufficiently large number of market participants, both as buyers and
sellers
Low market concentration No dominant supplier or consumer
Possibility of natural gas imports
Trading activity Entrepreneurial activity to arbitrage prices, requiring third-party
access, part of supply uncontracted and part of demand contestable;
price reporting agencies
Institutional Liberalisation of price
determination
Liberalised prices for wholesale natural gas and along the supply
chain
Stable regulatory framework Competition policy and market regulation ensures level playing field
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continental Europe and the United Kingdom took
place against a backdrop of domestic production
and imported natural gas, both through pipeline
and as LNG. In contrast, US hub development
took place without LNG playing an important
role. Continental European natural gas markets
have also been undergoing a gradual transition
from a highly regulated, state-dominated system
in the 1990s towards a fully liberalised system.
Finally, potentially analogous to Asian markets,
Europe has been home to several regional hubs
that coexist on the EU natural gas market.
Overall, a robust and credible liberalisation
process, along with favourable market condi-
tions, has been instrumental in the development
of natural gas hubs. The US experience shows
that open access to pipelines is critical for
market-based pricing, and that liberalisation can
help wholesale markets shift away from
long-term contracts and towards market-based
pricing in 5–10 years. The experience of conti-
nental Europe is of hubs being established as a
result of favourable market conditions enabled by
the regulatory reform process. In these cases,
market forces created a buyers’ market in natural
gas, which, combined with the liberalisation of
natural gas markets, accelerated hub develop-
ment. The UK experience is one of market and
regulatory changes working in parallel to
increase competition in wholesale markets,
leading to the establishment of the NBP. Stan-
dardisation of contracts played a key role in
driving hub success in the United Kingdom.




The US natural gas market underwent funda-
mental reform beginning in the 1980s, with the
emergence of ample natural gas supplies and
regulatory changes to liberalise the market. In the
1980s and early 1990s, the US regulator, FERC,
implemented reforms to decouple the production
and trading of natural gas from its transportation
by pipeline. The economic argument was that the
production and consumption of natural gas can
involve many different buyers and sellers and has
the potential to be competitive. Meanwhile,
pipeline transport services were often highly
concentrated, as a result of their natural mono-
poly characteristics, and should be regulated. As
an alternative, guaranteed open access for all
market participants on a non-discriminatory basis
could create greater competition among produc-
ers and natural gas shippers and better allocation
of economic resources.
The empirical evidence shows that reforms in
the United States had substantial impact quickly.
In the early 1990s, movements of natural gas
prices in different regions were weakly corre-
lated, with significant price divergence. By the
late 1990s, wholesale price correlations had risen
to very high levels with the application of the law
of one price, an approach that equalised prices
across locations, excluding transport costs. Evi-
dence suggests that regulation to ensure
non-discriminatory open access to pipelines
played a key role in driving the move to a
competitive, national natural gas market.
In parallel, the underlying contract structure of
the industry shifted from long-term contracts to
short-term pricing. Existing long-term contracts
were either renegotiated in light of the changed
market environment or terminated. Spot and
futures prices emerged as the key co-ordinating
mechanisms within the US natural gas sector,
with pricing centred on Henry Hub. Market
concentration fell, with the 20 largest players
accounting for 44% of physical and financial
transaction volumes in 2014. More recently, the
Henry Hub price, plus a mark-up for transport,
has been used in LNG contracts between US
exporters and foreign buyers.




European natural gas hubs began developing
only in 2008, reflecting the slow progress of EU
natural gas market liberalisation. Northern
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Europe is more advanced than southern Europe
in terms of natural gas trading and hub devel-
opment. The legacy system of bilaterally nego-
tiated oil-indexed natural gas contracts remains
more prevalent in the south.
Several factors drove deepened natural gas
trading and hub development in Western Europe
after 2008. The 2008 global financial crisis
dampened European natural gas demand, in
contrast to the boom that had been expected.
Increased shale natural gas production in the
United States meant that the country no longer
imported LNG, with much of the freed supply
diverted to Europe. These two factors created a
buyers’ market in natural gas, and traders and
brokers in key European markets—especially
Germany and France—began to enjoy access to
uncontracted pipeline natural gas. Low natural
gas demand and greater LNG supply coupled
with high oil prices meant that oil-linked contract
prices rose above market-based natural gas pri-
ces, creating powerful incentives for buyers to
renegotiate long-term contracts with upstream
natural gas suppliers, such as Norway and Rus-
sia. Within a few years, long-term contracts had
either been terminated or renegotiated to reflect
market-based hub prices rather than oil prices.
The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is
widely seen as the most successful of the conti-
nental European natural gas trading hubs. The
facility was deliberately designed as a virtual
hub, based on its physical pipeline and LNG
connections, its geographic location and the large
domestic natural gas supply from the Dutch
Groningen field. Development of the TTF
accelerated in the late 2000s, and it has overtaken
NBP as Europe’s most liquid hub. In contrast, the
Belgian Zeebrugge hub is generally seen as a
much less successful natural gas trading centre.
Conditions at Zeebrugge—its location and rela-
tively early development—once suggested that it
could become the leading European natural gas
hub, but local trading restrictions limited the
number of market participants and slowed the
development of its trading platform.
Overall, the move towards more active natural
gas trading has increased the correlation of nat-
ural gas prices across European countries, similar
to the US experience in the 1990s. Spot prices in
the European Union now account for about half
the natural gas trade.
19.4.5 Case Study 3: The UK—Two
Natural Gas Market
Reform Bills
Natural gas market liberalisation began in the
United Kingdom in the 1990s, following a wave
of privatisations in the previous decade. The
United Kingdom was the first country in Europe
to begin natural gas market reform, and aspects
of first-mover advantage remain.
Two pieces of regulation were especially
important to the reform effort in the United
Kingdom. The Gas Act of 1986 removed the de
facto monopoly of British Gas in serving large
natural gas customers, while also requiring open
access to its pipelines for its competitors. The
Gas Act of 1995 set out a statutory timetable for
full competition in the British natural gas market,
including at the residential level. As a result, the
market share held by British Gas declined
rapidly, from nearly 100% in 1990 to 29% by
1996. These institutional and regulatory changes
led to a surge in the number of market partici-
pants and trading activity during the mid-1990s.
Among the new entrants to the natural gas mar-
ket were merchant banks, electricity companies
and foreign and domestic trading houses. The
number of participants in the wholesale market
rose from fewer than 15 in 1995 to more than 50
within about two years.
The 1995 Gas Act also established the Net-
work Code, a key element in the development of
natural gas trading. The code is a set of rules and
procedures governing third-party access to the
UK natural gas pipeline network. The code also
enabled a system of daily balancing, which
required short-term natural gas trades.
These regulatory developments were accom-
panied by shifts in the country’s demand and
supply of natural gas. On the demand side, the
“dash for gas” in the British electricity industry
saw the growth of generation capacity using flex-
ible combined-cycle natural gas turbines. On the
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supply side, natural gas was available from
domestic production in the North Sea. The regu-
latory changes introduced by the Gas Acts of 1986
and 1995 meant that new participants were able to
access natural gas segments across the value chain.
The regulatory and market factors combined
put pressure on the old system of bilateral con-
tracts, which were typically indexed to other
commodities, such as gas oil or fuel oil.
The NBP was created within the code as a virtual
hub to promote the balancing of the natural gas
system. From the late 1990s, the NBP evolved
quickly as a trading point and was used as the
basis for the standardised NBP97 contract, which
became the cornerstone of British over-the-
counter contracts. The NBP also became the
delivery point for the Intercontinental Exchange
natural gas futures contract.
With the deepening of UK natural gas trade
since the late 1990s, NBP has become a leading
natural gas hub in Europe. A number of factors
helped its ascension, including the existence of
domestic natural gas reserves, periods of high
demand for natural gas and a stable regulatory
framework that enabled open-access market
participation via open access and offered a clear
set of rules and standardised contracts.
19.4.6 Establishing Natural Gas Hubs
in China
Natural gas hubs are market institutions, and thus
to create a successful hub in China, the market
structure of the natural gas industry in China will
need to be changed. This will generate efficiency
and generate costs, while also creating winners
and losers. However, the long-term benefits of
China establishing a hub are clear, as it will raise
domestic natural gas production, raise energy
diversification and also have major significance
to response capabilities. Construction of natural
gas hubs in China is therefore critical to the
development of natural gas. This section will
discuss the overall prospects for construction of
natural gas hubs in China and the factors that
must be considered in hub development, and
analyse the potential steps.
1. The overall outlook for construction of
natural gas trading hubs in China
Insights gained from international experience
in establishing natural gas hubs, combined with
an assessment of China’s circumstances, lead to
five key conclusions.
• China is in a good position to develop more
market-based natural gas trading with hub
pricing. Key positive factors include domestic
gas production, exposure to both pipeline and
LNG imports, and its size within Asian
energy markets.
• China’s large and complex domestic natural
gas market would benefit from value-based
pricing, market co-ordination and lower
transaction costs. It is likely that these effi-
ciency gains from hub pricing will bring large
and long-lasting benefits, while any adverse
effects, particularly disruption of current
market arrangements, would be short-lived.
• A successful hub would require significant
further liberalisation of the natural gas sector
in China, which would reduce the influence
of state-owned incumbents, improve market
transparency, and create a level playing field
for new market entrants through third-party
access arrangements.
• China canmove towards hub pricing in a series
of small steps, backed by government policy.
Beginning with pilot natural gas trading in a
particular region, these steps may gradually
satisfy the pre-conditions for a successful hub
and ease the transition for incumbents.
• China is likely to develop the leading hub in
Asia. Even though international experience
suggests that first-mover advantages exist in
the development of gas hubs, it is likely that a
China hub would become the Asian market
leader even if it emerges later than hubs in
other countries in the region.
2. Factors for consideration when developing
hubs
Based on international experience, the pri-
mary conditions for creating a successful hub are
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a well-developed physical natural gas transmis-
sion network that market participants can access
under non-discriminatory conditions; a large
number of independent buyers and sellers
actively engaged in arbitrage, but without sig-
nificant market power; and a government com-
mitment to liberalising wholesale gas markets
and a stable, transparent and credible regulatory
framework.
Many of these preconditions for a successful
hub are not currently met in Asian countries,
including China. For instance, in China trans-
mission infrastructure remains under develop-
ment, markets are concentrated, prices are widely
regulated and regulations such as third-party
access rules that support the smooth operation of
a market with many buyers and sellers are not yet
in place.
A plan to develop a Chinese natural gas hub
could begin by securing the preconditions through
liberalisation of the natural gas sector in China.
A hub is a market institution and requires market
liberalisation to function well. Liberalisation facil-
itates a hub by enabling prices to be set competi-
tively, reducing the influence of state-owned
incumbents, improving market transparency and
creating a level playing field for new market
entrants through third-party access arrangements.
Hub pricing creates winners and losers along
the natural gas value chain. Some players, pro-
tected under the previous regulatory regime,
could lose revenues. Improving market signals
could undermine the main rationale for vertical
integration and for co-ordinating action across a
supply chain. Other players, on the other hand,
could benefit from greater market connectivity
and the ability to optimise asset portfolios more
actively.
Who wins and who loses, and by how much,
is also affected by the oil price. Historically,
natural gas prices have been driven by oil
indexation. A higher oil price would mean higher
natural gas contract prices, and moving to hub
pricing would create strong downward pressure
on natural gas prices. Midstream utilities that are
locked into long-term oil-indexed contracts but
unable to pass through their higher costs to
consumers would be among the losers. However,
in a world with lower oil prices, as seen since late
2014, legacy oil-linked natural gas contract pri-
ces would lie below the market-determined price
for natural gas, thus potentially reversing the
roles of winners and losers were a hub estab-
lished, and slowing the adoption of hub pricing.
International experience shows that natural
gas hubs are formed in response to market
pressure coming from domestic sources or
international market developments. In the past,
the development of hubs has often been driven
by large additional supplies of natural gas seek-
ing access to consumers. This supply has either
been domestically produced, as in the case of the
UK’s NBP hub development in the 1990s, or
available from global LNG markets, as in the
deepening of continental European hub markets
from the late 2000s.
At least three supply-side factors are exerting
market pressure to form a hub in China:
expanding domestic gas production, including
from unconventional sources; supplies from the
global LNG market not already contractually
committed to particular export markets; and
additional gas imports from Russia from existing
or planned pipelines.
The development of natural gas hubs else-
where in Asia could also challenge China’s
domestic natural gas pricing arrangements and
create momentum for a Chinese natural gas hub.
For example, Singapore has put itself forward as
an LNG hub, with limited trading since 2014.
Japan has begun to publish spot LNG prices and
has proposed the creation of a futures market.
Although the European experience suggests that
there are first-mover advantages in hub creation,
a potential Chinese hub is likely to become the
principal Asian hub even if it is not the first.
China’s economy is much larger, with large
industrial consumers of natural gas. China also
has significant domestic production and has
begun to develop a national pipeline network.
China’s natural gas imports come over pipelines
as well as LNG, unlike the rest of Asia, which
relies heavily on LNG. These factors suggest
that, supported by the appropriate regulatory
environment, a Chinese hub is likely to emerge
as the leader in Asia.
19.4 The Downstream Segment: Natural Gas Trading Hubs and the Liberalisation … 469
3. Potential steps for developing hubs
International experience shows that successful
hub development takes time—at least 5–10 years
—even in countries with energy sectors that were
much more liberalised than that in China.
Taking an incremental and phased approach
would allow China to address the preconditions
for full hub pricing, within the broader market
liberalisation process. Rushing to establish a full
hub by government mandate in the early stages
of liberalisation is likely to fail because of a
shortage of participants and institutions.
A phased approach, on the other hand, would
allow market participants to learn and build
institutions concurrently with a liberalisation
programme. A phased approach would also
allow for the gradual creation of a support net-
work among participants, as various players have
time to adjust to the new liberalised markets and
the benefits of market-based pricing become
more apparent.
The evolution of China’s natural gas sector
towards hub pricing could be phased over 5–
10 years and cover six specific aspects
(Fig. 19.21).
• Pilot trading market: Within an individual
region, such as Shanghai, the government
could create a pilot trading market with con-
testable natural gas demand and some
uncontracted natural gas supply. The market
would be connected through a natural gas
network with third-party access. Entrepre-
neurs would also be encouraged to trade the
uncontracted natural gas supply to meet
demand among the customers, who are free to
choose their supplier.
• Price transparency: The government could
require publication of prices of natural gas
sold under all types of contracts. The mandate
would help reveal opportunities for arbitrage
to entrepreneurial buyers and sellers, vital
components of a successful market-based
arrangement.
• Government recognition: Once significant
trading activity develops within the pilot
region—for example, a shift to standardised
over-the-counter trading—the government
could explicitly endorse the market by
establishing a regulatory body. This body
would standardise contracts further and seek

























Fig. 19.21 Hub development and its support from regulatory measures and their market effects
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• Maturing trading: As exchange-based trad-
ing develops, the government would increase
the scope of the pilot region to cover a larger
geographic area or more types of buyers and
sellers. At this stage, market regulation may
have to become more stringent to reflect the
growing system-wide role of natural gas trade.
Following these steps, a natural gas hub could
then become self-sustaining with two final
changes:
• Renegotiation: If traded natural gas prices
are lower than legacy oil-indexed natural gas
contract prices, companies paying legacy
prices would be put at a disadvantage and
may incur losses if they cannot pass along the
price difference to their customers. With
access to the liberalised trading on the natural
gas hub, such companies would have a strong
incentive to renegotiate legacy contracts,
recalibrating prices or volumes, and buy tra-
ded natural gas instead.
• Network effects. As more and different
organisations join hub trading, the benefits of
the natural gas hub would increase as a result
of network effect. The use and scope of hub
pricing would tend to grow until it reaches the
limits of either incomplete liberalisation or of
geography.
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